Does Askey explicitly reach the same conclusion as you - that Germany had adequate reserves, and the problem was simply that Germany lacked the rail capacity to send them to the front? If the Replacement Army alone was sufficient, then why did Germany need to send garrison divisions from Western Europe to the Russian Front by the end of 1941?TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑24 Jan 2020 20:50Casualties did not exceed planning margins during 1941. The Heer had 561,600 replacements available on June 22, 1941, the LW another 90,000. These were sufficient to cover permanent losses (KIA, wounded and not returned, MIA/PoW) through Novmember: Ostheer's KIA was ~170,000 by the end of November, permanently wounded were about the same, MIA was ~35K. See Askey, Operation Barbarossa v.IIB page 177.Sid Guttridge wrote:When Germany invaded the USSR, General Fromm of the Ersatzheer thought he had five months of replacements available for the Feldheer. This would have been OK if (1) the Red Army had not fought as hard as it did and (2) the war had been won by the end of the year.
However, casualties were much higher than anticipated and the five months of reserves were expended to replace casualties in just July and August 1941. And, of course, the men lost were of higher standard and longer experience than the replacements, so quality, as well as quantity, declined from the start.
If you just look at replacements versus ALL casualties (i.e. including temporarily sick/unfit and lightly wounded) then you can get the impression that the Heer ran out of replacements in August or so. That gives a wrong impression, however, as the Heer received 509,000 "recuperated replacements" - i.e. returning wounded/sick/unfit - during 1941.
Now it's true that not all available replacements reached the front during the relevant times, especially during Taifun. That was due to failure to plan railroad upgrades adequately, not due to lack of replacements.
Casualties significantly exceeded the replacement pool only during winter.
An earlier post in this thread clearly showed that Germany had a replacement deficit of over 800,000 soldiers as of March 1942: viewtopic.php?p=2241691#p2241691
Was this due to a lack of rail? Are there any cables or memos from the OKH during this time to the following effect: "We have adequate reserves ... If only we had more trains to get them to the front!"
And for all your ad hominems against Ziemke, his numbers as of May 1, 1942 still stand: Army Group North and Army Group Center had only 35% of their original infantry strength, and Army Group South had only 50%. You claim this improved during the course of the year as reinforcements arrived, but Ziemke clearly states, as quoted in the first post of this thread, that this brought AGN and AGC up to only 55% of their original strength.
The facts are clear: Germany was losing more men in the east than it could replace. The lack of trains didn't help, but it wasn't the source of the problem. The Red Army killing all its men was the source of Germany's problem.