The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[ljadw]

Different planning would not give the Ostheer more trucks,tanks,divisions,fuel, etc,etc .
And there was no convicion that the SU could be defeated in 1941 : there was an agreement that the SU could only be defeated in 1941 and that it needed to be defeated in 1941 .
Besides, more intelligence would not result in different planning,as there was sufficient intelligence and as planning was mainly depending not on intelligence but on the German strength .

You are conveniently ignoring that the red army was underestimated. There was a wrong conviction that the red army was near collapse which led to a stubborn continuing of offensive action in circonstances where it was better to stop.

To stop would not strengthen the German position .And if the Red Army was not underestimated , the result would be the same .There was no other alternative than to continue as they began and to hope that on a certain day, suddenly the Soviets would collaps . The Soviets would not collaps if the Germans stopped .

[ljadw]

In November 1940 Halder wrote in his diary that they would (try to ) defeat the Red Army by envelopping operations west of the DD line,because such operations would have no success east of the DD line.
After a few weeks it was obvious that the envelopping operations west of the DD line had failed to defeat the SU and that they were faced with 2 options
a remaining west of the DD line, what would mean a long war with the SU
b advance east of the DD line,hoping that the envelopping operations who failed west of the DD line ,could still be successful east of the DD line .
As a would not give Germany victory , they chosed b and as b was the only remaining option , it had to be successful, and thus it would be successful .
An other example not of underestimating the enemy, but of wishful thinking.Wishful thinking happens always when you are in a desperate situation .It was always : we will win,because we must win .

[Aida1]

Different planning would not give the Ostheer more trucks,tanks,divisions,fuel, etc,etc .
And there was no convicion that the SU could be defeated in 1941 : there was an agreement that the SU could only be defeated in 1941 and that it needed to be defeated in 1941 .
Besides, more intelligence would not result in different planning,as there was sufficient intelligence and as planning was mainly depending not on intelligence but on the German strength .

You are conveniently ignoring that the red army was underestimated. There was a wrong conviction that the red army was near collapse which led to a stubborn continuing of offensive action in circonstances where it was better to stop.

To stop would not strengthen the German position .And if the Red Army was not underestimated , the result would be the same .There was no other alternative than to continue as they began and to hope that on a certain day, suddenly the Soviets would collaps . The Soviets would not collaps if the Germans stopped .

Untrue. Without the conviction that the red army was near defeat, it made no sense to keep pushing in bad conditions. Without the underestimation of the red army ,operational decisions would have been different. Bad Intel did influence these.

[ljadw]

What would be the operational decisions without the underestimations of the Red army ?
The strength of the Red Army was irrelevant for the decisio to attack the SU . And the strength of the Red army was irrelevant for the decision how they would invade the SU .There was no different operational decision available .

[Aida1]

What would be the operational decisions without the underestimations of the Red army ?
The strength of the Red Army was irrelevant for the decisio to attack the SU . And the strength of the Red army was irrelevant for the decision how they would invade the SU .There was no different operational decision available .

It affects the conviction whether the USSR could be defeated in one campaign before and during Barbarossa.

[ljadw]

Sigh : the conviction was NOT that the USSR could be defeated in one short campaign, but that it HAD to be defeated in one short campaign .

[Aida1]

Sigh : the conviction was NOT that the USSR could be defeated in one short campaign, but that it HAD to be defeated in one short campaign .

Based on the Intel one had, one could be convinced the USSR could be defeated in one campaign.

[Appleknocker27]

It is certainly true the Abwehr startend its effort late and its activities were more in the border area so there was no effort and no information on the strategic level. I do not know whether they could have succeeded in having informants at the higher level as that would not be
I do think they were aware of weather and terrain but were convinced it would all be over before weather affected operations.

Assuming the campaign would effectively be over before weather had serious adverse effects is a direct effect of the campaign being planned on bad Intel estimates. The calculations of time, terrain and expected level of enemy resistance make up base consumption rates used by Logisticians in estimating how supportable a plan is and building pre-campaign stock. Logisticians are almost completely reliant upon the Intel staff (maps, weather, terrain effects, enemy capabilities) and the operations staff (scheme of maneuver, phases, priorities of support) to furnish them with all of the variables in the equation. If those Intel estimates are wrong, the operational scheme is thrown off and logistics is left in reaction mode, unable to forecast and plan in advance.
In short, for OKH to accept the Intel staff's estimates without much scrutiny and the leap to assume the campaign would be decided in fair weather set up Wehrmacht logistical functions at all levels...to fail. Logistics did not cause Barbarossa to fail, OKH failed to do its job and the operation's failure was a forgone conclusion.
Anyway, just my thoughts, which I may have stated many pages ago.

