Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

[Aida1]

"Der Chef der Heeresrüstung 25.1.1942
OB of the Ersatzheer
Nr 10/42 gkdos Chefsache
Chief of staff

Memorandum on the personnel and material armament situation 1942

The Führer has communicated his requirements on the organisation of the army in the following form:
1) Creation of a full operations army of mobile troops in the strength of about 10-12 Pz div , from newly to be constituted, refitted and reformed inf div in possibly a large number.
2) Filling up the inf divisons of Army Group South to full personnel and material strength for offensive use.
3) Filling up Army Group Central and North with the only limitation that the Pz and mot divisions remaining there only need to be operational in a limited way
4) Filling up exhausted Pz and inf divisions which should be transferred to the west

At the same time it has been ordered to check if it is not feasible to carry out largescale stocking of material in the east to save the transport of full units to the relief of the transport situation and only need to drive people transport .
A few days later the order of the Führer came for the control of the armament, which aimed at the fullfillment of an army program which still had to be approved and which fixed a stock of 4 months of weapons and material and 6 months of munition for the organisational framework of the army determined after this decision.
The required stock of weapons and munition should be created by may 1 by a preferred treatment of army neeeds in the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1942.
In order to take position on this program definitively, it was necessary to first check the foundations on which such a planning can be built.
They are of a personnel and material nature.
First the material nature. Here 2 accounts are made. One which only fills up the weapon losses and the other which besides filling up the existing units also takes as a foundation the creation of a full operations army.
In both accounts there has been no specific calculation for MG and rifles. The current Soll of the field army with its numerous demand in rear services where the prevailing strength of former times had to be exceeded , is not certain. On the other hand an overview is available as far as that with renewed start of the production of rifles one will get by and concerning MG with a monthly production of about 4500 pieces(including later half new MG)there will always be available a certain stock."

to be continued

[TheMarcksPlan]

Could you maybe post the original document as well?

[Aida1]

Could you maybe post the original document as well?

The individual images are too big to upload here .You can get the file they are in from digitalhistoryarchive by buying T 78 roll 346 for 25 dollar and having it transferred to you by file transfer. Marc Romanych is always quick in executing orders and sending files. Memorandum starts on page 645. Documents on Isabella and Attilla are also in there ;also disposition of forces after Barbarossa etc... You get more than 1100 pages of copies of original documents for 25 dollar so it is cheap.

[Aida1]

memorandum continued

" The basic calculation of both types are limited to the most important calibres. These are in weapons and munition :

light mortars
heavy mortars
light infantry guns
heavy infantry guns
light howitzers
heavy howitzers
PAK(3,7 and 5 cm)
On 1.5.1942 there should, besides the stocks at the front be a supply of 4 months to the total of all firing barrels. With an estimated loss of 40 % in 10 months, it would be 4% per month. Based on the loss numbers of 22.6.1942 to 10.1.1942 it is 30% which is 5 % per month. Acoordingly, 20 % is fixed as a 4 months supply in both accounts.
Even in the 2nd account where for Army group north and center 50% , for this for Army group south only the real loss of 10 % is fixed, the account gives the same result of 5 % a month, therefore also 20% as a 4 months supply.
In both accounts for refilling the needs including the 4 months supply are available:
a) the operational stocks of Fz.Jn on 1.1.1942
b) the repairable stocks of Fz Jn on 1.1.1942 insofar as their repair is ensured by 1.5.1942
c) the new production from the Wa A according to the red book of 1.1.1942 which is ensured from a viewpoint of raw material in I/1942, from a viewpoint of personell departs from the workers level of 1.1.1941 , therefore does not yet take into account the calling up of workers to the armed forces.
d) a supplementary delivery by Wa A through a special measure ,by which from available individual parts and new production of spare parts more weapons are assembled

In both accounts were not considered;
22.,23. and 24. Pz division
5.,8. and 28 . light division
5 rheingold divisions
They all have their full equipment."

to be continued

[Aida1]

