Don't care about your ignorant, made-up opinions and thread spamming. I gave the sources, go get them. There are a few other books/unit histories on June 6-9th and the II SS PzK counterattack.Aida1 wrote: ↑28 Dec 2019, 23:49I think you are in denial here of how unfunny it was to be attacking while subjected to superior allied firepower “Unwiling to spend the blood price” is a strange way of describing what actually happened.Cult Icon wrote: ↑27 Dec 2019, 03:06On the CW side of the equation (they fought the majority of Pz formations in Normandy). The first book covers
https://www.amazon.com/Stopping-Panzers ... 886&sr=8-1
https://www.amazon.com/Breaking-Panzers ... 622&sr=8-1
Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
I don't have the book with me anymore as I returned it. However, there is a casualties breakdown at the end of the book with both sides having around the same.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑27 Dec 2019, 04:42
Sorry, but no. 3 CID reported a total of 354 casualties for 8 June and 804 for 9 June, the peak of the 12. SS-Panzerdivision counterattack. For 6 and 7 June the casualties totaled about 642. On 10 June casualties dropped to 205 and by that time at least 22 MIA had RTD.
I think that is a rather wordy way of saying the German attacks failed.
This is called in "less wordy terms" an abortive attack. 9.SS had sufficient strength to support the defense of hill 112 for the next couple of weeks- they came from Russia at approx. 3/4th combat strength and were down to about half after the attack. KG Weidinger was reduced and returned to its parent formation.
Last edited by Cult Icon on 29 Dec 2019, 16:38, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
No need to refer to another war and another army. The Ardennes is filled with case studies, although of much lower quality force than the one present in June. The fuel shortage was not so acute in June either due to the situation in Romania. The German commitments in Normandy was effected by the lack of reserves at the moment and the high level of strategic pressure being brought down on them. So 9.SS/2.SS, 12.SS made abortive attacks and were soon committed into the defense.Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑26 Dec 2019, 18:56
You are referring to the Normandy battle, June-August? The December offensive was of multiple armored or mechanized corps. Or what passed for such in 1944 German terms
It looks to me that fighting mobile concentrated multi corps size operations on the 'plains' of NW Europe wont work against air power on the scale the Allies had that year. Or in 1943 for that matter. Theres a reason the Germans severely curtained daylight movement and administrative ops in Normandy. How they neutralize Allied air power while fighting a large mobile ground battle on the French or Belgian plains I cant see.
As the allies moved East, the artillery and air power become a lot less concentrated- with accordingly decrease in suppressive firepower. Various campaigns in the fall of 44' show only a 3 times artillery superiority. However, the fighting qualities of the German army dropped to unprecedented levels with volksgrenadier formations developed with a 4-6 week training cycle and staffed with more demoralized troops from a polygot of sources. Panzer brigades were raised, with a 4 week training cycle.
It was not an impossibility to attack in conditions of air and artillery superiority. It was another "friction of war" imposed on attacking forces. 12.SS HJ lost 10% of their combat strength in June 6-9th attacking 3rd Division, largely using the resources of one PzG regiment and a few companies of armor. The division was partially engaged- the rest seeing either no use or light use. In event of taking the staging area, they, PzLehr, 21.Pz were to regroup and make a full attack.
In my estimate- based on what happened in the field- against a hardened divisional position on an operationally important piece of real estate supported by artillery and air superiority, using up two German divisions was necessary to take it.
To go back back to the OP, destroying most of the fighting power of the german panzer troops in the summer was a necessary prerequisite to smooth operations later on. Historically, in the fall there were only the heavily damaged and reduced 9.Pz, 11.Pz, 116.Pz, 21.Pz continuously in the West (not mentioning PzG units like the 25.PzG or 17.SS.
Last edited by Cult Icon on 29 Dec 2019, 19:44, edited 2 times in total.
Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
If you read German sources, you would learn how unfunny it was to attack into the teeth of superior allied firepower in Normandy. You calling me ignorant is very funny. I have much more reading than you on the German Army. I do have the advantage of being very fluent in German so i can read much more than you.Cult Icon wrote: ↑29 Dec 2019, 15:38Don't care about your ignorant, made-up opinions and thread spamming. I gave the sources, go get them. There are a few other books/unit histories on June 6-9th and the II SS PzK counterattack.Aida1 wrote: ↑28 Dec 2019, 23:49I think you are in denial here of how unfunny it was to be attacking while subjected to superior allied firepower “Unwiling to spend the blood price” is a strange way of describing what actually happened.Cult Icon wrote: ↑27 Dec 2019, 03:06On the CW side of the equation (they fought the majority of Pz formations in Normandy). The first book covers
https://www.amazon.com/Stopping-Panzers ... 886&sr=8-1
https://www.amazon.com/Breaking-Panzers ... 622&sr=8-1
Your postings show clearly that you are a civilian with an interest in military history like most here. You therefore could do with some modesty when making statements about the conduct of military operations.One of the things i have noticed is that you are a pure number cruncher who ,for example, judges an attack by the casualties sustained.
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Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
Cult Icon,
viewtopic.php?t=159188
Regards
Tom
That might be an interesting fact for you, but it isn't actually true. For example, you might want to have a look through this 72-page mega-thread:An interesting fact of this forum- almost nobody is interested in VE day by Christmas while everybody else is either fanatically for or against Moscow 1941/42, an even more far fetched objective.
viewtopic.php?t=159188
Regards
Tom
Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
I enjoy your particularly british "flavor" of etiquette...
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Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
You often see this type of bogus comparison in German accounts. A long list of all allied units in the area is compared to a specific German sub-Unit. It is then assumed every single Allied soldier in the Army Group opposing has a rifle and a bayonet and is in the front line.
Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
Eh, I have a lot of "German sources..." Even my humble, earthly status can see that the hourly progress of these fights did not indicate they were facing an invincible wall of fire. Get the sources...
I know exactly what you are/your attempts to flood the thread and I don't care about your wind-up
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Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
Concerning the counterattack by II SS Panzercorps at the end of june ,for example,i read different. The Lagebericht of the 9.SS Panzerdivision of 02071944 makes a clear statement about the devastating effect of allied artillery fire(Im Feuersturm letzter Kriegsjahre W Tieke Muninn 1975 pp135-136). You will find that mentioned in many contemporary documents. Allied air superiority and superior firepower were always a major inhibiting factor.Cult Icon wrote: ↑29 Dec 2019, 17:41Eh, I have a lot of "German sources..." Even my humble, earthly status can see that the hourly progress of these fights did not indicate they were facing an invincible wall of fire. Get the sources...
I know exactly what you are/your attempts to flood the thread and I don't care about your wind-up
Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
You will have to quote these then.Michael Kenny wrote: ↑29 Dec 2019, 17:31You often see this type of bogus comparison in German accounts. A long list of all allied units in the area is compared to a specific German sub-Unit. It is then assumed every single Allied soldier in the Army Group opposing has a rifle and a bayonet and is in the front line.
Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
The Germans did have to do a little bit more than just take a piece of real estate. And launching a coordinated attack by several divisions was always difficult with all the delays incurred by allied air attack. If the HJ attacked with only part of its force, it is because the rest was still strung out along the road.Cult Icon wrote: ↑29 Dec 2019, 16:17No need to refer to another war and another army. The Ardennes is filled with case studies, although of much lower quality force than the one present in June. The fuel shortage was not so acute in June either due to the situation in Romania. The German commitments in Normandy was effected by the lack of reserves at the moment and the high level of strategic pressure being brought down on them. So 9.SS, 10.SS, 12.SS made abortive attacks and were soon committed into the defense.Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑26 Dec 2019, 18:56
You are referring to the Normandy battle, June-August? The December offensive was of multiple armored or mechanized corps. Or what passed for such in 1944 German terms
It looks to me that fighting mobile concentrated multi corps size operations on the 'plains' of NW Europe wont work against air power on the scale the Allies had that year. Or in 1943 for that matter. Theres a reason the Germans severely curtained daylight movement and administrative ops in Normandy. How they neutralize Allied air power while fighting a large mobile ground battle on the French or Belgian plains I cant see.
