The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

[TheMarcksPlan]

If things were dire in 1942, it should be expected that in the middle of winter, when more of the daily calorific intake would be required to maintain body temperature

However, things had clearly deteriorated by 1943 when 10-20% of male deaths in the age range 20-60 in two home-front regions were attributed to starvation.

The authors of Hunger and War explain this best so I'll just quote them (pg.24):

food supply reached its lowest level in 1942. Mortality from starvation, however, reached its apex in 1943 and continued into 1944 even after the food supply improved. The year of greatest food shortage was not the year of greatest death. A lag existed between the shortages of 1942 and their subsequent impact. The lag is explained by the fact that food deprivation takes a slow and often irreversible toll on the human organism. There was thus a delayed reaction between the low point for the food supply (1942–1943) and the high point of starvation deaths (1943–1944).

[ljadw]

Best ex source :climate policy watcher
Table 54 : estimates for grain production in the USSR between 1920 and 1940 millions of tons

1933 : Soviet estimate in the 1930s :89,8 /revised soviet estimate :68,4 A difference of more than 21 million of tons
1934 : 89,4 ,revised to 67,6
1935 : 90,1 ,revised 75
1936 : 82,7,revised 55,8
1937 120,3 ,revised :97,4
1938 :95, revised 73,6
1939 :106,5 revised 73,3
1940 :95,9 ,revised 86,9
Thus The soviet figures were wrong for 172 million for 8 years ,which is yearly almost 22 million .
Official German figures were not better : initially they claimed to have taken prisonner in 1941 3906765 Soviet soldiers, then they ''corrected '' this figure to 3367206 ( Source : Vabanque P 73 ) and the German war losses figures are as unreliable as the Soviet ones .

[TheMarcksPlan]

One of the points made in this thread is that had the Ostheer achieved more in the south in 1941, the near collapse of 1942 in the OTL would have been an unavoidable collapse in the ATL. A simplistic response to that is - a near collapse in 1942 has not been demonstrated and since no collapse occurred in 1943/44, why would it have occurred in 1942 under the ATL?

I had begun a long reply outlining my conceptual approach to the problem when I dropped my mouse and it somehow closed the window, deleting all my work. But it was still a work in progress and a long way to go, I probably would have kicked it to another day.

But let me set up the basic issues:

1. It is possible that certain territorial losses could have caused up to 25% decline in the per-capita food supply of the SU. Western/Central Ukraine was the only large grain surplus region lost during '41, yet is the biggest explanation for the ~25% per-capita decrease during '42 (much grain was evacuated from territories taken during Blau, though not all). If Germany removes the Blaulands and/or Volga basin from SU agriculture, 25% decline in food supply is possible.

2. Starvation mortality/morbidity relates to an individual's accumulated caloric deficit. Rations were standard for work categories. Individual caloric expenditure, however, depended primarily body weight (most peasants/workers were lean). Therefore, the distribution of caloric deficit would relate to the normal statistical distribution of body size. The CRITICAL INSIGHT: In a normally distributed population where ~2% of workers' accumulated caloric deficit causes death, an increase of caloric deficit by one standard deviation would mean that ~16% of workers die.

In other words, The mortality/morbidity effects of X% food supply reduction is inevitably going to be multiples of X

From Hunger and War (for reasons I'll explain in depth if folks would like), it seems that average worker caloric deficit per day was on the order of ~5% or lower. That's in line with the long progression of starvation effects... So a 25% reduction of food supply is so far beyond the bounds of what the workers coped with that I have absolutely no doubt that 25% would cause widespread death if people kept working at historical levels. At least a majority of deaths. Of course something else would happen before a majority of workers died on the factory floor (or in hospitals, whatever).

While 25% per capita food supply reduction is imaginable, even 10% delta to '42 levels and maintenance of that lower level would double or triple average daily caloric deficit, which would mean in individual terms a quick trip up the normal distribution.

There's still more math/modelling/research for me to do, my goal here is simply to explain to you that I don't consider a linear evaluation ("10% less food means 10% more deaths) to be remotely credible. Given my limited tolerance for certain mental habits and my desire not to be banned just yet, I'll probably ignore anyone who is unwilling to engage these arguments with at least a basic statistical bent.