[Appleknocker27]

NO : better informations by FHO would not make the Soviet road and railway system capable to supply the advance of an army of 3 million men over a distance of more than 1000 km . And better informations from FHO would not make disappear the Red Army .
The Ostheer lost more than 200000 men in August 1941. Better informations would not prevent this .
In September 1944 the Wallies did not succeed to go to Berlin ,this was not caused by bad informations but by logistics and German resistance .
Every time an offensive fails the front generals blame intelligence/logistics,instead of admitting that they were stopped by the enemy .This is always so and will always be so .
Planning is not the decisive factor in victory,and different planning will not change logistical needs or logistical capacities . Logistical needs are determined by the enemy and by logistical capacities . Better informations will not give the Ostheer more tanks, more trucks, more fuel, more ammunition ...
As usual you are constructing a scenario where the Red Army is absent .

Better Intel and ANALYSIS of the campaign based on it would have given the Wehrmacht the necessary information to understand that the requirements for supporting Barbarossa were far in excess of initial estimates.
What immediately comes to mind is allowing the Deutsches Reichsbahn to handle all things rail and give them more personnel, better equipment and a higher priority of support. Next, raise more engineer units, bridging companies and construction personnel.
Germany had the manpower pool to provide a few more thousand men in specialized support roles, as well as slack in industry that worked a single shift, 5 days a week. Combat enablers like more engineers and railway specialists could have doubled or tripled the rate of supply in the OTL without having to provide huge amounts more troops, tanks, etc. The size of the Ostheer was adequate to destroy the Red Army west of the Dnieper, and it did just that. It was also adequate enough in size to destroy the Red Army East of the Dnieper...IF...it could be supported at a level that maintained its combat efficiency. That is exactly where FHO and OKH failed due to underestimation of the size and force generation capability of the Red Army.

The Wehrmacht did not need more mass to throw at the Red Army, it needed to maintain the mass it already possessed. That is something I have never been able to get through your head, on any thread, on any forum, in any year... In June of 1940 Germany possessed the potential means to provide that level of support, but without the requisite Intelligence demonstrating the need, it was simply left on the table.
In 1940, did Germany possess the capability to build bridging equipment, bulldozers, dump trucks, railway equipment, quarry equipment, etc.? Could they train say...a dozen more engineer battalions and a few battalions of railway specialists???

This isn't construction of a scenario where the Red Army is absent, its solving basic problems before they become problems. Its planning to set conditions were the combat elements can do their job with minimal impedance from waiting for fuel, ammunition, replacement parts, to cross a river, etc.
Maybe the Wehrmacht would have used those millions of Soviet POWs for construction instead of murdering them? Who knows, better information could have made a massive difference.

[ljadw]

NO : better informations by FHO would not make the Soviet road and railway system capable to supply the advance of an army of 3 million men over a distance of more than 1000 km . And better informations from FHO would not make disappear the Red Army .
The Ostheer lost more than 200000 men in August 1941. Better informations would not prevent this .
In September 1944 the Wallies did not succeed to go to Berlin ,this was not caused by bad informations but by logistics and German resistance .
Every time an offensive fails the front generals blame intelligence/logistics,instead of admitting that they were stopped by the enemy .This is always so and will always be so .
Planning is not the decisive factor in victory,and different planning will not change logistical needs or logistical capacities . Logistical needs are determined by the enemy and by logistical capacities . Better informations will not give the Ostheer more tanks, more trucks, more fuel, more ammunition ...
As usual you are constructing a scenario where the Red Army is absent .

Better Intel and ANALYSIS of the campaign based on it would have given the Wehrmacht the necessary information to understand that the requirements for supporting Barbarossa were far in excess of initial estimates.
What immediately comes to mind is allowing the Deutsches Reichsbahn to handle all things rail and give them more personnel, better equipment and a higher priority of support. Next, raise more engineer units, bridging companies and construction personnel.
Germany had the manpower pool to provide a few more thousand men in specialized support roles, as well as slack in industry that worked a single shift, 5 days a week. Combat enablers like more engineers and railway specialists could have doubled or tripled the rate of supply in the OTL without having to provide huge amounts more troops, tanks, etc. The size of the Ostheer was adequate to destroy the Red Army west of the Dnieper, and it did just that. It was also adequate enough in size to destroy the Red Army East of the Dnieper...IF...it could be supported at a level that maintained its combat efficiency. That is exactly where FHO and OKH failed due to underestimation of the size and force generation capability of the Red Army.

