Operation Sealion

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Richard Anderson
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Re: Operation Sealion

#46

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Nov 2019, 05:49

pugsville wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 00:48
source for this numbers? the Minesweepers looks a little large

https://www.kbismarck.com/kriegsmarine- ... epers.html
I suspect he is counting the converted fishing trawlers with their 2cm and MG armament along with the M1935 MS.
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Richard Anderson
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Re: Operation Sealion

#47

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Nov 2019, 06:10

glenn239 wrote:
28 Nov 2019, 23:45
Because the 168 ships of 4,524 were only a small fraction of the material assembled for the invasion.

Type-Number-
Cargo- 168
Barge-About 1700(?)
Tugs - 386
Motor boats - about 1,000
Mine sweepers - 86
R Boats - 45
Fishing trawlers - 64
Destroyers - 9
Torpedo boats - 18
S-boats - 24
Siebel Ferries - 25

About 3,500 total ships and boats, of which the 168 big steamers were 5% of the total. A total of maybe about 1.7 million tons of shipping? If so, the average displacement was about 480 tons. Get rid of the Motor boats (high numbers, low displacement) and maybe the average displacement of the 2,500 remaining craft was about 600 tons?
Why are you now mixing the "escorts" with the transports? And why are you equating ships with craft? You seem to be confused about what the different vessels the Germans had access to actually were.

The "transports" were large merchant ships (Handelschiff) and smaller Dampfer (steamers) - 168 of them.
The "barges" were Prähme – powered and un-powered barges, over 2,000 were confiscated in Belgium, Holland, France, and Germany for use in the operation. There were generally two types, the Spitsen or pinnace (typically 38.5 x 5.05 x 2.3 meters, 360 DWT or about 240 GRT) and the slightly larger Kempenaars (or French Campinois, typically 50.0 x 6.6 x 2.5 meters, 620 DWT or about 413 GRT). Eventually 1,336 Spitsen and 982 Kempenaars were collected, about 1,000 of them not motorized.
The "tugs" were Schlepper, the 471 available were intended to assist in maneuvering the barges and transports inshore.
The "motor boats" were smaller motorized barges and other small motor vessels. At least 230 were available according to the layout of the flotillas. A typical vessel was M/S Bente, built in 1934 at Flensburg for Baltic traffic. She was 24.0 x 4.8 x 1.8 and 54 GRT and weighed about 90 metric tons. Another was M/S Steffen Heinrich, built in 1925. She was 16.96 x 4.04 x unknown depth and 33 GRT, capable of 8 knots and carrying – as a commercial ferry – up to 102 passengers.

There were not "about 1,000" motor boats. There were 230, plus about 100 Motorensegler...motorized sailing vessels, typically fishing vessels. The "1,161 motorboats with another 439 on the way" as of 17 September included the motor boats, the motor sailors, and the motorized Prähme, about 1,270 of them.

The actual "amphibious lift" were the transports and barges. The motor boats and motor sailors were auxiliaries to land forces from the transports, which otherwise only had ships boats.
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glenn239
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Re: Operation Sealion

#48

Post by glenn239 » 29 Nov 2019, 19:56

pugsville wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 00:48
source for this numbers? the Minesweepers looks a little large
Source is the Axis History Forum website here,

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... =+sea+lion

Post 85 (page 6) by RichTO90. Skimmed quickly to try and generate a tonnage guesstimate for the whole of Sealion.

Actual organizations was:

Transportflotte B – Planned landing area Folkestone to Dungeness
Schleppverband 1 (Dunkirk)
Minensuchflottille 3 (8 minesweepers, M15-19, 22, 29, and 30)
Räumbootsflottille 11 (8 converted fishing cutters, re-equipped with purpose-built vessels in Oct 40 and renamed as Flotille 7)
Vorpostenflottille 3 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V301-308)
Geleitzug 1 (Ostende)
Minensuchflottille 16 (9 converted fishing trawlers, M1601-1609)
Schleppverband 2 (Ostende)
Räumbootsflottille 3 (8, R33-R40)
Vorpostenflottille 2 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V201-208)
Geleitzug 2 (Rotterdam)
Minensuchflottille 4 (still organizing and only three operational, M1, 2, and 36)

Transportflotte C – Planned landing area Dungeness to Cliff’s End
Schleppverband 3 (Calais)
Minensuchflottille 1 (5 minesweepers, M3, 4, 6-8)
Minensuchflottille 32 (28 converted fishing boats, M3200-3227)
Räumbootsflottille 4 (12, R41-R52)
Vorpostenflottille 7 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V701-708)
Geleitzug 3 (Antwerpen)
Minensuchflottille 15 (8 converted fishing trawlers, M1501-1508)

Transportflotte D – Planned landing area Bexhill to Beachy Head
Schleppverband 4 (Boulogne)
Minensuchflottille 2 (4 minesweepers, M9, 10, 12, and 13)
Minensuchflottille 18 (8 converted fishing trawlers, M1801-1808)
Räumbootsflottille 2 (9, R25-R32)
Vorpostenflottille 15 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V1501-1508)
Vorpostengruppe 16 (3 converted fishing trawlers, Schiff 9, 18, and 37)
Vorpostengruppe 18 (3 converted fishing trawlers, Schiff 7, 27, and 27)

Transportflotte E – Planned landing area Brighton to Selsey Bill
Schleppverbandverband 5 (Le Havre)
Räumbootsflottille 1 (8, R17-R24)
Vorpostenflottille 4 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V401-408)
Vorpostenflottille 13 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V1301-1308)
Vorpostenflottille 20 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V2001-2008
Geleitzug 4 (Le Havre)
Minensuchflottille 12 (5 converted fishing trawlers, M601-605)
Geleitzug 5 (Le Havre)
Minensuchflottille 14 (8 converted fishing trawlers, M1401-1408)

The numbers of VP-boot available is based upon the organization of the flotillas initially. Typically these expanded as the war went on, but it seems doubtful there would be many more at this time since the flotillas were still in the process of expansion in terms of the number of units, so the number of converted vessels appears to have been finite.