Memorandum continued

" After these preliminary remarks which are valid for both calculations i will submit the calculation itself. At first the first one(sie annexe 1-4)
It results from this comparison at first sight that a four month supply cannot be created by 1.5. Furthermore, the following picture results:
light mortars no supply
heavy mortars 300 in supply about 1/2 month
light infantry guns 500 in supply about 3 1/2 month
heavy infantry guns no supply
light field howitzers no supply and a shortage of 250 for the filling up
heavy field howitzers no supply and one is 60 short for filling up
PAK(3,7 and 5 cm) 2300 in supply which is about 4 months ,naturally only 3,7 cm
It is possible that these conclusions do not entirely stand the test of reality , especially for infantry weapons because it seems that a not inconsiderable part of the supplies destined for the filling up of the combat troops are used in the rear services for protecting the railroads and similar missions and possibly, and that is also valid for the artillery, part of the material has not yet reached its destination. But when one takes these numbers in total as a base then one can conclude from them that the filling up of the combat troops is possible with the exception of the le F.H and s F.H.. The deficiencies which exist here however, only mean that an Abteilung with 12 guns can only obtain 11 , that therefore in an Abteilung of 3 batteries, one battery only has 3 guns instead of 4.
Now the calculation which is based on the wish expressed by the führer to create the requested operations army besides the filling up of the existing units. Here the need is as follows according to annexe 5:
a) creation of a full operations army(column 1)
b) filling up the infantry divisions of Army Group South( without 2. Army) with adding of the needs of the 3. mountain division(column 2)
c) filling up Army group north and armygroup center including 2.army (column 3).
d) formation of 3 Pz divisions and 6 inf divisions as a replacement for the divisions which are to be transferred from west to east(column 4)
d) the 4 months supply(column 5)
This results in the global need in column 6

From this calculation it results at first sight that one has to renounce the building up of a 4 months supply and in addition the formation of 3 pz div and 6 inf div as a replacement for the divisions wchich go from the west by 1.5.1941 cannot be achieved. The renouncement of this last point seems especially dangerous ; about a remedy we will speak at another point.
At first however, the renouncement of this point can be taken as a base for further calculations."

to be continued

[Aida1]

memorandum continued
" The not covered need in column 8 of annexe 5 diminishes then at:

light mortars to 1031
heavy mortars to 606
light infantry guns to 0 with a stock of 96
heavy infantry guns to 151
light howitzers to 552
heavy howitzers to 113
PAK(3,7 and 5 cm) to 0 with a stock of 678

For Army Group Mitte and Army group north ,inclusive 2. Army this means a not covered stock of:

light mortars 1081
heavy mortars 606
light inf guns 0
heavy inf guns 128
light howitzers 362
heavy howitzers 180
PAK 0
In both Army groups this means that the inf divisions with a Soll of 84 only have 74 light mortars; this means therefore that about 10 companies , instead of 3 only have 2 light mortars.
That with a Soll of 54, inf divisions only have 48 heavy mortars , which means that 6 of the 9 MG companies only have 5 mortars instead of 6.
That with a Soll of 6 heavy infantry guns only 4-5 will be available, and that concerning light and heavy howitzers with the Abteilungen with 3 batteries 2 batteries will have 3 instead of 4 guns .
This measure of insufficient stocks seems bearable with both army groups. The situation at the artillery can be shaped even more favourable when one principally goes over to 3 gun batteries at both army groups. A further relief will occur when with 15 inf divisions the planned reorganisation will occur in such a way that the artillery regiment is composed of 2 light Abteilungen with 2 batteries each and one Abteilung with 4 batteries including 2 light and 2 Nebelwerfer batteries.
This last relief however will mainly occur with army group south, but anyway brings with it a reduction of the material need by 45 batteries of 4 = 180 guns for the global count.
That way it will be possible to quicker create the artillery of the 3 Pz divisions to be set up in the west.
And so we can go over to the description of how these 3 pz divisions and 6 inf divisions in the west can maybe be equipped after all by 01.5."

to be continued

[Aida1]

