At what point did Germany lose WW2?

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ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 06 Jan 2020 11:43

Tank commanders do not PREFER to stick their head out : they ,and their crew, are forced to stick their head out, for security reasons and for health reasons .
If the tank commander is seeing,from in his tank,something suspect on the road before him, he will be forced to leave the tank, or to order some one else to leave the tank, to investigate the object, as the object could be a mine.

ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 06 Jan 2020 11:49

Aida1 wrote:
05 Jan 2020 15:51
Ulater wrote:
05 Jan 2020 15:35
Aida1 wrote:
05 Jan 2020 14:33
Ulater wrote:
05 Jan 2020 13:56
Aida1 wrote:
04 Jan 2020 16:23


:lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: :lol: Not in the midst of combat unless the vehicle is disabled.I doubt you even believe yourself the nonsense you write
There is statistical evidence to support the fact that a significant portion of tank crews were wounded or killed outside of their vehicles. So I would ease up on emoticons If I were you.
After the tank is disabled and they have to evacuate they obviously are very vulnerable but has nothing to do with the vulnerability of tanks without infantry support. When a tank is disabled by enemy tank, AT or artillery fire and the crew has to evacuate,own infantry being present or not will not help the crew against the fire from the enemy. I think they will prefer to get into a tank or another armoured vehicle.And i did mention the vulnerability of the crew when the tank is disabled in the posting you quoted so you make no sense at all.
It is a silly discussion so i do use the emoticon.
No, tank does not have to be disabled at all for the crew to be in danger from small arms fire, artillery and so on.
British OR study? For them that was the case.
Not just british, vulnerability of commanders especially is noted by all sides involved.
I did not talk about artillery originally as i answered a posting about tank crews bing hit by small arms fire. A crew is certainly safe from small arms fire within the tank.That is the whole purpose of armoured vehicles.From artillery fires it is mostly safe too except in case of a direct hit which can cause splintering within the tank. No studies needed to be aware that a crew is most vulnerable outside the tank. Speaks for itself.
Anyway, that has all nothing to do with tanks not being able to operate without infantry.
A tank commander has to keep his hatch closed when the danger is great of being hit by snipers,etc...
And how will the tank commander know that there is a danger of being hit by snipers ? The snipers will not warn him .
The reality is that tanks which are not protected by infantry and artillery,are sitting ducks: they are helpless against snipers, bazookas, mines, artillery .Artillery is stronger than tanks because the firepower of artillery is stronger than tanks . To neutralize artillery,you n eed infantry or artrillery .

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Aida1
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 06 Jan 2020 12:48

ljadw wrote:
06 Jan 2020 11:43
Tank commanders do not PREFER to stick their head out : they ,and their crew, are forced to stick their head out, for security reasons and for health reasons .
If the tank commander is seeing,from in his tank,something suspect on the road before him, he will be forced to leave the tank, or to order some one else to leave the tank, to investigate the object, as the object could be a mine.
Nitpicking as usual as a tank commander does have the option of keeping the hatch closed. When possible, he will stick his head out because he can see more that way. You have very simplistic purely theoretical ideas about how tanks operate. Certainly not based on having been in a tank yourself, let alone in combat.
Last edited by Aida1 on 06 Jan 2020 12:55, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 06 Jan 2020 12:53

ljadw wrote:
06 Jan 2020 11:49
Aida1 wrote:
05 Jan 2020 15:51
Ulater wrote:
05 Jan 2020 15:35
Aida1 wrote:
05 Jan 2020 14:33
Ulater wrote:
05 Jan 2020 13:56