So 7 VP-flotille and 2 VP-gruppe (probably 64 boats), 5 R-flotille (probably 45 boats), and 10 MS-flotille (probably 86 ships and boats) were part of the escort and transport units assigned. Unfortunately I can only identify 12. U-jägdflotille on the Channel Coast in 1940, so I'm unsure which the other one supposedly was? And they were essentially the same vessels as VP-boot, converted fishing trawlers. And in any case they were intended as escorts for the '14 minelayers' and none of these were 'escorts' for the assault convoys since the minelayers had their own mission to lay minefields in the Channel, a subject I addressed some time ago.

So the actual convoy 'escort' totaled about 195 ships and boats. To this may be added the 9 Z-boot, 12-18 T-boot, and 24 S-boot planned to 'close' the eastern and western approaches to the Channel.

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Re: Operation Sealion

#49

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 Nov 2019, 20:27

glenn239 wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 19:56
Post 85 (page 6) by RichTO90. Skimmed quickly to try and generate a tonnage guesstimate for the whole of Sealion.
Ah, okay, I see now the confusion. You were trying to generate an average tonnage of all vessels intended for SEELÖWE, but you seem to have missed the distinction between vessels (ships and craft) transporting troops, tugs, auxiliary landing craft, and escorts. I'm not sure why you would want such, since the civilian vessels were generally measured by DWT or GRT while military vessels were by displacement?

Also, that is the organizational scheme and does not always match what was actually available, which is also subject to often contradictory records...for one, the Germans never seemed to agree twice what they were counting as "motor boats". As an example, while 24 S-Boot were planned, it appears that only 20 were ever actually available, 10 destroyers were planned, but only 8 were available (and were doing double-duty as minelayers and escorts, so needed to be in two places at once), and so on. They were only in a good position WRT the M1935 mine sweepers since the plan called for 20, while 29 were available. The number of tugs is also problematic, varying from 386/387 to 471 depending on whether it was what was "available" or what was "planned" for.

In terms of the escorts, the only really "military" vessels were the Zestörer, Torpedo-Boot, M-1935, R-Boot, and S-Boot. The V-Boot were converted fishing vessels of minimal effectiveness and were matched by the hundreds of similar patrol vessels outfitted by the British.

BTW, at the time I assumed the R-Boot were converted fishing cutters, but in fact they were based upon Lürssen's F-type inshore minesweeping boat design from the Great War and were in fact built as military vessels. Also BTW, R-Boot 1-8 had a single 2cm, the later ones had two.
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pugsville
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Re: Operation Sealion

#50

Post by pugsville » 29 Nov 2019, 23:54

glenn239 wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 19:56
pugsville wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 00:48
source for this numbers? the Minesweepers looks a little large
Source is the Axis History Forum website here,

http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic. ... =+sea+lion

Post 85 (page 6) by RichTO90. Skimmed quickly to try and generate a tonnage guesstimate for the whole of Sealion.

Actual organizations was:

Transportflotte B – Planned landing area Folkestone to Dungeness
Schleppverband 1 (Dunkirk)
Minensuchflottille 3 (8 minesweepers, M15-19, 22, 29, and 30)
Räumbootsflottille 11 (8 converted fishing cutters, re-equipped with purpose-built vessels in Oct 40 and renamed as Flotille 7)
Vorpostenflottille 3 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V301-308)
Geleitzug 1 (Ostende)
Minensuchflottille 16 (9 converted fishing trawlers, M1601-1609)
Schleppverband 2 (Ostende)
Räumbootsflottille 3 (8, R33-R40)
Vorpostenflottille 2 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V201-208)
Geleitzug 2 (Rotterdam)
Minensuchflottille 4 (still organizing and only three operational, M1, 2, and 36)

Transportflotte C – Planned landing area Dungeness to Cliff’s End
Schleppverband 3 (Calais)
Minensuchflottille 1 (5 minesweepers, M3, 4, 6-8)
Minensuchflottille 32 (28 converted fishing boats, M3200-3227)
Räumbootsflottille 4 (12, R41-R52)
Vorpostenflottille 7 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V701-708)
Geleitzug 3 (Antwerpen)
Minensuchflottille 15 (8 converted fishing trawlers, M1501-1508)

Transportflotte D – Planned landing area Bexhill to Beachy Head
Schleppverband 4 (Boulogne)
Minensuchflottille 2 (4 minesweepers, M9, 10, 12, and 13)
Minensuchflottille 18 (8 converted fishing trawlers, M1801-1808)
Räumbootsflottille 2 (9, R25-R32)
Vorpostenflottille 15 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V1501-1508)
Vorpostengruppe 16 (3 converted fishing trawlers, Schiff 9, 18, and 37)
Vorpostengruppe 18 (3 converted fishing trawlers, Schiff 7, 27, and 27)

Transportflotte E – Planned landing area Brighton to Selsey Bill
Schleppverbandverband 5 (Le Havre)
Räumbootsflottille 1 (8, R17-R24)
Vorpostenflottille 4 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V401-408)
Vorpostenflottille 13 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V1301-1308)
Vorpostenflottille 20 (8 converted fishing trawlers, V2001-2008
Geleitzug 4 (Le Havre)
Minensuchflottille 12 (5 converted fishing trawlers, M601-605)
Geleitzug 5 (Le Havre)
Minensuchflottille 14 (8 converted fishing trawlers, M1401-1408)

The numbers of VP-boot available is based upon the organization of the flotillas initially. Typically these expanded as the war went on, but it seems doubtful there would be many more at this time since the flotillas were still in the process of expansion in terms of the number of units, so the number of converted vessels appears to have been finite.

