Japan delays Pearl Harbor, attacks USSR during the high point of Barbarossa

[Takao]

I'd also say that here, with the US holding the PI-- there's little doubt that fully mobilized the Japanese were doomed trying to take the PI-- that they'd have less to throw at the DEI. I could see them managing to get ashore in the PI then tossing in more and more units to try and win a losing situation.

I agree, a Japanese attack on the Philippines in mid to late 1942 would have been very different from what happened. By then the Philippine divisions should have been fully manned and equipped and so should have done much better...assuming of course that MacArthur was less bone-headed than in real life too.

I'd agree, assuming the U.S. is committed to fighting in the PI - i.e. that it sends the Pacific Fleet to ensure lines of communication. IRL we didn't do this until late 44; absent Midway is the U.S. really going to stick its neck out this far? Maybe if we win a Midway-type battle early in the war but we'd have been outnumbered in carriers pretty badly in later 1942. There's no guarantee that the IJN blunders into a disastrous ambush in every ATL. In non-ambush carrier battles the IJN came out slightly ahead of USN during 1942.

If the USN seeks a decisive fleet action around the PI in 1942 and loses badly (due to being outnumbered), that could push the timeline for naval superiority back into 1944. Seems more likely they behave similarly to OTL, with a desultory defense of the PI that costs the Japanese more time and blood but ends similarly.

The US will be committed to the defense of the Philippinesb but it will not send the Pacific Fleet. You see Cavite, in no way shape or form would be able to support the entire Pacific Fleet. Under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, the base was never improved. It would take many months to assemble a fleet train capable of supporting the Pacific Fleet so far from Pearl. Not to mention that the line would be vulnerable to attack from the Japanese Mandates.

The Pacific Fleet did not arrive there until late '44, because of the intervening Japanese islands that had to be captured and advance fleet bases built up, before the next leap could be taken. Don't forget that it was also a two-pronged advance that constantly kept the Japanese guessing where the next hammer blow would fall.

Would the US be outnumbered in carriers. In general terms, yes, the Japanese would have more decks. However the Hiyo & Junto were classified as auxiliary carriers, not fleet carriers, so they would not be operating with Kido Butai proper. It was only after the loss of 4 fleet carriers at Midway, that Hiyo & Junyo were reclassified as fleet carriers.

[ljadw]

In post 101,TMP writes that the average SU citizen was surviving on state rations below emergency subsistence norms,albeit supplemented by informal channels (potato gardens and black market ) .
This is wrong : as in the occupied countries from WWII the average citizen of the SU survived on informal channels as black market and potato gardens, because the Soviet state admitted on June 22 that it could not feed its population, as admitted the administrations of other countries during the war .
The food of the black market and the potato gardens was ,some times,but that was an exception, supplemented by state rations .State rations were mostly not available and if the Soviet population had to survive on state rations, dozens of millions would have died . And we know that this did not happen .
The Soviet population feeded itself,this is admitted by Moskoff .
Official rations were as electoral promises .
The number of calories from official rations is only theory.

Rations didn't cover the rural population - i.e. the producers from whom the state extracted rationed food.

From Barber and Harrison's "The Soviet Home Front 1941-1945":
"In 1942, about 62 million people received rationed bread." p.80
"69 percent [of calories] came from central or local government stocks." p.83

P 80 is correct but irrelevant,as NO ONE knows how many rationed broad people received
P 83 is unprovable ,as no one can prove that 69 % of calories came from the government .It is even for 99 % wrong ,as the government said at the beginning of the war to the civilians : we can't feed you . Take care of yourself .P 80 debunks P 83 .
Already BEFORE the war the Soviet government was unable to feed the population and was forced to limit the nationalisation of the agriculture sector : farmers had the right to use 15 % of the surface of the farms for private aims .And this 15 % was making the difference between sufficient food and starvation . Thus the Soviet government could not do during the war what it could not do before the war .
Already under Stalin there was a strong private sector in the Soviet agriculture,which was almost as important as the nationalised sector .The private sector accounted in 1959 for almost 50% of the output of milk and meat .

[TheMarcksPlan]

The US will be committed to the defense of the Philippinesb but it will not send the Pacific Fleet. You see Cavite, in no way shape or form would be able to support the entire Pacific Fleet. Under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, the base was never improved. It would take many months to assemble a fleet train capable of supporting the Pacific Fleet so far from Pearl. Not to mention that the line would be vulnerable to attack from the Japanese Mandates.

I agree with all this - we wouldn't (and couldn't) stick our naval neck out that far.

But what does a commitment to the defense of the PI mean without a determination to control the seas around it? You can't supply an army from indigenous Philippine resources so you need reliable marine communications. That core contradiction would remain - as in OTL - even if the U.S. built up a larger force in the PI.

Even if MacArthur could have defended Luzon initially with a stronger army, Japanese control of the seas dooms Mindanao and the Visayas. From those islands, Japan can establish control of the skies and isolate Manila. Maybe the idea would be to hold out around Manila until 1944 or so?