-------------------------------------

By the way, about "dying on the factory floor," I forgot about the following letter quoted in Hunger and War:




...in case there remains any doubts about the drama of the starvation problem.

[Ружичасти Слон]

By the way, about "dying on the factory floor," I forgot about the following letter quoted in Hunger and War:

Thank you for giving evidence that workers were dropping dead at workplace.

[Ружичасти Слон]

In general I would agree with this. TheMarcksPlan has provided quite a lot of detail to suggest deaths were indeed likely, but when two posters are seemingly arguing past each other sometimes it is best for a third party to seek clarification at which point the matter can be put to rest. I would suggest that unless credible evidence that the workers at Nizny Tagil were for some reason receiving better rations than workers at other similar factories, then the matter can be left as reasonably established and supported.

Thank you for giving moderator idea of standards for giving evidence on forum.

I already wrote it was probably not important that themarksplan changed temporary days lost to dieing, changed ammunnition factory to most important tank factory and it wss literally happen not just conjecture. It is not important.

But you did not addres big claim. Is it same idea and standard?

Must we assume that it is reasonably established and suported that Soviet economy was on brink of collapse in 1942 until credible evidence from somebody else shows starvation and mortality data for 1943 and 1944 is not valid for 1942?

[Yuri]

Themarksplan does not give evidence for his claim that peope were literally being worked to death! .

Themarksplan does not give evidence for his claim Imagine working 12hrs/day in arguably the country's most important factory (70% of T-34 production in Nizhny Tagil Tractor IIRC) and being fed so poorly that young male coworkers are literally dying.

The evidence themarksplan gives does not prove his claim that the Soviet economy in 1942 was on the brink of total collapse.

TheMarcksPlan has proven beyond a shadow of a doubt that there was widespread starvation taking place within the Soviet Union at this time period. From this, we could reasonably extrapolate that there was also starvation taking place in the Nizhny Tagil factory.

Maybe he can't find a specific document saying that this was the case. But thats losing sight of the big picture. The USSR was clearly having major difficultys feeding its people. Its not much of a stretch to imagine that men may have been worked to death (at least in some of the harder hit areas).

Giving evidence for some thing is not the same as evidencing some very specific claims.

You are trying to pigeonhole him into a very narrow trap. He made an offhand claim that starvation was taking place at a specific factory, and you have spent the last 3 or 4 pages trying to hold his feed to the fire and yelling 'Citation Needed!' ad infinitum.

You are not arguing in good faith. How would you like it if someone combs through your posts, looks for a very specific claim you made, and then harangues you for citations?

Lets say that you made some offhand remark about the workers at Nizhy Tagil scratching their noses. And then someone comes in and demands that you provide a peer reviewed paper with primary sources proving that the workers at Nizhny Tagil scratched their noses? Would that be fair?

In general I would agree with this. TheMarcksPlan has provided quite a lot of detail to suggest deaths were indeed likely, but when two posters are seemingly arguing past each other sometimes it is best for a third party to seek clarification at which point the matter can be put to rest. I would suggest that unless credible evidence that the workers at Nizny Tagil were for some reason receiving better rations than workers at other similar factories, then the matter can be left as reasonably established and supported.

Workers scratch their noses in Nizhny Tagil, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, London, Ottawa, Detroit, Los Angeles and you won't believe it, but even workers in Hollywood scratch their noses. Am I right? Question: why do people die only in Nizhny Tagil for this reason? Because they don't scratch properly or does the nose of a worker in Nizhny Tagil itch only when and only when he is starving?

[Yuri]

PRESIDIUM OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE USSR
DECREE
from April 19, 1943

About measures of punishment for the German-fascist villains guilty of murders and tortures of the Soviet civil population and captured red army men, for spies, traitors of the homeland from among the Soviet citizens and for their accomplices


Liberated by the red Army from German-fascist invaders of the towns and villages discovered many facts unheard of atrocities and horrific violence perpetrated by German, Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, Finnish fascist monsters, Nazi agents and spies and traitors among the Soviet citizens against the peaceful Soviet population and red army prisoners. Many tens of thousands of innocent women, children, and old men, as well as captured red army soldiers, were brutally tortured, hanged, shot, and burned alive on the orders of commanders of military units and units of the gendarme corps of the Hitler army, Gestapo chiefs, burgomasters, and military commandants of cities and villages, heads of pow camps, and other representatives of the fascist authorities.