Memorandum continued

"A requirement which could have particular importance for political reasons.
The 6 inf div can at first be equipped with captured material. This will bring no complete equipment but anyway at first sufficient for the west . Today it cannot be seen whether and when later a re_ armament with German material can take place.
Concerning the 3 Pz div the inf weapons will at first have to be able to be delivered from captured stocks.
About the possibility for equipping with artillery was already spoken; it will be gained from the re-armament of artillery regiments with Nebelwerfer. Concerning its equipment with armor, a satisfying solution will possibly be found in time. This will have to be taken into account in the Panzer situation to which we can turn now.
The Panzer situation is shown in annexe 9. It is also set up as the hitherto calculation of material so

a) for a simple fillung up of existing units and the already planned units without further setting up for a operations army (case A)
and
b) with a pronounced focus in the sense of such an operations army(case B)
Here the focus is substantially that the new pz div to be used in the operations army will dispose of 3 instead of 2 Pz Abteilungen, that 5 inf div mot will have a Panzer spearhead from a Pz Abteilung, that Grossdeutschland and Leibstandarte will be equipped in accordance with orders, that however on the other hand the remaining 10 Pz div with army group Mitte and north will only dispose of 1 Pz Abteilung .
It remains now to check how the newly to be set up Pz div in the west, can get an equipment with Panzer early. Here the Pz reserve Sagan offers itself as the only solution. It would make it possible to deliver at first about 40 vehicles to each of these Pz div. The remaining stock should at first be taken from the old Pz of the Beutebrigade Paris. This way a makeshift equipment with Panzer of these divisions is really already possible by may 1.Its full equipment with German material can only take place from the may production, thus in june 1942. However this step will mean that for the supplying of the eastern front only the production of june 1942 can be provided.
The reserves provided for Afrika are not set in this calculation. "
To be continued

[Aida1]

memorandum continued
"How the situation will be in the area of the tractors can in no way be seen today. The basics are lacking to know what is available in the army and what will be available. It can be established with certainty that even when using old French captured cars(very high fuel consumption) as tractors , the situation has to be considered as quite serious.
The same goes in the area of the other vehicles, especially trucks. The vehicle situation is shown in annexe 10. When one draws conclusions from this annexe, it can be formulated as follows: the inf divisons, light div and mountain div in Army group south will only get a makeshift equipment with vehicles, not a full one. The army group center and north and in these calculations 2. Army has to be added, cannot count on any additional eqipment with vehicles.
The heavy PAK are a particular chapter. Annexe 11 shows the production of guns. Here also the tractor problem is the decisive difficulty.
We can now go to the munition situation . Here as a basis for the calculation the firing barrels are counted as yielded by material account 2, that is in the sense of the building of an operations army. Special munitions like Pz, smoke and concrete projectiles are not considered. As amount fired from january to including april four times the connsumption from december is fixed. The detail is shown by annexe 12. The result of this is that in 4 important areas a six month supply for le Fh and S Fh cannot be reached also on a longer term. The biggest concern in this whole calculation is that the new production will never cover the monthly consumption when one knows that there is always a certain need of munition on all fronts. Even when there is no firing on quiet fronts, it always remains necessary to fix certain amounts of munition in Norway, France , the Balkan and Africa. The picture which emerges is that according to our existing opinion the munition stocks for a big operation and a whole campaign are not available. Unless the judgment of the enemy situation about which no judgment can be made from here would allow a diversion from our principles so far . "

[Aida1]

memorandum continued
" Which is highlighted with particular urgency as an important realisation in the area of munitions , naturally applies in the same way for the other discussed weapon areas, where for the first time we are forced to start an operation on 1.05 without any stock.
So far the considerations have been based on what is available and what can come into our hands until april including from production. However the view on the material situation would be incomplete, when one would not take into account if and what can be realistically achieved beyond the forecasts in the area of weapons from may on. Before a description of this is given, we must again- looking back, portray the actual situation of our armament capacity because only from it the difficulties can be explained before which the army stands. About these things it was already reported repeatedly. It must only be recalled to memory that based on directives which went out already in the spring; on the basis of orders which are enacted in the summer and from then on tightened itself , the army willfully and consciously had its armament capability reduced, that it surrendered numerous capacities to other parts of the armed forces and was neither with sufficient contingents , neither with labour , neither in level of urgency equipped according to the real needs. Following directives and orders, the army has steered the reduction of its capability itself until in september on the basis of the changed operational situation the insight came that here a taking away of army capability happened which was so strong that even for modest missions only far insufficient could be done. From this time in september on the army has relentlessly pointed out the unbearable situation. However the army has found no hearing with the offices of the OKW. Finally, it was forced to exceed by its own initiative the contingents which had been granted, for its own self preservation. Not until 23 december , a new assignment of raw materials took place, which was then further increased in january. With these late assignments was it just possible to prevent a further reduction for I/42 and find itself back on the production level of october 1941 in the area of weapons and in the area of munitions to an output which is above that of the year's end and which can make possible the start of a bigger program for the later quarters."

