The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[MarkN]

Completely untrue as they did NOT say there were only 75 left. The divisions left had a combat strength of 65 divisions plus 10 panzerdivisions. That is not the same.

It doesn't matter whether it is 70-75 actual divisions or the kampfwert of 70-75 divisions - it was only 20% of the total Red Army strength supposedly in front of them after having already destroyed 67% - which can be discussed as 255-260 actual divisions or the kampfwert of 255-266 divisions.

I quote again from Angriff auf die Sowjetunion p 584 : “Nach abzug der als verrichtet angesehenen Divisionen und der Verbande in Nordfinnland,im Kaukasus,Mittelasien und im Fernen Osten wurde mit 150 Schutzendivisionen,25 Panzerdivisionen und 5 Kavalleriedivisionen gerechnet ,von denen nur 6 Divisionen noch nicht ,onder nur wenig im Gefecht gewesten waren.Wegen der horen Verluste galt die Masse der als abgekampft,so dass noch mit der Kampfkraft von weniger als 80 Schutzendivisionen ,13 Panzerdivisionen und 2-3 Kavalleriedivisionen zu rechnen sei.An neuaufstellungen waren bisher 25 Divisionen ermittelt worden.Eine weitere Grosse Zahl wurde erwartet ,allerdings weitgehend ohne genugende Bewaffnung und ohne ausreichendes Gerat.” These numbers came from a Lagebericht of 27/7.Here one can see mentioned the number of divisions left and what their equivalent combat strength was.

So what?

Your obsession with kampfwert or not kampfwert is irrelevant. On 8 August, not 27 July, the FHO assessment was that 67% of the Red Army was gone. The OKH accepted that. It was complete bonkers.

[BDV]

The equivalent of 255 to 260 have thus been wiped off the Red Army orbat. If you want obsess over the word "destroyed", then crack on. It doesn't matter whether they have been destroyed 100%, 75%, 50% or all just gone on holiday

It matters, because if the are on holiday, Germans have to "finish the job" quickly, lest holidayers return, and rudely interrupt Wehrmacht's advance to Wolga.

- the FHO has taken 67% of the Red Army off the table.

... for now (at the time of the report, that is).

[MarkN]

Nonsense.

:roll: :roll: :roll:

You do not understand that the units above divisional level are very specific and you identify them and estimate their strength. If you have no specific idea of the type and number of units above the divisional you get nowhere. The quote shows that the FHO had a specific idea about what type of units there were above the divisional level. You turn things upside down.The FHO did not work like that.

For tactical planning, you need details of actual units. For strategic planning, you don't.

The FHO generated assessments that included data for both tactical planning and strategic. For example, they assessed how many actual divisions existed in the peacetime Red Army and how many actual divisions they thought would be mobilized from the reserve - 209 rifle divisions in three waves is an example of that. The 200 divisions calculation example is an example of strategic planning, so is the 11-12 million and the 370 divisions total.

On 8 August, the FHO committed the fundamental error of mixing strategic with tactical. The OKH readers failed to spot this.

[MarkN]

The equivalent of 255 to 260 have thus been wiped off the Red Army orbat. If you want obsess over the word "destroyed", then crack on. It doesn't matter whether they have been destroyed 100%, 75%, 50% or all just gone on holiday

It matters, because if the are on holiday, Germans have to "finish the job" quickly, lest holidayers return, and rudely interrupt Wehrmacht's advance to Wolga.

They weren't on holiday. The FHO didn't write them up as on holiday. The just ignored them. The inferrence in the FHO briefing us that they have all been dealt with (destroyed or other) by the Heer in the preceeding 7 weeks.

- the FHO has taken 67% of the Red Army off the table.

... for now (at the time of the report, that is).

As far as the OKH was concerned, it was permanent. It was job already done.

In reality, the job was not done. With the benefit of hindsight, and good research, we can ascertain that several million they believed they had already dealt with were actually not there in the first place.

[Aida1]

Completely untrue as they did NOT say there were only 75 left. The divisions left had a combat strength of 65 divisions plus 10 panzerdivisions. That is not the same.