So 7 VP-flotille and 2 VP-gruppe (probably 64 boats), 5 R-flotille (probably 45 boats), and 10 MS-flotille (probably 86 ships and boats) were part of the escort and transport units assigned. Unfortunately I can only identify 12. U-jägdflotille on the Channel Coast in 1940, so I'm unsure which the other one supposedly was? And they were essentially the same vessels as VP-boot, converted fishing trawlers. And in any case they were intended as escorts for the '14 minelayers' and none of these were 'escorts' for the assault convoys since the minelayers had their own mission to lay minefields in the Channel, a subject I addressed some time ago.

So the actual convoy 'escort' totaled about 195 ships and boats. To this may be added the 9 Z-boot, 12-18 T-boot, and 24 S-boot planned to 'close' the eastern and western approaches to the Channel.
Ahh I see your problem you have misinterpreted the information in this post, you have listed everything in minesweeper flotilla as a minesweeper. Most of them are trawlers. Two quite different classes of ships.

Mine sweepers , purpose built are generally fairly capable escort vessels, sort of small destroyers, impressed converted trawlers are much much less capable of warships.

glenn239
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Re: Operation Sealion

#51

Post by glenn239 » 30 Nov 2019, 18:21

pugsville wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 23:54
Ahh I see your problem you have misinterpreted the information in this post, you have listed everything in minesweeper flotilla as a minesweeper. Most of them are trawlers. Two quite different classes of ships.

Mine sweepers , purpose built are generally fairly capable escort vessels, sort of small destroyers, impressed converted trawlers are much much less capable of warships.
I called them "minesweepers" because that was the task they were assigned according to the post in the link, not because I thought Germany would have purpose built military minesweepers in those quantities! I then did a quick google on the trawlers being used as minesweepers to get an idea of what they might have displaced. I don't know how many purpose built minesweepers Germany had in 1940, but I would be inclined to guess maybe around a dozen? (I didn't Wikipeak for that guess).

glenn239
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Re: Operation Sealion

#52

Post by glenn239 » 30 Nov 2019, 18:44

Richard Anderson wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 20:27
Ah, okay, I see now the confusion. You were trying to generate an average tonnage of all vessels intended for SEELÖWE, but you seem to have missed the distinction between vessels (ships and craft) transporting troops, tugs, auxiliary landing craft, and escorts. I'm not sure why you would want such, since the civilian vessels were generally measured by DWT or GRT while military vessels were by displacement?
The guess more specifically was about 700,000 tons for the 168 steamers (based on your figure of about 4,500 tons each), about another 700,000 tons for the 1700 (?) barges, (based on a guess of about 400 tons each) and about 300,000 tons for everything else, for something like 1.7 million tons all in. Divide that by the number of units in Sealion (3,500) and the average target is pretty small. One thing for a destroyer to be sunk by dive bombers hunting 5,000 ton steamers. Quite another to be sunk by dive bombers attacking 400 ton boats.
In terms of the escorts, the only really "military" vessels were the Zestörer, Torpedo-Boot, M-1935, R-Boot, and S-Boot. The V-Boot were converted fishing vessels of minimal effectiveness and were matched by the hundreds of similar patrol vessels outfitted by the British.
Absolutely, but there were plenty of convoy battles in WW2 where the escorts were ad hoc conversions and the attackers were formal warships. The escorts would proceed to be trounced, attempting to absorb the shock of the attack for as long as possible while the convoy tried to escape. The problem with an RN destroyer group commander being faced with some Siebel ferries and converted fishing trawlers is not that these pose any actual danger to his ships. It's that they will delay him, possibly confuse him, possibly absorb vast quantities of ammunition, and possibly disperse his forces.

The RN warships were like a battering ram, the German mixed bag of escorts, minelayers, and minesweepers, like a shock absorber. The danger is that the RN commander has no idea what is going on, no idea what is happening specifically, and in the middle of vastly confused series of night actions, become disorganized, distracted, and depleted, (ammunition). The RN ships had no fire control radar and the level of night fighting training was certain to be inadequate. A fishing trawler was an ineffective combat platform. But, as a target at night in smokey conditions, it very well may absorb large quantities of ammunition and time. The threat is that if the RN has 80 warships against 3,500 targets in a night battle, that night battles are confusing and lead to wrong decisions and inefficiencies that look baffling by daylight. Jellicoe found this out at Jutland.

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Re: Operation Sealion

#53

Post by glenn239 » 30 Nov 2019, 18:59

Richard Anderson wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 05:47
Hipper?...

Scheer?....

...Bismarck and Eugen were in commission, but Bismarck did not begin her sea trials until 14 September and continued them through 5 December. From 6 December 1940 to 24 January 1941 she is at Hamburg refitting and undergoing final construction changes. Eugen we have already covered, but it is much the same. I have zero idea what your third heavy cruiser is unless you are counting Hipper, then see above.
Counted Scheer in the heavy cruiser total since she was more like a Hipper than like a battleship.