There is statistical evidence to support the fact that a significant portion of tank crews were wounded or killed outside of their vehicles. So I would ease up on emoticons If I were you.
After the tank is disabled and they have to evacuate they obviously are very vulnerable but has nothing to do with the vulnerability of tanks without infantry support. When a tank is disabled by enemy tank, AT or artillery fire and the crew has to evacuate,own infantry being present or not will not help the crew against the fire from the enemy. I think they will prefer to get into a tank or another armoured vehicle.And i did mention the vulnerability of the crew when the tank is disabled in the posting you quoted so you make no sense at all.
It is a silly discussion so i do use the emoticon.
No, tank does not have to be disabled at all for the crew to be in danger from small arms fire, artillery and so on.
British OR study? For them that was the case.
Not just british, vulnerability of commanders especially is noted by all sides involved.
I did not talk about artillery originally as i answered a posting about tank crews bing hit by small arms fire. A crew is certainly safe from small arms fire within the tank.That is the whole purpose of armoured vehicles.From artillery fires it is mostly safe too except in case of a direct hit which can cause splintering within the tank. No studies needed to be aware that a crew is most vulnerable outside the tank. Speaks for itself.
Anyway, that has all nothing to do with tanks not being able to operate without infantry.
A tank commander has to keep his hatch closed when the danger is great of being hit by snipers,etc...
And how will the tank commander know that there is a danger of being hit by snipers ? The snipers will not warn him .
The reality is that tanks which are not protected by infantry and artillery,are sitting ducks: they are helpless against snipers, bazookas, mines, artillery .Artillery is stronger than tanks because the firepower of artillery is stronger than tanks . To neutralize artillery,you n eed infantry or artrillery .
Besides the fact that armoured units are always a combined arms team , which makes all your assertions without object, it is certainly not so that tanks can never operate on their own. In open terrain tanks do not have to fear snipers much and can keep out of range of close range AT weapons. German infantry on the eastern front suffered from tank scare in 1943 for a good reason.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by gebhk » 06 Jan 2020 15:12

Aida - all your quotations prove is that towed A/T guns are vulnerable to the supporting arms, not the tanks themselves and that they can be bypassed by tanks where there are insufficient guns to cover the front adequately. None of which proves unsupported tanks can overcome adequately supported infantry. No one argues that, if you can afford it and if you can support it logistically, a self-propelled anti tank gun is a better option. However, as countless encounters demonstrated at the start of the war, tank attacks without the support of infantry onto enemy infantry positions supported with anti-tank guns (towed anti-tank guns) either failed or only succeeded by sheer weight of numbers at significant cost.

I am glad that you at least accept that tanks mostly operate in close cooperation with infantry and artillery. There is a reason for this, one which the participants in WW2 virtually all learned the hard way with tank-heavy armoured divisions in the early stages of the war (with perhaps the exception of the Americans who heeded the experiences of other nations and the results of their own experiments). To achieve this close co-operation, it is necessary to have an adequate balance of all arms in the armoured division. That was patently not achievable with a 400 or more tank division.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 06 Jan 2020 15:39

gebhk wrote:
06 Jan 2020 15:12
Aida - all your quotations prove is that towed A/T guns are vulnerable to the supporting arms, not the tanks themselves and that they can be bypassed by tanks where there are insufficient guns to cover the front adequately. None of which proves unsupported tanks can overcome adequately supported infantry. No one argues that, if you can afford it and if you can support it logistically, a self-propelled anti tank gun is a better option. However, as countless encounters demonstrated at the start of the war, tank attacks without the support of infantry onto enemy infantry positions supported with anti-tank guns (towed anti-tank guns) either failed or only succeeded by sheer weight of numbers at significant cost.
This is completely wrong. You would be hard put to have high concentrations of AT guns on the whole front of a division.The whole problem with towed AT is that it is not sufficiently mobile and very vulnerable. You need to be able to concentrate your AT resources.And tanks can win a firefight with PAK guns. So what happens on the terrain is much more complex than what you are stating here.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Cult Icon » 06 Jan 2020 15:50

gebhk wrote:
06 Jan 2020 15:12
However, as countless encounters demonstrated at the start of the war, tank attacks without the support of infantry onto enemy infantry positions supported with anti-tank guns (towed anti-tank guns) either failed or only succeeded by sheer weight of numbers at significant cost.