It doesn't matter whether it is 70-75 actual divisions or the kampfwert of 70-75 divisions - it was only 20% of the total Red Army strength supposedly in front of them after having already destroyed 67% - which can be discussed as 255-260 actual divisions or the kampfwert of 255-266 divisions.

I quote again from Angriff auf die Sowjetunion p 584 : “Nach abzug der als verrichtet angesehenen Divisionen und der Verbande in Nordfinnland,im Kaukasus,Mittelasien und im Fernen Osten wurde mit 150 Schutzendivisionen,25 Panzerdivisionen und 5 Kavalleriedivisionen gerechnet ,von denen nur 6 Divisionen noch nicht ,onder nur wenig im Gefecht gewesten waren.Wegen der horen Verluste galt die Masse der als abgekampft,so dass noch mit der Kampfkraft von weniger als 80 Schutzendivisionen ,13 Panzerdivisionen und 2-3 Kavalleriedivisionen zu rechnen sei.An neuaufstellungen waren bisher 25 Divisionen ermittelt worden.Eine weitere Grosse Zahl wurde erwartet ,allerdings weitgehend ohne genugende Bewaffnung und ohne ausreichendes Gerat.” These numbers came from a Lagebericht of 27/7.Here one can see mentioned the number of divisions left and what their equivalent combat strength was.

So what?

Your obsession with kampfwert or not kampfwert is irrelevant. On 8 August, not 27 July, the FHO assessment was that 67% of the Red Army was gone. The OKH accepted that. It was complete bonkers.

There is no obsession. It is about you considering divisions destroyed that were not. And applying a percentage of diminition of combat strength on the total strength of the red army is really bonkers. The FHO did not consider that 67 % of the red army was gone.There was a lot more left of the total manpower of the red army What was underestimated is the ability of the red army to replace the losses and refit divisions.

[Aida1]

Nonsense.

:roll: :roll: :roll:

You do not understand that the units above divisional level are very specific and you identify them and estimate their strength. If you have no specific idea of the type and number of units above the divisional you get nowhere. The quote shows that the FHO had a specific idea about what type of units there were above the divisional level. You turn things upside down.The FHO did not work like that.

For tactical planning, you need details of actual units. For strategic planning, you don't.

The FHO generated assessments that included data for both tactical planning and strategic. For example, they assessed how many actual divisions existed in the peacetime Red Army and how many actual divisions they thought would be mobilized from the reserve - 209 rifle divisions in three waves is an example of that. The 200 divisions calculation example is an example of strategic planning, so is the 11-12 million and the 370 divisions total.

On 8 August, the FHO committed the fundamental error of mixing strategic with tactical. The OKH readers failed to spot this.

Wrong. They simply underestimated the ability of the red army to replace the losses that were really inflicted.
And you do need a detailed idea about the structure of an army ,otherwise you cannot have an idea about how much manpower is available for frontline divisions.

[Appleknocker27]

I don't think its hard to believe at all. There were almost no Red Army units that were at full MTOE of equipment or near 100% fill of personnel when the war started. The vast majority of units were under strength, under equipped and very much under trained.

I'm not sure the undertrained holds up to the extent that you seem to infer. But the rest is very true. The Red Army's cover forces along the border were significantly short of men and equipment. The Heer chewed through so quickly there was no time to strenthen them properly.

When it came to assessing the combat damage inflicted, there does not appear to be any attempt to establish what strength the Red Army formations started with and what actual damage was inflicted. Each Red Army formation was completely written off the orbat. No allowance appears to have been made for any residual manpower or equipment to have been able to be used later.

The Red Army was likely more under trained than it was under equipped, as manning and equipping are requisite for collective training at every level and become more critical in support functions and higher echelons of command. Glantz makes it clear that all of the Red Army units in the WMDs were somewhere between 72 - 88% fill and lacked critical specialists and qualified leaders to a huge extent.
To further the point, you cannot take school trained Soldiers and expect them to be competent when they show up at their unit or mobilization unless they are at the lowest level and not specialized in any way. Due to extremely rapid expansion the Red Army did not have enough schools, enough trained cadre to man them and were forced to cut short training in order to fill the ranks of brand new units.
All of this was readily apparent to the FHO from the Red Army's performances 1939-1940.

