At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
HistoryGeek2019
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 06 Dec 2019 17:50

I said the 2nd Army (under Weichs) was the weakest, not 2nd Panzer Group (under Guderian).

AGN could not sustain its advance, its right flank was exposed and required the 3rd Panzer Group under Hoth to assist it in order to reach Leningrad. The deployment of Hoth's forces to the north caught the Soviets by surprise as they were massing in between AGN and AGC.

Manstein's memoirs were written years after fact with a view to exonerating himself and other generals he liked. Scholars such as Glantz and Stahel have gone back and read the real-time situation reports, which paint a far bleaker picture of the Ostheer in August 1941.

AGC was on the defense in August, being attacked by new Soviet armies that were being deployed to the east of Smolensk. The panzer forces had to be withdrawn from the front line for rest and refit after having been engaged in non-stop fighting since the campaign opened, and the infantry forces that relieved them were strung out in a long, thin front with few reserves. This wasn't because of anything Hitler did, it was an inherent feature of the front that it got wider the farther east the Germans pushed, and they entered the campaign with inadequate reserves. The Soviets were massing strength on the flanks of AGC, so Germany had no choice but to deploy forces on the north and south of AGC to deal with them. To keep plunging straight ahead when the enemy is massing on your flanks is suicide. The German logistical situation was barely adequate to sustain a defense. There was no build up of supplies that would have been necessary to sustain another advance.

An army cannot simply keep attacking indefinitely. Every attack has a "culmination point" according to Clausewitz, and the Germans reached that point at Smolensk, if not earlier.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 06 Dec 2019 19:39

checkov wrote:
06 Dec 2019 15:14
Jldaw: Well, as an unimportant note I didn't say the T-34 was first met by the German army in October, I said it was first met by Guderians men in October. Who said this? Guderian said that. T-34s certainly did attack German tanks, It was mentioned in several sources how the German tanks (especially lighter 2s and 3s models) could not penetrate its armor but the T-34 would penetrate German armor with an accompanying "swooshing sound that mercifully hid the cries of the crews inside". My entire point here is there would have been fewer advanced Soviet tank types in August (as well as British lend lease if you will kindly remember).

Max Payload: I'm absolutely sure the defense of Moscow and positions in front of it were started immediately in August and not October. Moscow citizens were called out en mass in October when the exact axis of the attack became more evident, that doesn't mean auxiliary troops and the military in general did not immediately start improving defenses in the Moscow region. So by halting the drive Moscow in August was better defensively prepared, I don't see how this can be argued. Also you give examples of Soviet threats here and ongoing battles there which show impressive knowledge but are not convincing to me. These are inconveniences. I am talking of the " Schwerpunkt" the main (or should have been) the primary effort of the entire war in the East should have been a early drive on Moscow. The logistical, communications, population, manufacturing, rail, road, air, governmental, industrial, economical, military, educational and perhaps above all else the cultural heart of Russia. It's fall would have hurt the national morale to an unknown degree as well. Again you (and others) amaze me by saying there would have been no difference in an attack in August than October in terms of the Soviet defenses. Please let me repeat my points on this:
1. Soviet forces had been defeated repeatedly and were reeling backwards in retreat for months. The Germans while suffering heavily were in comparatively better shape and had the initiative.
2. A delay allowed new Soviet forces to be consolidated (and trained) and not fed into battle piece meal.
3. Existing Soviet units (most at least) were sadly equipped and manned, the delay allowed them to be rearmed, reinforced and equipped. Consequently their fighting ability was greatly enhanced by October.
4. Not taking Moscow in August gave Soviet factories and lend lease months to create new weapons and equipment. These didn't exist in August so they couldn't have been used.
5. Guderian's forces were too battle worn and weary to advance on Moscow in August. Yet they then marched 200 miles, fought, marched back 200 miles and fought again.....🤔.