I am glad that you at least accept that tanks mostly operate in close cooperation with infantry and artillery. There is a reason for this, one which the participants in WW2 virtually all learned the hard way with tank-heavy armoured divisions in the early stages of the war (with perhaps the exception of the Americans who heeded the experiences of other nations and the results of their own experiments). To achieve this close co-operation, it is necessary to have an adequate balance of all arms in the armoured division. That was patently not achievable with a 400 or more tank division.
These two statements are overgeneralizations- what applied to the Western Allies did not necessarily apply globally. CW towed AT guns like 6-pounders seem to have done pretty well.

In terrain conditions of Russia, the Soviet anti-tank arm (Destroyer regiments/brigades) was successful in sealing off the Eastern Front but took too high losses to sniping from german tanks and AG. Unit/battle histories are littered with examples of this, eg. entire Soviet "pakfronts" neurtralized by armor. The opposite was also the case, with german tank formations running into a concealed pakfronts and getting shot up.

The Soviets produced well over 100,000 AT guns and lost vast quantities. The effectiveness of Soviet AT guns was more in quantity than quality. Also, a "400" tank PzD is really just 300-200 and Soviet late war armored formations did not have the balance in infantry you describe. Maybe if people stop pressing this issue, Aida1 could stop spamming threads. :lol:

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 06 Jan 2020 15:58

gebhk wrote:
06 Jan 2020 15:12

I am glad that you at least accept that tanks mostly operate in close cooperation with infantry and artillery. There is a reason for this, one which the participants in WW2 virtually all learned the hard way with tank-heavy armoured divisions in the early stages of the war (with perhaps the exception of the Americans who heeded the experiences of other nations and the results of their own experiments). To achieve this close co-operation, it is necessary to have an adequate balance of all arms in the armoured division. That was patently not achievable with a 400 or more tank division.
:lol: :lol: The whole theory about armored divisions is infantry, tanks and artillery working together as one unit. That was always the idea. A Panzerdivison with a higher number of tanks does not have less infantry but the balance is towards tanks as it should be. The main striking force of a Panzer division in the true sense of the word is the tank and so you need a lot of them. German Panzerdivisons ended up later in the war with being lucky to have around a 100 and that is before attrition makes that number drop quickly. They were very tank light and resembled more a mechanised infantry division. A Panzerdivison with a much higher number of tanks can operate in 3 powerful armored battlegroups instead of one only. So more tanks does not mean less cooperation , rather the contrary . A lesser number of Panzerdivisions with more tanks each would have worked better and would have been armored in the real sense with certainly more infantry on halftracks instread of only one batallion and more Sf artillery.
The other side certainly succeeded in operating 300 plus tank divisions and that goes up to this day. Just look at a US ABCT.
Last edited by Aida1 on 06 Jan 2020 18:12, edited 3 times in total.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 06 Jan 2020 16:06

Cult Icon wrote:
06 Jan 2020 15:50
gebhk wrote:
06 Jan 2020 15:12
However, as countless encounters demonstrated at the start of the war, tank attacks without the support of infantry onto enemy infantry positions supported with anti-tank guns (towed anti-tank guns) either failed or only succeeded by sheer weight of numbers at significant cost.

I am glad that you at least accept that tanks mostly operate in close cooperation with infantry and artillery. There is a reason for this, one which the participants in WW2 virtually all learned the hard way with tank-heavy armoured divisions in the early stages of the war (with perhaps the exception of the Americans who heeded the experiences of other nations and the results of their own experiments). To achieve this close co-operation, it is necessary to have an adequate balance of all arms in the armoured division. That was patently not achievable with a 400 or more tank division.
These two statements are overgeneralizations- what applied to the Western Allies did not necessarily apply globally. CW towed AT guns like 6-pounders seem to have done pretty well.

