What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

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pugsville
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#316

Post by pugsville » 02 Dec 2019, 05:01

Avalancheon wrote:
29 Nov 2019, 10:48

If Germany did not declare war on the Soviet Union, and instead focused all her efforts against Britain, it would be surprising if they were unable to defeat them before the end of 1941 (when America entered the war). The Reich could have battered them severely by embarking on a Mediterranean campaign.
Based on what? The German army could neither cross the channel or be deployed in numbers outside Europe. The Vast majority of German resources just could not be deployed against Britain. Germany was incapable of defeated Britain in the air or on the sea or deployed enough resources to North Africa to be successful there.

Not invading the Soviet Union actually makes very very little difference in the fight against Britiain.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#317

Post by glenn239 » 02 Dec 2019, 17:07

pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 05:01
Based on what? The German army could neither cross the channel or be deployed in numbers outside Europe. The Vast majority of German resources just could not be deployed against Britain. Germany was incapable of defeated Britain in the air or on the sea or deployed enough resources to North Africa to be successful there.

Not invading the Soviet Union actually makes very very little difference in the fight against Britiain.
Britain cannot possibly win a war win which both the SU and USA remain neutral.


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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#318

Post by glenn239 » 02 Dec 2019, 17:19

Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 19:21
Are you saying that your scenario A) means that Nazi Germany simply ignores the Soviet behemoth on its border? In reality, the Nazis and Soviets were like the Kilkenny Cats, which had tied each others tails together and then hing themselves over a clothesline.
Between a political and military solution to the problem of the Soviet Union, a political process stood some degree of chance of success of keeping Stalin on the side of the Axis, whereas a military attack guaranteed Germany's destruction.
What in this scenario changes Franco's mind?
A bullet, just like with Darlan.
How do the Germans transport a stronger force to North Africa to put "heavier pressure" there? Malta may fall, but if in 1941 probably only because the 7. Flieger-division is sacrificed there instead of Crete. In any case it was Italian rail and port capabilities and lack of shipping space that created the Axis logistic headache in the Med, exacerbated by the RN...Malta was just a single factor affecting that outcome.
The Axis build more Siebel Ferries and MFP's and other specialised landing craft. Built in the thousands to invade Britain on the Channel and sweep the Med. Gibraltar is taken and the Axis fleet make a union in Iberia to cut Britain's SLOC in the Atlantic. The Luftwaffe establishes strong bases on Crete to allow shipping via the Aegean route straight from Crete to Tobruk. Malta is taken, and Egypt falls. When Egypt falls the Axis have the deepwater Egyptian ports and can attack into the Middle East. Concurrently, the Axis will start repairs on the Suez Canal in order to be able to project naval power down the Red Sea towards India, while the Red Army occupies Iran and pushes its influence into the Persian Gulf. Churchill may make peace rather than be the PM that lost the British Empire?
Anyway, if Britain stands alone successfully as they really did in 1940, the only real change would be no or reduced Lend-Lease in 1941. So greater reliance in building up British and Canadian industry. The real problem isn't industry though, its financial...the loss of Lend-Lease without American loans substituted would cripple the British war effort.
Later in the war Churchill displayed a strong preoccupation with the balance of power in the Eastern Med, and what the situation of the British Empire would be in the post war. Ergo, it stands to reason that Hitler erred severely by not leveraging this threat in 1940/1941.
Last edited by glenn239 on 02 Dec 2019, 17:42, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#319

Post by glenn239 » 02 Dec 2019, 17:35

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:54
Germany also lacked the aluminum to produce a larger air force. Per DRZW Volume V, Part IIB, By late war, the Luftewaffe needed 700,000 tons of aluminum to meet its needs, but Germany was producing only 400,000 tons of aluminum.
700,000 tons of aluminium? That's way higher than I would have guessed. What did they need that amount for? That's enough to make 70,000 JU-88's a year!
The Allies also had a decided technological advantage in the air war, particularly for high altitude bombers and fighters. And the Me 262 was no savior for the Luftewaffe. Its safety was so bad, the Allies had to stop taking it on test flights after the war because it was too great a danger to the test pilots.
The problem with the ME-262 was that the engines required rare strategic materials that were in very short supply. Had Germany not committed the folly of attacking the Soviet Union, it could have attempted to rectify these shortages there.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#320