Thank you for reading my opinions.
1 Soviet armour ( T 34 ) could penetrate German armour IF they saw German armour and if German armour accepted the battle/could not avoid the battle .But only a very small part of German tank losses were caused by T 34 tanks .
2 The Soviet forces were NOT reeling backwards : the Ostheer lost 200000 men in August 1942 .
3 The Germans were not in better shape and did not have the initiative,
4 Not taking Moscow in August is a meaningless argument,unless you can prove that Moscow could be taken in August '
5 A German advance on Moscow ,which was unlikely to be possible,does not mean the capture of Moscow but would probably result in a Stalingrad avant la lettre .
6 In November 1940 Halder wrote in his diary that envelopping operations ( thus encirclements ) east of the DD line would not have any chances of success . Thus what Guderian did was not decisive .
7 It is not correct to say that the Kiew battle was decided by Guderian : 2 PzA was only ONE of the German units involved in the Kiew battle and not the most important .
8 The German losses were in August almost the double of those from October, idem for tank losses, thus it is not so that the Red Army was better in October than in August .
The dies were cast in July and August.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Max Payload » 07 Dec 2019 02:19

checkov wrote:
06 Dec 2019 15:14
1. Soviet forces had been defeated repeatedly and were reeling backwards in retreat for months. The Germans while suffering heavily were in comparatively better shape and had the initiative.
Months? It was less than eight weeks from the start of Barbarossa to mid August - the earliest start date for a Moscow centric offensive. But Soviet forces were not ‘reeling backwards’ on 23 July when Timoshenko began the Smolensk counter-offensive. They were not reeling backwards at the end of July when all Soviet forces facing AGC were ordered to undertake vigorous offensive action. AGC was gaining the initiative by mid-August but not on the critical Yartsevo-Elnia-Roslavl sector, east of which were the still uncommitted 31st, 32nd and 33rd Armies of the new Front of Reserve Armies.

checkov wrote:
06 Dec 2019 15:14
2. A delay allowed new Soviet forces to be consolidated (and trained) and not fed into battle piece meal.
A delay allowed new German forces (from the Balkans, from AGN and from AGS) to be consolidated.

checkov wrote:
06 Dec 2019 15:14
3. Existing Soviet units (most at least) were sadly equipped and manned, the delay allowed them to be rearmed, reinforced and equipped. Consequently their fighting ability was greatly enhanced by October.
You don’t question that AGC faced, if anything, a greater number of Soviet combat units in August than in October, so what evidence do you have that the 122 divisions it faced in August were less combat effective than the 95 divisions and 14 brigades it faced in October. And do you have any evidence (because I haven’t assessed the data) that the AGC of mid-August was as capable of undertaking a major offensive against Moscow as the AGC of early October.

checkov wrote:
06 Dec 2019 15:14
4. Not taking Moscow in August gave Soviet factories and lend lease months to create new weapons and equipment. These didn't exist in August so they couldn't have been used.
Months? It was 46 days from mid-August the start of Typhoon during which the Red Army lost almost the entirety of SW Front and its associated equipment. Any new weapons and equipment available at the end of September would have been desperately needed in the Ukraine.

checkov wrote:
06 Dec 2019 15:14
5. Guderian's forces were too battle worn and weary to advance on Moscow in August. Yet they then marched 200 miles, fought, marched back 200 miles and fought again.
Not quite. It was only part of II PzGr that advanced that far. Guderian’s forces were strung out from the middle Desna north of Glukhov south to Lokhvitsa, and Guderian began his contribution to Typhoon from Glukhov. As for the advance, the turn to the south from Roslavl was following the line of least resistance. Any attempt to advance east from Roslavl would have met considerably greater resistance.

checkov wrote:
06 Dec 2019 16:38
The Red Army would stay and fight to defend Moscow and thus be destroyed.
This is the nub of your argument and it does not bear close scrutiny for the reasons previously cited. The Red Army was no more likely to be destroyed defending Moscow in August/September than it was in October/November. In fact in attempting a narrow advance from the Yartsevo-Elnia-Roslavl sector it would have been AGC at risk of being destroyed.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 07 Dec 2019 18:12

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
06 Dec 2019 17:50
I said the 2nd Army (under Weichs) was the weakest, not 2nd Panzer Group (under Guderian).

AGN could not sustain its advance, its right flank was exposed and required the 3rd Panzer Group under Hoth to assist it in order to reach Leningrad. The deployment of Hoth's forces to the north caught the Soviets by surprise as they were massing in between AGN and AGC.

Manstein's memoirs were written years after fact with a view to exonerating himself and other generals he liked. Scholars such as Glantz and Stahel have gone back and read the real-time situation reports, which paint a far bleaker picture of the Ostheer in August 1941.