Maybe if people stop pressing this issue, Aida1 could stop spamming threads. :lol:
The problem is you dislike criticism even wellfounded and sourced ones. You are not an idiot but not perfect either.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Cult Icon » 06 Jan 2020 16:48

Richard Anderson wrote:
06 Jan 2020 02:03
I'm honestly surprised you are still interacting with a sockpuppet of a poster banned so many times I can't even remember all the pseudonyms. I'm also astonished that this clear violation of posting rules hasn't been shut down long ago as all his various other sockpuppets were.
He had countless accounts on Armchairgeneral forums and he periodically appeared and aggressively FLOODED the forum like he is doing now on certain threads, usually with an extreme german bias and insulting manner.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by gebhk » 07 Jan 2020 10:16

CW towed AT guns like 6-pounders seem to have done pretty well.
Good point Cult Icon. However, I think you have to take into account the overall situation. The Western Allies had a crushing superiority in artillery and virtually complete control of the air. This meant that towed anti-tank guns were a lot less vulnerable than they would have been, on the other side of this equation. At the same time enemy tanks were becoming increasingly rare, to the point that some anti-tank subunits were disbanded to provide more infantry. Tellingly, units equipped with towed A/T guns were the first for the chop. No one (apart from one :wink: ) is saying that towed anti-tank guns were useless - just that they were less effective in most situations than well-designed self-propelled ones. Not least because the latter could support tanks on the move which towed guns clearly could not.

That being said, this of course has no impact on the general premise that adequately supported infantry, regardless of whether the supporting guns are self propelled, jet propelled or towed, are unlikely to be overcome by unsupported tanks. Which then leads us inexorably back onto the fact, which was clearly blindingly obvious to all designers of Armoured Divisions in the latter stages of WW2, that to achieve adequate support for the tanks on the battlefield, a good balance of all arms must exist in the armoured division.
Last edited by gebhk on 07 Jan 2020 11:21, edited 1 time in total.

ljadw
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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by ljadw » 07 Jan 2020 10:47

gebhk wrote:
07 Jan 2020 10:16
CW towed AT guns like 6-pounders seem to have done pretty well.
Good point Cult Icon. However, I think you have to take into account the overall situation. The Western Allies had a crushing superiority in artillery and virtually complete control of the air. This meant that towed anti-tank guns were a lot less vulnerable than they would have been, on the other side of this equation. At the same time enemy tanks were becoming increasingly rare, to the point that some anti-tank subunits were disbanded to provide more infantry. Tellingly, units equipped with towed A/T guns were the first for the chop. No one (apart from one :wink: ) is saying that towed anti-tank guns were useless - just that they were less effective in most situations than well-designed self-propelled ones. Not least because they could support tanks on the move which towed guns clearly could not.

That being said, this of course has no impact on the general premise that adequately supported infantry, regardless of whether the supporting guns are self propelled, jet propelled or towed, are unlikely to be overcome by unsupported tanks. Which then leads us inexorably back onto the fact, which was clearly blindingly obvious to all designers of Armoured Divisions in the latter stages of WW2, that to achieve adequate support for the tanks on the battlefield, a good balance of all arms must exist in the armoured division.
:thumbsup:

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Aida1 » 07 Jan 2020 11:40

gebhk wrote:
07 Jan 2020 10:16
CW towed AT guns like 6-pounders seem to have done pretty well.
Good point Cult Icon. However, I think you have to take into account the overall situation. The Western Allies had a crushing superiority in artillery and virtually complete control of the air. This meant that towed anti-tank guns were a lot less vulnerable than they would have been, on the other side of this equation. At the same time enemy tanks were becoming increasingly rare, to the point that some anti-tank subunits were disbanded to provide more infantry. Tellingly, units equipped with towed A/T guns were the first for the chop. No one (apart from one :wink: ) is saying that towed anti-tank guns were useless - just that they were less effective in most situations than well-designed self-propelled ones. Not least because the latter could support tanks on the move which towed guns clearly could not.

