Tom from Cornwall wrote: ↑13 Dec 2019, 17:59
Thanks, which suggests that Wavell, despite the experience gained by the British during both O'Connor's campaign and then in the shambles of Rommel's first campaign, had an unrealistic expectation of the likely pace of events on the modern battlefield.
Maybe.
He explains that everything seemed ok on the evening of the 16th, not perfect but nothing too serious to get agitated about. Beresford-Peirce had just returned from visiting both div commanders and he'd flown up to WDF HQ.
Then the comms went down. Wavell only notes they went down with 7 Div but we know it was with 4 Div too. He says the first message they got from 7 Div in the morning was garbled and had to be sent again. That was the 0930 message saying they (7 Div) were being driven back from the Omars and outflanked.
Based on that, he decide to fly forward and make a decision personally what to do.
He doesn't state categorically when (and from whom) he received the message that Messervy had decided to withdraw 4 Div. But, reading between the lines, and supported by other evidence, it points to getting the news from 7 Div when he arrived.
Was he slow to grasp what was going on? Perhaps. But he would have understood far better had he received the right information at the right time. I'd argue that if the comms had not failed overnight, he would have received a flow of messages from both div HQs of the German counter attack across the whole battlefield and been able to make a clearer and earlier decision. He may not even have decided, or needed, to fly forward.
Remember, the first clear message from 7 Div was at 0930 saying they were being pushed back and 4 Div was still silent. 4 Div only managed to get a clear message through to HQ WDF at 1115 saying they were already withdrawing - 5 mins after Wavell and Beresford-Peirce had left!
And then there is the belief the night before that things "
seemed fairly satisfactory". What is that based upon? It is based upon unit commanders and lower grossly overclaiming their successes. If the amount of German armour destroyed was as great as claimed, there wouldn't be too great a worry. However, ....
In the round, there is enough in the evidence to finger Wavell for being behind the curve. The evidence makes him an easy target. However, l personally feel that if you dig a bit deeper to understand the context in more detail, he was trying to bat against a fast bowler whilst wearing a blindfold and one arm tied behind his back. The evidence shows he missed the ball and lost his stumps. Could he have done better?
Tom from Cornwall wrote: ↑13 Dec 2019, 17:59
MarkN wrote: ↑13 Dec 2019, 01:17
I also found an interesting document laying out the siting of I./18.Flak.Abt's twelve 88mm guns and a breakdown of their success against the Cruiser and I tanks.
That sounds interesting - is it a German source?
It's a British write-up based upon a combination of info from captured German docs and British battle reports.
