At what point did Germany lose WW2?

[Ulater]

The way the red army counterattacked at Kursk was not very smart. You should attack weakness, not strength. So Invoking Kursk against tanks strong tankdivisions does not make sense. When a tank division has not many tanks left, it becomes a de facto Panzergrenadierdivision.

Speaking of sense is misplaced if you truly think that there is some great opportunity to attack "into weakness" when you are reacting to a breach in your own defense, or that 5th Guard Tank army actually attacked "into strength" at Kursk.

And since trhe thread is being derailed for this, Im really interested.

Was Guderian planning to revive light tank battalions for this new huge formations?
Was he planning for a Panther/Pz IV division, just bigger?
Was this a theoretical division that would come to be if production was sufficient, or was he planning to cancel existing divisions and concentrate the assets?

Because it looks to me like Guderian was not aware that in 1944, wehrmacht was not racing in weaponised tractors, on a developed infrastructure, in a short and comparatively small campaign that was the battle of France.

And really, why do you think that new german Panzer division organisation made them weak in 1941?

It is much smarter to let your opponent attrit himself and reach his culmination point before mounting a wellprepared counterattack. You could also attack somewhere else and force the opponent to break off his attack. Everything was better than the ill prepared counterattack that took place. Led to the red army attritting itself which was what Manstein wanted.
It cannot be difficult for you to read for yourself Guderians full program in his memoirs.It is only a few pages.There were certainly not going to be any new formations set up given that one could not even keep up to strength existing ones. As a stopgap measure assaultguns on the panzer IV chassis would be appropriated in the Panzerdivisions until a sufficiënt production of Panzer IV,Panther and Tiger was achieved. New equipment would be held back until it can be used decisively. No commitment of Panzerdivisions for a long period period in defensive roles....
It should not be rocketscience to know that the Panzerdivion with more tanks will have a higher striking force.

It is smarter, in a classroom on theoretical warfare.

Panzer divisions were more or less, concerning tanks, up to strength until mid 1944.

And if he indeed planned to fill-out panzer divisions with StuG IVs, after he had reports that mixed StuG/Tank unit dont work either, then I dont know what to say.

And no, Panzer division with 200 more tanks does not have equally more striking power.

And that some armored division employs up to 100 light tanks for scouting and other secodnary duties does not mean that you can make a blanket statement that it has 300 tanks, or that it has 100 points more in "striking power".

[ljadw]

Russell Hart is very critical about Guderian : Guderian Panzer pioneer or myh maker?

[ljadw]

Only some one stupid would say that in June 1940 Germany should have advanced to the French Mediterranean coast and from there to North Africa ( probably using swimming tanks ? ) .
Guderian said this in Panzer Leader .
Conclusion : Guderian was stupid .

[Aida1]

The way the red army counterattacked at Kursk was not very smart. You should attack weakness, not strength. So Invoking Kursk against tanks strong tankdivisions does not make sense. When a tank division has not many tanks left, it becomes a de facto Panzergrenadierdivision.

Speaking of sense is misplaced if you truly think that there is some great opportunity to attack "into weakness" when you are reacting to a breach in your own defense, or that 5th Guard Tank army actually attacked "into strength" at Kursk.

And since trhe thread is being derailed for this, Im really interested.

Was Guderian planning to revive light tank battalions for this new huge formations?
Was he planning for a Panther/Pz IV division, just bigger?
Was this a theoretical division that would come to be if production was sufficient, or was he planning to cancel existing divisions and concentrate the assets?

Because it looks to me like Guderian was not aware that in 1944, wehrmacht was not racing in weaponised tractors, on a developed infrastructure, in a short and comparatively small campaign that was the battle of France.

And really, why do you think that new german Panzer division organisation made them weak in 1941?

