General time was deciding as every day the Germans became weaker and the Wallies and the Soviets became stronger .corbulo wrote: ↑30 Dec 2019, 14:36Hmmm. The aim of Kursk was to essentially stabilise the front by shortening it and taking advantage of trapping Soviet forces within it. It was similar in a certain (but reverse) sense of retreating from the Rzhev salient (after seriously mauling Soviet attempts to take it).ljadw wrote: ↑24 Dec 2019, 20:36Totally wrong . The aim of Kursk was to prevent a mass Soviet attack,against which Germany had nothing to oppose, by a preventive attack to eliminate the Soviet mobile forces . What happened is that while Citadel was still happening, the Soviets launched their own attack,with forces that were bigger than those the Germans used for Citadel .Citadel .
Not fot the first time Guderian was talking nonsense .The biggest enemy of Germany was general time ,against which Germany could do nothing . If, as Guderian stupidly was arguing,the mobile German reserves were remaining in the East, who would stop the Allied invasion of Italy ?
At the start of Citadel the Soviets had a superiority of 3/1 in men and tanks ,of 5/1 in artillery and of 4/1 in aircraft .A week after the start of Citadel, the Soviets started Kutuzov with a superiority in manpower of 4/1,tanks 5/1,artillery and aircraft 5/1 .And on August 7 a new Soviet offensive started .
"What happened is that while Citadel was still happening, the Soviets launched their own attack,with forces that were bigger than those the Germans used for Citadel"
I agree. But even with the numerically superior forces, after Kursk, and subsequent Soviet offensives, the Soviets still lost 3 times as many men, and 5 times the number of armoured vehicles. Even during the Soviet offensives of 1944 after the dam had broken in the south, the Soviets were still losing 5,6,7+ times the amount of men.
"Not fot the first time Guderian was talking nonsense .The biggest enemy of Germany was general time ,against which Germany could do nothing . If, as Guderian stupidly was arguing,the mobile German reserves were remaining in the East, who would stop the Allied invasion of Italy ?"
I wasn't really arguing for not moving troops to Italy. Just saying that to continue with attacking the Kursk salient after removing those troops was suicidal at that stage in 1943. The new armour arriving (or due to arrive) in the East (Panthers, Tigers etc) would have ground Soviet offensive to a standstill. Guderian was correct in that respect. General time didnt really matter as long as the Soviets (post Stalingrad set back) were kept back and the Allies did not gain a major foothold in the West. In Italy, the Allies victories were eventually very hard won. If the dam had not broken in the East would the Allies have eventually swept through Italy? Would the landings in Normandy 1944 have worked...?
At what point did Germany lose WW2?
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
HistoryGeek2019 wrote: ↑19 Dec 2019, 23:20And if they had captured Moscow in Typhoon, they would have had to give it up, like Rostov. The Germans were actually lucky they didn't capture Moscow, because Hitler would have refused to allow any retreat from the city. Which would have resulted in a Stalingrad level encirclement of German soldiers in the city.ljadw wrote: ↑19 Dec 2019, 22:53Typhoon was not stopped because of the bad weather, but because it had failed, already before the start of the Soviet win ter offensive / Already on the end of November, Wagner had said : we are at the end of our possibilities . Thus even if Typhoon had succeeded to capture Moscow, the Germans could not go farther .
Or the political, logistical , population, communications , cultural , industrial and morale catastrophe of losing Moscow would have caused Stalin to come to the table for peace negotiations (or a military coup).
Once again all of my foes in this argument seem determined to treat Moscow as just another little village. It was the HEART of the SU, its loss would have caused repucussions never seen in the actual history of WW2. IMO.
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
Ljadw
Come on! Weather was definitely one of the factors.
You yourself have told me the fall rains and resulting mud was a factor in the failed drive on Moscow, cold weather had some (but I agree less than the fall rains) impact as well. As I've said before the Soviet effective strategy of scorched earth policy denied shelter for attacking axis troops while the retreating defending soviets had significantly more.
