One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

[MarkN]

What this shows decisively is that, pre-Barbarossa, OKH considered a Kessel along the lines I envision in AGS's sector. It shows that OKH judged that double envelopment as having a good chance of success, given the forces at its disposal in the wargame (two armies in Romania plus a panzer corps).

This version of my ATL adds 10 mobile divisions to AGS plus it would shift some OTL infantry divisions from the Bug front to the Prut. Does anyone have further details on the content of the Operation Otto wargames?

Historically speaking, it is almost certain that HGS could have effected a successful encirclement at the border.

The problem with your fantasy scenario, however, lies elsewhere.

First, every change to reality leads to a different set of outcomes and consequences. To create your mythical fifth panzergruppe you have had to go backwards several years to change a series of most profound political, industrial, economic and military decisions. Then you have just assumed the outcomes and consequences work perfectly to your advantage and ignored anything that would work against it. In otherwords, it is not an attempt to consider and discuss a feaseable but alternate history, it is a work of complete fiction.

Second, your fantasy scenario is written such that this border encirclement nets 600,000 Soviets and knocks them off the Red Army orbat. Your fantasy has such a total because, based upon a fantasy later decisive battle, that is the number you have derived from a countback as having to disappear from the orbat at that stage to make the numbers work at the later decisive moment. However, that number translates to about 3-4 greater than historically evident. Not only have you created a completely fictional Germany, Wehrmacht and Heer, your fantasy scenario also requires a completely fictional Soviet Union and Red Army.

Furthermore, even though an encirclement of the historical border elements of Southwestern Front is almost certain, does that certainty extend to your fictional Southwestern Front which has 3-4 fold greater strength?

[TheMarcksPlan]

Historically speaking, it is almost certain that HGS could have effected a successful encirclement at the border.

Wow you could have saved yourself hours of meandering, analytically weak, and fruitless posting had you simply conceded this point months ago. Better late than never I guess?

As for the rest of your post, typical garbage.

If anybody else thinks MarkN has raised a good point and wants me to address it, I will.

[TheMarcksPlan]

A few possible revisions and/or further details from reading/thinking subsequent to my starting this thread.

First, I now have the full Heer OoB for June 22, 1941. Here's where ID's were:



Nearly all the OKH reserve divisions (12) were with 2nd Army on June 22, which was behind AGC. None of 2nd Army's divisions participated in the Kessel portions of Minsk/Bialystok and Smolensk; on August 19 I see only one of 2nd Army's original divisions (112th ID) showing up on AGC's front:



[note that 2nd Army HQ is in the field in this map; it's controlling divisions formerly assigned to 4A, however.]

So to the extent that one might be nervous about AGS's infantry component for encirclement, we can move at least half a dozen ID's from AGC to AGS on June 22 without impacting Minsk/Smolensk. While AGC won't have these divisions later in the campaign, AGC will be facing a far weaker foe in August/September than OTL: AGS will have removed up to 1mil men more men than OTL from the Red Army OoB via successive Kessels in Western Ukraine. To repeat, it's not just the initial encirclement that AGS executes; it also encircles whichever forces reconstitute Southwest Front during July and August because AGS has two full panzer armies.

Likewise there 8 quality ID's (of the good waves/Welle) deployed in Norway and the Balkans on June 22. Many of these divisions possessed old and/or captured equipment as of June 22, but this ATL has ample room for more Heer weapons. While earlier I said I wasn't sure which of the Western divisions would be motorized and committed to Barbarossa, these divisions are the prime candidates. Specifically, I'd probably take 2 from Norway and one from Balkans. Given that Hitler has moved moved Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, and Gniesenau to defend Norway, they're less-needed. Maybe it'd be wise to shift a few static divisions (3rd, 5th, 6th, 13th, 14th Welle) from France to Norway in compensation - the UK isn't doing anything in France in 1941.

[TheMarcksPlan]

on August 19 I see only one of 2nd Army's original divisions (112th ID) showing up on AGC's front

To be fair, the maps I'm using are from Glantz's Barbarossa Derailed and appear not to include the southern part of AGC's front towards its junction with AGS east of the Pripyat Marshes. As 2nd Army held that front, it's likely that more of its divisions were engaged than shown on my maps. Nonetheless, the magnitude of AGC's mission is completely different in this ATL: Per Glantz, the fronts facing AGC deployed 732,400 men on July 10. Of these, ~40% came from two armies moved from Stavka reserve around Kiev northwards after the Minsk debacle (19th and 21st armies with 100k and 109k men respectively). Western Front also deployed 20th Army and its 113k men from Stavka reserve on July 10th. So basically the forces facing AGC on July 10th were largely re-created from Stavka reserves.

