Tiger tank Ammunition expenditure.

[Michael Kenny]

.I think you want to post at this thread...seems they are patiently awaiting your response...

viewtopic.php?f=55&t=163515&hilit=carius&start=15

This is the important bits:

3) Some brigade commander (major, HSU) killed by Carius is a pure fantasy. The most high-ranking Soviet tank officer killed at Malinovo on this day was captain Orlovskiy, CO of the 1st battalion, 41st Tank Brigade.
4) Ambush east of Malinovo, in which Carius allegedly destroyed 28 Soviet tanks seems to a fantasy as well. At least no Soviet tank unit ever noticed that it was ambushed in that area.

You say you read the book but failed to notice a made-up claim for 28 Soviet tanks knocked out on July 22nd 1944?

[Miles Krogfus]

My 13 Jan 2020 post "502 Tiger Abt. July 22,1944 combats" has the official unit's report. The Carius Soviet tanks shot total is there.

[Richard Anderson]

Gee, I qonder how many M4 of FUSA were not 75mm on 20 June 1944?

[Yoozername]

Gee, I qonder how many M4 of FUSA were not 75mm on 20 June 1944?

Are you referring to the 105mm M4?

[Richard Anderson]

Oh dear, it's not just a lack of intellectual curiosity, but apparently it's combined with a lack of simple comprehension due to a spelling error (pesky smartphones)? Or perhaps my nomenclature shorthand was misunderstood?

So I "wonder" how may Medium Tanks M4-series assigned to First U.S. Army were not armed with 75mm guns on 20 June 1944? Or, to put it another way, I wonder how many Medium Tanks M4-series armed with 76mm guns or 105mm howitzers were assigned to First U.S. Army on 20 June 1944?

[Yoozername]

Gee...Oh Dear!.... yes, I know when the 76mm M4s were brought over. If you have a point, why not share it? Is it on-topic somehow? I would like it if it is. I do find the 75 mm ammunition info interesting by the way. It doesn't support MK though.

Again, I already have a wife that expects me to read her mind. Perhaps...you are going for a piping fresh MacGuffin?

[Yoozername]

Well, the 2,202 Medium Tanks M4 in the ETOUSA, including the 893 of First Army deployed to 16 June 1944, expended a grand total of 46,980 HE, 27,247 AP and APC, 1,904 WP Smoke, and 1,603 HC Smoke rounds in combat and training 6-20 June 1944. So I suspect the expenditure in combat was somewhere less than 3.5 rounds HE per tank per day, 2.0 rounds of AP/APC per tank per day, and 0.26 rounds of Smoke per tank per day, so something under 6 rounds per tank per day expended for all reasons, including fired in anger, fired in "ranging", fired in training, and lost (likely at least 10% of the total).

That is an interesting stat. Given that almost all M4 were 75mm at that time. Also, given that the number of Panzer Divisions, or even armor faced was low, that means (according to the MK rule), that hundreds of rounds of M72 and M61 were fired at each AFV.

I believe total 75 mm tank ammo production was 13 million? Or was it 26 million? I forget. I do know that post war, after it was obsoleted, they demilitarized it by modifying the production machines to run backwards (or upside down...doesn't matter). Hundreds of tons of material.

Just in case you missed it.

In any case, one would have to factor in the ramp up of the M4s ashore. They didn't land 2,202 tanks on June 6th. Again, one needs to be careful when using 'macro' numbers.

[Richard Anderson]

So how many are "almost all"? I wonder if anyone knows what the distinction between the ETOUSA and the FUSA was?

[Yoozername]

My guess would be one is a macro-number, and the other a super-macro number?

[Yoozername]

In any case, when I have time, I will go over the other days of the combat action in question.

Given the majority of the Soviet Armor was destroyed on the first day (~80%), and the available Tigers are listed as 16, then an upper value of possible AP use could be construed as 80% 0f 1079 or 54 rounds per enemy armor destroyed. But wait, some must have been 'non-fired' as far as being in the destroyed/damaged Tigers? So how does that impact the numbers? It actually increases the number of AP needed to destroy the enemy armor! Unless, of course, the silly argument is made that they fired off all their ammunition first, and then were destroyed or knocked out. IF the destroyed and knocked out rounds were not fired, Then the runners have to fire even more AP. makes 'logical' sense.

Given a 50/50 loadout of AP to HE, then we are talking about reloading the Tigers up it seems. They have to drive to these 'trucks' that sit there full of ammo, right? Actually, the trucks would bring the ammo forward, and it would be unloaded, so as allow the trucks to go back and get more ammo, fuel, etc., instead of sitting on a road waiting to be destroyed (as someone imagines).

[peeved]

Assuming the 50/50 AP/HE ammunition loadout ratio is correct, the fact that the 24-30 June ammunition consumption is an almost identical 48,8/51,2 tends to indicate that the Tigers which returned for resupply had pretty much consumed all their ammo and hence had less choice of ammo type towards the end of each mission. The fact that the lost Tigers do not appear to skew the ammunition consumption figures tends to support the 50/50 loadout hypothesis.

Markus

[Yoozername]

Markus

Given the relatively 'large' number of Soviet tanks destroyed on that one day, and also the large number of antitank guns (~80%), plus the described bunkers, fortifications and 'fortress-like' defenses, one could assume that a large percentage of the total ammunition was used that day. 16 Tigers possibly firing ~1000 total main gun ammunition in one battle? 50-60 tons of ammo? This includes packing etc.

[critical mass]

I notice an implicite bias in these calculations.
They generally presume effeciency as a paradigm gouverning the ammo consumption. While that can be rational time to time on the micro level, it cannot be generalized for in the macro level. Fire suppression may be wasteful in terms of ammo usage but also effective in tactical terms, and there is no chance to understand from the data at hand, which of those is going on.

Thats why I am convinced, that it is useful to compare both sides consumption on different levels. To explore the patterns present here.
Its just data, we shouldnt put them on a podest.

For my part, I dont exactly know, for example, if 50 or 5000 shots used per measure of success is comparatively high or low. Basic research is required.

Richard Anderson, I would be happy to learn more about allied practices and data here.

[Michael Kenny]

For my part, I don't exactly know, for example, if 50 or 5000 shots used per measure of success is comparatively high or low. Basic research is required.

Most people have no idea of how many rounds (on average) you need to fire at a target to get a direct hit.
However a lot of people have in their mind how many rounds they think tank A (as opposed to tank B) would need to fire to get a direct hit.
To validate this 'belief' range-firing data is being used as if it was routinely replicated on the battlefield.
At first blush it would appear that this was not the case.

[Yoozername]

At first blush it would appear that this was not the case.

At first blush, you made the incorrect assumptions that AP is just fired at armored targets, ammunition is not lost by other means, other people are wrong and you are right, etc.

Another example , given the particular circumstances, the ranges mentioned in the reports, and the German policy of firing till a tank/SP is fully burning, can be a factor also. I don't post here to show just how ill informed you are, but to also share information with people that are not closed minded.

Richard Anderson, I would be happy to learn more about allied practices and data here.

It is very interesting data. I thought the WP use was actually lower than I would imagine.