It is much smarter to let your opponent attrit himself and reach his culmination point before mounting a wellprepared counterattack. You could also attack somewhere else and force the opponent to break off his attack. Everything was better than the ill prepared counterattack that took place. Led to the red army attritting itself which was what Manstein wanted.
It cannot be difficult for you to read for yourself Guderians full program in his memoirs.It is only a few pages.There were certainly not going to be any new formations set up given that one could not even keep up to strength existing ones. As a stopgap measure assaultguns on the panzer IV chassis would be appropriated in the Panzerdivisions until a sufficiënt production of Panzer IV,Panther and Tiger was achieved. New equipment would be held back until it can be used decisively. No commitment of Panzerdivisions for a long period period in defensive roles....
It should not be rocketscience to know that the Panzerdivion with more tanks will have a higher striking force.

It is smarter, in a classroom on theoretical warfare.

Panzer divisions were more or less, concerning tanks, up to strength until mid 1944.

And if he indeed planned to fill-out panzer divisions with StuG IVs, after he had reports that mixed StuG/Tank unit dont work either, then I dont know what to say.

And no, Panzer division with 200 more tanks does not have equally more striking power.

And that some armored division employs up to 100 light tanks for scouting and other secodnary duties does not mean that you can make a blanket statement that it has 300 tanks, or that it has 100 points more in "striking power".

Not only smarter in a class room as Kursk showed. Not a good idea to launch yourself in a very hasty fashion headlong into a strong enemy force. Leads to disaster.
The idea of giving stugs to Panzer divisions was a stopgap measure to get armoured strength up quickly. The idea was to equip one tank bataillon per month with the Stugs and incorporate them in the Panzerdivisions.These stugs could work perfectly well with the infantry of the Panzerdivisions.
Given the type of tanks Guderian wanted to equip his tank heavy Panzerdivision with,it would certainly have much more striking power.
And a tank is a tank even if it is a light one. Even if you only count the medium tanks, the US heavy armoured division had double the tanks the average German Panzerdivision had at Kursk for example.

[ljadw]

Kursk has nothing to do with the discussion about if the proposal from Guderian to build PzD with 400 tanks,was
a good or stupid
b if it was good, could Germany afford it .
And Guderian had no business with Kursk as he had no field command : the IG of the infantry or the IG of the artillery were also not meddling with Kursk .
That Guderian was meddling with Kursk, instead of doing his job, proves only that he was an arrivist, a streber,someone who never would be satisfied til he was the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, function which was miles to high for him .
He failed as commander of a PzGruppe, thus he should have the modesty not to lecture his superiors. But : modesty and Guderian were two incompatible notions .
He used his ellbows to eliminate his superior,Lutz, the real creator of the Panzertruppen and who made his career .

[Aida1]

Kursk has nothing to do with the discussion about if the proposal from Guderian to build PzD with 400 tanks,was
a good or stupid
b if it was good, could Germany afford it .
And Guderian had no business with Kursk as he had no field command : the IG of the infantry or the IG of the artillery were also not meddling with Kursk .
That Guderian was meddling with Kursk, instead of doing his job, proves only that he was an arrivist, a streber,someone who never would be satisfied til he was the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, function which was miles to high for him .
He failed as commander of a PzGruppe, thus he should have the modesty not to lecture his superiors. But : modesty and Guderian were two incompatible notions .
He used his ellbows to eliminate his superior,Lutz, the real creator of the Panzertruppen and who made his career .

If somebody makes a comment about Kursk, i answer it. Your description of Guderian only betrays your prejudice.Kenneth Macksey for example, gives a much different judgment in Guderian Panzer general pp 210-217.

[Ulater]

Kursk has nothing to do with the discussion about if the proposal from Guderian to build PzD with 400 tanks,.

Kursk, and namely Prokhorovka, is a great example of how a tank heavy formation like 5th Guard tank army can perform badly, because of depending on tank attacks over combined warfare, and would not do much better even if concentrated, because II SS Pz. Korps was a more balanced force.

And Kursk is also a good example, when raving about "weak" 100 tank strong panzer divisions, without realizing that there were 15 such armored formations on a 250 square km battlefield.

[Aida1]

Kursk has nothing to do with the discussion about if the proposal from Guderian to build PzD with 400 tanks,.