[Aida1]

" However all measures are not enough to fully equip the former army , let alone the enlarged army following the wishes of the führer and to preserve it in a full war situation. In the annexes 13 to 14 it is visible what the situation will be from may to september 1942. Annexe 13 shows for weapons and munition as a foundation the raw materials allocation for the I/42 and the request for II/42 while maintaining the worker stock of december 41 and a supplemental allocation of workers for the higher mechanical production. Annexe 14 shows the extra production which is possible after fullfilling the following further prerequisites :
a) replacement of the workers which will be called up jan to march 1942, especially the skilled workers .
b) an additional allocation of workers
for weapons 1200 skilled workers
2300 unskilled workers
total 3500
for munition 2000 skilled workers
21000 unskilled workers
total 23000
c) full allocation of the additional raw materials weapons and munitions besides the quantities requested for the former production programs for II/42 and III/42
d) full supply with coal and energy
e) return of the capacities that fell from the army to navy and airforce at the redirection in II/41, expansion of a few plants( building volume 3 million RM), extracting more flak capacity ( in flak 8,8 cm there will despite this still be a production of 190 guns per month)
f) reducing all export orders which are at the expense of army production
Whether and to what extent these prerequisites can be fullfilled , or not can be left aside. A lot will certainly be achieved.
The supplementay need for raw materials is shown by annexe 15 . What can be achieved under these conditions is shown by annexe 16. The total need for raw materials in the current year is drawn up in annexe 17.
A fullfillment of the army request for raw materials only for the first half of 1942 further impairs the army armament situation."

[Aida1]

Memorandum continued

"This look at the production possibilities shows, and that can be drawn as a conclusion from the individual annexes globally , that above all two things are necessary: the army must be suspplied with new capacities, in the first place the ones that the army created itself and then abandoned in the course of the summer to other parts of the Wehrmacht. Here it will be not be preventable how regretfull it may seem and how serious such a step may be judged , again to have recoiurse to the flak program , with guns as well as munition. Insofar as can be seen until now however, a production of up to 190 8,8 cm guns per month can still remain secured with the estimated numbers . Furthermore, the necessary manpower has to be supplied to the armaments industry. On this point the following is to be stated in principle : at a time where the front calls for people in a measure that has never been seen before, it is unavoidable to request the handing over of people from the armament industry. Its reservoir of people was besides the first intervention at the mobilisation , almost not used. On the contrary it was fed continuously through people on leave, people freed from service and retraining. The burden which now has to be put on the armaments industry , i consider as bearable as it will only be about 12,5 % of the pool. The industry must get away from the idea that it alone is always prepared a percect bed. Besides the enrolment of prisoners, it must find out of itself in its structure the powers for finding the necessary focus for armament puposes by limitations in branches not important for the war. Talks with the munitions minister as well as the Gen.bev for the use of the labour force justify the opinion that this question can get a satisfying solution. "

[TheMarcksPlan]

It must only be recalled to memory that based on directives which went out already in the spring; on the basis of orders which are enacted in the summer and from then on tightened itself , the army willfully and consciously had its armament capability reduced, that it surrendered numerous capacities to other parts of the armed forces and was neither with sufficient contingents , neither with labour , neither in level of urgency equipped according to the real needs. Following directives and orders, the army has steered the reduction of its capability itself until in september on the basis of the changed operational situation the insight came that here a taking away of army capability happened which was so strong that even for modest missions only far insufficient could be done.

Thanks for your efforts.

Apropos of our discussion on the state of the Ostheer '42, one cannot forget the fact that Germany, with the army's consent, shot itself in the foot for the '42 campaign. The resources relinquished willingly by the army only were redirected towards the end of Barbarossa, by which time the economic Winter Crisis - also caused by Barbarossa's destruction of Germany's rail assets - was in full swing.

And all for what? Not much. There was no real threat from Britain in '41, especially no threat that justified shrinking the army's economic resources just as Barbarossa began.

