Avalancheon wrote: ↑03 Dec 2019, 15:41
Good lord, no. The Germans would need to keep a sizeable army posted along their border, in order to defend against a potential Soviet attack in the future. But the number of divisions required for this task are much less than what they would need to actually wage a total war against the Soviets. Better yet, they won't be losing tens of thousands of trained soldiers every month.
Yes.
The Nazis aren't engaged on the Eastern front, so they can easily spare the troops needed to pull off operation Felix. Hitler and Mussolini can both put pressure on Franco. If he gives in, they march through Spain and take Gibralter. If he doesn't give in, they march through Spain and take Gibralter anyway. Francos military is in a rather sorry state, and wasn't capable of putting up any real resistance to Germany and Italys combined might.
As I understand it, the Germans already had the troops needed and that was never an issue until the spring of 1941 when those troops began to redeploy. The issue was Franco successfully chose not to succumb to Hitler and Mussolini's...so what changes Franco's mind? Under this scenario the world is essentially the same until 22 June 1941.
Nice nuke sub.
You assume that they will execute a Mediterranean strategy with the exact same forces they had at their disposal as OTL. Even though a shift in strategy would have needed to happen about six months earlier (giving them plenty of time to tailor their army for the task). Remember, Hitler didn't make the decision to go to war with Russia in June 1941: That decision was made months earlier, in December 1940. He chose this strategy due to the unhappy outcome of his conference with Molotov in the previous month. If Hitler decided not to invade the Soviet Union, then it would be because he managed to get the terms he wanted.
If Germany choses to embark on a Mediterranean strategy, then they will not need to raise the 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 16th wave of divisions. They aren't planning to go to war with Russia, so they have no need for masses of infantry. Instead, they will raise more motorised divisions, along with some airborne divisions. By the time they enter the Mediterranean, the Germans won't have one airborne division, but several of them. The extra capability will enable them to take Malta soon after Crete.
I'm not assuming anything of the sort. The German-Italian problem with getting troops and supplies to Italian North Africa was getting the Germans from Germany to Italy, then getting them loaded in ships at Italian ports, and then getting those ships to North Africa and unloaded. The Italian rail couldn't handle the traffic, the Italian ports in Italy and Africa couldn't handle the traffic, and the German and Italian shipping couldn't handle the traffic.
Not raising the 12.-16. Welle will not solve that problem. BTW, the 12. Welle were not occupation divisions, they were the leichte-Infanterie divisionen (later Jäger divissionen), which likely would have been quite useful in a Mediterranean strategy. Nor was the 16. Welle divisions, they were four brigades, each consisting of three two-battalion regiments with no infantry heavy weapons or artillery and they weren't established until June 1941. Nevertheless, not raising the 13.-15. Welle would save about a quarter million men the Germans could put to better use in industry...but then they need to use 32 of the existing divisions for occupation duties. That leaves them with 21 Panzer, 15 Infanterie (mot), 1 Kavallerie, 115 Infanterie, and 9 Sicherungs divisionen.
Lack of port capacity in Libya is a problem, but not an insurmountable one. Capturing Malta will partially solve the Axis supply issues. It will eliminate the aircraft that interdicted the convoys and bombed the ports. This will enable more ships to unload supplys at Benghazi, which is much closer to the front lines than Tripoli. While its true that Benghazi did not have as much port capacity as Tripoli, this was partly due to the bomb raids that made it difficult to repair infrastructure and stockpile supplys.
IIRC, Malta played an insignificant part in the deployment of Sperrverbande Rommel in February 1941...and yet bits of its units were still waiting to cross from Italy and Sicily to Tripoli in November 1941. Nor did Malta-based air forces bomb ports in any significant fashion.
The Germans can also bypass the ports by making heavier use of air transport. Hundreds of Ju 52 flights every week would help minimise the logistical problems of the Afrika corps, and get them the supplys they need to finish the British. If necessary, they could also send some construction battalions to improve the infrastructure in Libya. Extending the Benghazi railway would be a good step.
Who hauls the fuel how to North Africa to enable the return flights? Oh and have you ever noticed what unimproved airfields in North Africa did to aircraft readiness?
Quite right.
See, we can agree on some things.
Hmmm?
I thought I was quite clear?
You only made that comment later, in response to Robert Rojas. Hence, your original remark is still a simplification. Specifically, this part: ''What you postulate with your A) and B) is very different from the strategic situation that led to the decision in June-December 1943 to confine the Army to the "90-division gamble".''
No, it was something of a simplification, but also remains quite literally correct. The OPD estimate for divisions required remained 140 until agreement was reached on 105 as the 31 December 1944 Troop Basis on 9 December 1943. The 90-division gamble cap was not actually applied until 15 January 1944. The approved troop basis for a date was not the same as the estimated requirement, which started with Wedemeyer's figure, then was reduced to the 140 division figure until it shifted to the 105 division figure accepted in Decemeber 1943 and finally the fait accompli of the 90 division (really 89 division) figure of January 1944. It was the changing strategic situation between Marshall's 200-division estimate of 6 December 1941 and the acceptance of 90 divisions January-June 1944 that caused the change.