British armour came a cropper against well handled German anti-tank guns in France. 10Hussars got decimated at Huppy, Bays and 2RTR fared hardly any better, and 3RTR were embarrassed outside Calais. The former engagement not a single German pantser was anywhere near the battlefield At the latter, as soon as the shooing started, the pantsers backed of, brought forward their ATk and wrecked 3RTR in situ.Sheldrake wrote: ↑08 Nov 2019, 11:18Yes, Identifying and solving the problems caused by aggressive use of anti tank guns was a major problem facing the British in the Western Desert. It wasn't the only one. The British also needed to find a way to engage German tanks that engaged British field and anti tank guns beyind their effective range.
Shoorly the answer to both was field arty to deal with the German ATk. I don't see how an HAA gun is going to be the solution to dealing with German 37mm ATk and Panzerbuchse.
What German pantser could deal with a British field gun beyond the field guns range? Why were British CS pantsers not used to deliver HE against German ATk?
All HAA units had a secondary anti-tank role. Whether this was something the troops practised and were competent with is another matter.Sheldrake wrote: ↑08 Nov 2019, 11:18Minor point. Brooke's defence was based on aggressive mobile operations. Static coastal defences which were handed over to coastal divisions and the Home Guard. He was using the mobile HAA as dual purpose. As early as July 1941 at least one HAA unit (103 HAA) was given a secondary anti tank role.
At the time, and on this matter, did Brooke's collegues in the Army see him as a visionary or an annoying heretic? In the spring of 41, the ATk carrier project (3" HAA guns into Churchill) tanks was a greater priority than putting 6-pdr guns into pantsers. Before the year was out, somebody in the military had cancelled the order without telling anybody other than a delighted Vauxhalls.Sheldrake wrote: ↑08 Nov 2019, 11:18The point is that Brooke found a way to incorporate HAA into the field army anti tank plans. Maybe it took someone with Brooke's authority, energy and seniority to overcome institutional barriers and individual lethargy. Wavell or the Auk could have done something similar, if the tactical problem had attracted their personal attention.