AGC was on the defense in August, being attacked by new Soviet armies that were being deployed to the east of Smolensk. The panzer forces had to be withdrawn from the front line for rest and refit after having been engaged in non-stop fighting since the campaign opened, and the infantry forces that relieved them were strung out in a long, thin front with few reserves. This wasn't because of anything Hitler did, it was an inherent feature of the front that it got wider the farther east the Germans pushed, and they entered the campaign with inadequate reserves. The Soviets were massing strength on the flanks of AGC, so Germany had no choice but to deploy forces on the north and south of AGC to deal with them. To keep plunging straight ahead when the enemy is massing on your flanks is suicide. The German logistical situation was barely adequate to sustain a defense. There was no build up of supplies that would have been necessary to sustain another advance.

An army cannot simply keep attacking indefinitely. Every attack has a "culmination point" according to Clausewitz, and the Germans reached that point at Smolensk, if not earlier.
You are conveniently ignoring that German commanders at the time had a totally different opinion .I do not see what Manstein has to do with any of this as hè had nothing to do with the whole discussion in the German high command You seem to think that there only two authors whose opinion matters.Probably the only ones you read.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 07 Dec 2019 18:19

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
06 Dec 2019 16:50
Germany could not attack Moscow in September. Germany couldn't even hold Yelnya (the launch point for an attack on Moscow) in September. The forces from AGC that took Kiev were not sufficient for an attack on Moscow - 2nd Panzer Group and 2nd Army. These two forces alone could not take Moscow. 2nd Army was the weakest army in AGC and was needed to cover the southern flank of AGC until Kiev was liquidated. It was the Kiev encirclement that freed up these forces to participate in the attack on Moscow. The Soviets were attacking AGC in September and AGC was on the defense with no reserves to spare, and Bock was even contemplating a withdrawal to a more defensible position. Stalin deployed most of his forces along the Moscow-Smolensk axis and left the northern flank of Kiev exposed - the only reason Kiev fell is because Stalin ignored the advice of Zhukov to strengthen this sector.

Talk of a German attack on Moscow in September is pure fantasy.
Only proves that your knowledge is limited as the German commanders wanted to attack towards Moscow at the end of august including von Bock who did not want to be on the defensive as his front was difficult to defend.He was absolutely against the diversion to the south.(Fedor von Bock Herbig 1995 pp255-258).An offensive would work out much better for the infantry divisions.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by checkov » 16 Dec 2019 16:46

Max, for the Red Army to be at 122 divisions in August and 95 in October means units were lost. Are you saying they were transferred to other actions or lost due to Soviet offensives? Please provide evidence of this. BTW I noticed you spent some effort attacking the term "reeling", well it's not my word. I used that term because various authors used it to describe the Red army's shape after multiple significant defeats in rapid succession.

I stand by my argument to all of you. I've sourced all of my statements and often used the opinions of top German Field Commanders from their own narratives. I think alternative hisoriy and political biases (arguably justified) are playing a part in your views...at least in some cases. Of course I am willing to admit this is my conjecture, it's my theory. I could be wrong, can you say the same?

IMO THE BEST CHANCE FOR VICTORY ON THE EASTERN FRONT IN WW2 WAS TO THRUST TO MOSCOW IN THE SUMMER OF 41.

Would it have worked? I think so, could it have failed? Possibly.

I will leave you with a few more pieces of evidence to support everything on this subject I've already said.

From Gorlaski..WW2 almanac, page 170.
1. On August 14, 1941 the OKW released its data for battle losses. The Wehrmacht on the entire eastern front had sufferered a TOTAL of 30,000 KIA in over 6 weeks of heavy fighting. As wounded normally doubles KIA let's say... what... that the German Army had lost about 100,000 men? That's out of a fighting force of 3 million that attacked in June, a mere 3-4 percent (wiki puts it at about 130,000 Kia or with wounded maybe 16%). They still had something like 50% of their effective armor. They had the initiative, the weather was fine, the ground was firm (heavy rains started on October 8), train tracks had been built all the way to near Smolensk for supply, they had complete air superiority, they were close to Moscow (AGC).

The Red Army on the other hand had taken terrible loses by August, probably over a million men captured alone not counting KIA and wounded. Their air forces shattered, in retreat, no initiative to speak of, huge loses in armor. Moscow had no prepared defenses I know of (by oct 16 civilian defense workers from Moscow had dug 60 miles of anti-tank ditches, 5000 miles of trenches and 177 miles of barbed wire around Moscow).