Meanwhile, all these criminals who are guilty of committing bloody massacres against the peaceful Soviet population and captured red army soldiers, and their accomplices from the local population, are currently subject to a measure of retribution that clearly does not correspond to the atrocities they have committed.

Bearing in mind that reprisals and violence against defenseless Soviet citizens and captured red army soldiers and treason to the Motherland are the most shameful and grave crimes, the most heinous atrocities, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR decides:

1. To establish that German, Italian, Romanian, Hungarian, Finnish, Nazi villains, convicted of the murder and torture of civilians and prisoners of war, and spies and traitors from among Soviet citizens are punishable by death by hanging.

2. Accomplices from the local population who are convicted of assisting the villains in committing massacres and violence against the civilian population and captured red army soldiers are punished by exile to hard labor for a period of 15 to 20 years.

3. The cases of fascist villains responsible for the killings and violence against the peaceful Soviet population and red army prisoners, and spies, the traitors to the Motherland among Soviet citizens and their accomplices from the local population to impose on courts-martial, formed by division of the army consisting of: the Chairman of the military Tribunal of the division (Chairman of court), head of the special Department of the division and Deputy division commander for political Affairs (the members of the court), with the participation of the Prosecutor division.

4. Sentences of military field courts at divisions to approve to the commander of a division and to execute immediately.

5. The enforcement of sentences of courts-martial in the divisions - the hanging of those sentenced to death - to make public, with people, and bodies hanged on the gallows leave in a few days to let everyone know how punishable and what retribution will befall anyone who commits the violence and the massacre of the civilian population and who betray their country.

Chairman Of The Presidium
Supreme Soviet of the USSR
M. KALININ

Secretary Of The Presidium
Supreme Soviet of the USSR
A. GORKIN

[Yuri]

In the end '70s and' 80s, I was doing in the USSR what the guys from The Burroughs Corporation for U.S. Air Force Ballistic Missiles program. The work was carried out throughout the USSR: from West to East from the Baltic Kaliningrad to The Pacific Petropavlovsk-Kamchatka; from North to South-from the shores of the White sea in the Arctic, to the hot Kara-Kum desert in Turkmenistan and the subtropics of Georgia. The contractors were the corresponding factories in all regions of the USSR. I know the history of these factories.
In Central Asia (in particular, in the capital of the Uzbek USSR, Tashkent, or the capital of the Kyrgyz SSR, Frunze (now Bishkek), where tractor, aviation, radio, and cable plants were evacuated from Kharkov, Moscow, and other regions), there were no problems with food. Should I (or do I have the right) extrapolate the situation in Central Asia to other territories of the USSR?
Can we also extrapolate the situation in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia (for example, an aviation plant was evacuated in Tbilisi, where the famous designer Shopkeeper was sent) to the entire territory of the USSR?
All right, let's put the rhetoric aside. Let's get to the specifics. The branch is called "The State of the OstHeer - May 1942". For some reason, I was interested in the theme of "The State of the OstHeer - May 1942". But the discussion went in a completely different direction - the Famine in the USSR in 1942" and the "Mediterranean strategy of the Wehrmacht".
I had no intention of actively participating in this. However, I can't help but pass by Your statement that enough evidence was provided about the famine in the USSR in 1942 and, as a result, the Soviet economy was on the verge of collapse in 1942.
To prove this statement, data for 1943 and 1944 for the Urals and Western Siberia are provided. Let's try to understand calmly and thoroughly how serious was the problem of famine in the USSR in 1942. The graphs from the book "Hunger and War" show graphs of death rates and graphs of diseases of workers associated with starvation. As can be seen in the graphs of indicators growth in 1943 and the first half of 1944.
However, the lack of food in 1943 and the first half of 1944 was not caused by a lack of food in regions that were not occupied by European invaders, but by the fact that in 1943 there was a mass liberation of the territory and population of the USSR.
In the liberated territories of the USSR, European invaders left hungry and sick people, and healthy men and women aged 14 to 65 years were taken into slavery. Scorched earth tactics were first used on a large scale by European invaders in March 1943 (operation Buffalo). Now on the website of the TSAMO there are already documents of the 9th army, in particular documents of the 86th Infantry division (General Weidling), which show the scale and brutality of this action.
The above text of the law of the USSR of April 19, 1943 is a reaction to what was seen on the territory from which the troops of the 9th army and the 2nd army of the Wehrmacht and the 2nd Royal Army of Hungary were expelled in early 1943.
Only from the Urals, Volga, and Western Siberia could food be delivered quickly and in large volumes in 1943 to the districts of Voronezh, Smolensk, Oryol, Kursk, Bryansk, Kharkov etc. for sick adults and children under 14 years of age.
Once again, I will remind you that under the orders of the OKH, which are repeated by General Weidling, all healthy adults and children from 14 years old were taken to the West, who refused-executed in the most brutal way for intimidation.