[MarkN]

The Red Army was likely more under trained than it was under equipped, as manning and equipping are requisite for collective training at every level and become more critical in support functions and higher echelons of command. Glantz makes it clear that all of the Red Army units in the WMDs were somewhere between 72 - 88% fill and lacked critical specialists and qualified leaders to a huge extent.
To further the point, you cannot take school trained Soldiers and expect them to be competent when they show up at their unit or mobilization unless they are at the lowest level and not specialized in any way. Due to extremely rapid expansion the Red Army did not have enough schools, enough trained cadre to man them and were forced to cut short training in order to fill the ranks of brand new units.
All of this was readily apparent to the FHO from the Red Army's performances 1939-1940.

I am not argue whether the average 1941 Red Army troepie had less, equal or greater military basic training or the quality of it compared to other miltaries and other timeframes. Nor am l going to argue about gaps in certain specialist areas. The Red Army 1941 was a mass conscript army where the bulk of the forces were expected only to point a gun, fire and thrust a bayonet when the bullets ran out. The Soviets had about 30 million trained soldiers. 30 million who had completed or in the process of completing their 2 years conscription. The Red Army could mobilize a mass of ready trained forces far quicker than the British of the Americans who did not have conscription. Training raw recruits was a non-issue.

The NCO and officer corps was certainly very weak and that us evident in the results of many of the early battles. However, it was good enough to survive and far better than the collective German assumption of the Heer officer corps.

[Appleknocker27]

What was underestimated is the ability of the red army to replace the losses and refit divisions.

Fully agree, which is why I brought up the Soviet "creep up to war" throughout 1941 that went undetected by the Abwehr and to me is THE intel failure that ensured Barbarossa could not succeed. The Imperial Russian Army demonstrated the ability to conduct clandestine mobilization twice before WWI, and how the Abwehr/FHO ignored the historical trend is beyond me and appears criminally negligent.

[MarkN]

Wrong. They simply underestimated the ability of the red army to replace the losses that were really inflicted.

Quite wrong.

And you do need a detailed idea about the structure of an army ,otherwise you cannot have an idea about how much manpower is available for frontline divisions.

The detail is needed for tactical planning. The availability of manpower is a function of population size - a strategic planning consideration.

[MarkN]

What was underestimated is the ability of the red army to replace the losses and refit divisions.

Fully agree, which is why I brought up the Soviet "creep up to war" throughout 1941 that went undetected by the Abwehr and to me is THE intel failure that ensured Barbarossa could not succeed. The Imperial Russian Army demonstrated the ability to conduct clandestine mobilization twice before WWI, and how the Abwehr/FHO ignored the historical trend is beyond me and appears criminally negligent.

The "1941 creep to war" was largely spotted and briefed on by the FHO. What they don't seem to have recognised is the jump in permanent 'peacetime' numbers from about 2 million to 4 million between 1938 and the end of 1940.

[Appleknocker27]

The NCO and officer corps was certainly very weak and that us evident in the results of many of the early battles. However, it was good enough to survive and far better than the collective German assumption of the Heer officer corps.

Agreed, no issue there. The point of looking at Soviet training quality in the context of all of this as it bears on German logistical support is that it is one of the main drivers of the expected level of resistance that can be offered, which equates to estimated burn rates.
Soviet leadership ability was low, due to the average Soviet officer having a rushed education, limited practical experience and being elevated two full levels beyond even his limited training. Couple that with massive field communication issues (lack of equipment, lack of specialists), massive mobility issues and an invasive political aspect and you more or less have a huge number of die in place formations incapable of a war of movement.
Regardless of the millions the Soviets can muster, they cannot provide competent tactical leadership (C2), mobility, communications or even firepower to them in the short term. The issue is maintaining and projecting Wehrmacht combat power beyond Smolensk in the OTL, which failed due to the lack of knowledge of clandestine Red Army mobilizations of early-mid 1941.
So...(to me) The problem statement for OKH would read something like; "How does AGC conduct a deep encirclement of Red Army forces East of Smolensk by the third week of July in order to, 1) destroy the STAVKA reserve on the central axis, 2) occupy major Red Army mobilization centers Vyazma and Briansk before forming Soviet forces become combat capable".