2. According to a youtube video " https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=wu3p7dxrhl8" the SU assembled 1.2 million troops in the region in front of Moscow between August and the start of the resumption of the drive on it in October. (Max p. You need to set this guy straight because you are saying the opposite).

3. Factories first "began" to be disassembeled for evacuation to the East on October 10, 1941 from the Moscow region. That means they were in operation for about an extra two months longer than if AGC would have attacked towards Moscow in August. Two months of round the clock production of weapons (JLDAW that includes apparently much of the USSR's aircraft) and equipment in the single greatest industrial center in the SU. That's a heck of a lot of weapons that didn't even exist in August.
Gorlaski, WW2 Almanac page 177.

Finally let's just use basic common sense. The Red Army had almost a two months reprieve to prepare for the defense of Moscow. Why would it be weaker after the two months?

Stay healthy and be thankful (allies) Der Fuhrer Hitler was such a blockhead or Moscow would have most likely fallen in the fall of 41 and the war would/likely could have taken a radically different turn.
Last edited by checkov on 16 Dec 2019 17:58, edited 2 times in total.

ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 16 Dec 2019 17:35

checkov wrote:
16 Dec 2019 16:46
Max, for the Red Army to be at 122 divisions in August and 95 in October means units were lost. Are you saying they were transferred to other actions or lost due to Soviet offensives? Please provide evidence of this. BTW I noticed you spent some effort attacking the term "reeling", well it's not my word. I used that term because various authors used it to describe the Red army's shape after multiple significant defeats in rapid succession.

I stand by my argument to all of you. I've sourced all of my statements and often used the opinions of top German Field Commanders from their own narratives. I think alternative hisoriy and political biases are playing a part in your views...at least in some cases. Of course I am willing to admit this is my conjecture, it's my theory. I could be wrong, can you say the same?

IMO THE BEST CHANCE FOR VICTORY ON THE EASTERN FRONT IN WW2 WAS TO THRUST TO MOSCOW IN THE SUMMER OF 41.

Would it have worked? I think so, could it have failed? Possibly.

I will leave you with a few more pieces of evidence to support everything on this subject I've already said.

From Gorlaski..WW2 almanac, page 170.
1. On August 14, 1941 the OKW released its data for battle losses. The Wehrmacht on the entire eastern front had sufferered a TOTAL of 30,000 KIA in over 6 weeks of heavy fighting. As wounded normally doubles KIA let's say... what... that the German Army had lost about 100,000 men? That's out of a fighting force of 3 million that attacked in June, a mere 3-4 percent. They still had something like 50% of their effective armor. They had the initiative, the weather was fine, the ground was firm (heavy rains started on October 8), train tracks had been built all the way to near Smolensk for supply, they had complete air superiority, they were close to Moscow (AGC).

The Red Army on the other hand had taken terrible loses by August, probably over a million men captured alone not counting KIA and wounded. Their air forces shattered, in retreat, no initiative to speak of, huge loses in armor. Moscow had no prepared defenses I know of.

2. According to a youtube video " https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=wu3p7dxrhl8" the SU assembled 1.2 million troops in the region in front of Moscow between August and the start of the resumption of the drive on it in October. (Max p. You need to set this guy straight because you are saying the opposite).

3. Factories first "began" to be disassembeled for evacuation to the East on October 10, 1941 from the Moscow region. That means they were in operation for a full extra two month than if AGC would have attacked towards Moscow in August. Two months of round the clock production of weapons (JLDAW that includes apparently most of the USSR's aircraft) and equipment in the single greatest industrial center in the SU. That's a heck of a lot of weapons that didn't even exist in August.
Gorlaski, WW2 Almanac page 177.

Finally let's just use basic common sense. The Red Army had almost a two months reprieve to prepare for the defense of Moscow. Why would it be weaker after the two months?

