The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

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Appleknocker27
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 30 Dec 2019 17:54

ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 08:02
Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 03:44
Aida1 wrote:
29 Dec 2019 10:54
You are digging yourself a very deep hole by trying to get into a discussion with somebody who did logistics as a job :lol:
This is nothing new... Also, I am still a Logistician and most recently spent 2016-17 in Iraq.
Iraq 2016-2017 is not the SU 1941 .
You are arguing as a Logistician of 2019 with the knowledge and bias of 2019 about what happened 78 years ago in an other country,but you forget that only the German logisticians of 1941 with the knowledge and bias of 1941 could decide ,judge the importance of logistics of 1941 . The logistics of the Ostheer in 1941 are not the logistics of the US army in the ME .
You make the big mistake of assuming that there are universal logistic laws and that what is used in 2019 could also be used in 1941 .
1941 was an other world with other laws,where the principals and concepts of 2019 had no place .
You know the outcome of Barbarossa, the logisticians of 1941 did not, thus you should not judge or condemn them . You would not have done better because your knowledge, your MA would be useless .
Interesting opinion, not much merit to it, but still interesting. So, in the mind of a logistician and the analysis of an operation; we look specifically at "requirements", priority of support as designated by the Ops section, by phase, by day, by 8 hour, etc. That is matched with "capabilities", as in stockage level, delivery assets, etc. The Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) drives demand, which conversely drives logistical planning. A concept of support is built based on the information from the Intel section (trafficability of road net, weather, expected enemy interdiction, etc.) and the Ops section (priority of support, type or level of combat expected, etc.). From that we get "burn rates" for fuel, ammo, etc.
Like the Wehrmacht, we use what we call a LEW (Log est worksheet) that lists all of the major equipment and its burn rates depending on terrain, weather, level of combat, etc. and we plug in the numbers from there and get base estimates to match against our capabilities and prioritize.
That is Kindergarten level logistics in a paragraph. What part of that seems modern and out of touch to you? I've studied Paulus' wargames from Fall of 1940 and we don't do business much different than he and his staff did then. So...seems obvious to me your comments are way off. To bring this full circle, "IF" the Wehrmacht had better Intel in 1940 about the Soviet force array, dispositions, force generation, etc., what would the operational plan look like and more importantly what could Germany have done to support it?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Richard Anderson » 30 Dec 2019 18:31

Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 17:54
Interesting opinion, not much merit to it, but still interesting.
Your problem is you're trying to provide facts and analysis to opinion merchants. You would do well to put ljadw and Aida1 on ignore as I have. It cuts out some of the static from the monkey gallery. Aida1 of course has been banned under so many sock puppet accounts I can't keep track of them...with any luck he'll get banned when the moderators agree to what is evident.

You've gotten me reinterested in examing the Neptune logistics hiccups again. Have you ever lookued at that?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 30 Dec 2019 21:47

Good advice...I could copy paste Ljadw from 12-15 years ago and its the exact same lines as he posts now (and he was obtuse then as well).

Neptune? We beat just about every aspect of Normandy to death in just about every log school I've ever attended. To me it's still amazing improvisation and creativity though. The whole Mulberry and PLUTO concept just still seems audacious. I recall in the SPO course (support ops) we had a graded practical exercise as part of a staff to research and brief Neptune to a COL. Spent a week researching PLUTO from concept to execution to extension across France.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Yuri » 30 Dec 2019 21:49

Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 17:54
ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 08:02
Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 03:44
Aida1 wrote:
29 Dec 2019 10:54
You are digging yourself a very deep hole by trying to get into a discussion with somebody who did logistics as a job :lol:
This is nothing new... Also, I am still a Logistician and most recently spent 2016-17 in Iraq.
Iraq 2016-2017 is not the SU 1941 .
You are arguing as a Logistician of 2019 with the knowledge and bias of 2019 about what happened 78 years ago in an other country,but you forget that only the German logisticians of 1941 with the knowledge and bias of 1941 could decide ,judge the importance of logistics of 1941 . The logistics of the Ostheer in 1941 are not the logistics of the US army in the ME .
You make the big mistake of assuming that there are universal logistic laws and that what is used in 2019 could also be used in 1941 .
1941 was an other world with other laws,where the principals and concepts of 2019 had no place .
You know the outcome of Barbarossa, the logisticians of 1941 did not, thus you should not judge or condemn them . You would not have done better because your knowledge, your MA would be useless .
Interesting opinion, not much merit to it, but still interesting. So, in the mind of a logistician and the analysis of an operation; we look specifically at "requirements", priority of support as designated by the Ops section, by phase, by day, by 8 hour, etc. That is matched with "capabilities", as in stockage level, delivery assets, etc. The Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) drives demand, which conversely drives logistical planning. A concept of support is built based on the information from the Intel section (trafficability of road net, weather, expected enemy interdiction, etc.) and the Ops section (priority of support, type or level of combat expected, etc.). From that we get "burn rates" for fuel, ammo, etc.
Like the Wehrmacht, we use what we call a LEW (Log est worksheet) that lists all of the major equipment and its burn rates depending on terrain, weather, level of combat, etc. and we plug in the numbers from there and get base estimates to match against our capabilities and prioritize.
That is Kindergarten level logistics in a paragraph. What part of that seems modern and out of touch to you? I've studied Paulus' wargames from Fall of 1940 and we don't do business much different than he and his staff did then. So...seems obvious to me your comments are way off. To bring this full circle, "IF" the Wehrmacht had better Intel in 1940 about the Soviet force array, dispositions, force generation, etc., what would the operational plan look like and more importantly what could Germany have done to support it?
Your opponent does not provide proof of his claims. He's wrong about that. However, in essence, his statements are correct.
I am assuming, no, I am sure that you have not been trained and you have no experience, for example:

1. Using prisoners of war to clear minefields. This is the technology used by the Wehrmacht, when it turned out that the rapid movement of tank divisions are hindered by minefields, and the Wehrmacht does not have enough sappers and mine detectors. German minefields must also be cleared by Russian prisoners of war. If there are no the Russian mine detectors, then prisoners of war must work with their hands. The corresponding order of the commander of the 14th Panzer division is available and already posted on the website.
2. The use of civilians of both sexes between the ages of 12 and 65 to carry out earthworks in a war zone. This is the technology used by the Wehrmacht, when there was a problem of lack of earthmoving machines and mechanisms. Since the German infantrymen are very tired, performing earthworks, and sapper units are not enough and they do not have time to dig trenches and defenses, the OKH has ordered to involve in these works all civilians of both sexes aged from 12 to 65 years. Immediate death penalty for anyone 14 years or older who refuses to comply with this order. All pity and remorse must be put aside, for all that contributes to the preservation of the precious German blood is the highest virtue. That's what the commander of the 86th infantry division, General Weidling, said in his order. And Yes, this is the same General Weidling whom 3.5 years later Hitler appointed in April 1945 as commandant of the defense of Berlin.
3. Total plunder of the population and the country. This is the technology used by the Wehrmacht to provide troops with food and fodder.
I won't list everything else
-
In General, the Wehrmacht did not have any special problems with logistics in 1941-42. Logistical problems in the East of the Wehrmacht began in the second half of 1943, when it rolled back. This is my opinion, which is based on knowledge of the relevant documents, and mainly documents of companies, battalions, regiments and divisions, that is, those for whom, in fact, logistics works.

Can a 21st-century specialist understand and solve the problems of the Wehrmacht better than the specialists who provided the logistics of Barbarossa in 1940-41?
I suppose your opponent is right here, that is, he can't.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2019 21:51

Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 17:54
ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 08:02
Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 03:44
Aida1 wrote:
29 Dec 2019 10:54
You are digging yourself a very deep hole by trying to get into a discussion with somebody who did logistics as a job :lol:
This is nothing new... Also, I am still a Logistician and most recently spent 2016-17 in Iraq.
Iraq 2016-2017 is not the SU 1941 .
You are arguing as a Logistician of 2019 with the knowledge and bias of 2019 about what happened 78 years ago in an other country,but you forget that only the German logisticians of 1941 with the knowledge and bias of 1941 could decide ,judge the importance of logistics of 1941 . The logistics of the Ostheer in 1941 are not the logistics of the US army in the ME .
You make the big mistake of assuming that there are universal logistic laws and that what is used in 2019 could also be used in 1941 .
1941 was an other world with other laws,where the principals and concepts of 2019 had no place .
You know the outcome of Barbarossa, the logisticians of 1941 did not, thus you should not judge or condemn them . You would not have done better because your knowledge, your MA would be useless .
Interesting opinion, not much merit to it, but still interesting. So, in the mind of a logistician and the analysis of an operation; we look specifically at "requirements", priority of support as designated by the Ops section, by phase, by day, by 8 hour, etc. That is matched with "capabilities", as in stockage level, delivery assets, etc. The Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) drives demand, which conversely drives logistical planning. A concept of support is built based on the information from the Intel section (trafficability of road net, weather, expected enemy interdiction, etc.) and the Ops section (priority of support, type or level of combat expected, etc.). From that we get "burn rates" for fuel, ammo, etc.
Like the Wehrmacht, we use what we call a LEW (Log est worksheet) that lists all of the major equipment and its burn rates depending on terrain, weather, level of combat, etc. and we plug in the numbers from there and get base estimates to match against our capabilities and prioritize.
That is Kindergarten level logistics in a paragraph. What part of that seems modern and out of touch to you? I've studied Paulus' wargames from Fall of 1940 and we don't do business much different than he and his staff did then. So...seems obvious to me your comments are way off. To bring this full circle, "IF" the Wehrmacht had better Intel in 1940 about the Soviet force array, dispositions, force generation, etc., what would the operational plan look like and more importantly what could Germany have done to support it?
Thherre was no other operational plan possible than the plan that was used,and more intelligence and ''better '' logistics would not help the Germans : you still refuse to admit the fact that the only who could make Barbarossa successful,were the Soviets . ''better '' logistics were not possible,and were not needed, besides German logistics were not that bad . It was a mission impossible that could only succeed by a Deus ex Machina, a miracle . And the Germans knew this .
Your big fault is that you are arguing as if the Soviets did not exist,but that is not so .'Studying Paulus'wargames is good but also useless unless you also study the Soviet wargames .
It takes two to tango, and to fight. Trying to unmake Germany's defeat by ignoring the existence of the Soviets,is not serious .
It was very easy for the Soviets to make a failure of Barbarossa already on the first day : = by going east with their armies instead of going west : they could retreat faster than the Germans could advance,and Halder knew this : a few days after June 22 ,he wrote relievedly in his diary : the Soviets accept the battle .That is a proof that the inportance of logistics for Barbarossa is very much exaggerated .
No one is arguing that with better logistics France and Britain could have won in May /June 1940 or that with better logistics the Soviets would have been in Berlin in March 1942 . Thus the incessant attempts to create a scenario where the Germans would have been at the Volga before September 1941 is something curious and even suspect .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2019 21:58

Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 21:47
Good advice...I could copy paste Ljadw from 12-15 years ago and its the exact same lines as he posts now (and he was obtuse then as well).

Neptune? We beat just about every aspect of Normandy to death in just about every log school I've ever attended. To me it's still amazing improvisation and creativity though. The whole Mulberry and PLUTO concept just still seems audacious. I recall in the SPO course (support ops) we had a graded practical exercise as part of a staff to research and brief Neptune to a COL. Spent a week researching PLUTO from concept to execution to extension across France.
Did ''we '' study seriously Fall Gelb ? Look at a possibility for an allied victory ? Have the logistics of both parties been studied ?
Has anyone tried to create a scenario where the Soviet winter offensives would have resulted in the occupation of Berlin in March 1942 ?
Of course not .One prefers to wast resources and time to make possible the victory of the Germans .
For God's sake : the Cold War is over .Let it go .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 30 Dec 2019 22:00

ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 21:51
Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 17:54
ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 08:02
Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 03:44
Aida1 wrote:
29 Dec 2019 10:54
You are digging yourself a very deep hole by trying to get into a discussion with somebody who did logistics as a job :lol:
This is nothing new... Also, I am still a Logistician and most recently spent 2016-17 in Iraq.
Iraq 2016-2017 is not the SU 1941 .
You are arguing as a Logistician of 2019 with the knowledge and bias of 2019 about what happened 78 years ago in an other country,but you forget that only the German logisticians of 1941 with the knowledge and bias of 1941 could decide ,judge the importance of logistics of 1941 . The logistics of the Ostheer in 1941 are not the logistics of the US army in the ME .
You make the big mistake of assuming that there are universal logistic laws and that what is used in 2019 could also be used in 1941 .
1941 was an other world with other laws,where the principals and concepts of 2019 had no place .
You know the outcome of Barbarossa, the logisticians of 1941 did not, thus you should not judge or condemn them . You would not have done better because your knowledge, your MA would be useless .
Interesting opinion, not much merit to it, but still interesting. So, in the mind of a logistician and the analysis of an operation; we look specifically at "requirements", priority of support as designated by the Ops section, by phase, by day, by 8 hour, etc. That is matched with "capabilities", as in stockage level, delivery assets, etc. The Operational Tempo (OPTEMPO) drives demand, which conversely drives logistical planning. A concept of support is built based on the information from the Intel section (trafficability of road net, weather, expected enemy interdiction, etc.) and the Ops section (priority of support, type or level of combat expected, etc.). From that we get "burn rates" for fuel, ammo, etc.
Like the Wehrmacht, we use what we call a LEW (Log est worksheet) that lists all of the major equipment and its burn rates depending on terrain, weather, level of combat, etc. and we plug in the numbers from there and get base estimates to match against our capabilities and prioritize.
That is Kindergarten level logistics in a paragraph. What part of that seems modern and out of touch to you? I've studied Paulus' wargames from Fall of 1940 and we don't do business much different than he and his staff did then. So...seems obvious to me your comments are way off. To bring this full circle, "IF" the Wehrmacht had better Intel in 1940 about the Soviet force array, dispositions, force generation, etc., what would the operational plan look like and more importantly what could Germany have done to support it?
Thherre was no other operational plan possible than the plan that was used,and more intelligence and ''better '' logistics would not help the Germans : you still refuse to admit the fact that the only who could make Barbarossa successful,were the Soviets . ''better '' logistics were not possible,and were not needed, besides German logistics were not that bad . It was a mission impossible that could only succeed by a Deus ex Machina, a miracle . And the Germans knew this .
Your big fault is that you are arguing as if the Soviets did not exist,but that is not so .'Studying Paulus'wargames is good but also useless unless you also study the Soviet wargames .
It takes two to tango, and to fight. Trying to unmake Germany's defeat by ignoring the existence of the Soviets,is not serious .
It was very easy for the Soviets to make a failure of Barbarossa already on the first day : = by going east with their armies instead of going west : they could retreat faster than the Germans could advance,and Halder knew this : a few days after June 22 ,he wrote relievedly in his diary : the Soviets accept the battle .That is a proof that the inportance of logistics for Barbarossa is very much exaggerated .
No one is arguing that with better logistics France and Britain could have won in May /June 1940 or that with better logistics the Soviets would have been in Berlin in March 1942 . Thus the incessant attempts to create a scenario where the Germans would have been at the Volga before September 1941 is something curious and even suspect .
You are refusing any type of discussion as always. Where the retreating of the red army is concerned, that would never have happened. Stalin did not like to give things up,just as Hitler. And obviously there are always things that could have been done differently which leads to a different campaign.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 30 Dec 2019 22:03

ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 21:58
Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 21:47
Good advice...I could copy paste Ljadw from 12-15 years ago and its the exact same lines as he posts now (and he was obtuse then as well).

Neptune? We beat just about every aspect of Normandy to death in just about every log school I've ever attended. To me it's still amazing improvisation and creativity though. The whole Mulberry and PLUTO concept just still seems audacious. I recall in the SPO course (support ops) we had a graded practical exercise as part of a staff to research and brief Neptune to a COL. Spent a week researching PLUTO from concept to execution to extension across France.
Did ''we '' study seriously Fall Gelb ? Look at a possibility for an allied victory ? Have the logistics of both parties been studied ?
Has anyone tried to create a scenario where the Soviet winter offensives would have resulted in the occupation of Berlin in March 1942 ?
Of course not .One prefers to wast resources and time to make possible the victory of the Germans .
For God's sake : the Cold War is over .Let it go .
The could war has nothing to do with this. Do not tell me you are now a lover of the USSR and Stalin. :lol: Nobody prevents you from opening a what if where the red army wins quicker.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 30 Dec 2019 22:07