The Wehrmacht did not need more mass to throw at the Red Army, it needed to maintain the mass it already possessed. That is something I have never been able to get through your head, on any thread, on any forum, in any year... In June of 1940 Germany possessed the potential means to provide that level of support, but without the requisite Intelligence demonstrating the need, it was simply left on the table.
In 1940, did Germany possess the capability to build bridging equipment, bulldozers, dump trucks, railway equipment, quarry equipment, etc.? Could they train say...a dozen more engineer battalions and a few battalions of railway specialists???

This isn't construction of a scenario where the Red Army is absent, its solving basic problems before they become problems. Its planning to set conditions were the combat elements can do their job with minimal impedance from waiting for fuel, ammunition, replacement parts, to cross a river, etc.
Maybe the Wehrmacht would have used those millions of Soviet POWs for construction instead of murdering them? Who knows, better information could have made a massive difference.

As usual you continue to claim that the Germans could have don in 1941 what the Wallies could not do in 1944 .
Even if the Germans could have the capability to build more railways,etc, this would not help them ,as
1 they did not have the locs and waggons needed to transport the supplies for the victorious advance of an army of 3 million men to the Volga
2 if they had these locs and waggons,this does not mean that they would have the needed supplies an army of 3 million men needed to go to the Volga
3 even if they had the needed supplies,there was still one factor who would block the advance of an army of 3 million men to the Volga = DISTANCE /TIME .It would take weeks for a train to move men and supplies to the Volga and to return . WEEKS .
When the Germans were on the run in August/September 1944, the Wallies were still unable to cross the Rhine,encircle the Ruhr and to march on Berlin,notwithstanding that they were closer to Berlin than the Germans were to the Volga .
If the Wallies could not do it, why would the Germans be able to do it,especially as the Soviets were never on the run,but were always counter-attacking ?
It was impossible to go to the Volga with 3 million men in 3 months .
The only thing that was possible was to go to the Volga with 300000 men in 3 months , but that was depending on the possibility that the SU would collaps if its standing forces were defeated west of the DD line . And that was depending on the Soviet willingness to collaps .
The truth is that success or failure of Barbarossa did not depend on what the Germans could/would or should do,but that it depended on the Soviets .
The key of victory was in the hands of the Soviets .

[Aida1]

It is certainly true the Abwehr startend its effort late and its activities were more in the border area so there was no effort and no information on the strategic level. I do not know whether they could have succeeded in having informants at the higher level as that would not be
I do think they were aware of weather and terrain but were convinced it would all be over before weather affected operations.

Assuming the campaign would effectively be over before weather had serious adverse effects is a direct effect of the campaign being planned on bad Intel estimates. The calculations of time, terrain and expected level of enemy resistance make up base consumption rates used by Logisticians in estimating how supportable a plan is and building pre-campaign stock. Logisticians are almost completely reliant upon the Intel staff (maps, weather, terrain effects, enemy capabilities) and the operations staff (scheme of maneuver, phases, priorities of support) to furnish them with all of the variables in the equation. If those Intel estimates are wrong, the operational scheme is thrown off and logistics is left in reaction mode, unable to forecast and plan in advance.
In short, for OKH to accept the Intel staff's estimates without much scrutiny and the leap to assume the campaign would be decided in fair weather set up Wehrmacht logistical functions at all levels...to fail. Logistics did not cause Barbarossa to fail, OKH failed to do its job and the operation's failure was a forgone conclusion.
Anyway, just my thoughts, which I may have stated many pages ago.

Even if your Intel about enemy strength is correct and the operational plan is adapted to it, consumption rate is still guesswork as you cannot accurately predict enemy resistance and speed of advance. There are other variables too you cannot predict when you do not have a similor campaign you can use as a yardstick. Plans rarely work out.There is always improvisation.