Stay healthy and be thankful der Fuhrer Hitler was such a blockhead or Moscow would have most likely fallen in the fall of 41 and the war would/likely could have taken a radically different turn.
WW2 Almanac is wrong and good for under the bus :
1 German losses were not counted weekly but per 10 -days
2 German combat losses were at the end of July (40 days )
45000 KIA
11000 MIA
150000 WIA Wounded do not double KIA
Total :206000 , NOT including the Finland losses and not including the LW losses .
In June the losses were 41000 men,some 4000 a day
In July the losses were 165000 men ,some 5000 a day
You Tube videos are also for under the bus .
The figure of more than 1 million Soviet POWs at the end of July is also not correct : German inflated figures were 813000 POWs at the end of July .
At the end of the year, they were forced to decrease the number of Soviet POWs by 540000 .= some 14 %, 14 % of 813000 is 113000 ,thus a realistic number of Soviet POWs would be 700000 .
The dies were cast at the end of July : at that day, for Germany to be able to win, the Soviets had to be on the run . They were not, they never were .The German losses in August were 200000 ,almost 7000 a day .

checkov
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by checkov » 17 Dec 2019 01:54

I feel like arguing with some of you is....tiring...😆

From historynewsnetwork.org

"An interview in which a Soviet commander admitted how close Moscow came to defeat by Germany during the Second World War has been broadcast in Russia for the first time.

The Soviet Union nearly lost the war in 1941 and suffered from poor planning, according to Marshal Georgy Zhukov in the frank television interview that has been banned since it was recorded in 1966.

Zhukov, the most decorated general in the history of both Russia and the Soviet Union, admitted that Soviet generals were not confident that they could hold the German forces at the Mozhaisk defence line outside Moscow.

"Did the commanders have confidence we would hold that line of defence and be able to halt the enemy? I have to say frankly that we did not have complete certainty.

"It would have been possible to contain the initial units of the opponent but if he quickly sent in his main group, he would have been difficult to stop," he told the interviewer, the Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov.
Zhukov also revealed details of his exchanges with Joseph Stalin, the wartime leader, in the interview broadcast on state-run Channel One."

Let me restate his one key point..from the mouth of Marshall Georgy Zhukov:

"It would have been possible to contain the initial units of the opponent BUT IF HE QUICKLY sent in HIS MAIN GROUP he would have been difficult to stop".

As I've been saying for weeks. Send in the main German effort as early as possible, August better than Sept better than Oct etc.

Im finished with this thread.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 17 Dec 2019 08:54

checkov wrote:
17 Dec 2019 01:54
I feel like arguing with some of you is....tiring...😆

From historynewsnetwork.org

"An interview in which a Soviet commander admitted how close Moscow came to defeat by Germany during the Second World War has been broadcast in Russia for the first time.

The Soviet Union nearly lost the war in 1941 and suffered from poor planning, according to Marshal Georgy Zhukov in the frank television interview that has been banned since it was recorded in 1966.

Zhukov, the most decorated general in the history of both Russia and the Soviet Union, admitted that Soviet generals were not confident that they could hold the German forces at the Mozhaisk defence line outside Moscow.

"Did the commanders have confidence we would hold that line of defence and be able to halt the enemy? I have to say frankly that we did not have complete certainty.

"It would have been possible to contain the initial units of the opponent but if he quickly sent in his main group, he would have been difficult to stop," he told the interviewer, the Soviet writer Konstantin Simonov.
Zhukov also revealed details of his exchanges with Joseph Stalin, the wartime leader, in the interview broadcast on state-run Channel One."

Let me restate his one key point..from the mouth of Marshall Georgy Zhukov:

"It would have been possible to contain the initial units of the opponent BUT IF HE QUICKLY sent in HIS MAIN GROUP he would have been difficult to stop".

As I've been saying for weeks. Send in the main German effort as early as possible, August better than Sept better than Oct etc.

Im finished with this thread.
I am surprised that you use the historynewsnetwork as a source . :roll:
That Zhukov was the most decorated general in the history of Russia and the Soviet Union is an argument of authority, thus not a reason to believe what he said .
Zhukov became chief of staff in February 1941 and was fired in July 1941,a month after the start of Barbarossa and for the rest of the was had only subordinated functions .
Montgomery had also a lot of medals, but he was still subordinated to the CIGS = Brooke .
Zhukov had no overview of the war , this was reserved to his BOSS = Chapochnikov .
Besides, what Zhukov said is irrelevant, even if it was true, which it was not :Germany could not lauch an offensive against Moscow in August 1941 .Last point : Zhukov did NOT say that the Germans could go to Moscow . He said that it would be difficult to stop them , he did not say that it would be impossible to stop them .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Max Payload » 19 Dec 2019 01:54