Kursk, and namely Prokhorovka, is a great example of how a tank heavy formation like 5th Guard tank army can perform badly, because of depending on tank attacks over combined warfare, and would not do much better even if concentrated, because II SS Pz. Korps was a more balanced force.

And Kursk is also a good example, when raving about "weak" 100 tank strong panzer divisions, without realizing that there were 15 such armored formations on a 250 square km battlefield.

The reason that it was not combined arms is because the attack was ordered so quickly, there was no recce and no time for coordination with air and artillery. And it was also a frontal attack instead of the flank attack which had been intended (Das deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Band 8 p 135)Nothing to do with the unit being tank heavy. You seem to have an obsession against Tank divisions that have a lot of tanks.

[Ulater]

The reason that it was not combined arms is because the attack was ordered so quickly, there was no recce and no time for coordination with air and artillery.

"We assembled at the start line by 0100 12.07.43 in full strength, with the exception of one T-34 tank (the tank of the 277th Tank Battalion’s commander, driven by mechanic-driver Shcherbin, was disabled). At the jumping-off line, discussions were conducted with the crews on the subjects of the military oath, their knowledge of the Stavka directives, hidden sabotage, the approach of the hour of revenge, the situation on the other fronts, and the operations of tanks in combat. Applications for Party membership were written up. Seven applications for the Party were distributed, and nine for Komsomol membership. The political awareness and morale was high. In their jumping-off positions, the men received a hot meal."

Sure thing, it was ordered so quickly they had a breakfast and were doing paperwork in the 31st tank brigade of the 29th Tank corps.

And yes, its exactly my point that front aviation that was attacking the 5th GTA repeatedly instead of the enemy and artillery that was for the most part in a different formation would need a hell of a lot more sorting out to create anything coherent from an attack of 400 tanks and assault guns of more or less untested formation through a 5-6 km wide sector.

And if we were to ever analyse reports from 5th GTA itself, we would come back to my original point - that battlefield isnt a frictionless empty steppe or a combat match in some game.

- Like for example that 18th tank corps had to attack in 3 echelons, because their offensive sector was cut by ravines and gullies. which lead to itnermingling of corps' formations and a breakdown in coordination.

- 29th Tank corps, around 200 tank strong, advanced 2 kilometers in a sector 1 km wide, for a loss of 77% of its armored vehicles and 1,991 men.

And even if they performed better, it does not matter much, since at this level, a Tank corps would lack severely against a comparative panzer division in AT-guns, AA guns. field artillery and trucks, not even talking about manpower.

[Aida1]

The reason that it was not combined arms is because the attack was ordered so quickly, there was no recce and no time for coordination with air and artillery.

"We assembled at the start line by 0100 12.07.43 in full strength, with the exception of one T-34 tank (the tank of the 277th Tank Battalion’s commander, driven by mechanic-driver Shcherbin, was disabled). At the jumping-off line, discussions were conducted with the crews on the subjects of the military oath, their knowledge of the Stavka directives, hidden sabotage, the approach of the hour of revenge, the situation on the other fronts, and the operations of tanks in combat. Applications for Party membership were written up. Seven applications for the Party were distributed, and nine for Komsomol membership. The political awareness and morale was high. In their jumping-off positions, the men received a hot meal."

Sure thing, it was ordered so quickly they had a breakfast and were doing paperwork in the 31st tank brigade of the 29th Tank corps.

And yes, its exactly my point that front aviation that was attacking the 5th GTA repeatedly instead of the enemy and artillery that was for the most part in a different formation would need a hell of a lot more sorting out to create anything coherent from an attack of 400 tanks and assault guns of more or less untested formation through a 5-6 km wide sector.

And if we were to ever analyse reports from 5th GTA itself, we would come back to my original point - that battlefield isnt a frictionless empty steppe or a combat match in some game.

- Like for example that 18th tank corps had to attack in 3 echelons, because their offensive sector was cut by ravines and gullies. which lead to itnermingling of corps' formations and a breakdown in coordination.