"...not stopped because of bad weather."
"
Come on! Weather was definitely one of the factors.
You yourself have told me the fall rains and resulting mud was a factor in the failed drive on Moscow, cold weather had some (but I agree less than the fall rains) impact as well. As I've said before the Soviet effective strategy of scorched earth policy denied shelter for attacking axis troops while the retreating defending soviets had significantly more.
"...not stopped because of bad weather."
"
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
The meaning of Kursk was that it badly positioned Axis mobile reserves into a battle of attrition in that summer, so that subsequent Soviet offensives along the Eastern Front could achieve an unprecedented level of success. The tactical superiority of the Pz troops in combat doesn't matter, they were pinned down in attack ops and the Soviets were able to move their troops forward.
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
It did not. Without Kursk, German mobile divisions would still have been sent all over the place to counterattack anywhere the red army broke through. There would certainly not have been any question of a grand operational maneuver as Manstein would have loved to do.Kursk was operationally speaking a partial success with temporary effect as red army operational reserves lost heavily( see analysis of the importance of Kursk in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Band 8 DVA 2011 pp 169-172).Cult Icon wrote: ↑31 Dec 2019, 15:39The meaning of Kursk was that it badly positioned Axis mobile reserves into a battle of attrition in that summer, so that subsequent Soviet offensives along the Eastern Front could achieve an unprecedented level of success. The tactical superiority of the Pz troops in combat doesn't matter, they were pinned down in attack ops and the Soviets were able to move their troops forward.
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
Citadel is also not a good case study for the "general" performance of the armored attacks/counterattacks in 43-45. It was a planned offensive, highly prepared/recon and heavily supported by artillery/ close air support with up to some IIRC 800 sorties per day per attacking Pz Korps. It was also executed by comparatively veteran, well trained and equipped formations, many of which drilled before their commitment.
People mention this because of its fame but its too unusual to be considered a "general case" in the late war era.
People mention this because of its fame but its too unusual to be considered a "general case" in the late war era.
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
This is called nitpicking. You can certainly use it as a case study of an armoured attack against a deep defense with strong armoured reserves behind it. And it was a major German offensive operation with large forces involved on both sides. Reason enough to give it a lot of attention even if some descriptions of it are over the top.Cult Icon wrote: ↑31 Dec 2019, 18:37Citadel is also not a good case study for the "general" performance of the armored attacks/counterattacks in 43-45. It was a planned offensive, highly prepared/recon and heavily supported by artillery/ close air support with up to some IIRC 800 sorties per day per attacking Pz Korps. It was also executed by comparatively veteran, well trained and equipped formations, many of which drilled before their commitment.
People mention this because of its fame but its too unusual to be considered a "general case" in the late war era.
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
Since 70 years the German lobby has repeated that the weather was the reason for the failure of Typhoon, why they remained silent about the fact that Barbarossa failed in the summer .checkov wrote: ↑30 Dec 2019, 17:55Ljadw
Come on! Weather was definitely one of the factors.
You yourself have told me the fall rains and resulting mud was a factor in the failed drive on Moscow, cold weather had some (but I agree less than the fall rains) impact as well. As I've said before the Soviet effective strategy of scorched earth policy denied shelter for attacking axis troops while the retreating defending soviets had significantly more.
"...not stopped because of bad weather."
"
That scorched earth denied shelter for attacking axis forces is not a serious argument as the Germans were sheltering with the civilians and as they still advanced.
The main reason for the failure of Typhoon was that after the defeats of Vyazma and Briansk,the Soviets were still able to commit new reserves . If they had collapsed after these battles, the bad weather would not have stopped a German advance .
If the bad weather did not prevent the German victories at Briansk/Vyazma, why should it have blocked the exploitation of these victories ?