checkov wrote:
16 Dec 2019 16:46
Max, for the Red Army to be at 122 divisions in August and 95 in October means units were lost. Are you saying they were transferred to other actions or lost due to Soviet offensives? Please provide evidence of this.
I’m not saying either one. I was merely responding your statement (06 December 16:14) that the delay from August to October allowed, “Existing Soviet units (most at least)” to have “their fighting ability ... greatly enhanced”. And I asked for evidence that the 122 divisions AGC faced in August represented a less effective opposition than the 95 divisions and 14 brigades that it faced in October. I also questioned whether the offensive potential of AGC in mid-August was as great as that at the beginning of October, particularly when the situation at Krichev was at that time (mid-August) still unresolved.

checkov wrote:
16 Dec 2019 16:46
I will leave you with a few more pieces of evidence to support everything on this subject I've already said.

From Gorlaski..WW2 almanac, page 170.
1. On August 14, 1941 the OKW released its data for battle losses. The Wehrmacht on the entire eastern front had sufferered a TOTAL of 30,000 KIA in over 6 weeks of heavy fighting. As wounded normally doubles KIA let's say... what... that the German Army had lost about 100,000 men? That's out of a fighting force of 3 million that attacked in June, a mere 3-4 percent
I’m not sure where Gorlaski got his Ostheer loss figures from. Halder quoted for the first five and a half weeks (39 days) of the campaign;
“Casualties 22 June to 30 July.
Killed.............3,292 Officers .......64,778 NCO and EM
Wounded....... 7,964 Officers........224,364 NCO and EM
Missing.......... 315 Officers.......... 17,670 NCO and EM
Losses 318,333, or 9.63% of the Eastern Army”
(Source Halder diary entry 17/8/41)

checkov wrote:
16 Dec 2019 16:46
Finally let's just use basic common sense. The Red Army had almost a two months reprieve to prepare for the defense of Moscow. Why would it be weaker after the two months?
Because by the end of September the Red Army had seen more that two million of its personnel irretrievably lost with more than a further two-thirds of a million wounded sufficiently badly to require hospitalisation.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Max Payload » 19 Dec 2019 12:10

checkov wrote:
16 Dec 2019 16:46
Factories first "began" to be disassembeled for evacuation to the East on October 10, 1941 from the Moscow region. That means they were in operation for about an extra two months longer than if AGC would have attacked towards Moscow in August. Two months of round the clock production of weapons (JLDAW that includes apparently much of the USSR's aircraft) and equipment in the single greatest industrial center in the SU. That's a heck of a lot of weapons that didn't even exist in August.
Gorlaski, WW2 Almanac page 177.
And a heck of a lot of weapons that did exist in August were no longer in Red Army possession in October.
Gorlaski cites a ten-day delay between the commencement of Typhoon and the start of factory evacuation. If we assume a similar delay in August, then since the offensive could not have begun until the middle of the month, that puts the commencement of evacuation off until 25 August. I don’t have the relevant data but, given what happened on the battlefield between 25 August and 10 October, it would be unrealistic to suggest that Soviet weaponry and munitions output in that six to seven weeks period could have come close to matching actual Red Army losses at Kiev and Viazma. Materiel losses in the Kiev operation alone would have dwarfed the monthly output from the Moscow region.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by checkov » 19 Dec 2019 16:14

Max.

I don't have written sources yet that state the Red Army units in front of Moscow were in worse shape than in August. Yet.
However they had just retreated after a series of nearly disastrous defeats over 6 weeks and I did give a sourced statement on their (infantry battalions) sorry state of preparation after nearly a two months reprieve to rest, rearm, reinforce and resupply. It just boggles my mind that any one would infer they were in better shape right after their disastrous defeats in August and yet no significant battles were fought in the direction of Moscow until October and yet they would be in worse shape then.

On the manufacture of weapons. You are effectively clouding the air with smoke and mist--very effective tactic I compliment you.😊It doesn't matter how many weapons were lost, or what happened on what battlefield etc. It's irrelevant. My entire point on this subject is the factories were given an extra month or two to add weapons, equipment etc to the SU aresenal, as it existed for a crucial period of time. If Hitler would have listened to all of his Field Commanders (literally) and launched the offensive in mid- late August then I propose a change to the time line:

Reality.
Around mid October Hitler gives the go and offensives launched towards Moscow.
Moscow Factories built x units until mid-late oct.
Factories dismantled and moved, rebuilt resumed production in???? (Late November? December?? January???)
Hitler called off the drive around Dec 5 (?) due to bad weather and Soviet actions

So in reality x thousand weapons were available for the crucial time period of the defense of Moscow built sometime in August until a week or so after the offensive in October.