If AGS destroys Southwestern Front by early July, there is nothing much left in the Ukraine to oppose it. Stavka has to keep at least 19th and 21st Armies in the Ukraine to check AGS; it probably has to send at least some other reinforcement as well.

All this means that AGC will face something like half its OTL opposition on July 10th unless Stalin has decided to abandon Ukraine (a war-losing strategy and we all know how obsessively he clung to Kiev OTL). AGC takes ~half its OTL casualties during the Smolensk battle as a result. A weaker Western Front also means that AGC likely surrounds it in Smolensk with little trouble, avoiding the weeks-long battle to close the pocket - by which time most of its inmates had escaped or died in costly battles with the Panzer Groups.

Long story short, stripping AGC of six reserve ID's to bolster AGS has no impact on the Minsk Kessel while the Smolensk battle is a far easier affair ATL than OTL. By the end of the Smolensk battle, AGC's lower casualties make up probably half the difference of 6 diverted ID's.

[MarkN]

Historically speaking, it is almost certain that HGS could have effected a successful encirclement at the border.

Wow you could have saved yourself hours of meandering, analytically weak, and fruitless posting had you simply conceded this point months ago. Better late than never I guess?

No reason to suspect it was out of the question. They would almost certainly have succeeded with just a single panzergruppe. They managed it at Uman, didn't they? No need for your fantasy fifth panzergruppe at all.

However, the Heer decided against trying for it, didn't they? There must have been a reason. I wonder what it could be...

And, still wondering how you magic enough Soviets into the pocket to generate a loss figure of 600,000. But, whatever magic you use, have you considered how much harder it would be to achieve with a 3-4 fold greater Red Army strength to deal with?

There is little point bothering with historical examples when you have created a complete work of fiction that has no connection to historical reality.

[TheMarcksPlan]

They would almost certainly have succeeded with just a single panzergruppe. They managed it at Uman, didn't they? No need for your fantasy fifth panzergruppe at all.

Lol. They succeeded in capturing 100k two months later so what's the point of capturing 600k earlier?
You need to read Halder's diaries - or anything, please. Your ignorance regarding the Ostheer impedes these discussions: The Germans were trying to encircle Southwest Front from the get-go OTL; they just couldn't absent a second pincer arm until Uman.

Absolute garbage posting as usual. I honestly wish you were smarter, it would make our disagreement at least interesting.

[HistoryGeek2019]

I can't imagine what it must have been like being in one of those occupation divisions in France, and being told in August/September, "You're being deployed to the Russian Front."

[MarkN]

They would almost certainly have succeeded with just a single panzergruppe. They managed it at Uman, didn't they? No need for your fantasy fifth panzergruppe at all.

However, the Heer decided against trying for it, didn't they? There must have been a reason. I wonder what it could be...

And, still wondering how you magic enough Soviets into the pocket to generate a loss figure of 600,000. But, whatever magic you use, have you considered how much harder it would be to achieve with a 3-4 fold greater Red Army strength to deal with?

There is little point bothering with historical examples when you have created a complete work of fiction that has no connection to historical reality.

Lol. They succeeded in capturing 100k two months later so what's the point of capturing 600k earlier?
You need to read Halder's diaries - or anything, please. Your ignorance regarding the Ostheer impedes these discussions: The Germans were trying to encircle Southwest Front from the get-go OTL; they just couldn't absent a second pincer arm until Uman.

You need to read your own fiction, please.

In your fantasy you have your fictional HGS write 600,000 Soviets off the orbat. Historically speaking, there were not 600,000 within the encircled area you define. Your fantasy 600,000 is based on a fictional Red Army that you neglect to define. A fictional Southwestern Front with a 3-4 fold greater strength than historically evident.

Reading Halder and studying history will not help in understanding your fantasy.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Reading Halder and studying history will not help

Actually reading history is helpful and interesting.

[MarkN]

Reading Halder and studying history will not help

Actually reading history is helpful and interesting.

Researching and reading history is a very interesting pastime that is immense help in understanding history.

It has negligeable value in understanding your fiction.

Trying to combine history with fiction is the root cause of your credibility problems.