[Yuri]

Pravda, No. 209 (9345), Sunday, August 22, 1943

On urgent measures to restore the economy in areas liberated from German occupation

In order to restore the economy as soon as possible and provide assistance to the population of areas liberated from German occupation, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) decided:
I.
About return to collective farms of the cattle evacuated to East areas
Oblige the regional Executive committees and regional committees of the CPSU(b) of the Yaroslavl, Gorky, Vologda, Kirov, Ryazan, Tambov, Saratov, Kuibyshev, Chkalov regions, the Sovnarkom and regional committees of the CPSU(b) of the Mordovian, Mari, Dagestan ASSR and the Sovnarkom and Central Committee of the CPSU(b) of the Kazakh SSR, the Azerbaijani SSR and the Armenian SSR to return to the collective farms of the Kalinin, Smolensk, Oryol, Kursk, Voronezh, Stalingrad, Rostov, Tula regions, Krasnodar and Stavropol territories evacuated by these regions and edges of cattle in the following quantities:
...

To oblige the people's Commissariat of agriculture of the USSR in order to assist in the restoration of animal husbandry to collective farms in areas liberated and being liberated by the red Army, to organize in 1943-44 in the Eastern and Central regions the state purchase of all types of livestock for areas liberated from the German occupation.
The purchase of cattle for specified regions and republics to make under the voluntary sales of farms, farmers, workers and employees of the rear areas at the prices of public procurement with enrollment sold cattle farms in the implementation of their state plan for the development of animal husbandry.
Allow the agricultural Bank to provide loans to collective farms in areas liberated from German occupation for the purchase of livestock and bream in the amount of the full cost.
1. To recommend to collective farms of the areas released from German occupation to leave for cultivation of working oxen all livestock of bullocks of the offspring of 1942-43.

On measures to restore poultry farming in collective farms
1. Obligate the oblast Executive committees, the Executive Committee, regional committees and territorial committees of the CPSU(b) to enable the restoration of 1943-44 of all poultry farms had the farms before the occupation, and to increase the number of adult birds on 1 January 1945, on the collective farm poultry regions up to the following amounts:
…

IV
About privileges to collective farms, collective farmers, sole proprietors, workers and employees on deliveries of agricultural products to the state and about the order of carrying out preparations in 1943.
1. To oblige the district Executive committees and district committees of the CPSU(b) release wholly or partly in 1943 from passing the state agricultural farm yards, individual farms, farms workers, civil servants and artisans who suffered from the German occupation.