[Aida1]

NO : better informations by FHO would not make the Soviet road and railway system capable to supply the advance of an army of 3 million men over a distance of more than 1000 km . And better informations from FHO would not make disappear the Red Army .
The Ostheer lost more than 200000 men in August 1941. Better informations would not prevent this .
In September 1944 the Wallies did not succeed to go to Berlin ,this was not caused by bad informations but by logistics and German resistance .
Every time an offensive fails the front generals blame intelligence/logistics,instead of admitting that they were stopped by the enemy .This is always so and will always be so .
Planning is not the decisive factor in victory,and different planning will not change logistical needs or logistical capacities . Logistical needs are determined by the enemy and by logistical capacities . Better informations will not give the Ostheer more tanks, more trucks, more fuel, more ammunition ...
As usual you are constructing a scenario where the Red Army is absent .

Better Intel and ANALYSIS of the campaign based on it would have given the Wehrmacht the necessary information to understand that the requirements for supporting Barbarossa were far in excess of initial estimates.
What immediately comes to mind is allowing the Deutsches Reichsbahn to handle all things rail and give them more personnel, better equipment and a higher priority of support. Next, raise more engineer units, bridging companies and construction personnel.
Germany had the manpower pool to provide a few more thousand men in specialized support roles, as well as slack in industry that worked a single shift, 5 days a week. Combat enablers like more engineers and railway specialists could have doubled or tripled the rate of supply in the OTL without having to provide huge amounts more troops, tanks, etc. The size of the Ostheer was adequate to destroy the Red Army west of the Dnieper, and it did just that. It was also adequate enough in size to destroy the Red Army East of the Dnieper...IF...it could be supported at a level that maintained its combat efficiency. That is exactly where FHO and OKH failed due to underestimation of the size and force generation capability of the Red Army.

The Wehrmacht did not need more mass to throw at the Red Army, it needed to maintain the mass it already possessed. That is something I have never been able to get through your head, on any thread, on any forum, in any year... In June of 1940 Germany possessed the potential means to provide that level of support, but without the requisite Intelligence demonstrating the need, it was simply left on the table.
In 1940, did Germany possess the capability to build bridging equipment, bulldozers, dump trucks, railway equipment, quarry equipment, etc.? Could they train say...a dozen more engineer battalions and a few battalions of railway specialists???

This isn't construction of a scenario where the Red Army is absent, its solving basic problems before they become problems. Its planning to set conditions were the combat elements can do their job with minimal impedance from waiting for fuel, ammunition, replacement parts, to cross a river, etc.
Maybe the Wehrmacht would have used those millions of Soviet POWs for construction instead of murdering them? Who knows, better information could have made a massive difference.

A lot of this is true. If you know beforehand how difficult defeating the USSR will be, a lot of things will be done differently beginning with the organisation of the war economy I doubt the campaign will still start in 1941.

[ljadw]

If the campaign would not start in 1941, it would and could not start later .

[BDV]

In November 1940 Halder wrote in his diary that they would (try to ) defeat the Red Army by envelopping operations west of the DD line,because such operations would have no success east of the DD line.

That's one interesting proposition, because it was not what they tried in Barbarossa. What they tried was 1000+ km deep strikes that failed miserably, turned to envelopments, and back to deep strikes (in unfavourable terrain).

After a few weeks it was obvious that the envelopping operations west of the DD line had failed to defeat the SU

The only envelopment in the first 4 weeks was Minsk. Even planned envelopments (Polotsk-Nevel rooms, Estonia) were abandoned in attempt to pursue the deep strikes.

As a would not give Germany victory , they chose b and as b was the only remaining option , it had to be successful, and thus it would be successful. An other example not of underestimating the enemy, but of wishful thinking.Wishful thinking happens always when you are in a desperate situation. It was always : we will win,because we must win .

In a war where they had meager resources and a short (in their mind) timeframe Schicklgruber et Co chose to attack along the slowest and most difficult/inappropriate terrain for their battle strengths, most logistically expensive, while moving by truck against a high manpower enemy withdrawing along his rail network. There is desperation, there is stupidity, and there is desperate people doing stupid things.

And for us folk trying to understand what happened, there is of course the copiuos post-war lying by Schicklgruber's former underlings.

[BDV]

You are completely factually wrong here.You seem to imply that 0 % of the panzer strength was in the south as 40 +60 is a 100.

I meant the armor concentrated for the Luga breakout (August) and Taifun (September).

And you are in denial of the fact that one wanted to go for Moscow.

One can:

A) Go for Moscow (subsequently and only after going for Leningrad),
or one can
B) Plan the attack against Bolshevik Russia "around panzerwaffe doctrine".

Choosing A. excludes B.
Choosing B. excludes A.