My question was what the RN planning factor was for these ships. One thing for us to know Bismarck and Eugen were not available in 2019. Quite another for the RN command protecting the east coast from invasion to assume it in September 1940.
A torpedo boat is not a destroyer...destroyers are torpedo boat destroyers after all. I cannot fathom why you think a powered barge is the same as a sloop?
The equivalency is not that the ships were equal, but that in any combat the ships absorbed each others time and attention. The Scheer and Jervis Bay were no where near comparable warships, but in the time it took Scheer to sink her opponent, she was fully absorbed in the task and unable to do anything else.
Nor can I fathom why you include coastal artillery guns of any kind?
Because these created 'safe zones' near the coast in which warships could not operate. For example for forming up invasion flotillas on the French side, if the coastal artillery were not covering them, the RN warships could just come in as they left port.

For faster units, the presence of coastal artillery hindered the ability of the RN to engage decisively. For example, in that piece posted earlier where RN warships get in amongst the German steamers and sink them, in actual fact what would have happened is that the German steamers would have attempted to turn around and sailed back under the protection of their coastal artillery on the French side as reports came in that a major RN formation was colliding with picket forces, then, after the RN was gone, resumed their advance at a later time. (The crossing would only take a few hours for steamers, unlike the barges).

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Re: Operation Sealion

#54

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Dec 2019, 04:27

glenn239 wrote:
30 Nov 2019, 18:44
The guess more specifically was about 700,000 tons for the 168 steamers (based on your figure of about 4,500 tons each), about another 700,000 tons for the 1700 (?) barges, (based on a guess of about 400 tons each) and about 300,000 tons for everything else, for something like 1.7 million tons all in. Divide that by the number of units in Sealion (3,500) and the average target is pretty small. One thing for a destroyer to be sunk by dive bombers hunting 5,000 ton steamers. Quite another to be sunk by dive bombers attacking 400 ton boats.
Okay, my bad for shorthanding too much...as of 17 September 155 transports totaling 700,000 GRT were in the invasion harbors and another 13 were on the way...I calculated the average for the other 13.

Why guess? I gave you the barge data. 1,336 Spitsen times c. 242 GRT and 982 Kempenaars times c. 413 GRT. 323,312+405, 566 = 728,878. Everything else? Well, the civilian vessels like these are mostly given as GRT rather than displacement tonnage as for warships. The problem? They aren't the same. GRT has nothing to do with the weight such a vessels carries, weighs, or displaces. Rather, it is the total enclosed cubage of the vessel, measured as 40 cubic feet equals one GRT. Is a 38.5 or 50 meter long vessel really "small"? Compared to a Hunt I at 91.3 meters...but is a troikaschlep of three Spitsen, plus towlines at probably 150+ meters a "small" target?
Absolutely, but there were plenty of convoy battles in WW2 where the escorts were ad hoc conversions and the attackers were formal warships. The escorts would proceed to be trounced, attempting to absorb the shock of the attack for as long as possible while the convoy tried to escape. The problem with an RN destroyer group commander being faced with some Siebel ferries and converted fishing trawlers is not that these pose any actual danger to his ships. It's that they will delay him, possibly confuse him, possibly absorb vast quantities of ammunition, and possibly disperse his forces.
Really? Name all those battles please. From what I can tell, there was one, Jervis Bay versus Scheer in November 1940. One case out of 41 Armed Merchant Cruisers commissioned by the British as convoy escorts, escorting literally hundreds of convoys 1939-1943. There is also Rawalpindi versus Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, but she was not escorting a convoy, but instead was running patrols in the North Sea and got combative when she should have run.

BTW, how do the German convoys "escape"? Do they do a Gefechtskehrtwendung? :lol: Let's take Schleppverband 1 out of Dunkirk. Minensuchflottille 3 (8 minesweepers, M15-19, 22, 29, and 30), Räumbootsflottille 11 (8), and Vorpostenflottille 3 (8 converted trawlers, V301-308), 24 vessels, escort Schleppzüge 1 with 75 powered barges, each towing two barges. Call them all Spitsen and that is 25 vessel tows each 150+ meters long...so five kilometers+ of river barges chuffing along at 6 to 8 knots. They have to stay in formation, because once they break up they will never get organized again.

Meanwhile, the convoy escorts you are depending on are not 14,464 GRT converted liner AMCs capable of 15 knots and armed with seven 6-inch and two 3-inch guns. They are mostly fishing trawlers, typically under 1,000 GRT, but some as much as 1,500 GRT. armed typically with one or two 8.8cm, up to 9 2cm, and a number of MG.
The RN warships were like a battering ram, the German mixed bag of escorts, minelayers, and minesweepers, like a shock absorber. The danger is that the RN commander has no idea what is going on, no idea what is happening specifically, and in the middle of vastly confused series of night actions, become disorganized, distracted, and depleted, (ammunition). The RN ships had no fire control radar and the level of night fighting training was certain to be inadequate. A fishing trawler was an ineffective combat platform. But, as a target at night in smokey conditions, it very well may absorb large quantities of ammunition and time. The threat is that if the RN has 80 warships against 3,500 targets in a night battle, that night battles are confusing and lead to wrong decisions and inefficiencies that look baffling by daylight. Jellicoe found this out at Jutland.
Because that is what happened at Matapan? No, you seem to decide that must be so because that is what happened at Jutland, and everyone knows that the British were incapable of learning from experience, especially the Royal Navy...and, oh, also of course because that is the way you need it to be for your scenario to work. However, the reality is the Royal Navy, like the Japanese, stressed short-range action and night fighting training interwar...to an extent because of what happened at Jutland. Yes, fire control radar was not common, but "no" is incorrect. The prototype Type 284 FC radar system was prototyped in 1938, went through sea trials in summer 1939, and began installing in ships in 1940. I doubt many were deployed by September 1940, but would not exclude some being around...and it doesn't matter since your starting assumption is in fact wrong.
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Re: Operation Sealion

#55

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Dec 2019, 04:37

glenn239 wrote:
30 Nov 2019, 18:59
Counted Scheer in the heavy cruiser total since she was more like a Hipper than like a battleship.