Post by ljadw » 02 Dec 2019, 18:12

You do not make 70000 Ju-88's a year with 700000 tons of aluminium . And even if you could, making 70000 JU-88's would be a wast of resources .And, what were these strategic raw materials in very short supply that no longer would be in veryt short supply if the Germans did not attack the SU .And how many more ME-262 could be built without Barbarossa ?

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#321

Post by pugsville » 02 Dec 2019, 23:10

glenn239 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 17:07
pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 05:01
Based on what? The German army could neither cross the channel or be deployed in numbers outside Europe. The Vast majority of German resources just could not be deployed against Britain. Germany was incapable of defeated Britain in the air or on the sea or deployed enough resources to North Africa to be successful there.

Not invading the Soviet Union actually makes very very little difference in the fight against Britiain.
Britain cannot possibly win a war win which both the SU and USA remain neutral.
CONTEXT. t this is response top a claim that Britain was certain to be defeated in 1941. Which seems fanciful.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#322

Post by glenn239 » 02 Dec 2019, 23:51

pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 23:10
CONTEXT. t this is response top a claim that Britain was certain to be defeated in 1941. Which seems fanciful.
Yes, I think you're right that it's unlikely Britain is defeated in 1941.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#323

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Dec 2019, 07:37

glenn239 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 17:19
Between a political and military solution to the problem of the Soviet Union, a political process stood some degree of chance of success of keeping Stalin on the side of the Axis, whereas a military attack guaranteed Germany's destruction.
And vice versa. Except neither side truly trusted a "political process" and both anticipated a military process to decide things.
A bullet, just like with Darlan.
I will endeavor not to violate the niceties of this fine site, but that is the most amazing bullshit of all bullshit hand-waves you, or any other poster here has ever been guilty of. I will not bother to respond to it.
The Axis build more Siebel Ferries and MFP's and other specialised landing craft.
More bullshit hand-waving. My response? Instead, I will build a black hole, and annihilate all your Siebel ferries and MFP.

You have just jump-started the concept of RO-RO in military operations, something that actually germinated in December 1943 and saw partial fruition in January-May 1944 in Italy and in June-July in NWE. You have translated a potential amphibious assault capability - untried, unproven, and viewed with considerable trepidation by the GROFAZ and OKH/OKW - into a a means of bypassing the accepted need for ports and port handling and conventional sea transport. Congratulations, you have taken the logical absurdity of themarcksplan concept of "earlier deep thinking" winning the war for the Germans to its logical absurdity.
Later in the war Churchill displayed a strong preoccupation with the balance of power in the Eastern Med, and what the situation of the British Empire would be in the post war. Ergo, it stands to reason that Hitler erred severely by not leveraging this threat in 1940/1941.
Wow, that's really deep. I may have to think a minute or so about it...oh, wait, Hitler did not "leverage threats", he reacted to opportunities and to what he thought his gut was telling him to do.
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Avalancheon
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#324