Would the US be outnumbered in carriers. In general terms, yes, the Japanese would have more decks. However the Hiyo & Junto were classified as auxiliary carriers, not fleet carriers, so they would not be operating with Kido Butai proper. It was only after the loss of 4 fleet carriers at Midway, that Hiyo & Junyo were reclassified as fleet carriers.

Fair points. But whether Hiyo, Junyo, Shoho, and Zuiho are called fleet or auxiliary carriers, the IJN wasn't shy about adding their aerial component to fleet actions, which would have allowed them to dominate the Pacific Fleet in 1942, assuming a non-ambush carrier battle.

[Richard Anderson]

The US will be committed to the defense of the Philippinesb but it will not send the Pacific Fleet. You see Cavite, in no way shape or form would be able to support the entire Pacific Fleet. Under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, the base was never improved. It would take many months to assemble a fleet train capable of supporting the Pacific Fleet so far from Pearl. Not to mention that the line would be vulnerable to attack from the Japanese Mandates.

Exactly, it is the strategic conundrum forced on the US at the outset. Sending anything to the PI...or Wake or Guam for that matter...was throwing good money after bad, which was something strategic planners had known for years. The reinforcement of the Philippines was a purely political action unless the fleet train and especially the oilers was built up.

[T. A. Gardner]

The US will be committed to the defense of the Philippinesb but it will not send the Pacific Fleet. You see Cavite, in no way shape or form would be able to support the entire Pacific Fleet. Under the terms of the Washington Naval Treaty, the base was never improved. It would take many months to assemble a fleet train capable of supporting the Pacific Fleet so far from Pearl. Not to mention that the line would be vulnerable to attack from the Japanese Mandates.

Exactly, it is the strategic conundrum forced on the US at the outset. Sending anything to the PI...or Wake or Guam for that matter...was throwing good money after bad, which was something strategic planners had known for years. The reinforcement of the Philippines was a purely political action unless the fleet train and especially the oilers was built up.

It isn't so much a conundrum for the Navy as for the Army. If the PI held out AND there was a means to send in reinforcements and supplies however tenuous, the Army would be the primary service defending the islands. If Japan couldn't take the islands between the PI and Australia, then it would be possible to maintain some sort of supply line to the PI and that's all it would take.
The US would build bases between Australia and the PI at a prodigious rate and it would be mostly the Army's battle.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both brother Richard Anderson and the community as a whole. Howdy Richard! Well sir, in reference to your posting of Sunday - November 03, 2019 - 2:12pm, you sparked my curiosity with your notation of "The reinforcement of the Philippines was a purely political action unless the fleet train and especially the oilers was built up". it's always been my relative understanding that both the Democrats and the Republicans had no grand desire to keep sinking funding into this far flung possession in the Western Pacific - especially when the Commonwealth of the Philippines was slated for independence from the United States of America on July 04, 1944. So, which constituency within the Seventy Seventh Congress was lobbying for the reinforcement of the Philippines? Let's see, how did the ethnocentric ditty go? They might be little brown brothers of big Bill Taft, but they ain't no brothers of mine! Richard, I'm not attempting to pick a fight with you, but there is something amiss here. Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents worth on this now meandering topic of interest - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day up in your neck of the woods that is the Evergreen State of Washington.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[Richard Anderson]

Greetings to both brother Richard Anderson and the community as a whole. Howdy Richard! Well sir, in reference to your posting of Sunday - November 03, 2019 - 2:12pm, you sparked my curiosity with your notation of "The reinforcement of the Philippines was a purely political action unless the fleet train and especially the oilers was built up". it's always been my relative understanding that both the Democrats and the Republicans had no grand desire to keep sinking funding into this far flung possession in the Western Pacific - especially when the Commonwealth of the Philippines was slated for independence from the United States of America on July 04, 1944. So, which constituency within the Seventy Seventh Congress was lobbying for the reinforcement of the Philippines? Let's see, how did the ethnocentric ditty go? They might be little brown brothers of big Bill Taft, but they ain't no brothers of mine! Richard, I'm not attempting to pick a fight with you, but there is something amiss here. Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents worth on this now meandering topic of interest - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day up in your neck of the woods that is the Evergreen State of Washington.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

No problemo Unca' Bob.

MacArthur was recalled on 26 July 1941 and on the same date told in no uncertain terms by Marshall he would have "no additional forces, except approximately 400 reserve officers to assist in training the Philippine Army". And yet, five days later discussions began on reinforcing the Philippines. However, those was no strategic discussion on how or why such a reinforcement would affect grand strategy. Instead, it all appears to have been based upon the recall of MacArthur and a misplaced belief by the Secretary of War in the efficacy of the B-17 in stopping a seaborne attack. To me that smacks of political necessity driving military decisions rather than a rational military analysis, especially given that all such analysis to date was the Philippines were indefensible.

