The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[AbollonPolweder]

To help get a glimpse of just how disastrous Germany's supply situation in Russia was, David Stahel states in Retreat from Moscow that the OstHeer required 300 trains a day in order to meet its supply needs in December 1941. But the actual number of trains arriving was 45.

Thus, weather wasn't the primary culprit in the failure of Operation Barbarossa. It was logistics.

1. Great idea! Congratulations to you and David Stahel! 15% of all supply needs are an imminent disaster. In such a situation, Germany simply had to surrender to the mercy of the USSR. Right?
2. Another brilliant idea: logistics is independent of any weather.
Do not you think that there is an excess of ideas in one post?

[HistoryGeek2019]

Weather made the logistical situation worse, but the Ostheer was not receiving adequate trains before winter either. In his first book on Operation Barbarossa, Stahel documents that the Ostheer was receiving less than the required number of trains throughout August and September.

[MarkN]

To help get a glimpse of just how disastrous Germany's supply situation in Russia was, David Stahel states in Retreat from Moscow that the OstHeer required 300 trains a day in order to meet its supply needs in December 1941. But the actual number of trains arriving was 45.

This does not help at all in the understanding of history. The Ostheer did not require 300 trains per day, 45 was not the actual number in December 1941. Of the two pieces of data - the only two - presented, both are inaccurate. Full house!

This misrepresentation is based upon two common problems: published storytellers misrepresenting history (deliberately perhaps) in their tomes; and readers/posters not bothering to fact check. This misrepresentation is further complicated by poster HistoryGeek2019 misrepresenting what Stahel wrote.

It is very, VERY easy for anybody to confirm the inaccuracy if they have the inclination to do so. In the age of internet, fact checking is real easy.

Stahel's words are produced above by HistoryGeek2019. Compare those words to his source: Halder's diaries (easily found on the internet, probably on everybody's hd already). Note how "Reich Marshall...extravagant accusations and demands" evolves into "the supply of the eastern front required" (Stahel) and then into "the Ostheer required" (HistoryGeek2019).

[MarkNote: also look at how Stahel misrepresents the 122 trains too]

As regards the number 45, HistoryGeek2019 manages to transpose Stahel's January figure into December!

[Aida1]

To help get a glimpse of just how disastrous Germany's supply situation in Russia was, David Stahel states in Retreat from Moscow that the OstHeer required 300 trains a day in order to meet its supply needs in December 1941. But the actual number of trains arriving was 45.

Thus, weather wasn't the primary culprit in the failure of Operation Barbarossa. It was logistics.

1. Great idea! Congratulations to you and David Stahel! 15% of all supply needs are an imminent disaster. In such a situation, Germany simply had to surrender to the mercy of the USSR. Right?
2. Another brilliant idea: logistics is independent of any weather.
Do not you think that there is an excess of ideas in one post?

Indeed, weather does impact on logistics.

[Aida1]

To help get a glimpse of just how disastrous Germany's supply situation in Russia was, David Stahel states in Retreat from Moscow that the OstHeer required 300 trains a day in order to meet its supply needs in December 1941. But the actual number of trains arriving was 45.

Thus, weather wasn't the primary culprit in the failure of Operation Barbarossa. It was logistics.

Cannot be correct.” Der Angriff auf die SOwjetunion Boog/Forster/Hoffmann/Klink/Müller/Überschar Fischer 1991” mentions on p.1158 a daily need for AGC in August of 30 trains a day. On p 1149 a daily need of 24 trains is mentioned for AGS. Therefore i do not see how 300 trains could be required for the Ostheer in december. In the abovementioned book, the logistics of The Ostheer until the failure before Moscow are treated in pp 1138-1168.

[HistoryGeek2019]

Historian Rob Citino describes the logistical situation in 1941 as follows:

Because of the insufficiencies of the road net, staff planners had assigned just two major road arteries per army group. The standard up to that point in the war had been a main artery for every corps; with eight to ten corps in an army group, the Germans weren’t even coming close to keeping up with the supply requirements. By late August, front line formations were running short of a laundry list of items crucial to modern, mechanized war: tanks, tank engines, trucks, prime movers. Moreover, it wasn’t a good idea for any modern army to be operating 450 miles from its railhead, but with conversion of the Russian railways to the western European gauge moving so slowly, that was the exact situation for large parts of Army Group Center.

Rob Citino, Death of the Werhmacht, p. 41

[Aida1]

Historian Rob Citino describes the logistical situation in 1941 as follows:

Because of the insufficiencies of the road net, staff planners had assigned just two major road arteries per army group. The standard up to that point in the war had been a main artery for every corps; with eight to ten corps in an army group, the Germans weren’t even coming close to keeping up with the supply requirements. By late August, front line formations were running short of a laundry list of items crucial to modern, mechanized war: tanks, tank engines, trucks, prime movers. Moreover, it wasn’t a good idea for any modern army to be operating 450 miles from its railhead, but with conversion of the Russian railways to the western European gauge moving so slowly, that was the exact situation for large parts of Army Group Center.

Rob Citino, Death of the Werhmacht, p. 41

How far you can operate from railheads depends on number of trucks one has and Germany had not enough and too many different types. Production of spare parts was insufficient and tires were a problem Logistical problems were not only about transport.Production of tanks,trucks,spare parts etc.. was insufficient.