Post by Avalancheon » 03 Dec 2019, 15:28

ljadw wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 12:14
1 The war on the Eastern Front did never tie the bulk of the German military, but the bulk of the German ground forces .
And the Army, in turn, makes up the bulk of the German military. (At least in terms of manpower) So your statement undoes itself.
ljadw wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 12:14
2 USA remaining neutral would not result in Britain losing Gibraltar /Malta : without the consent of Spain Germany could not attack Gibraltar,and there was no reason why Franco would give this consent .
You didn't get it. The British will get clobbered in the Mediterranean. Not because the U.S.A. is neutral, but because the Soviets are. No Eastern front = Britain getting manhandled. Comprende?
ljadw wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 12:14
About Malta : the plan for the attack at Malta ( Hercules ) was made because not the British but the Axis was taking a lot of beating , There would be no reason for attacking Malta if the Axis was winning in NA .And the capture of Malta would not help the Axis .
Operation Herkules was a thing because Malta was interdicting the Axis supply lines from Italy to Libya. These were naval problems that indirectly translated into army problems. The Germans were far superior to the British at mobile warfare, but it didn't matter because they weren't getting enough fuel to do the 'maneuver' part.
ljadw wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 12:14
3 The British were NOT taking beating from the Afrika Corps , but from the Italian-German forces in NA : there were always more Italians than Germans in NA .
You're splitting hairs. The distinction doesn't really matter in the end, even though we all know who was doing most of the fighting. (Hint, it was the Germans)

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#325

Post by Avalancheon » 03 Dec 2019, 15:41

Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 19:21
Are you saying that your scenario A) means that Nazi Germany simply ignores the Soviet behemoth on its border? In reality, the Nazis and Soviets were like the Kilkenny Cats, which had tied each others tails together and then hing themselves over a clothesline.
Good lord, no. The Germans would need to keep a sizeable army posted along their border, in order to defend against a potential Soviet attack in the future. But the number of divisions required for this task are much less than what they would need to actually wage a total war against the Soviets. Better yet, they won't be losing tens of thousands of trained soldiers every month.
Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 19:21
How do they lose Gibraltar? What in this scenario changes Franco's mind? No Franco, no Gibraltar.
The Nazis aren't engaged on the Eastern front, so they can easily spare the troops needed to pull off operation Felix. Hitler and Mussolini can both put pressure on Franco. If he gives in, they march through Spain and take Gibralter. If he doesn't give in, they march through Spain and take Gibralter anyway. Francos military is in a rather sorry state, and wasn't capable of putting up any real resistance to Germany and Italys combined might.

Image
Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 19:21
How do the Germans transport a stronger force to North Africa to put "heavier pressure" there? Malta may fall, but if in 1941 probably only because the 7. Flieger-division is sacrificed there instead of Crete.
You assume that they will execute a Mediterranean strategy with the exact same forces they had at their disposal as OTL. Even though a shift in strategy would have needed to happen about six months earlier (giving them plenty of time to tailor their army for the task). Remember, Hitler didn't make the decision to go to war with Russia in June 1941: That decision was made months earlier, in December 1940. He chose this strategy due to the unhappy outcome of his conference with Molotov in the previous month. If Hitler decided not to invade the Soviet Union, then it would be because he managed to get the terms he wanted.

If Germany choses to embark on a Mediterranean strategy, then they will not need to raise the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th wave of divisions. They aren't planning to go to war with Russia, so they have no need for masses of infantry. Instead, they will raise more motorised divisions, along with some airborne divisions. By the time they enter the Mediterranean, the Germans won't have one airborne division, but several of them. The extra capability will enable them to take Malta soon after Crete.
Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 19:21
In any case it was Italian rail and port capabilities and lack of shipping space that created the Axis logistic headache in the Med, exacerbated by the RN...Malta was just a single factor affecting that outcome.
Lack of port capacity in Libya is a problem, but not an insurmountable one. Capturing Malta will partially solve the Axis supply issues. It will eliminate the aircraft that interdicted the convoys and bombed the ports. This will enable more ships to unload supplys at Benghazi, which is much closer to the front lines than Tripoli. While its true that Benghazi did not have as much port capacity as Tripoli, this was partly due to the bomb raids that made it difficult to repair infrastructure and stockpile supplys.