…

V
On assistance to collective and state farms with seeds for winter sowing in 1943
1. To ensure the plan for sowing winter crops for the harvest of 1944, release 50,000 tons of winter crop grain from state resources as loans to collective farms, including:

…

About delivery of fuel and oils for MTS
1. Oblige Glavneftesnab under the Soviet people's Commissar of the USSR under all conditions to complete the shipment of fuel and oils for the allocated funds for agriculture and for restoration work in the liberated areas in the following terms:


…

VII
About measures of assistance for restoration and construction of dwellings of collective farmers, workers and employees
1. Consider it an urgent task of the party and Soviet organizations of the Kursk, Oryol, Voronezh, Kalinin, Stalingrad, Rostov regions, Krasnodar and Stavropol regions to restore and build new residential buildings from local construction materials in villages, cities and working settlements liberated from the German occupation, in order to provide accommodation in habitable premises for collective farmers, workers, and employees currently living in dugouts and destroyed houses.
2. Oblige the Council of people's Commissars of the RSFSR and regional committees, regional committees of the CPSU (b) and regional Executive committees to ensure the construction and commissioning in 1943:

…

H
About the organization for children of soldiers of the red Army and partisans of the Patriotic war, as well as children of orphans whose parents died at the hands of the German occupiers - Suvorov military schools, special vocational schools, special orphanages and children's receivers-distributors
1. For the device, training and education of children of soldiers of the red Army, partisans of the Patriotic war, as well as children of Soviet and party workers, workers and collective farmers who died at the hands of the German occupiers, to organize in the Krasnodar and Stavropol territories, Rostov, Stalingrad, Voroshilovgrad, Voronezh, Kharkiv, Kursk, Oryol, Smolensk and Kalinin regions:
a) nine Suvorov military schools, such as the old cadet corps, 500 people each, a total of 4500 people with a training period of 7 years, with a closed boarding school for pupils;
b) twenty-three special vocational schools of 400 people each, a total of 9,200 people with a 4-year training period; of these, 12 schools for boys and 11 for girls;
C) special children's homes with a total of 16,300 children and children's homes for 1,750 children;
d) twenty-nine children's receivers-distributors for 2 thousand people.
The contents of all these institutions fully be attributed to the state, according to estimates of NGOs, Public administration of labour reserves, Narkomprosa SFSR and the USSR, the NKVD and people's Commissariat of the USSR.

…

Special children's homes
1. Oblige the people's Commissars Of the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR to organize special children's homes with a contingent of pupils in the total number of 300 people, including 13.100 people in the RSFSR –
…
Establish that special children's homes accept children of preschool and school age from 3 to 13 years (boys and girls)
Assign the NKVD of the USSR daily control over the organization of special children's homes and their work. Instruct the NKVD of the USSR to appoint representatives of the NKVD of the USSR for the regions, assigning them the duty to ensure the organization of special children's homes in the prescribed time, control over their work and take measures to provide daily assistance to special children's homes.
…

Instruct the Committee under the SNK of the USSR to restore the economy in areas liberated from the German occupation, consisting of T. T.: Malenkov G. M.-Chairman of the Committee, Beria P. P., Mikoyan A. I., Voznesensky N. A. and Andreev A. A.-management of the restoration of the economy in areas liberated from the German occupation, and control over the implementation of Government decisions related to these areas.

[Terry Duncan]

Workers scratch their noses in Nizhny Tagil, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, London, Ottawa, Detroit, Los Angeles and you won't believe it, but even workers in Hollywood scratch their noses. Am I right? Question: why do people die only in Nizhny Tagil for this reason? Because they don't scratch properly or does the nose of a worker in Nizhny Tagil itch only when and only when he is starving?

Were the workers living on reduced rations, and were significant numbers of them incapacitated as the evidence provided by TheMarksPlan suggests?

If you have evidence that his evidence is wrong, or other evidence that will call into question the rations recieved, then please post it, as non-content argumentative posts are against the purpose of the forum and thus fall outside of the rules. Even if you disagree with what has been posted, it is sourced and also far more numerous than any attempt to refute them, which at present amounts to opinion only.