Had army production been on an upward slope during '41 instead of downward, the '42 Ostheer could have had twice the equipment firepower.

[Aida1]

Memorandum continued
" To the material field an other remark has to be made which seems essential: other than the Panzer material to be surrendered to Hungary ,no further deliveries to other countries should be made from our stocks and our production. Each piece which is put at the disposal of other countries tears a hole in our stock, which seems even more serious the more imperfect our own possibilities even seem to us. In connection with this consideration of the material situation, we can now deal with the question whether for the 3 Pz div and 6 inf div to be brought from the west, material can be prepared in the east to relieve the transport situation in the last weeks before the operation. The explanation above shows clearly that the necessary material is not available. One can therefore not approach this matter.

Now to the personnel question.
Small changes are possible to the oral presentation based on directives which were issued now.
The old calculation for I/42 was for the army 442000 which was composed of:
replacements for the field army : 300.000
Rheingold : 75.000
Walküre : 50.000
Tansport columns : 12.000
Jagdcommandos : 5.000

The Luftwaffe requested 157.000 , the Kriegsmarine 51.000, so that a general need for the Wehrmacht of 650.000 men was presented for I/42.
This basic calculation has moved a lot in timing and magnitude, because in december 141500 men had already needed to be called up early and for january to including april an additional 750.000 are requested. According to the plan which is now effective, are necessary for the army 937.000 men , in addition the previous stock for Airforce and Navy together 208.000 , therefore as a whole for the wehrmacht 1.145.000 men."

[Aida1]

It must only be recalled to memory that based on directives which went out already in the spring; on the basis of orders which are enacted in the summer and from then on tightened itself , the army willfully and consciously had its armament capability reduced, that it surrendered numerous capacities to other parts of the armed forces and was neither with sufficient contingents , neither with labour , neither in level of urgency equipped according to the real needs. Following directives and orders, the army has steered the reduction of its capability itself until in september on the basis of the changed operational situation the insight came that here a taking away of army capability happened which was so strong that even for modest missions only far insufficient could be done.

Thanks for your efforts.

Apropos of our discussion on the state of the Ostheer '42, one cannot forget the fact that Germany, with the army's consent, shot itself in the foot for the '42 campaign. The resources relinquished willingly by the army only were redirected towards the end of Barbarossa, by which time the economic Winter Crisis - also caused by Barbarossa's destruction of Germany's rail assets - was in full swing.

And all for what? Not much. There was no real threat from Britain in '41, especially no threat that justified shrinking the army's economic resources just as Barbarossa began.

Had army production been on an upward slope during '41 instead of downward, the '42 Ostheer could have had twice the equipment firepower.

Given the optimistic view of the campaign against the red army, it is not surprising that there was a shifting of resources towards Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine. Hindsight is too easy.

[Aida1]

memorandum continued
" This difference towards the old calculation whose magnitude becomes somewhat smaller at precise individual calculation , but does not change in principle, leads us to the dificulties which force at the moment to really bring the last man to the front.
It remains to check a)what is requested and b) how can the requests be met.
In december was requested and met what is shown by annexe 18
What is demanded by I/42 , is shown by annexe 19. From this annexe emerges also that these requirements can only be met when from february one already falls back to a great extent on the class of 22 . In spite of this exertion it emerges that the losses of the front cannot be entirely replenished (see annnexe 20). With the superficial calculation, there remains a deficit of 108.000 men. This means, for the divisions fighting on the eastern front inclusive Finland and Lappland, a deficit of 500 men per division, which can by definition be shifted with concentration.
The difficulty in bringing in the necessary replacements is shown by annexe 21. It shows clearly that the total stock of all men indispensable for the economy is not sufficient to cover the need for replacements and forces to the conclusion that in its place a large part of the class of 22 has to be pushed in. Because this break-in to class of 22 has to be compensated again in some form, and class of 23 as our last reserve cannot yet be pulled in, it remains only to compensate the loss of men of the class of 22 by calling up the same number of men immediately from unskilled men of the economy. These unskilled men will hit the economy less hard than the skilled ones because the army is not interested in the individual person and a compensation can happen according to the wishes of the firms.
How extraordinary dificult this procedure is, can be shown by the composition of annexe 22."