The Germans can also bypass the ports by making heavier use of air transport. Hundreds of Ju 52 flights every week would help minimise the logistical problems of the Afrika corps, and get them the supplys they need to finish the British. If necessary, they could also send some construction battalions to improve the infrastructure in Libya. Extending the Benghazi railway would be a good step.
Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 19:21
Anyway, if Britain stands alone successfully as they really did in 1940, the only real change would be no or reduced Lend-Lease in 1941. So greater reliance in building up British and Canadian industry. The real problem isn't industry though, its financial...the loss of Lend-Lease without American loans substituted would cripple the British war effort.
Quite right.
Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 19:21
Sure...just like the Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact. In that case, neither side worried at all about the guys staring at them across the river...did they? :lol:
Hmmm?
Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 19:21
Er, no, I said nothing of the sort. What I said was, "The actual GHQ estimate of 6 December 1941 was for 200 divisions. The first Troop Basis approved 15 January 1942 for 31 December 1942 was for 75 divisions. By 23 May 1942 the OPD estimated requirement was for 140 divisions, but the Troop Basis approved on 24 November 1942 for 31 December 1943 was for 100 divisions, which was modified to 90 divisions on 4 October 1943. By 31 December 1943 the Army achieved its peak wartime enlisted manpower strength. Army Ground Forces combat units were 2,282,000, Army Service Forces troops were 1,221,000, the Army Air Forces were 2,126,000, and the remaining overhead was 1,375,000, for a peak strength of 7,004,000. The manpower limitations were industry, the Navy Department requirements, and the requirements of the AAF and ASF, both of which over-expanded to meet perceived ideas of how the war would be fought based upon the situation in late 1942, not Avalancheon's postulated Case A) plus B)."
You only made that comment later, in response to Robert Rojas. Hence, your original remark is still a simplification. Specifically, this part: ''What you postulate with your A) and B) is very different from the strategic situation that led to the decision in June-December 1943 to confine the Army to the "90-division gamble".''

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#326

Post by Avalancheon » 03 Dec 2019, 16:06

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:54
Germany spent a far greater proportion of its GDP on its military than the Allies. The Allies had flexibility to expand production where they saw fit, whereas Germany was straining its war industry to its limits.
This is not true, however. For the first few years of WW2, the Germans and British were closely matched in terms of military spending. The proportion of GDP devoted to the war also increased with each year.
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:54
Germany also lacked the aluminum to produce a larger air force. Per DRZW Volume V, Part IIB, By late war, the Luftewaffe needed 700,000 tons of aluminum to meet its needs, but Germany was producing only 400,000 tons of aluminum.
If Germany put its full effort into the Luftwaffe, then they could potentially achieve 1944 levels of aircraft production in 1942. That would be enough for them to bring the strategic bombing campaign to a dead halt. Even if we assume they can't overcome the aluminum shortages[], then that simply means they would be unable to exceed their 1944 production levels. A Luftwaffe of that size would still be an extremely formidable opponent. Maybe they wouldn't be able to dominate Britain, but they could certainly make German airspace impenetrable.

[]And this isn't exactly a given. If the Axis take Malta and Gibraltar, then their ships can enter and leave the Mediterranean at their convenience. This would complicate the Allied attempts to enforce a blockade on them. And if nothing else, Germany can still trade with Russia.
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 04:54
The Allies also had a decided technological advantage in the air war, particularly for high altitude bombers and fighters. And the Me 262 was no savior for the Luftewaffe. Its safety was so bad, the Allies had to stop taking it on test flights after the war because it was too great a danger to the test pilots.
This is not preordained. The short engine life of the Jumo 004 engine was not due to bad design, but to shortages of alloying elements. Technological gaps came about due to a lack of priority, among other things. More funding would yield better equipment for the Luftwaffe.
pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 05:01
Based on what? The German army could neither cross the channel or be deployed in numbers outside Europe. The Vast majority of German resources just could not be deployed against Britain. Germany was incapable of defeated Britain in the air or on the sea or deployed enough resources to North Africa to be successful there.
They don't need to invade Britain in 1941. No one claimed they would. The Germans would embark on a Mediterranean campaign that the British would be unable to defend against.
pugsville wrote:
02 Dec 2019, 05:01
Not invading the Soviet Union actually makes very very little difference in the fight against Britiain.
Thats nonsense.
Last edited by Avalancheon on 03 Dec 2019, 16:18, edited 1 time in total.

