The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

[HistoryGeek2019]

Here I always thought peek-a-boo referencing was frowned upon.

Is Mr. Plan referring to the German oil crisis (pp. 493-494), the monetary crisis (pp. 494-497), or the industrial crisis (pp. 497-499) when referencing The Wages of Destruction? Oh, wait, no, there apparently was a "domestic railroad" crisis? Is that a reference to pp. 413-414? Wait, that's winter 40/41 and not domestic. Maybe pp. 343-344? No, that's domestic, but winter of 1939/1940.

Oh, heck, of course, he's actually referencing Mierzejewski, except p. 163, the "crisis" was maybe not so much a crisis since '[The DRB] faced a major crisis in the winter of 1941-42, which it eventually mastered using its well-tried procedures." So I guess not much of a disaster except for the bureaucratic loss to the DRB?

Meanwhile, what does any of that have to do with "immediate replenishment of the replacement stock for the '42 campaign" and "less needless reinforcement of the West"? Where is the spigot and what reinforcement of the West?

The winter of 1941/42 is commonly referred to as an economic and manpower crisis for Germany. See DRZW Volume V Part II, Chapter VI, and Part III Chapter V.

[Ружичасти Слон]

A post by Ружичасти Слон who had personal innsults and attack to another member was removed. Please read the rules of AHF which doesn´t tolerate personal attacks or insults. If you disagree is one thing, but stay polite. If this continues a formal warning will be given with a future ban as a possibility.

Regards
Georg

[Richard Anderson]

The winter of 1941/42 is commonly referred to as an economic and manpower crisis for Germany. See DRZW Volume V Part II, Chapter VI, and Part III Chapter V.

Indeed, but so was the winter of 1939/1940, 1940/1941, 1942/1943, and et cetera. It was a systemic problem that grew to crisis over and over again before band aids were applied and the Wehrmacht shambled on to the next crisis. My questions remain as to how "immediate replenishment of the replacement stock for the '42 campaign" and "less needless reinforcement of the West" enters into it and how they are supposed to be accomplished. I've read all the goobly-gook about how the Nazis suddenly stop being Nazis so force Polish manpower into industry instead of agriculture, where they actually freed up German manpower. Oh, and how the French PW instead of also being put into agriculture get forced into German industry. Its robbing Peter to pay Paul.

Oh, and what "needless reinforcement of the West" occurred prior to the 1942 campaign? The divisions of the 17., 18., and 19. Welle formed in Germany and the West specifically for service in the Ostheer?

[HistoryGeek2019]

Well, Germany did deploy 49 divisions in 1941 in sectors other than the Russian Front (See: Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) p. 121.)

Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, that was too many.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The winter of 1941/42 is commonly referred to as an economic and manpower crisis for Germany. See DRZW Volume V Part II, Chapter VI, and Part III Chapter V.

The economic crisis being driven largely by collapse of the rail system, which was caused largely by unplanned-for diversion of trains to supply an army that should mostly have been home by Christmas, and by the extended stay of those diverted trains amidst burst boiler pipes and other perfectly-foreseeable results of the Russian winter. Lack of trains caused lack of coal, causing lack of electricity among other problems. All sectors of German armaments production declined. OTOH it gave Speer a nifty low baseline from which to judge his performance, as early '42 was both a nadir of production and the moment he rode to the rescue.

Starvation does not mean death in every circumstances.

Your desperateness to find solution to nazi victory has no limits.

Already in September 1941, men who were fit for health reasons from 45 to 50 years old were called up to the Sapper army (in total, 10 sapper armies were created in the Red Army with a total number of 600,000 people)

600k men over 5 year-classes is a small fraction of the levies from the 20-29 year classes. So, again, we'd expect the mortality effects to show more among the 20yo's. The data show the opposite.

yeah, you're back on ignore.

See ya in a day or so. Thanks for your addition to my point.

[Yuri]

Already in September 1941, men who were fit for health reasons from 45 to 50 years old were called up to the Sapper army (in total, 10 sapper armies were created in the Red Army with a total number of 600,000 people)

600k men over 5 year-classes is a small fraction of the levies from the 20-29 year classes. So, again, we'd expect the mortality effects to show more among the 20yo's. The data show the opposite.

Sorry, I don't understand. Why?
In my opinion, the opposite is true.
Could you give us more details? Perhaps my poor understanding of complex sentences prevents me from correctly understanding what is being said.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Well, Germany did deploy 49 divisions in 1941 in sectors other than the Russian Front (See: Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) p. 121.)

Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, that was too many.

The 49 is for June 22, right? Many of these moved east during 1941 I think.

Hitler started moving units west - Grossdeutschland division stands out - during the '42 offensive.
Several panzer divisions moved from France to Ostheer during Fall/Winter '42. I can't remember which ones right now but I bet Richard Anderson does know.
Hitler also reinforced Africa at a time when many - even Rommel - suggested evacuating the continent.
Had the divisions sent to Tunisia and those belatedly transferred from France participated in the Summer/Fall '42 campaign - who knows? It's the only remotely feasible shot at German victory yet Hitler was unwilling to stake enough on this play, frittering away resources to non-decisive fronts out of an egomaniacal refusal to concede ground anywhere.

Evacuation of Africa means earlier landings in Sicily/Italy. Not a big deal - Italy contributed more as an occupied economy than as an ally.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Well, Germany did deploy 49 divisions in 1941 in sectors other than the Russian Front (See: Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) p. 121.)

Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, that was too many.

What's up with your DM's? Can't reply.

[Peter89]

The Italians could not attack British shipping in the Indian Ocean .
The Indian National Army was formed from Indian soldiers who were taken POW in Burma by Japan and preferred to volunteer to fight against Britain ( what they did not ) than to die in Japanese custody . As it was excluded that an Italian-German Army would advance in Pakistan in 1942, there would be no Indian National Army fighting for the Germans : the Ukrainian and Vlassov forces also did not fight on the Eastern front .
About the 70 Axis divisions that would be needed to conquer the ME : it is wrong to compare these forces with the British occupation forces in the ME .The conquest of Turkey alone would demand a force of more than 20 divisions and how would the Axis conquer KSA that was mainly desert without a decent transport system ?
And the Axis would need big garrisons to protect their conquests against British attacks .
Before the war, Britain did not occupy Turkey ,KSA and Yemen, because there was no need for it . But there would be a need for the Axis to occupy Turkey, KSA and Yemen .
Before the war British garrisons in the ME were small ,because there was no foreign power that could threaten British domination in the ME. But that would not be the case for the Axis .
Last point : the ME was irrelevant for the Axis economy,and also for the British economy .

The Italians could not attack the British shipping in the Indian Ocean, because they were isolated and they didn't have the Suez Canal and the Mediterraneum.

The original INA of Burmese POWs were dibanded in 4 months (Aug 1942 - Dec 1942), but the second and more stable INA under Subhas Chandra Bose had a large number of volunteers in its ranks. Also, there was the Christmas Island Mutiny (March 1942) and whatnot. We can talk endlessly about the freedom movements of the subjugated nations under British rule around the time of the WW2, and also about their relationship to the Axis powers, but we know two things for sure: first, these colonies ceded from the BE soon after the WW2 even without German/Axis help, second, the invasion of the SU has proven to be a fatal mistake for the Reich, so if you argue against such a strategy, you have to prove that it was a worse choice than attacking the SU. Which is absolutely impossible. Even doing nothing was better than an attack on the SU.

Germany didn't need to occupy Turkey, and you completely misunderstand the international relations and the economics of 1940. Again. The Turks not only disregarded the Anglo-French-Turkish Treaty of 1939, but also supplied Germany of strategic raw materials without a single German dead. https://encyclopedia2.thefreedictionary ... ty+of+1939
Also, the pro-German Iraqi and Iranian leaders (Rashid Ali and Reza Shah) in 1941 failed directly as a consequence of Barbarossa and the German lack of strategy for the region. These two countries only controlled twice of the production of Romania and about 40% that of the SU - and they were ready to supply the Germans with intact industrial facitlities. https://i.pinimg.com/originals/72/5f/44 ... bcaf07.jpg A safe Mediterran sea could provide the cheap way to transport these materials to the German homeland from the terminals of Haifa and Tripoli. This was the reason why the British occupied these regions.

But you can name any raw materials of strategic importance; I can prove to you that the Mediterraneum/ME and the already Axis-held territories could cover the German needs for the war against the BE. Tungsten, chrome, manganese, bauxite, iron ore, crude oil, etc. If the infrastructure was not there, it was always cheaper to increase production or invest into mining / processing facilities than attack the SU and take it from them.

See:
https://books.google.hu/books?id=NZndfUnWC1IC
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom ... 0010-2.pdf

[TheMarcksPlan]

Sorry, I don't understand. Why?
In my opinion, the opposite is true.
Could you give us more details? Perhaps my poor understanding of complex sentences prevents me from correctly understanding what is being said.