[Yuri]

Scheme of the Railways in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR operated by the enemy (July 01, 1943)

[MarkN]

Historian Rob Citino describes the logistical situation in 1941 as follows:

Because of the insufficiencies of the road net, staff planners had assigned just two major road arteries per army group. The standard up to that point in the war had been a main artery for every corps; with eight to ten corps in an army group, the Germans weren’t even coming close to keeping up with the supply requirements. By late August, front line formations were running short of a laundry list of items crucial to modern, mechanized war: tanks, tank engines, trucks, prime movers. Moreover, it wasn’t a good idea for any modern army to be operating 450 miles from its railhead, but with conversion of the Russian railways to the western European gauge moving so slowly, that was the exact situation for large parts of Army Group Center.

Rob Citino, Death of the Werhmacht, p. 41

Did you make any effort to fact check any of what Citino wrote?

[MarkN]

How far you can operate from railheads depends on number of trucks one has...

It does indeed.

The Heer's plan for the attack on the Soviet Union was based around panzerwaffe doctrine and driving as far away from the railheads as possible as quickly as possible.

Unfortunately, ...

... Germany had not enough and too many different types.

Oh dear!

How could such a gross mistake be made?

How could it pass unnoticed?

Was it hubris and delusion, incompetence or stupidity?

[Aida1]

How far you can operate from railheads depends on number of trucks one has...

It does indeed.

The Heer's plan for the attack on the Soviet Union was based around panzerwaffe doctrine and driving as far away from the railheads as possible as quickly as possible.

Unfortunately, ...

... Germany had not enough and too many different types.

Oh dear!

How could such a gross mistake be made?

How could it pass unnoticed?

Was it hubris and delusion, incompetence or stupidity?

There was no mistake And expedients were found to allow mobile divisions to move far away from railheads.All explained in the book i quoted above. As you claim to be wellread it should not be difficult for you to educate yourself on the subject.

[BDV]

The Heer's plan for the attack on the Soviet Union was based around panzerwaffe doctrine and driving as far away from the railheads as possible as quickly as possible.

That misconception is due to post-war fabrications by Schicklgruber's over-promoted boot-lickers.

The planned and partially executed German actions Northeast of Riga-Bryansk line puts a lie to the statement that "Heer's plan for the attack on the Soviet Union was based around panzerwaffe doctrine".

Particularly dumb-founding from a "panzerwaffe doctrine" POV is the OKH launching 40% of the Axis armor in the Luga basin marshes, and following that with sending 60% of the Axis armor through the Smolensk-Moscow upland. The logical solution to the conundrum is to deny that "panzerwaffe doctrine" had much to do with the strategic plan.

[Aida1]

The Heer's plan for the attack on the Soviet Union was based around panzerwaffe doctrine and driving as far away from the railheads as possible as quickly as possible.

That misconception is due to post-war fabrications by Schicklgruber's over-promoted boot-lickers.

The planned and partially executed German actions Northeast of Riga-Bryansk line puts a lie to the statement that "Heer's plan for the attack on the Soviet Union was based around panzerwaffe doctrine".

Particularly dumb-founding from a "panzerwaffe doctrine" POV is the OKH launching 40% of the Axis armor in the Luga basin marshes, and following that with sending 60% of the Axis armor through the Smolensk-Moscow upland. The logical solution to the conundrum is to deny that "panzerwaffe doctrine" had much to do with the strategic plan.

You are completely factually wrong here.You seem to imply that 0 % of the panzer strength was in the south as 40 +60 is a 100.
And you are in denial of the fact that one wanted to go for Moscow.

[Appleknocker27]

The Operational plan for Barbarossa and subsequent logistical support plan...aka, the concept of support, were based on the Intel section's pre-campaign estimates. That plan more or less ended at Smolensk, based on Intel estimates of enemy strength most likely course of action, ability to generate new forces, etc.
Anything beyond that is pure improvisation and a string of expedients that are reacting to circumstances as opposed to forecasting and staying ahead of the situation. If Logisticians do not get the operational concept, order of battle, task organization, routes, etc. from the Operations staff, there WILL be logistical problems due to the time required to react to demand. All of this goes back to the Intel section.... Call it hubris, arrogance, incompetence, etc., but the logistical issues of Op Barbarossa/Taifun are symptoms of the larger problem caused by bad Intelligence work by the Abwehr and Fremde Heere Ost as well as Halder and his staff accepting it, not putting more resources into it.
The entire operation was a strategic blunder that lost the war due to going far past its natural culmination point due to bad Intel right up until the Red Army counter-attack. The fact is, Wehrmacht logistics worked absolute miracles in relation to what was asked of them, what was available and what they accomplished. Perhaps if they failed, the campaign would have culminated in October and saved a massive amount of personnel and equipment that was sacrificed in November/December.

[ljadw]

This is not correct ; it is the usual blaming of some Germans for the German defeat and to bypass the existence of the Red Army . The Germans were defeated by the Red Army, not by mistakes of Intelligence or Logistics .
Better intelligence does not mean better logistics .
German logistics were limited. That is a fact . With better intelligence you will not have better logistics .
It was impossible to go with an army of 3 million men to the Volga in a few months . The existent roads and railways could not support the advance of 3 million men to the Volga and if they could support this, the advance would stall because of the Red Army .. Everyone knew it and thus the plan was changed .
The distance Berlin/Volga was as the distance Cologne/Madrid .The Germans could in May 1940 not advance to Madrid and the Wallies could not advance to Berlin in 1944,and the reason was not Intelligence.