pugsville
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#327

Post by pugsville » 03 Dec 2019, 16:13

Avalancheon wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 15:41

You assume that they will execute a Mediterranean strategy with the exact same forces they had at their disposal as OTL. Even though a shift in strategy would have needed to happen about six months earlier (giving them plenty of time to tailor their army for the task). Remember, Hitler didn't make the decision to go to war with Russia in June 1941: That decision was made months earlier, in December 1940. He chose this strategy due to the unhappy outcome of his conference with Molotov in the previous month. If Hitler decided not to invade the Soviet Union, then it would be because he managed to get the terms he wanted.
Well for starters Italy was pursing a seperate but parallel war strategy, and would not have tolerate German interference in the Mediterranean. Jutt because Germany decides on something does not mean the Italians agree. And before their defeat by compass they were unwilling for any German interference in what they regarded as their zone.

Also before the Italian army is defeated during compass, there is an extra 140,000 Italian troops in North Africa (as they had not been killed or captured) and require to supplied. This actually makes a lot harder to bring in German troops before this happens as the ships and ports are simply busy supplying the Italian troops and there isnt the spare capacity created by the British removal of these troops. It took 6 weeks to get 1 panzer division into north Africa with this historical spare capacity,.
Avalancheon wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 15:41
If Germany choses to embark on a Mediterranean strategy, then they will not need to raise the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th wave of divisions. They aren't planning to go to war with Russia, so they have no need for masses of infantry. Instead, they will raise more motorised divisions, along with some airborne divisions. By the time they enter the Mediterranean, the Germans won't have one airborne division, but several of them. The extra capability will enable them to take Malta soon after Crete.
That is still not long enough to create and train new paratrooper divisions. Also the German just don;yt have enough transport aircraft. Capacity like that takes longer to create.
Avalancheon wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 15:41
Lack of port capacity in Libya is a problem, but not an insurmountable one. Capturing Malta will partially solve the Axis supply issues. It will eliminate the aircraft that interdicted the convoys and bombed the ports. This will enable more ships to unload supplys at Benghazi, which is much closer to the front lines than Tripoli. While its true that Benghazi did not have as much port capacity as Tripoli, this was partly due to the bomb raids that made it difficult to repair infrastructure and stockpile supplys.
The Effect of Malaya is often over stated. the Aircraft that bombed ports did not come from Malta.
Avalancheon wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 15:41
The Germans can also bypass the ports by making heavier use of air transport. Hundreds of Ju 52 flights every week would help minimise the logistical problems of the Afrika corps, and get them the supplys they need to finish the British. If necessary, they could also send some construction battalions to improve the infrastructure in Libya. Extending the Benghazi railway would be a good step.
There not enough j-52's to more enoughg to make a real difference. Railways line supplies, construction battalions, it;s reduction in actual fighting capacity and a year to build the railway. It's pretty long term investment not going to achieve much in the short term.
Avalancheon wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 15:41
Richard Anderson wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 19:21
Anyway, if Britain stands alone successfully as they really did in 1940, the only real change would be no or reduced Lend-Lease in 1941. So greater reliance in building up British and Canadian industry. The real problem isn't industry though, its financial...the loss of Lend-Lease without American loans substituted would cripple the British war effort.
Quite right.
Quite wrong. if Britain stands alone it's more lend lease not less as the supplies to the Russian can be redirected.

pugsville
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#328

Post by pugsville » 03 Dec 2019, 16:21

Avalancheon wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 16:06
If Germany put its full effort into the Luftwaffe, then they could potentially achieve 1944 levels of aircraft production in 1942.
No they could not. Increased production in 1944 was more than just diverting more resources.

production efficiency -production of existing types of aircraft becomes easier the longer it iis in production, the amount of man hours to make an me109 fell something like 30% each year it was in production. diverting more resources will not mean these production efficiencies will be realized any sooner than they were histrionically.