That being said, this of course has no impact on the general premise that adequately supported infantry, regardless of whether the supporting guns are self propelled, jet propelled or towed, are unlikely to be overcome by unsupported tanks. Which then leads us inexorably back onto the fact, which was clearly blindingly obvious to all designers of Armoured Divisions in the latter stages of WW2, that to achieve adequate support for the tanks on the battlefield, a good balance of all arms must exist in the armoured division.
Armored divisions were always meant as a combined arms team from the beginning(See for example Achtung Panzer , Heinz Guderian , specifically the chapter on the tactics of Panzern forces and the cooperation with other arms) . This was not an insight from later in the war. But an armored division must be tank heavy because that is its main striking weapon, the rest is support. German Panzer divisions were far removed from the ideal as they were too tank light and the infantry and artillery were only very partially armored. So a lower number of divisions with 300 plus tanks ,at least more of the infantry on halftracks(preferably all) and 100% Sf artillery would have worked much better. Heinz Guderian would have been impressed by the modern US armored division which is armored in the true sense.
You are overgeneralising when you think that tanks cannot overcome infantry on their own. A lot of factors come into play in that.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Cult Icon » 07 Jan 2020 14:28

ljadw wrote:
07 Jan 2020 10:47
:thumbsup:
A weakness of your repetitive, agenda driven posts is the lack of tactical knowledge and excessive bias. I will agree with Aida1 on this part despite disliking his awful agenda.

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Re: At what point did Germany lose WW2?

Post by Cult Icon » 07 Jan 2020 14:52

gebhk wrote:
07 Jan 2020 10:16
That being said, this of course has no impact on the general premise that adequately supported infantry, regardless of whether the supporting guns are self propelled, jet propelled or towed, are unlikely to be overcome by unsupported tanks. Which then leads us inexorably back onto the fact, which was clearly blindingly obvious to all designers of Armoured Divisions in the latter stages of WW2, that to achieve adequate support for the tanks on the battlefield, a good balance of all arms must exist in the armoured division.
Not to the Soviets, who had low infantry support for their tank units except for their mech. corps units. This is the main area where they did not have much upgrade since the corps units of the mid war. My point, ad nauseum, is that there were no hard and fast rules. The theory makes sense in one's head but actual combat realities show mixed results.

For US tank destroyer battalions, in general they did not respect the towed AT gun very much compared to the TDs and many of these were overrun in the fighting in the Ardennes. They believed that it was simply less efficient than the their TDs and required higher losses than the TDs. The Germans came to the same conclusion with their reports on SP Anti-tank guns vs. towed AT guns.

Point taken on the 6-pounders being well covered by artillery and infantry. eg. In Normandy. But was this necessarily the case in North Africa? Anyway, the Soviet destroyer units were well supported by infantry and sometimes armor as well. The destroyer units were personnel rich, with MGs and Anti-tank rifle teams. In the Soviet Union german armor had mixed results. They often approached and destroyed them like they were a roadblock. They sometimes got repulsed. These units were always a waste of time and ammunition for their forces and significantly impeded offensive operations. They usually did not use infantry attacks from their often weak PzG regiments to neutralize them. Another option , frequently pursued, was the commitment of the SP artillery and armor of the Panzer Division. The SP artillery battalion would concentrate and fire on the "pakfront". A collection of reports can be found in this volume:

https://ospreypublishing.com/panzerartillerie

The independent heavy tank units- such as Tigers and Stugs- also frequently destroyed these "pakfronts" just by sniping them. It comes to mind that things didn't necessarily work out like in theory.

I refer you to Igorn's detailed studies on the Tank armies and soviet armored forces. The failure of the 1941 mech. corps is largely due to early stage organizational development, rather than tank-inf-artillery ratio ideas:

https://www.amazon.com/Igor-Nebolsin/e/ ... 035&sr=8-3

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