The Germans knew that a victorious advance to Moscow with 70 divisions was not possible and would not be needed .Briansk and Vyazma had to be deciding, they were not .
Even if the weather has been better ( which it could not be ) the German advance to Moscow would have failed .
General mud is an invention .General mud did not stop the Soviet advance on the front of AGC in the fall of 1943,the Soviets were stopped by the Germans .
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
The fall of a capital does not decide the outcome of a war .checkov wrote: ↑30 Dec 2019, 17:38HistoryGeek2019 wrote: ↑19 Dec 2019, 23:20And if they had captured Moscow in Typhoon, they would have had to give it up, like Rostov. The Germans were actually lucky they didn't capture Moscow, because Hitler would have refused to allow any retreat from the city. Which would have resulted in a Stalingrad level encirclement of German soldiers in the city.ljadw wrote: ↑19 Dec 2019, 22:53Typhoon was not stopped because of the bad weather, but because it had failed, already before the start of the Soviet win ter offensive / Already on the end of November, Wagner had said : we are at the end of our possibilities . Thus even if Typhoon had succeeded to capture Moscow, the Germans could not go farther .
Or the political, logistical , population, communications , cultural , industrial and morale catastrophe of losing Moscow would have caused Stalin to come to the table for peace negotiations (or a military coup).
Once again all of my foes in this argument seem determined to treat Moscow as just another little village. It was the HEART of the SU, its loss would have caused repucussions never seen in the actual history of WW2. IMO.
Besides, at a certain moment Stalin had decided to leave Moscow ( his train was ready ) and to continue the war from an other HQ. But he cancelled his decision when the militat=ry told him that they could save Moscow .
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
1 Not anywhere as the Soviets could attack anywhere, while the Germans had only reserves for a few attacksAida1 wrote: ↑31 Dec 2019, 17:38It did not. Without Kursk, German mobile divisions would still have been sent all over the place to counterattack anywhere the red army broke through. There would certainly not have been any question of a grand operational maneuver as Manstein would have loved to do.Kursk was operationally speaking a partial success with temporary effect as red army operational reserves lost heavily( see analysis of the importance of Kursk in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Band 8 DVA 2011 pp 169-172).Cult Icon wrote: ↑31 Dec 2019, 15:39The meaning of Kursk was that it badly positioned Axis mobile reserves into a battle of attrition in that summer, so that subsequent Soviet offensives along the Eastern Front could achieve an unprecedented level of success. The tactical superiority of the Pz troops in combat doesn't matter, they were pinned down in attack ops and the Soviets were able to move their troops forward.
2A partial success ?? ,how long took it before the Soviets recaptured Kiev ?
Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?
1) Useless nitpickingljadw wrote: ↑02 Jan 2020, 09:151 Not anywhere as the Soviets could attack anywhere, while the Germans had only reserves for a few attacksAida1 wrote: ↑31 Dec 2019, 17:38It did not. Without Kursk, German mobile divisions would still have been sent all over the place to counterattack anywhere the red army broke through. There would certainly not have been any question of a grand operational maneuver as Manstein would have loved to do.Kursk was operationally speaking a partial success with temporary effect as red army operational reserves lost heavily( see analysis of the importance of Kursk in Das Deutsche Reich und der Zweite Weltkrieg Band 8 DVA 2011 pp 169-172).Cult Icon wrote: ↑31 Dec 2019, 15:39The meaning of Kursk was that it badly positioned Axis mobile reserves into a battle of attrition in that summer, so that subsequent Soviet offensives along the Eastern Front could achieve an unprecedented level of success. The tactical superiority of the Pz troops in combat doesn't matter, they were pinned down in attack ops and the Soviets were able to move their troops forward.
2A partial success ?? ,how long took it before the Soviets recaptured Kiev ?
2) the partial success mentioned by K H Frieser in DRZW Band 8 is about inflicting heavy losses on red army operational reserves which was the second atm of Zitadelle.