My question was what the RN planning factor was for these ships. One thing for us to know Bismarck and Eugen were not available in 2019. Quite another for the RN command protecting the east coast from invasion to assume it in September 1940.
My question is why you keep circling around to this when there was zero planning by the Germans to use these or any of the other heavy vessels to contest with the RN in SEELÖWE. They only planning was for the diversionary operation.

Okay, so let's assume the Germans ignore sea trials, post-build repairs and modifications necessary revealed by those sea trials, and just for the hell of it add Scheer and Eugen and Bismarck to the three light cruisers and do the diversion...two battleships, three battlecruisers, two heavy cruisers... :roll:

Who do the British have as a reaction force just in case? The Home Fleet. You know, the guys at Scapa, Dundee, the Tyne, Rosyth, the Humber, Blyth...
The equivalency is not that the ships were equal, but that in any combat the ships absorbed each others time and attention. The Scheer and Jervis Bay were no where near comparable warships, but in the time it took Scheer to sink her opponent, she was fully absorbed in the task and unable to do anything else.
I see you circled back and came up with the exception you hope proves your rule... :lol:
Because these created 'safe zones' near the coast in which warships could not operate. For example for forming up invasion flotillas on the French side, if the coastal artillery were not covering them, the RN warships could just come in as they left port.

For faster units, the presence of coastal artillery hindered the ability of the RN to engage decisively. For example, in that piece posted earlier where RN warships get in amongst the German steamers and sink them, in actual fact what would have happened is that the German steamers would have attempted to turn around and sailed back under the protection of their coastal artillery on the French side as reports came in that a major RN formation was colliding with picket forces, then, after the RN was gone, resumed their advance at a later time. (The crossing would only take a few hours for steamers, unlike the barges).
Seriously? :lol: :lol: :lol:
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

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Re: Operation Sealion

#56

Post by Richard Anderson » 01 Dec 2019, 07:08

Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 04:37
Because these created 'safe zones' near the coast in which warships could not operate. For example for forming up invasion flotillas on the French side, if the coastal artillery were not covering them, the RN warships could just come in as they left port.
German coastal batteries:

24 August 1940 - 3./Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 367...Namsos Norway.
1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 570...three batteries of 10cm guns at Villerville, Benerville, and Houlgate
15 October 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 778...two batteries of 10.5cm guns at Le Havre
24 October 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 738...three batteries, probably all 15.5cm guns at Fort Mahon and Le Touquet
18 November 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 769...probably three batteries
23 November 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 770...three batteries of 10.5cm guns at Cayeux and Le Tréport
23 November 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 789...probably three batteries
27 December 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 823 (mot)...three batteries of 15.5cm guns at Nieuport, La Panne, and Fort Mardik
27 December 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 826...three batteries of 15.5cm guns at Nieuport, La Panne, and Midelkerke
27 December 1940 - Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie-Abteilung 827...three batteries

Of those, 738., 769., 770., and 789. were Stellungs-Artillerie-Abteilungen probably already in the area during SEELÖWE. So 15 batteries of 10cm, 10.5cm, and 15.5cm guns...able to range out a maximum 19,500 meters for the 15.5cm, 12,000 meters for the 10.5cm, and 16,500 meters for the 10cm. Aside from that the Germans did man some of the French and Belgian coastal batteries that had not been spiked or were repaired.

In any case, in this period the German coastal artillery hindered pretty much nothing the RN did. At 2000 hours 10 October, REVENGE escorted by the destroyers JAVELIN (D5), JAGUAR, JUPITER, KASHMIR, KELVIN, KIPLING sailed from Plymouth on Operation MEDIUM. The Operation MEDIUM plan was for Blenheims of 2 Group to bomb the harbour area followed by Wellingtons of 3 Group who would carry out a combined bombing and flare dropping during which the REVENGE force would carry out a bombardment of the port area. To cover the REVENGE force from surface attack from the west were the light cruisers NEWCASTLE and EMERALD and destroyers WANDERER and BROKE and Polish destroyers BURZA and GARLAND. To the east were the light cruiser CARDIFF and destroyers VANOC and VOLUNTEER)