Alternative reality
Moscow Factories built x units until late August, just as in reality
Early offensive launched in mid-late August
Factories dismantled, moved, rebuilt and resumed production in??? (October? November???)
In this reality about two months (end of August all of September, maybe some of October???) of weapon production would not have been aviliable for the battle of Moscow, not to mention British lend -lease.

You could argue the total weapons produced would still be the same (I doubt that) but the time they were available would swing to the USSRs disadvantage. (weapons losses in Ukraine have an unknown effect on weapons produced in Moscow and where they would be sent...logic I think would make sense you would send said weapons to the most crucial area, i.e. defense of Moscow).

Thanks for reading my opinions. I am going to search for a book that would have more details on the defenses around Moscow in August-October, any suggestions?

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 19 Dec 2019 21:53

Typhoon was not stopped because of the bad weather, but because it had failed, already before the start of the Soviet win ter offensive / Already on the end of November, Wagner had said : we are at the end of our possibilities . Thus even if Typhoon had succeeded to capture Moscow, the Germans could not go farther .

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 19 Dec 2019 22:20

ljadw wrote:
19 Dec 2019 21:53
Typhoon was not stopped because of the bad weather, but because it had failed, already before the start of the Soviet win ter offensive / Already on the end of November, Wagner had said : we are at the end of our possibilities . Thus even if Typhoon had succeeded to capture Moscow, the Germans could not go farther .
And if they had captured Moscow in Typhoon, they would have had to give it up, like Rostov. The Germans were actually lucky they didn't capture Moscow, because Hitler would have refused to allow any retreat from the city. Which would have resulted in a Stalingrad level encirclement of German soldiers in the city.

Max Payload
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Posts: 488
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Max Payload » 20 Dec 2019 02:11

checkov wrote:
19 Dec 2019 16:14
Max.

I don't have written sources yet that state the Red Army units in front of Moscow were in worse shape than in August. Yet.
However they had just retreated after a series of nearly disastrous defeats over 6 weeks and I did give a sourced statement on their (infantry battalions) sorry state of preparation after nearly a two months reprieve to rest, rearm, reinforce and resupply. It just boggles my mind that any one would infer they were in better shape right after their disastrous defeats in August and yet no significant battles were fought in the direction of Moscow until October and yet they would be in worse shape then.
Let’s examine these, “ disastrous defeats over six weeks”, and the, “disastrous defeats in August”, as they relate to the Moscow axis. The major Soviet losses were in the first three weeks west of the Dnepr and to a lesser extent west of Smolensk in the second half of July. Even so 21st Army attacked across the Dnepr against AGC’s right flank on 13 July and Timoshenko launch a counter-offensive against AGC in the Smolensk area ten days later. That offensive expanded into a general offensive against AGC’s central and left wing positions and continued pretty much unabated until 10 September by which time Kluge’s forces had been driven out of Elnia. To suggest that, “no significant battles were fought until October” is simply untrue. The fact that the left and centre of AGC was under sustained pressure throughout August attests to the fact that the divisions of Western and Reserve Fronts were eminently combat capable. Consequently these forces did not have, “nearly a two months reprieve to rest, rearm, reinforce and resupply”; they had three weeks. Furthermore Timoshenko’s losses had been high - nearly 700,000 casualties in Western, Reserve and Central Fronts in the two months to 10 September, so it is not unreasonable to suggest that battalions manned by inexperienced reservists fed in to replace these losses were no more combat capable in October than those fighting in August.

checkov wrote:
19 Dec 2019 16:14
... (weapons losses in Ukraine have an unknown effect on weapons produced in Moscow and where they would be sent...logic I think would make sense you would send said weapons to the most crucial area, i.e. defense of Moscow).
On 27 September Timoshenko had command of just 147,000 residual troops of SWF to cover more than 600km of frontline. Since at that time there were three German Field Armies and two German Panzer Groups in eastern Ukraine, Stavka might have been forgiven for designating that as a crucial area during the second half of September.

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