Take two groups, A and B, each with 100 total people.
In each group, 50 are healthy and 50 are unhealthy.
Now suppose we remove 40 healthy people from Group A and 10 healthy people from Group B.
Which group is now more healthy on average?
Group A has 10 healthy people and 50 unhealthy. Group B has 40 healthy people and 50 unhealthy. So Group A is 83% unhealthy and Group B is only 55% unhealthy.
If we now subject A & B to stress, which group will have a higher rate of death/sickness?
If "healthy/unhealthy" explains who is more likely to die in cases of stress, then clearly Group A should have the higher death rate.

In our historical case, young men are like Group A and older men like Group B: The government has removed healthy men from both groups, but the heavier draft of Group A's men (in our case of young men) has left the remaining members of Group A (of young men) disproportionately unhealthy. When a stress shock occurs, we should expect to see Group A and young men to see the greatest increase in deaths, if the sorting mechanism of militarily "fit/unfit" tracks "healthy/unhealthy."

...but we don't. Instead, Group B (older men) suffers the highest increase of mortality rates under the stress (lack of food) of the environment (interior Russia).
Which implies that militarily "fit/unfit" doesn't track "healthy/unhealthy" for the purposes of explaining mortality when food-deprived.

...OK I apologize. That's actually not at all a well-written explainer for someone whose first language is not English (or maybe for anyone). I'm not very good at that. I considered deleting the post but, well, there it is.

[Peter89]

Well, Germany did deploy 49 divisions in 1941 in sectors other than the Russian Front (See: Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) p. 121.)

Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, that was too many.

Also, the mobilization of its allies was too low.

[Peter89]

Not a big deal - Italy contributed more as an occupied economy than as an ally.

Indeed.

This is why "occupying your Axis allies and neutral countries" was also a real alternative for Barbarossa.

[Ружичасти Слон]

A post by Ружичасти Слон who had personal innsults and attack to another member was removed. Please read the rules of AHF which doesn´t tolerate personal attacks or insults. If you disagree is one thing, but stay polite. If this continues a formal warning will be given with a future ban as a possibility.

Regards
Georg

Is it ok on history forum to imagine stories such as this?

Yeah it's simply astounding. Imagine working 12hrs/day in arguably the country's most important factory (70% of T-34 production in Nizhny Tagil Tractor IIRC) and being fed so poorly that young male coworkers are literally dying. And still showing up day after day until you cannot stand - literally - anymore.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Not a big deal - Italy contributed more as an occupied economy than as an ally.

Indeed.

This is why "occupying your Axis allies and neutral countries" was also a real alternative for Barbarossa.

Say more but maybe in another thread? How does Hitler justify (politically not morally) invading Italy? His Fascist ally...

Maybe provocation to war? As in "not an ounce of coal until you win a darn battle?" Until you send me 2 million workers or 10,000 finished guns?

[Aida1]

Well, Germany did deploy 49 divisions in 1941 in sectors other than the Russian Front (See: Stahel, Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East (Cambridge Military Histories) p. 121.)

Perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, that was too many.

The 49 is for June 22, right? Many of these moved east during 1941 I think.

Hitler started moving units west - Grossdeutschland division stands out - during the '42 offensive.
Several panzer divisions moved from France to Ostheer during Fall/Winter '42. I can't remember which ones right now but I bet Richard Anderson does know.
Hitler also reinforced Africa at a time when many - even Rommel - suggested evacuating the continent.
Had the divisions sent to Tunisia and those belatedly transferred from France participated in the Summer/Fall '42 campaign - who knows? It's the only remotely feasible shot at German victory yet Hitler was unwilling to stake enough on this play, frittering away resources to non-decisive fronts out of an egomaniacal refusal to concede ground anywhere.

Evacuation of Africa means earlier landings in Sicily/Italy. Not a big deal - Italy contributed more as an occupied economy than as an ally.

You are again acting as if Germany was only fighting one enemy and could ignore the west. The 4 panzer divisions refitting in the west in 1942 were also a reserve of OB west against a perceived threat of an allied landing and would never have participated in Blau. Whatever was sent to Tunisia in the fall of 1942 could hardly have participated in the summer 1942 offensive. A success of the 1942 summer offensive did not depend on forces being taken from the west or Afrika. You could always find enough forces within the eastern front by shortening the front.