It didn't help that MacArthur was a darling of the Republican Party, I suspect mostly based on his decisive, albeit reckless, handling of the Bonus March a few years earlier when he was Chief of Staff.

Cheers!

[OpanaPointer]

The United States of America granted independence to the Philippines on July 4, 1946. In accordance with the Philippine Independence Act (more popularly known as the "Tydings–McDuffie Act"), President Harry S. Truman issued Proclamation 2695 of July 4, 1946 officially recognizing the independence of the Philippines.[7] On the same day, the Treaty of Manila was signed.[8]

[BobTheBarbarian]

The Soviet Union would have no hope of stopping a determined Japanese invasion of Siberia: their forces were reliant on the Trans-Siberian Railway for supply and this would easily have been cut. According to D.M. Giangreco the Red Army's strategic position was even more precarious than the US Army's was in the Philippines in 1941/42.

On the other hand, commitment of massive IJA forces to Siberia would have prevented them from invading SE Asia in the medium term and would have left Japan's war economy at the mercy of Western sanctions. It should be noted that even before Pearl Harbor certain US Army specialists recommended doing everything possible to keep the respective strengths of the USSR and Japan "in balance" in order to shore up the Russian war effort against Germany.

[Robert Rojas]

Greetings to both brother Opana Pointer and the community as a whole. Howdy O.P.! Well sir, in reference to your informative posting of Monday - November 04, 2019 - 8:51am, thank you for setting old yours truly straight on the political transition from the Commonwealth of the Philippines to the Republic of the Philippines on July 04, 1946. For whatever the reason, I was under the erroneous impression that Filipino independence was initially planned for July 04, 1944 and if it not for the inconvenience of the Pacific War, Washington D.C. would have cut Manila loose two years earlier. As brother Paul R. Ward has asserted in other areas within this thread, the newly minted Republic of the Philippines would have been ripe for the picking by the military junta of Dai Nihon. Well, that's my latest two Yankee cents worth on this topic now far removed from the Siberian Taiga - for now anyway. As always, I would like to bid you an especially copacetic day over in your corner of the SHOW ME STATE of Missouri.

Best Regards,
Uncle Bob

[OpanaPointer]

That was the date it went down. I didn't look for an "intended date". Cell phone searches are a PITA.

[Takao]

Yes, most folks just know the ten year period from the Tydings–McDuffie Act becoming law. However, they overlook the two year period that the Philippines had to come up with and ratify a Constitution, after which the ten year transition would begin. So, it was always 12 years.

Text here:
https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1934PhilippineIndep.pdf

[TheMarcksPlan]

What are some good sources on the likelihood and timing of American entry into WW2 absent Pearl Harbor? I'd specifically like to see analysis of the "swing" votes in Congress for a war declaration and what their likely tipping points were. Did important senators issue "red line" statements, either publicly or privately?
I've seen it argued that America wouldn't have gone to war in the event of an attack on Singapore/DEI, let alone an attack on the USSR.

Any evaluation of this ATL has to account for the global impact of delayed - perhaps indefinitely? - American involvement.

[OpanaPointer]

What are some good sources on the likelihood and timing of American entry into WW2 absent Pearl Harbor?
I've seen it argued that America wouldn't have gone to war in the event of an attack on Singapore/DEI, let alone an attack on the USSR.

Any evaluation of this ATL has to account for the global impact of delayed - perhaps indefinitely? - American involvement.

Secretary of War Stimson noted in his diaries that on two occasion in 1941 FDR's entire cabinet was unanimous that he could get a declaration of war against Japan if they attacked British and/or Dutch colonies in South East Asia. The first time was on July 5th, Stimson noting this in his entry for July 7th. (Stimson was an indefatigable diarist, his diaries run to thousands of pages. He didn't make an entry every day, but he made notes every day that made it into the diary when he had time to update it.)

[BobTheBarbarian]

What are some good sources on the likelihood and timing of American entry into WW2 absent Pearl Harbor? I'd specifically like to see analysis of the "swing" votes in Congress for a war declaration and what their likely tipping points were. Did important senators issue "red line" statements, either publicly or privately?
I've seen it argued that America wouldn't have gone to war in the event of an attack on Singapore/DEI, let alone an attack on the USSR.

Any evaluation of this ATL has to account for the global impact of delayed - perhaps indefinitely? - American involvement.

Brig. Gen. Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of US Army intelligence, advocated in October 1941 that:

"it is very much to our interest, so long as Russia continues to offer active resistance to Germany, to take whatever steps may be possible to maintain the present Russian equality in combat strength vis-a-vis the Kwantung Army. Two such practicable steps immediately present themselves:

a. Increased aid to China, to enable the latter to continue to pin to the ground in North, Central and South China the bulk of the Japanese Army.

b. Increased aid to the Russian armies both in Europe and Siberia."

So I would imagine some sort of economic assistance to the USSR/pressure on Japan would be forthcoming in the event of an invasion by the latter.

Source: https://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411021amie.html