The Cold War has everything to do : there are people who are disappointed that the Cold War did not become a Warm War and decide that if they could not deffeat the Soviets, the best they could do is to make the Germans defeat the Soviets .
And, FYI, I know that I was on the list of the Cheka .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 30 Dec 2019 23:03

Yuri wrote:
30 Dec 2019 21:49
Can a 21st-century specialist understand and solve the problems of the Wehrmacht better than the specialists who provided the logistics of Barbarossa in 1940-41?
That wasn't the problem set, so what exactly are you after? You are also leaving out the fact that I already have the answers to the test of what was going to happen, the Wehrmacht planners didn't.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 30 Dec 2019 23:10

ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 21:58
Did ''we '' study seriously Fall Gelb ? Look at a possibility for an allied victory ? Have the logistics of both parties been studied ?
Has anyone tried to create a scenario where the Soviet winter offensives would have resulted in the occupation of Berlin in March 1942 ?
Of course not .One prefers to wast resources and time to make possible the victory of the Germans .
For God's sake : the Cold War is over .Let it go .
Actually, I've studied how the Poles in 1939 could have been more effective, as well as the French in 1940, the Italians in North Africa, the US in the Philippines, the Japanese at Khalkin Gol, etc. and that's just WW2.
YOU seem to have a serious issue when the topic is the Germans and you bring it up every time and in such a way that basically says "all of you are stupid, only I know what is correct". That's probably why a lot of posters either don;t respond or block you, as I will do after I'm done typing. Since English is not your primary language, I suggest you look up the word presumptuous and try to stop what is obviously a bad habit.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ulater » 30 Dec 2019 23:48

Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 23:10
ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 21:58
Did ''we '' study seriously Fall Gelb ? Look at a possibility for an allied victory ? Have the logistics of both parties been studied ?
Has anyone tried to create a scenario where the Soviet winter offensives would have resulted in the occupation of Berlin in March 1942 ?
Of course not .One prefers to wast resources and time to make possible the victory of the Germans .
For God's sake : the Cold War is over .Let it go .
Actually, I've studied how the Poles in 1939 could have been more effective, as well as the French in 1940, the Italians in North Africa, the US in the Philippines, the Japanese at Khalkin Gol, etc. and that's just WW2.
YOU seem to have a serious issue when the topic is the Germans and you bring it up every time and in such a way that basically says "all of you are stupid, only I know what is correct". That's probably why a lot of posters either don;t respond or block you, as I will do after I'm done typing. Since English is not your primary language, I suggest you look up the word presumptuous and try to stop what is obviously a bad habit.

I always wondered about one thing.

You mentioned that you studied how french could have been more effective in 1940, and I was thinking about this from the other side.

In Barbarossa, german tank armies, without much rest or large scale maintenance stops, moved forward until 25th July, and in the meantime they left many broken and functional units behind them or on their flanks.

So what I wanted to ask, were French capable of some kind of coherent action at the time the Halt order was issued?

Because neither un-protected flanks nor the wear and tear on armored vehicles seem to be a satisfactory explanation for the order, so I wondered whether there was something about French forces the germans were wary of.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Appleknocker27 » 31 Dec 2019 02:41

Ulater wrote:
30 Dec 2019 23:48
I always wondered about one thing.

You mentioned that you studied how french could have been more effective in 1940, and I was thinking about this from the other side.

In Barbarossa, german tank armies, without much rest or large scale maintenance stops, moved forward until 25th July, and in the meantime they left many broken and functional units behind them or on their flanks.

So what I wanted to ask, were French capable of some kind of coherent action at the time the Halt order was issued?