- 29th Tank corps, around 200 tank strong, advanced 2 kilometers in a sector 1 km wide, for a loss of 77% of its armored vehicles and 1,991 men.

And even if they performed better, it does not matter much, since at this level, a Tank corps would lack severely against a comparative panzer division in AT-guns, AA guns. field artillery and trucks, not even talking about manpower.

You are not refuting anything. The issue is that what was originally meant as the proper flanking attack turned into a precipitous frontal attack against enemy strength without recce and artillerie and air support .And the lack of recce led to the disaster of falling into a red army antitank ditch.

[Ulater]

The reason that it was not combined arms is because the attack was ordered so quickly, there was no recce and no time for coordination with air and artillery.

"We assembled at the start line by 0100 12.07.43 in full strength, with the exception of one T-34 tank (the tank of the 277th Tank Battalion’s commander, driven by mechanic-driver Shcherbin, was disabled). At the jumping-off line, discussions were conducted with the crews on the subjects of the military oath, their knowledge of the Stavka directives, hidden sabotage, the approach of the hour of revenge, the situation on the other fronts, and the operations of tanks in combat. Applications for Party membership were written up. Seven applications for the Party were distributed, and nine for Komsomol membership. The political awareness and morale was high. In their jumping-off positions, the men received a hot meal."

Sure thing, it was ordered so quickly they had a breakfast and were doing paperwork in the 31st tank brigade of the 29th Tank corps.

And yes, its exactly my point that front aviation that was attacking the 5th GTA repeatedly instead of the enemy and artillery that was for the most part in a different formation would need a hell of a lot more sorting out to create anything coherent from an attack of 400 tanks and assault guns of more or less untested formation through a 5-6 km wide sector.

And if we were to ever analyse reports from 5th GTA itself, we would come back to my original point - that battlefield isnt a frictionless empty steppe or a combat match in some game.

- Like for example that 18th tank corps had to attack in 3 echelons, because their offensive sector was cut by ravines and gullies. which lead to itnermingling of corps' formations and a breakdown in coordination.

- 29th Tank corps, around 200 tank strong, advanced 2 kilometers in a sector 1 km wide, for a loss of 77% of its armored vehicles and 1,991 men.

And even if they performed better, it does not matter much, since at this level, a Tank corps would lack severely against a comparative panzer division in AT-guns, AA guns. field artillery and trucks, not even talking about manpower.

You are not refuting anything. The issue is that what was originally meant as the proper flanking attack turned into a precipitous frontal attack against enemy strength without recce and artillerie and air support .And the lack of recce led to the disaster of falling into a red army antitank ditch.

You certainly arent arbiter of that, or anything.

Yes, It was a flanking attack meant so hard to flank that its main objectives were basically the middle of the IInd Pz. Korps frontline.

[ljadw]

Kursk has nothing to do with the discussion about if the proposal from Guderian to build PzD with 400 tanks,was
a good or stupid
b if it was good, could Germany afford it .
And Guderian had no business with Kursk as he had no field command : the IG of the infantry or the IG of the artillery were also not meddling with Kursk .
That Guderian was meddling with Kursk, instead of doing his job, proves only that he was an arrivist, a streber,someone who never would be satisfied til he was the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, function which was miles to high for him .
He failed as commander of a PzGruppe, thus he should have the modesty not to lecture his superiors. But : modesty and Guderian were two incompatible notions .
He used his ellbows to eliminate his superior,Lutz, the real creator of the Panzertruppen and who made his career .

If somebody makes a comment about Kursk, i answer it. Your description of Guderian only betrays your prejudice.Kenneth Macksey for example, gives a much different judgment in Guderian Panzer general pp 210-217.

The opinion of Macksey is totally obsolete .

[Aida1]

The reason that it was not combined arms is because the attack was ordered so quickly, there was no recce and no time for coordination with air and artillery.