[Yuri]

So, in the book “Hunger and War”, the following is shown:
1. in 1941-42, people who were mostly unfit for military service were evacuated to the territory of the Urals and Western Siberia. At the same time, healthy men left these regions for the Red Army.
2. in 1942-43, people who were in a state of starvation were evacuated here from Leningrad;
3. In the spring and summer of 1943, extraordinary circumstances forced the Soviet government to export food from the Urals, Volga, and Western Siberia for sick adults and children under 13, whom the European invaders had left in the liberated territory.
4. There was a shortage of food in the Urals and Western Siberia for urban residents of the region, which led to an increase in diseases associated with lack of nutrition.
5. Since the second half of 1944, the problem of food shortages in the Urals and Western Siberia has ceased to be dangerous. And it's clear why. Since the second half of 1944, crops have appeared in the liberated territories.
This is what the graphs from the book "Hunger and War" show. And this does not correspond to the statement - in 1942, there was a famine on the non-occupied territory of the USSR and the economy was on the verge of collapse.

[Yuri]

The full text of the decree of August 22, 1943 with all data on the number and regions.
https://aftershock.news/?q=node/821918&full

[Max Payload]

If things were dire in 1942, it should be expected that in the middle of winter, when more of the daily calorific intake would be required to maintain body temperature

However, things had clearly deteriorated by 1943 when 10-20% of male deaths in the age range 20-60 in two home-front regions were attributed to starvation.

The authors of Hunger and War explain this best so I'll just quote them (pg.24):

food supply reached its lowest level in 1942. Mortality from starvation, however, reached its apex in 1943 and continued into 1944 even after the food supply improved. The year of greatest food shortage was not the year of greatest death. A lag existed between the shortages of 1942 and their subsequent impact. The lag is explained by the fact that food deprivation takes a slow and often irreversible toll on the human organism. There was thus a delayed reaction between the low point for the food supply (1942–1943) and the high point of starvation deaths (1943–1944).

If correct, then it follows that
a) The SU’s war effort was not close to collapse due to starvation in 1942, and
b) There is little to suggest that in an ATL in which the Ostheer achieved more in the south in 1941, the result would have been a collapse due to starvation in 1942.

What might have happened in 1943, two years after a 1941 ATL, becomes highly speculative.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Were the workers living on reduced rations, and were significant numbers of them incapacitated as the evidence provided by TheMarksPlan suggests?

Evidence about Nizhny Tagil ammunnition factory is probable extreme data for Ural factorys.

Numbers themarksplan advertise (40% ref) is extreme of extreme which is july and august 1944 data. In july 102.9 cases of temporary lost work days because of starvation and semistarvation from 3.100 for july and 65.3 cases of lost work days from august. So total in worst record period is 168.2 cases of temporary lost work days. Smaller that 3% of total work days.

Data does not say how many total days were lost. It is based on from 100. If you find number of workers total you can calculate total number of lost days for every month. But still less than 3% at most worst time.

Data does not say how many were incapacitated. It just says days are lost. Themarksplan gave other evidences of workers being sent to woods for food or to do subsitance farming on factory time. That is days lost from factory production to but workers are not incapasitaded. They are doing not production works.

Data does not say how many people have starvation or semistarvation problem. In july 1944 data 3 workers not working all month is 103 not working days. Or data maybe all 100 workers having 1 day off work in month and 3 workers having 2 days.

Data does not have any information of dead numbers and no data on how bad starvation or semistarvation is.

If most worst period in probably most worse factory in Ural region have loss of under 3% is this big problem or small problem? I do not know. But answer to question is understanding of how close economic production collapse at 1 specific factory.

It seems to me data does not make understand economic collapse.

Now we have new evidences from themarksplan that in december 1942 and january 1943 there was 16 workers drop dead at 1 different factory. 16 dead at factory to me us much biger problem than 168 temporary lost work days. But we still do not know any details about scale of problem. Is 16 dead workers in 2 month period understanding of economic collapse in factory of 50.000 workers? I do not know.

If problems not big enough for economic collapse of factory then how total collapse of total economy in period before data?

Evidences are most contradictory and not giving much helpful data to understand claim.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Can i please to make suggestion.

Themarksplan make claim that Soviet economy is on brink of total collapse in 1942.

Themarksplan say this claim is agreed with Stephen Kotkin.

Perhaps it is good idea tthemarksplan to give evidences from Kotkin why he think Soviet economy is on brink of collapse in 1942 than using different authors in different book giving datas on something different.