It really doesn't matter if the Soviets have hundreds of barely capable cannon fodder units if AGC's combat power and mobility can be maintained right through September.

[Appleknocker27]

The "1941 creep to war" was largely spotted and briefed on by the FHO. What they don't seem to have recognised is the jump in permanent 'peacetime' numbers from about 2 million to 4 million between 1938 and the end of 1940.

I'd have to dig back into that topic, but I understood something like 793,000 were called up around May and were still forming in the strategic depths as Barbarossa started. Many of them were caught up in the Vyazma and Briansk encirclement. That, and some of the formations in the STAVKA stretegic reserve were called up less than a year before Barbarossa and were also outside the WMD's, first encountered east of Smolensk. They were the units that were fed into the Soviet counter-attacks at Yelnya.

[MarkN]

The NCO and officer corps was certainly very weak and that us evident in the results of many of the early battles. However, it was good enough to survive and far better than the collective German assumption of the Heer officer corps.

Agreed, no issue there. The point of looking at Soviet training quality in the context of all of this as it bears on German logistical support is that it is one of the main drivers of the expected level of resistance that can be offered, which equates to estimated burn rates.
Soviet leadership ability was low, due to the average Soviet officer having a rushed education, limited practical experience and being elevated two full levels beyond even his limited training. Couple that with massive field communication issues (lack of equipment, lack of specialists), massive mobility issues and an invasive political aspect and you more or less have a huge number of die in place formations incapable of a war of movement.
Regardless of the millions the Soviets can muster, they cannot provide competent tactical leadership (C2), mobility, communications or even firepower to them in the short term. The issue is maintaining and projecting Wehrmacht combat power beyond Smolensk in the OTL, which failed due to the lack of knowledge of clandestine Red Army mobilizations of early-mid 1941.
So...(to me) The problem statement for OKH would read something like; "How does AGC conduct a deep encirclement of Red Army forces East of Smolensk by the third week of July in order to, 1) destroy the STAVKA reserve on the central axis, 2) occupy major Red Army mobilization centers Vyazma and Briansk before forming Soviet forces become combat capable".

It really doesn't matter if the Soviets have hundreds of barely capable cannon fodder units if AGC's combat power and mobility can be maintained right through September.

I'm not going to argue with your problem statement per se.

But l will add one caveat or question. Was the problem to get to those points before or after the Red Army mobilized? Your question assumes before. Is that the historical assumption of the OKH?

If the OKH assumption was to achieve those objectives after mobilization, then there will be little left of the Red Army to prevent them reaching the Volga. All well and good. If the OKH assumption is the same as yours, then the notion that several million Red Army troops in the process of mobilizing are neutralized by the capture of Vyazma and Bryansk is, to me, a bit far fetched.

In reality, and why l think the training issue is a bit of a red herring, is that the main reason the Heer failed to defeat the bulk of the Red Army in the location and timeframe that best suited them was because they weren't there. The Heer had not given enough time for the mobilized troops, trained or untrained, to get forward.

[MarkN]

I'd have to dig back into that topic, but I understood something like 793,000 were called up around May and were still forming in the strategic depths as Barbarossa started.

The FHO had identified and briefed the OKH of the first tranche of 500,000 and l think the second tranche too. But l'm posting from memory not from my files or notes.

Many of them were caught up in the Vyazma and Briansk encirclement.

Exactly. Those 800,000 ish troops were mainly called up to partly, but not completely fill the formations at the front. Few arrived. If any. Nevertheless, the FHO wrote them off the orbat completely when in reality they were being reorganized into 'new' formations beyond the next hill.

That, and some of the formations in the STAVKA stretegic reserve were called up less than a year before Barbarossa and were also outside the WMD's, first encountered east of Smolensk. They were the units that were fed into the Soviet counter-attacks at Yelnya.

All these formations are ones that were supposed to be destroyed before Smolensk. The Heer didn't give them sufficient time to concentrate and get forward. The Heer didn't start encountering the troops over and above the FHO briefings of 370 notional divisions or 11-12 million troops until after BARBAROSSA was supposed to have been already won.