"We assembled at the start line by 0100 12.07.43 in full strength, with the exception of one T-34 tank (the tank of the 277th Tank Battalion’s commander, driven by mechanic-driver Shcherbin, was disabled). At the jumping-off line, discussions were conducted with the crews on the subjects of the military oath, their knowledge of the Stavka directives, hidden sabotage, the approach of the hour of revenge, the situation on the other fronts, and the operations of tanks in combat. Applications for Party membership were written up. Seven applications for the Party were distributed, and nine for Komsomol membership. The political awareness and morale was high. In their jumping-off positions, the men received a hot meal."

Sure thing, it was ordered so quickly they had a breakfast and were doing paperwork in the 31st tank brigade of the 29th Tank corps.

And yes, its exactly my point that front aviation that was attacking the 5th GTA repeatedly instead of the enemy and artillery that was for the most part in a different formation would need a hell of a lot more sorting out to create anything coherent from an attack of 400 tanks and assault guns of more or less untested formation through a 5-6 km wide sector.

And if we were to ever analyse reports from 5th GTA itself, we would come back to my original point - that battlefield isnt a frictionless empty steppe or a combat match in some game.

- Like for example that 18th tank corps had to attack in 3 echelons, because their offensive sector was cut by ravines and gullies. which lead to itnermingling of corps' formations and a breakdown in coordination.

- 29th Tank corps, around 200 tank strong, advanced 2 kilometers in a sector 1 km wide, for a loss of 77% of its armored vehicles and 1,991 men.

And even if they performed better, it does not matter much, since at this level, a Tank corps would lack severely against a comparative panzer division in AT-guns, AA guns. field artillery and trucks, not even talking about manpower.

You are not refuting anything. The issue is that what was originally meant as the proper flanking attack turned into a precipitous frontal attack against enemy strength without recce and artillerie and air support .And the lack of recce led to the disaster of falling into a red army antitank ditch.

You certainly arent arbiter of that, or anything.

Yes, It was a flanking attack meant so hard to flank that its main objectives were basically the middle of the IInd Pz. Korps frontline.

What a load of nonsense. The statement i made was based on the source i gave which is very well researched. So i did not arbiter anything. i quote” It had been planned to breakthrough on the weakest spot and surround the advancing Panzer units.But the Germans did not respect the sowjet scenario and broke through themselves ,advancing on Prochorovka.Now it came to an unwonted effect for the red army, as it was exactly defined in the revised edition of the History of the Great Patriotic war :” The strongest Sowjet grouping attacked the strongest German grouping ,however not in its flank, but frontally (Das Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Band 8 DVA 2011 pp 134-135).
-

[Aida1]

Kursk has nothing to do with the discussion about if the proposal from Guderian to build PzD with 400 tanks,was
a good or stupid
b if it was good, could Germany afford it .
And Guderian had no business with Kursk as he had no field command : the IG of the infantry or the IG of the artillery were also not meddling with Kursk .
That Guderian was meddling with Kursk, instead of doing his job, proves only that he was an arrivist, a streber,someone who never would be satisfied til he was the Oberste Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht, function which was miles to high for him .
He failed as commander of a PzGruppe, thus he should have the modesty not to lecture his superiors. But : modesty and Guderian were two incompatible notions .
He used his ellbows to eliminate his superior,Lutz, the real creator of the Panzertruppen and who made his career .

If somebody makes a comment about Kursk, i answer it. Your description of Guderian only betrays your prejudice.Kenneth Macksey for example, gives a much different judgment in Guderian Panzer general pp 210-217.

The opinion of Macksey is totally obsolete .

Says you without detailed and sourced rebuttal of the detailed opinion given by .Macksey.

[Aida1]

Only some one stupid would say that in June 1940 Germany should have advanced to the French Mediterranean coast and from there to North Africa ( probably using swimming tanks ? ) .
Guderian said this in Panzer Leader .
Conclusion : Guderian was stupid .

Nothing stupid about it. And you misrepresent what he actually stated. Simply another strategic choice about the continuance of the war. Given Guderians career, he was certainly far from stupid. Your prejudice against him is wellknown so your credibility is low.