Your fiction requires 600,000 Soviets to be wiped from the Southwestern Front orbat in the first couple of weeks. Historically speaking, in the geographical area that your fiction has this fantasy encirclement taking place, there were less than half that total actually there. For your fantasy narrative to have any resemblance of credibility, you have to fictionalize both the forces of HGS and Southwestern Front. Your fictional encounter will bear almost zero resemblance to what historically occured.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Researching and reading history is a very interesting pastime that is immense help in understanding history.

No it is useless.

[Richard Anderson]

I can't imagine what it must have been like being in one of those occupation divisions in France, and being told in August/September, "You're being deployed to the Russian Front."

How odd.

46. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. In June it was "at the disposal of" (zur Verfügung von) 2. Armee and conducting security operations in Yugoslavia. It was placed at the disposal of OKH in July and moved to Rumania and assigned to 11. Armee on the Pruth later in the month.
73. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. On 9 June it was placed at the disposal of 11. Armee and conducting security operations in Strumica in northern Macedonia. It was assigned to LIV. AK of 11. Armee on 21 July.
164. ID was part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was on occupation and security duties in Yugoslavia under XVIII AK until November, when it moved to Crete and reorganized as Festungs-Division Kreta.
183. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was assigned to LI. AK of 2. Armee and was on occupation and security duties in Yugoslavia. It was placed at the disposal of OKH and moved to Poland in July as HG-S reserve, but remained in reserve successively for HG-M and then HG-N until October when it was assigned to IX. AK of 4. Armee and HG-M at Vyazma.
294. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was assigned to Höh. Kdo. LXV. of 2. Armee and was on occupation and security duties in Yugoslavia. It and 2. Armee moved to Russia as part of OKH reserve on 25 June and on 6 July it was assigned to LI. AK of HG-S, then to Korück 585 on 10 July and then bounced between various commands, all the time conducting rear-area security until it was committed to the front, assigned to XVII. AK of 6. Armee, HG-S on 27 September.
704. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was organized on 15 April 1941 as a security and occupation division, as were all the divisions of the 15. Welle. It was placed at the disposal of 2. Armee in Yugoslavia in May and then 12. Armee in Jully while it completed its organization and training, first in Proboj in southwestern Serbia, then Valjevo in western Serbia, and finally Belgrade in November, all the time on security and occupation duties. It remained in Serbia until 1 April 1943 when it was reorganized as the 104. Jäger-Division.
714, ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was organized as a 15. Welle division 1 May 1941 in Prague under BdE and assigned to XI. AK of 2. Armee and remained on occupation and security duties in Serbia and Croatia until 1 April 1943 when it was reorganized as the 114. Jäger-Division.
717. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was organized as a 15. Welle division 11 April 1941 in Bruck an der Leitha and Neusiedl am See (Lower Austria and Burgenland). On 22 June it was assigned to XI. AK of 2. Armee in Yugoslavia and remained in Yugoslavia and Croatia on occupation and security duties until 1 April 1943 when it was reorganized as the 117. Jäger-Division.
718. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was organized as a 15. Welle division 26 March 1941 in Wehrkreis XVIII. On 30 May it was assigned to LI. AK of 2. Armee in Yugoslaviaand remained in Yugoslavia and Croatia on occupation and security duties until 1 April 1943 when it was reorganized as the 117. Jäger-Division.

Still, I guess one out of nine ain't bad?

OKH reserves as part of 2. Armee on 22 June? Some were, some weren't and it was a lot more complex than a simple schematic would indicate.