At 0035 hours 11 October, the REVENGE force RVed with MGB’s 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46 and 51 who had sailed from Weymouth and were tasked with covering the bombarding force from E-Boats. At 0230 hours the MGB’s formed a screen ahead of the REVENGE force ready to engage any E-Boats or small vessels encountered. At 0315 hours the bombing attacks commenced ad flares were dropped over Cap de la Hague to enable REVENGE to obtain an accurate fix. From 0333 to 0351 hours from a range of approximately 15700 yards the REVENGE group bombarded Cherbourg harbour. During the 18 minute bombardment 120 x 15in shells were fired by REVENGE and a total of 801 x 4.7in shells from her escorting destroyers. The force then retired under fire from a German shore battery, estimated as up to 13.5in calibre, east of Cherbourg. The firing continued for 30 minutes and although accurate no hits were achieved. During the withdrawal REVENGE worked up to 21½ knots. https://www.naval-history.net/xGM-Chron ... evenge.htm
For faster units, the presence of coastal artillery hindered the ability of the RN to engage decisively. For example, in that piece posted earlier where RN warships get in amongst the German steamers and sink them, in actual fact what would have happened is that the German steamers would have attempted to turn around and sailed back under the protection of their coastal artillery on the French side as reports came in that a major RN formation was colliding with picket forces, then, after the RN was gone, resumed their advance at a later time. (The crossing would only take a few hours for steamers, unlike the barges).
You are creating a fantasy scenario to fit your preconceptions. Each of the Transportflotte included mixed transports and barge-tows...if the "steamers" sail away with the escorts to shelter within the defense zone of the massive coast artillery presence :lol: , then the barges are on their own...different speeds and maneuverability and all that. Essentially the only thing the barges can do with their slow speed and worse maneuverability if attacked is sauve qui peut.

Now add that they are coming from multiple ports, Schleppverband 1 from Dunkirk, Geleitzug 1 and Schleppverband 2 from Ostende, Geleitzug 2 from Rotterdamm, Schleppverband 3 from Calais, Geleitzug 3 from Antwerp, Schleppverband 4 from Boulogne, and Schleppverbandverband 5, Geleitzug 4 and 5 from Le Havre. Seven ports. Not a return to the "French side", but to seven ports spread over 280-odd miles of coast.

Ostende-Rotterdamm to the landing beaches at Folkestone about 75-150 miles.
Calais-Antwerp to the landing beaches at Rye-Hastings about 55-80 miles.
Boulougne to the landing beaches at Dungeness about about 30 miles.
Le Havre to the landing beaches at Brighton about 95 miles.

To you see a problem? Multiple sortie times and distances.

So the barges are the sacrificial lambs in your scenario?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Knouterer
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Re: Operation Sealion

#57

Post by Knouterer » 01 Dec 2019, 09:54

glenn239 wrote:
30 Nov 2019, 18:21
pugsville wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 23:54
Ahh I see your problem you have misinterpreted the information in this post, you have listed everything in minesweeper flotilla as a minesweeper. Most of them are trawlers. Two quite different classes of ships.

Mine sweepers , purpose built are generally fairly capable escort vessels, sort of small destroyers, impressed converted trawlers are much much less capable of warships.
I called them "minesweepers" because that was the task they were assigned according to the post in the link, not because I thought Germany would have purpose built military minesweepers in those quantities! I then did a quick google on the trawlers being used as minesweepers to get an idea of what they might have displaced. I don't know how many purpose built minesweepers Germany had in 1940, but I would be inclined to guess maybe around a dozen? (I didn't Wikipeak for that guess).
Of the M35 class minesweepers, which were capable little ships (with two 105 mm guns), 23 had been launched up to September 1940 and 19 were in service at that time. In addition, some WWI minesweepers (Type 1915/1916) were also still in frontline service.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

Knouterer
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Re: Operation Sealion

#58

Post by Knouterer » 01 Dec 2019, 10:29

Brief overview of the German naval forces by the end of September:

The Kriegsmarine’s resources were limited. The outbreak of war had come as a surprise; Hitler had assured Grossadmiral Raeder that he would have until 1944 or 1945 to build up a strong navy, and an ambitious expansion plan known as “Plan Z” had barely started. The first German aircraft carrier Graf Zeppelin had already been launched, but would never be completed. The battleship Bismarck had been completed but was still working up and would not be fully operational until the end of the year, her sister ship Tirpitz had been launched but would not be commissioned before February 1941. The battlecruisers – classed as battleships by the Germans – Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had both been torpedoed in the Norwegian campaign and would return to service in late October or early November. Of the smaller “pocket battleships” or Panzerschiffe, Graf Spee had been lost in December 1939 while Lützow had been torpedoed by HMS Spearfish and repairs were expected to last until April 1941. Admiral Scheer was undergoing trials in the Baltic after a major refit. There were also two “pre-dreadnoughts” launched in 1906, Schlesien and Schleswig-Holstein, which the navy had been allowed to keep in 1919. These had been used for shore bombardment during the Polish campaign. By September 1940, these old ships had been stripped of their secondary and AA armament and most of the crews had been assigned to other duties, leaving only an anchor watch.

Three heavy cruisers had been launched in 1937-38; Blücher had been sunk by shore batteries and torpedoes in Oslofjord on the 9th of April, Prinz Eugen had been hit by British bombs in July while still being completed but could be commissioned in August and was declared operational in December. Admiral Hipper had been rammed by a RN destroyer but was operational again by September.

Of the light cruisers, Königsberg had been sunk by Skua dive bombers in April, and Karlsruhe by HMS Truant a few days earlier. Leipzig had been torpedoed by HMS Salmon on 15 December 1939 and was out of commission until 1 December. This left only Köln and Nürnberg, plus Emden which although launched in 1925 was based on a WWI design and had long been considered obsolete and only useful for training.