As the allies moved East, the artillery and air power become a lot less concentrated- with accordingly decrease in suppressive firepower. Various campaigns in the fall of 44' show only a 3 times artillery superiority. However, the fighting qualities of the German army dropped to unprecedented levels with volksgrenadier formations developed with a 4-6 week training cycle and staffed with more demoralized troops from a polygot of sources. Panzer brigades were raised, with a 4 week training cycle.
It was not an impossibility to attack in conditions of air and artillery superiority. It was another "friction of war" imposed on attacking forces. 12.SS HJ lost 10% of their combat strength in June 6-9th attacking 3rd Division, largely using the resources of one PzG regiment and a few companies of armor. The division was partially engaged- the rest seeing either no use or light use. In event of taking the staging area, they, PzLehr, 21.Pz were to regroup and make a full attack.
In my estimate- based on what happened in the field- against a hardened divisional position on an operationally important piece of real estate supported by artillery and air superiority, using up two German divisions was necessary to take it.
Attacking in the teeth of enemy air and artillery superiority is not going to get you the desired breakthrough in depth.
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Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
Not the point of this thread. This is alt history thread, not history.., compressing this result into say June-July and examining allied mistakes- operational and strategic.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑25 Dec 2019, 22:08
Schweppenburg also at one point wanted to concentrate all the Panzers around Paris to protect against an imagined descent of eight allied airborne divisions. That does not mean it was a correct measure. Fundamentally, the Germans could not do what Schweppenburg wanted because if they did the front would have collapsed and the Panzers would have been defeated in detail as they tried to cover the sauve qui puet...which is effectively what happened anyway.
Er, um, but they were eliminated first as a serious force...between about mid-August and mid-December the Panzers were not a serious force in the West and yet the war was not won by Christmas. I think something may be missing in the equation.
The clear precedent of this was in German practice in Russia (where many of the divisions and Corps HQs were experienced in operating), and the later actions (Ruckzug, Sept 1944 as mentioned by Shieldrake) and offensives in the West. In the Soviet Union they would perform retrograde movements, delay actions, and use inf formations to hold ground to free as many armored units as possible, then group the armored units and some inf units into a planned counteroffensive.
It would interesting if the foreign historical studies or other interview material possessed any other details of what these debates were actually about, where they would withdraw to, and where this counteroffensive would take place.
Re: Allies end the war by Christmas 1944
You cannot compare eastern with western front. Germans were not faced with air superiority like in the west and could move easier. But what you described is not what happened either. There was no real operational freedom so it was about being pushed back or broken through and then counterattacking if possible. German commanders would have loved to be able to operate but that is not what Hitler allowed.Cult Icon wrote: ↑29 Dec 2019, 20:05Not the point of this thread. This is alt history thread, not history.., compressing this result into say June-July and examining allied mistakes- operational and strategic.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑25 Dec 2019, 22:08
Schweppenburg also at one point wanted to concentrate all the Panzers around Paris to protect against an imagined descent of eight allied airborne divisions. That does not mean it was a correct measure. Fundamentally, the Germans could not do what Schweppenburg wanted because if they did the front would have collapsed and the Panzers would have been defeated in detail as they tried to cover the sauve qui puet...which is effectively what happened anyway.
Er, um, but they were eliminated first as a serious force...between about mid-August and mid-December the Panzers were not a serious force in the West and yet the war was not won by Christmas. I think something may be missing in the equation.
The clear precedent of this was in German practice in Russia (where many of the divisions and Corps HQs were experienced in operating), and the later actions (Ruckzug, Sept 1944 as mentioned by Shieldrake) and offensives in the West. In the Soviet Union they would perform retrograde movements, delay actions, and use inf formations to hold ground to free as many armored units as possible, then group the armored units and some inf units into a planned counteroffensive.
It would interesting if the foreign historical studies or other interview material possessed any other details of what these debates were actually about, where they would withdraw to, and where this counteroffensive would take place.
There is a book on the counterattack by von Senger und Etterlin Der Gegenschlag Kampfbeispiele und Fuhrungsgrundsatze der Beweglichen Abwehr Scharnhorst Buchkameradschaft 1959. Mostly with examples from the 24.Panzerdivision on the eastern front.Very interesting.