And there is also more aircraft factories that were built in 1942,1943 that were used in 1944. Resources are not instantly transferable form one production item to another. Infrastructure is often needed to increase prodcution that takes time to build. And new workers, new factories take time to reach production effectiveness of old ones.

The Idea that 1944 production could just be achieved by a chnage of focus and resources is a deeply flawed idea.

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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#329

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Dec 2019, 17:52

Avalancheon wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 15:41
Good lord, no. The Germans would need to keep a sizeable army posted along their border, in order to defend against a potential Soviet attack in the future. But the number of divisions required for this task are much less than what they would need to actually wage a total war against the Soviets. Better yet, they won't be losing tens of thousands of trained soldiers every month.
Yes.
The Nazis aren't engaged on the Eastern front, so they can easily spare the troops needed to pull off operation Felix. Hitler and Mussolini can both put pressure on Franco. If he gives in, they march through Spain and take Gibralter. If he doesn't give in, they march through Spain and take Gibralter anyway. Francos military is in a rather sorry state, and wasn't capable of putting up any real resistance to Germany and Italys combined might.
As I understand it, the Germans already had the troops needed and that was never an issue until the spring of 1941 when those troops began to redeploy. The issue was Franco successfully chose not to succumb to Hitler and Mussolini's...so what changes Franco's mind? Under this scenario the world is essentially the same until 22 June 1941.

Image

Nice nuke sub. :lol:
You assume that they will execute a Mediterranean strategy with the exact same forces they had at their disposal as OTL. Even though a shift in strategy would have needed to happen about six months earlier (giving them plenty of time to tailor their army for the task). Remember, Hitler didn't make the decision to go to war with Russia in June 1941: That decision was made months earlier, in December 1940. He chose this strategy due to the unhappy outcome of his conference with Molotov in the previous month. If Hitler decided not to invade the Soviet Union, then it would be because he managed to get the terms he wanted.

If Germany choses to embark on a Mediterranean strategy, then they will not need to raise the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th wave of divisions. They aren't planning to go to war with Russia, so they have no need for masses of infantry. Instead, they will raise more motorised divisions, along with some airborne divisions. By the time they enter the Mediterranean, the Germans won't have one airborne division, but several of them. The extra capability will enable them to take Malta soon after Crete.
I'm not assuming anything of the sort. The German-Italian problem with getting troops and supplies to Italian North Africa was getting the Germans from Germany to Italy, then getting them loaded in ships at Italian ports, and then getting those ships to North Africa and unloaded. The Italian rail couldn't handle the traffic, the Italian ports in Italy and Africa couldn't handle the traffic, and the German and Italian shipping couldn't handle the traffic.

Not raising the 12.-16. Welle will not solve that problem. BTW, the 12. Welle were not occupation divisions, they were the leichte-Infanterie divisionen (later Jäger divissionen), which likely would have been quite useful in a Mediterranean strategy. Nor was the 16. Welle divisions, they were four brigades, each consisting of three two-battalion regiments with no infantry heavy weapons or artillery and they weren't established until June 1941. Nevertheless, not raising the 13.-15. Welle would save about a quarter million men the Germans could put to better use in industry...but then they need to use 32 of the existing divisions for occupation duties. That leaves them with 21 Panzer, 15 Infanterie (mot), 1 Kavallerie, 115 Infanterie, and 9 Sicherungs divisionen.
Lack of port capacity in Libya is a problem, but not an insurmountable one. Capturing Malta will partially solve the Axis supply issues. It will eliminate the aircraft that interdicted the convoys and bombed the ports. This will enable more ships to unload supplys at Benghazi, which is much closer to the front lines than Tripoli. While its true that Benghazi did not have as much port capacity as Tripoli, this was partly due to the bomb raids that made it difficult to repair infrastructure and stockpile supplys.
IIRC, Malta played an insignificant part in the deployment of Sperrverbande Rommel in February 1941...and yet bits of its units were still waiting to cross from Italy and Sicily to Tripoli in November 1941. Nor did Malta-based air forces bomb ports in any significant fashion.
The Germans can also bypass the ports by making heavier use of air transport. Hundreds of Ju 52 flights every week would help minimise the logistical problems of the Afrika corps, and get them the supplys they need to finish the British. If necessary, they could also send some construction battalions to improve the infrastructure in Libya. Extending the Benghazi railway would be a good step.
Who hauls the fuel how to North Africa to enable the return flights? Oh and have you ever noticed what unimproved airfields in North Africa did to aircraft readiness?
Quite right.
See, we can agree on some things.
Hmmm?
I thought I was quite clear?
You only made that comment later, in response to Robert Rojas. Hence, your original remark is still a simplification. Specifically, this part: ''What you postulate with your A) and B) is very different from the strategic situation that led to the decision in June-December 1943 to confine the Army to the "90-division gamble".''