Of the twenty-two Zerstörer commissioned up to mid-September 1940 twelve had been sunk since the beginning of the war, two (Z7 and Z8) were under repair and Z4 was refitting until 21 September. On 9 September the five destroyers of the 5th Destroyer Flotilla (Z6, Z10, Z14, Z16 and Z20) under Kapitän zur See Erich Bey left Germany for Brest to be on hand if the invasion should be launched and to interdict British coastal traffic in the western part of the Channel. Soon after the 6th DF, Z5 Paul Jacobi and Z15 Erich Steinbrinck, followed. The first five later moved on to Cherbourg, the last two remained at Brest. The German destroyers were large and modern and with five 127 mm guns carried a heavier gun armament than older RN destroyers. They were about evenly matched with the newer Tribal class with eight 120 mm (4.7in) guns and the J- and K-class with six. At 36 knots they were also faster, but their technologically advanced high-pressure steam turbines caused constant problems, and several were overdue for boiler cleaning.

The Kriegsmarine had a class of smaller vessels (around 1,000 tons) known as Torpedoboote. Of the older Raubtier and Raubvogel classes, launched in 1926-1928, seven were available. These were grouped in the 5th and 6th Torpedobootflottille, at Brest and Le Havre respectively. Of the slightly smaller Model 1935 class, launched in 1937-1939, twelve were available, grouped in the 1st TF (Den Helder with T1, 2, 3, 4, 9 and 10) and 2nd TF (T5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 12, based at Cherbourg). These latter ships carried the same torpedo armament, two sets of three tubes each, but only one 105 mm gun against three in the earlier classes, and had a very limited range. Like the rest of the invasion fleet, the T-Boote suffered losses from RAF attacks: T11 was badly damaged by bombs on 17 September, T1 was likewise damaged by a bomb hit on 18 September and under repair until 5 October, and T3 was sunk in port by air attack at Le Havre on 19 September and raised in March 1941.

The smallest fighting ships were the Schnellboote or S-Boote, known as E-Boats to the British. These existed in various versions with a displacement of 100-115 tons, but all were wooden-hulled, propelled by three MAN or DB diesels giving a top speed of between 35 and 39 knots, armed with two torpedo tubes and two spare torps (reloading at sea took about fifteen minutes), one 20 mm C/30 gun aft and one MG 34 forward. One or two additional MGs could be fitted on the bridge if required. Depth charges or up to eight naval mines could be carried instead of spare torpedoes. By the 24th of September, the 1st Flotilla was at Cherbourg with S18, S20, S26, S27 and S28 operational. The 2nd Flotilla was based at Ostend with S30, S33, S34, S37 and S55. The third flotilla at Vlissingen had four operational boats, S10, S11, S13 and 54. A “Schnelle U-Jagdgruppe” in Rotterdam had five older S-boats at this time, which were plagued with various mechanical problems and very rarely left port.

The U-boats scored numerous successes in the first year of the war, especially against unarmed merchant ships sailing alone. They were however still few in number, and of the between fifty and sixty in existence in the summer of 1940 only about a dozen were actively operating against the enemy at any given time. By suspending all other operations during the preceding weeks and throwing boats normally used for training into the battle, the Kriegsmarine hoped to make available for Seelöwe seven of the larger Type IX, twelve of the medium Type VII and twenty smaller Type II coastal submarines. The latter would be stationed in the invasion zone in the Channel and the southern part of the North Sea, while the larger boats, based in Lorient, would be stationed outside the westernmost mine barriers. A few would be held in readiness near the Orkneys to attack the ships of the Home Fleet if they came out.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

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Re: Operation Sealion

#59

Post by Knouterer » 01 Dec 2019, 11:29

Some notes about the RN at the same point in time:

The Royal Navy’s ships comfortably outnumbered the Kriegsmarine, which had suffered severe losses in the Norway campaign, but air power had added a new factor to the equation. Strong forces had to be kept in the Mediterranean to keep the Italian navy in check, and many ships were needed to escort convoys and to hunt German disguised merchant raiders or Hilfskreuzer, several of which were at large in the Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the Pacific. During September strong naval forces, including the Home Fleet's only modern aircraft carrier Ark Royal, were away on the unsuccessful expedition against Dakar (Operation Menace). As of 30 September, the RN worldwide numbered 28,143 officers and 239,037 men. The Royal Marines had 974 officers and 27,256 men; the two recently formed RM brigades were also assigned to Operation Menace. In addition, there were 1,820 Royal Marine Police (to guard naval installations, recruited from RM veterans) and 7,855 members of the Women’s Royal Naval Service (Wrens). The navies of the Commonwealth countries came under command of the British Admiralty.

A good part of the Home Fleet had been moved south to be closer to the expected scene of the action. Of the available battleships and battlecruisers only Repulse was at Scapa Flow, with the aircraft carrier Furious, four cruisers and four destroyers, while Nelson, Rodney and Hood were further south at Rosyth. The old Revenge was at Plymouth. Of the roughly 20 cruisers and 120 destroyers in home waters, including vessels refitting and under repair, 5 cruisers and 24 destroyers were in Nore Command (the Humber/Harwich/Sheerness/Chatham), 1 cruiser and 16 destroyers in Portsmouth Command, and 2 cruisers and 16 destroyers in Western Approaches Command (Plymouth/Milford Haven/Liverpool). After losses to air attack, and because it was within range of the recently installed German cross-channel guns near Cap Gris Nez, no destroyers were based at Dover, although it still was home to several dozen minesweeping trawlers and a few MTBs. The first of the fifty old American destroyers transferred to Britain arrived in British ports towards the end of September; RN crews had taken them over at Halifax but they still needed a lot of work done, such as the fitting of asdic and depth charge throwers.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir Charles Forbes, considered it excessively cautious to keep so many destroyers in readiness to defeat invasion, considering that there would be ample advance warning and that in any case no invasion could be attempted as long as the RAF remained undefeated, and wanted to free a number of them for more offensive action and convoy escort. Churchill and the Admiralty did not agree.