Because neither un-protected flanks nor the wear and tear on armored vehicles seem to be a satisfactory explanation for the order, so I wondered whether there was something about French forces the germans were wary of.
The French were no longer capable of a counter-attack by 25 July and were reeling. I think the main issue was that the OKW and OKH were more concerned with getting the marching Infantry divisions to reduce the pocket and spare the Panzer divisions the expense of fighting in close quarters. There is merit to that line of thought, just not so much in hindsight. No one on either side of the Channel thought that operation Dynamo could produce the results it did.
Most of my analysis of the 1940 campaign had to do with the lack of a French strategic reserve, their cumbersome command system, outdated tactical doctrine and their lack of respect for a tactical radio network. They had good equipment, good Soldiers, but poor communications and poor leadership.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Yuri » 31 Dec 2019 03:27

Appleknocker27 wrote:
30 Dec 2019 23:03
Yuri wrote:
30 Dec 2019 21:49
Can a 21st-century specialist understand and solve the problems of the Wehrmacht better than the specialists who provided the logistics of Barbarossa in 1940-41?
That wasn't the problem set, so what exactly are you after? You are also leaving out the fact that I already have the answers to the test of what was going to happen, the Wehrmacht planners didn't.
That's the whole point. This is your mistake. You don't have an answer to the test for a stronger Wehrmacht. You propose to improve the logistics of the Wehrmacht and its allies, do not forget that, in addition to the 4,500,000 th Wehrmacht against the red Army acted more than 1,000,000 of its European allies.
Thus, Your Wehrmacht in Your opinion will be stronger. However, if the Wehrmacht and its allies had performed better in June and July 1941, the Red Army would have acted in a different scenario.
On June 23, 1941, General mobilization was declared and the order was given to evacuate industry to East. At the same time, it was assumed that the first strategic echelon would be quickly lost. However, at the beginning of July 1941, it became clear to Stavka and GKO that the opponents did not have the strength to inflict a decisive defeat even to the first strategic echelon of the Red Army. Only in the center does the enemy have a significant advantage, while in the South and the North it is weak. Thus, there was an opportunity to delay the enemy's forces on the Dnieper line. There was no need for total mobilization, specialists were demobilized and the evacuation of industrial enterprises was suspended.
In the second half of July, the military-political balance of power in the world was clearly defined. On July 12, the Soviet-English agreement was concluded. At the end of July, the personal representative of the President of United States, Harry Hopkins, arrived in Moscow and assured that President Roosevelt would do everything possible for the USSR to receive assistance through lend-lease.
Taking all these circumstances into account, on August 1, 1941, the Stavka decided on the strategy of combat operations in this next war with continental Europe. In General, this strategy is defined as follows: it is Necessary not just to inflict a military defeat on the Europeans, it is necessary to defeat the Europeans with such ferocious force that they will never have the desire to start a war against Russia. As part of this strategy, specific operational plans were adopted for the autumn and winter of 1941/42.
The essence of these operational plans is as follows. The forces of the second strategic echelon and the remnants of the first strategic echelon forces to exhaust the enemy as much as possible. Prepare by the beginning of December the forces of the third strategic echelon: about 200 rifle divisions, 120 tank brigades and 50 ski regiments, which will be sent to the weakened enemy.
A deadly threat to the Soviet Union could only arise if the Maritime Empire – Great Britain -acted together with continental Europe. Since such a scenario was excluded, the Kremlin never even for a second had any doubts about where and how this war would end.
And Yes, the Stavka’s operational plan contained a gross error. They decided to encircle about thirty divisions of the Army Group Center in the area of Smolensk. Their forces were overestimated, and the strength of the Wehrmacht's defense was underestimated. This was an impossible task for the second strategic echelon. The forces that had been spent on this operation should have been directed to prevent the inner flanks of Army Groups Center and South from joining.
We can say that the Stavka did everything possible and even impossible to help the Wehrmacht inflicted such heavy losses on the red Army in September-October. This Stavka's error prolonged the agony of the Wehrmacht and its allies for a year and a half.
Note that a major Wehrmacht's success took place in the autumn and beyond the Dnieper, when the conditions for logistics were much worse.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 31 Dec 2019 03:48

ljadw wrote:
30 Dec 2019 22:07
The Cold War has everything to do : there are people who are disappointed that the Cold War did not become a Warm War and decide that if they could not deffeat the Soviets, the best they could do is to make the Germans defeat the Soviets .
And, FYI, I know that I was on the list of the Cheka .
You are clearly losing the plot now. Common sense is completely gone here.Another wild conspiracy theory without substance

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