No, it was something of a simplification, but also remains quite literally correct. The OPD estimate for divisions required remained 140 until agreement was reached on 105 as the 31 December 1944 Troop Basis on 9 December 1943. The 90-division gamble cap was not actually applied until 15 January 1944. The approved troop basis for a date was not the same as the estimated requirement, which started with Wedemeyer's figure, then was reduced to the 140 division figure until it shifted to the 105 division figure accepted in Decemeber 1943 and finally the fait accompli of the 90 division (really 89 division) figure of January 1944. It was the changing strategic situation between Marshall's 200-division estimate of 6 December 1941 and the acceptance of 90 divisions January-June 1944 that caused the change.
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ljadw
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Re: What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

#330

Post by ljadw » 03 Dec 2019, 18:26

Avalancheon wrote:
03 Dec 2019, 15:28
ljadw wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 12:14
1 The war on the Eastern Front did never tie the bulk of the German military, but the bulk of the German ground forces .
And the Army, in turn, makes up the bulk of the German military. (At least in terms of manpower) So your statement undoes itself.
ljadw wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 12:14
2 USA remaining neutral would not result in Britain losing Gibraltar /Malta : without the consent of Spain Germany could not attack Gibraltar,and there was no reason why Franco would give this consent .
You didn't get it. The British will get clobbered in the Mediterranean. Not because the U.S.A. is neutral, but because the Soviets are. No Eastern front = Britain getting manhandled. Comprende?
ljadw wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 12:14
About Malta : the plan for the attack at Malta ( Hercules ) was made because not the British but the Axis was taking a lot of beating , There would be no reason for attacking Malta if the Axis was winning in NA .And the capture of Malta would not help the Axis .
Operation Herkules was a thing because Malta was interdicting the Axis supply lines from Italy to Libya. These were naval problems that indirectly translated into army problems. The Germans were far superior to the British at mobile warfare, but it didn't matter because they weren't getting enough fuel to do the 'maneuver' part.
ljadw wrote:
01 Dec 2019, 12:14
3 The British were NOT taking beating from the Afrika Corps , but from the Italian-German forces in NA : there were always more Italians than Germans in NA .
You're splitting hairs. The distinction doesn't really matter in the end, even though we all know who was doing most of the fighting. (Hint, it was the Germans)
1 The 3 million men of the Ostheer on June 22 were still a minority of the manpower of the WM .
2 No Eastern Front does NOT mean a bigger AK,because it was impossible to supply a bigger AK and because a bigger AK could not operate in Libya,which was a desert . Comprende ?
3 Malta was NOT interdicting the supplies to NA : 15 % of what was sent to NA was lost,of which 2/3 by Malta = 10 % and if these 10 % arrived in NA,it would not help but hinder the Axis .The Axis got sufficient fuel .
4 The Germans were NOT doing most of the fighting : you have been looking too much to Allo,Allo.
5 It was farther from the Ruhr to Tripoli than from Berlin to Moscow and it took weeks before supplies that left the Ruhr could arrive at the ports of NA and again weeks for these supplies to arrive at the fronline .

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