15. ID was in Dijon and began a rail movement east late in June that ended on 2 July when it was placed at the disposal of 2. Armee in OKH reserve.
52. ID was in eastern France and began a rail movement east that ended 25 June when it was assigned to LIII. AK of 2. Armee near Vilna.
79. ID was at KLagenfurt, moving there in early May from Langres as reserve for Balkan operations as part of 2. Armee. It moved to Poland at the disposal of OKH in July and in August was assigned to XVII. AK of 6. Armee west of Korosten.
86. ID was in France and began a rail movement east in June that ended 23 June when it was assigned to L. AK, which was in HG-N reserve, but not as part of 2. Armee. On 28 June it was assigned to XXIII. AK in OKH reserve and in July participated in the clean up operations in rear of HG-N.
95. ID was in France, but completed its movement east by 8 June when it was placed at the disposal of 16. Armee in Poland. It was never part of 2. Armee. It was committed with LI. AK of 6. Armee in Ukraine on 26 June, but does not appear to have entered combat until 25 July with XXIX. AK of 6. Armee near Kiev.
112. ID moved to Poland from Wehkreis XII on 1o June and was assigned to 2. Armee in OKH reserve near Brok on the Bug in Poland. It spent three weeks of marching forward, always in reserve, until it was finally engaged on 25 July near Gomel with XII. AK of 2. Armee.
113. ID was at Grafenwöhr where it was organized 10 December with French equipment. It moved east on 23 June at the disposal of 2. Armee. Between 7 and 15 July it marched forward, clearing up Soviet remnants, before entering the line west of Zhitomir under LI. AK before it was assigned 19 July to XXIX. AK of 6. Armee.
125. ID was assigned to IV. AK of 17. Armee HG-S on 22 June after being assigned from 2. Armee 10 June and moving from Yugoslavia to the Stiermark.
132. ID was assigned to Höh. Kdo. XXXIV from 2. Armee on 28 June and moved from Yugoslavia to Ukraine where it was assigned to IV. AK of 6. Armee on 25 July although it appears to have been engaged only in mop up operations until parts of the division were committed c. 1 August south of Kiev along the Dnieper.
197. ID was in Mannheim-Landau and on 21 June was entrained for Lochow Poland where it was placed at the disposal of 2. Armee on 23 June and finished its assembly on 26 June when it began marching from Bug toBerezina. It entered combat 1 July near Bialystock under XXXV. AK.

But I know, details, schmeetails, we don need no stinkin batches...

[Avalancheon]

Historically speaking, it is almost certain that HGS could have effected a successful encirclement at the border. The problem with your fantasy scenario, however, lies elsewhere.

First, every change to reality leads to a different set of outcomes and consequences. To create your mythical fifth panzergruppe you have had to go backwards several years to change a series of most profound political, industrial, economic and military decisions. Then you have just assumed the outcomes and consequences work perfectly to your advantage and ignored anything that would work against it. In otherwords, it is not an attempt to consider and discuss a feaseable but alternate history, it is a work of complete fiction.

Second, your fantasy scenario is written such that this border encirclement nets 600,000 Soviets and knocks them off the Red Army orbat. Your fantasy has such a total because, based upon a fantasy later decisive battle, that is the number you have derived from a countback as having to disappear from the orbat at that stage to make the numbers work at the later decisive moment. However, that number translates to about 3-4 greater than historically evident. Not only have you created a completely fictional Germany, Wehrmacht and Heer, your fantasy scenario also requires a completely fictional Soviet Union and Red Army.

Furthermore, even though an encirclement of the historical border elements of Southwestern Front is almost certain, does that certainty extend to your fictional Southwestern Front which has 3-4 fold greater strength?

One really has to admire all the venom and scorn that you are able to conjure. The wording makes your disdain very apparent. ''Fantasy, mythical, complete fiction, fantasy, fantasy, fantasy, completely fictional, fantasy, completely fictional, fictional, etc.'' The same words repeated over and over again.


Leaving aside the semantics for now, where are you getting your numbers from? You say that an encirclement of the Southwestern front couldn't net 600,000 men, because that is 3-4 times more troops than they had. Are you seriously implying that they only had 150,000 to 200,000 men? According to Robert Kirchubel [], Southwestern front had over 907,000 troops at the start of Barbarossa. Whether or not Army Group South could encircle 2/3rds of their forces is another matter, however.

''Kirponos commanded over 907,000 men. Three of his four armies and half of his eight mechanized corps defended the Lvov salient.'' -Operation Barbarossa 1941 (1): Army Group South By Robert Kirchubel.

[Paul Lakowski]

How odd.

46. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. In June it was "at the disposal of" (zur Verfügung von) 2. Armee and conducting security operations in Yugoslavia. It was placed at the disposal of OKH in July and moved to Rumania and assigned to 11. Armee on the Pruth later in the month.
73. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. On 9 June it was placed at the disposal of 11. Armee and conducting security operations in Strumica in northern Macedonia. It was assigned to LIV. AK of 11. Armee on 21 July.
164. ID was part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was on occupation and security duties in Yugoslavia under XVIII AK until November, when it moved to Crete and reorganized as Festungs-Division Kreta.
183. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was assigned to LI. AK of 2. Armee and was on occupation and security duties in Yugoslavia. It was placed at the disposal of OKH and moved to Poland in July as HG-S reserve, but remained in reserve successively for HG-M and then HG-N until October when it was assigned to IX. AK of 4. Armee and HG-M at Vyazma.
294. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was assigned to Höh. Kdo. LXV. of 2. Armee and was on occupation and security duties in Yugoslavia. It and 2. Armee moved to Russia as part of OKH reserve on 25 June and on 6 July it was assigned to LI. AK of HG-S, then to Korück 585 on 10 July and then bounced between various commands, all the time conducting rear-area security until it was committed to the front, assigned to XVII. AK of 6. Armee, HG-S on 27 September.
704. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was organized on 15 April 1941 as a security and occupation division, as were all the divisions of the 15. Welle. It was placed at the disposal of 2. Armee in Yugoslavia in May and then 12. Armee in Jully while it completed its organization and training, first in Proboj in southwestern Serbia, then Valjevo in western Serbia, and finally Belgrade in November, all the time on security and occupation duties. It remained in Serbia until 1 April 1943 when it was reorganized as the 104. Jäger-Division.
714, ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was organized as a 15. Welle division 1 May 1941 in Prague under BdE and assigned to XI. AK of 2. Armee and remained on occupation and security duties in Serbia and Croatia until 1 April 1943 when it was reorganized as the 114. Jäger-Division.
717. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was organized as a 15. Welle division 11 April 1941 in Bruck an der Leitha and Neusiedl am See (Lower Austria and Burgenland). On 22 June it was assigned to XI. AK of 2. Armee in Yugoslavia and remained in Yugoslavia and Croatia on occupation and security duties until 1 April 1943 when it was reorganized as the 117. Jäger-Division.
718. ID was not part of 12. Armee on 22 June 1941. It was organized as a 15. Welle division 26 March 1941 in Wehrkreis XVIII. On 30 May it was assigned to LI. AK of 2. Armee in Yugoslaviaand remained in Yugoslavia and Croatia on occupation and security duties until 1 April 1943 when it was reorganized as the 117. Jäger-Division.

Still, I guess one out of nine ain't bad?

OKH reserves as part of 2. Armee on 22 June? Some were, some weren't and it was a lot more complex than a simple schematic would indicate.

15. ID was in Dijon and began a rail movement east late in June that ended on 2 July when it was placed at the disposal of 2. Armee in OKH reserve.
52. ID was in eastern France and began a rail movement east that ended 25 June when it was assigned to LIII. AK of 2. Armee near Vilna.
79. ID was at KLagenfurt, moving there in early May from Langres as reserve for Balkan operations as part of 2. Armee. It moved to Poland at the disposal of OKH in July and in August was assigned to XVII. AK of 6. Armee west of Korosten.
86. ID was in France and began a rail movement east in June that ended 23 June when it was assigned to L. AK, which was in HG-N reserve, but not as part of 2. Armee. On 28 June it was assigned to XXIII. AK in OKH reserve and in July participated in the clean up operations in rear of HG-N.
95. ID was in France, but completed its movement east by 8 June when it was placed at the disposal of 16. Armee in Poland. It was never part of 2. Armee. It was committed with LI. AK of 6. Armee in Ukraine on 26 June, but does not appear to have entered combat until 25 July with XXIX. AK of 6. Armee near Kiev.
112. ID moved to Poland from Wehkreis XII on 1o June and was assigned to 2. Armee in OKH reserve near Brok on the Bug in Poland. It spent three weeks of marching forward, always in reserve, until it was finally engaged on 25 July near Gomel with XII. AK of 2. Armee.
113. ID was at Grafenwöhr where it was organized 10 December with French equipment. It moved east on 23 June at the disposal of 2. Armee. Between 7 and 15 July it marched forward, clearing up Soviet remnants, before entering the line west of Zhitomir under LI. AK before it was assigned 19 July to XXIX. AK of 6. Armee.
125. ID was assigned to IV. AK of 17. Armee HG-S on 22 June after being assigned from 2. Armee 10 June and moving from Yugoslavia to the Stiermark.
132. ID was assigned to Höh. Kdo. XXXIV from 2. Armee on 28 June and moved from Yugoslavia to Ukraine where it was assigned to IV. AK of 6. Armee on 25 July although it appears to have been engaged only in mop up operations until parts of the division were committed c. 1 August south of Kiev along the Dnieper.
197. ID was in Mannheim-Landau and on 21 June was entrained for Lochow Poland where it was placed at the disposal of 2. Armee on 23 June and finished its assembly on 26 June when it began marching from Bug toBerezina. It entered combat 1 July near Bialystock under XXXV. AK.

But I know, details, schmeetails, we don need no stinkin batches...

Please provide sources for these statements above.

[Richard Anderson]

Please provide sources for these statements above.

http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/inh ... chnis1.htm