Many other vessels such as sloops and corvettes would also be thrown into the fray. Commander William Donald, at that time second in command or “Number One” of the sloop Black Swan, based at Rosyth, remembered the orders they received, under the heading of “Operation Purge”: “Briefly, the idea was that every available ship was to put to sea at once, continue firing till their ammunition was expended, and then sink the invasion craft by ramming them.” The corresponding orders of Portsmouth Command (Operation J.F.) specified that only ships with “strong bows” (such as larger minesweepers perhaps) should resort to ramming, but destroyers, being lightly built, should not. RN ships on convoy duty were to abandon their charges, directing them to the nearest port, and hurry to the sound of the guns.

Work on naval radar (RDF) had begun in 1935 and the first operational set, Type 79Y, was installed on the cruiser Sheffield in August 1938. The first production set, Type 79Z, was installed on the anti-aircraft cruiser Curlew a year later, and about a hundred were made. This was an aircraft warning set, but with some surface warning capability as well. Destroyers were (gradually) equipped with the Type 286 from mid-1940 (HMS Cossack had one installed in May), which had a fixed masthead antenna that scanned only forward of the ship and had a limited detection range of about 20 miles for aircraft and less than half that for surface targets. It was replaced by improved versions from 1941. Destroyers also had powerful searchlights and star shells (illuminating rounds) for their main guns. In the 1930s the Navy had spent much time training in night fighting, and this training paid off during nocturnal engagements with the Italian navy later in the war, such as the Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941.

Coastal waters were patrolled by the Auxiliary Patrol, consisting of more than seven hundred requisitioned motor boats, yachts and other small vessels, with crews drawn from the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and armed with whatever could be found. Coastal forces, which would later fight many spectacular actions in the Narrow Seas, were still in an embryonal stage and consisted of about two dozen MTBs of various models, plus some fifty MASBs (anti-submarine motor boats, half of which were being converted to Motor Gun Boats) and armed motor launches or MLs. Most of the available MTBs were based at Harwich from where they could have intercepted the invasion convoys moving along the Dutch and Belgian coast.

The Submarine Service had about three dozen subs in in home waters (including four brand-new Dutch ones) and maintained patrol lines with a dozen boats in the North Sea, concentrating off the exits between known minefields. Other subs were watching the Channel ports. Their orders were that reporting was their most important task and that, if at all possible, they should send a sighting report immediately and attack afterwards.

Various allied navies also contributed ships. The Free French Naval Forces, as of 21 September, consisted of 121 officers, 40 “aspirants” (midshipmen) and 2,171 ratings. Some 30 French officers and 600 ratings were serving in the Royal Navy, and were encouraged to transfer to the FF, which many were reluctant to do. In July, at the time of the attack on the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, French navy vessels in British ports had been boarded and seized but many of these were not yet in service with the RN. The most immediately useful ships were six fast and modern torpilleurs of 610 tons, comparable to the German Torpedoboote, based at Portsmouth. Four or five were operational with French, Dutch and British crews. The major part of the Royal Netherlands Navy was in the East Indies, but it did contribute, apart from the abovementioned submarines, a few useful vessels to the defence of Britain, such as minelayers, which the RN was short of. The contribution of the Polish Navy consisted of two submarines plus the destroyers Blyskawica and Burza, which were already acquiring a reputation for aggressive action. In addition, the destroyer Garland had been transferred from the RN.

Several squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm equipped with Swordfishes, Albacores and Skuas were based on land and available to repel invasion.

The fuel situation posed no problem. Like the other services, the Navy had been building up strategic fuel stocks for some time. In addition, since the start of the war, and even more so since May, many tankers bound for various European countries had been diverted to Britain. The arrival of petroleum products (mostly refined) jumped from a weekly average of 221,300 tons in April 1940 to 286,200 tons in May and 326,500 tons in June, after which it leveled off again. Storage tanks were full to the brim; the Navy had reserves of 2.3 million tons of fuel oil at home in June, which would be sufficient for more than a year at the current rate of operations, even without taking into account that Navy ships could refuel in other parts of the world.
"The true spirit of conversation consists in building on another man's observation, not overturning it." Edward George Bulwer-Lytton

glenn239
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Re: Operation Sealion

#60

Post by glenn239 » 02 Dec 2019, 18:20

Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 04:37
My question is why you keep circling around to this when there was zero planning by the Germans to use these or any of the other heavy vessels to contest with the RN in SEELÖWE. They only planning was for the diversionary operation.
Because if the RN bites hard on the diversion, then it is possible that many of those carriers, battleships, cruisers and destroyers are going to sail into the North Sea and not the Channel. You listed 2 carriers, 5 battleships, and nearly 100 CL's and DD's. They cannot be in two places at once. What was the RN's planning factor for ships we know were not available, but they did not? For example, I just read that the RN assumed Graf Zeppelin was operational in their planning in the summer of 1940. If they allowed for a ship that never commissioned in WW2 and never had an operational air wing, did they also allow for Bismarck, Eugen, Scharnhorst, etc?
Who do the British have as a reaction force just in case? The Home Fleet. You know, the guys at Scapa, Dundee, the Tyne, Rosyth, the Humber, Blyth...
You listed these resources earlier, within the context of Sealion in the Channel. Now you're listing the same resources as available to go after the German diversionary forces in the North Sea. Which is it? Sealion or the North Sea? They cannot do both in the key 24 hours of the battle.

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