The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
Ружичасти Слон
Member
Posts: 465
Joined: 24 Jan 2020 16:31
Location: Изгубљени

Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 08 Feb 2020 14:09

Max Payload wrote:
07 Feb 2020 16:16


If you have a stable population of say 50,000 people over the age of 5 in a particular location and the average further life expectancy of those people is 50 years, then you would expect 1,000 of those people to die every year. If one year 5,800 die, then that is significant. Something has changed to cause a 580% increase in the number of expected deaths and a problem appears to exist. But if during that year 10,000 sick and starving people arrive at that location, that would be a likely explanation for the rise in the percentage data. Alternatively if between 1940 and 1943 an additional 250,000 people have moved to the area (i.e. the population has grown by 500%) that is another less sinister explanation.
Without knowing what contributing factors may be at work in a particular data set, the percentage figures being quoted are only an indication that something has changed. Yet a 580% increase in the death rate is also an indication that something very significant has happened at that location.
Yes i agree. 580% change is significant change. Very significant change. But datas images give by themarksplan on self not give any explanation of what is cause of significant change and worstest still what is consequence of change.

How many total peoples dead? How to die? Short time starvation and quick dead or long time starvation? When dead? 1940,1941,1942,1943. Who dead? Factory workers or somebodys else? What war production lost? 1% 99%

In other topic i try to explain to other member that saying action have consequence is not proof that consequence is consequence you claim happen. Datas images from book hunger and war in this topic give very little informations. With explanations from authors of book we have much better understanding of datas. But we never get 100% understanding of 100% issue.

In 2001 Harison give very interested speech and essay about topic. Title of essay The USSR and Total War: Why didn’t the Soviet economy collapse in 1942?

In paragraph before conclusion he was write
We cannot measure the distance of the Soviet economy from the point of collapse in 1942, but it can hardly be doubted that collapse was near.
He also was write
Conclusion
The outcome of the war was decided by production, and production rested on the mobilisation of overall resources into the war effort. But in 1942 the Soviet war effort itself rested on a knife–edge. The war in that year saw a battle of motivations in which a hundred million people made individual choices based on the information and incentives available. Their preferences were shaped by moral, political, and national feeling. But their context was determined by overall resources. Only where the balance of overall resources was indecisive did moral, political, technical, and organisational factors play a significant role.

ljadw
Member
Posts: 12169
Joined: 13 Jul 2009 17:50

Re: The State of the OstHeer - May 1942

Post by ljadw » 08 Feb 2020 15:24

Max Payload wrote:
08 Feb 2020 00:53
ljadw wrote:
07 Feb 2020 19:27
If the life expectancy of a child at its birth would be 50 year, that does not mean that the life expectancy of some one of 30 is 20 year, or that no one will become older than 50 .
Of course not. It means that at the time of the child’s birth half the people in the population it has been born into are dying before they reach 50. It also means that, unless things change, the child only has a 50/50 chance of seeing its own 50th birthday.
But the fact that Ivan dies from TBC at the age of 28, does not mean that Igor has less chance to live longer than 50 .
Take Wuhan : 11 million of inhabitants ,let's assume that yearly 120000 people die and that the life expectancy is 70 years for certain groups, less or more for other groups . If this year because of the coronavirus not 120000 people will die but 600000, that thus not mean that the survivors will live longer or less than 70 years .
A lot of people in China are smoking , if they stop, that does not mean that the non-smokers will live longer than they do now .
A lot of young Germans died in WWII, but that has no influence on the life expectancy of the survivors .

HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 08 Feb 2020 23:55

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
08 Feb 2020 13:56
HistoryGeek2019 wrote: A blatant misrepresentation of the economic balance (as if continental Europe contained more resources than the rest of the world combined)
Whoa there. You're forgetting Japan and I know you have that one odd quote from Stahel about industrial production but let's look at an actual economic historian like Mark Harrison. From The Economics of the Second World War:

Image

https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mari ... _31-58.pdf

As you can see, shifting all of the SU's resources to the Axis gives them a $220bn lead over the Allies (1990 dollars) using 1938 GDP's of the occupied territories. Shifting half of the SU's remaining resources makes it equal.

We can argue about ensuing territorial changes from this 1942 benchmark or differential mobilization (including the fact of America spending proportionately only 40% of GDP on the war vs. 70% for Germany/Japan in '44) of the spheres of control. Regardless of how that argument turns out, there is absolutely nothing about my claim of comparative resources that involves misrepresentation. That inflammatory allegation was uncharacteristic and uncalled for.
I'm tired of going in circles with you on this issue in thread after thread. You've already conceded that the only economic advantage a continental German empire would have had is in potential manpower (and even that is debatable):

viewtopic.php?f=76&t=7982&hilit=Harrison&start=1245

And I have no idea why you would bring up puny Japan, which would have been knocked out of the war by the timeframe we are discussing (post-1945) - another point that I repeatedly have to make every time we discuss this.

As for the will to fight, you are wrong. The German people don't have some extra will to fight that other people lack. People are the same everywhere - when properly manipulated by their governments with the right mix of propaganda, threats and incentives, any group of people will fight just as hard as any other. When you have a madman shooting ICBMs at his enemies, terrorizing the world's oceans, and committing mass murder against civilians in his own territory, the American and British people would not rest until he and his ilk were wiped off the face of the Earth.

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 2333
Joined: 08 Apr 2014 19:00

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Cult Icon » 09 Feb 2020 00:17

The UK/CW forces were designed along the subjective beliefs of their leadership that the Germans were better at close combat, and that the UK/CW citizen-soldier wasn't as fanatical in combat. The British leadership also blamed "socialism" and the post-Great war fallout for making their soldiers "more soft" than those of the previous war.

I think that actual war- based on seeing countless POW stats and studying the details of battles- showed that the German combat morale really plummeted badly in 44/45 in the West Front while in the East they fought with the so-called "courage of desperation". German combat morale and fighting spirit seemed high while Germany was still winning battles in 39-42. CW and US troops had much higher combat morale and fighting spirit than the Germans in the last year of the war.

Leprechaun
Member
Posts: 57
Joined: 21 Feb 2018 09:44
Location: Cardiff

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Leprechaun » 09 Feb 2020 00:54

Cult Icon wrote:
09 Feb 2020 00:17
The UK/CW forces were designed along the subjective beliefs of their leadership that the Germans were better at close combat, and that the UK/CW citizen-soldier wasn't as fanatical in combat. The British leadership also blamed "socialism" and the post-Great war fallout for making their soldiers "more soft" than those of the previous war.

I think that actual war- based on seeing countless POW stats and studying the details of battles- showed that the German combat morale really plummeted badly in 44/45 in the West Front while in the East they fought with the so-called "courage of desperation". German combat morale and fighting spirit seemed high while Germany was still winning battles in 39-42. CW and US troops had much higher combat morale and fighting spirit than the Germans in the last year of the war.
LOL your source for this ?? The SS weren't that clever at close combat in 1940 that's why they resorted to massacring un-armed soldiers on at least two accounts in France.
So where are these battles where the Germans won in close combat ??
Jack

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 2333
Joined: 08 Apr 2014 19:00

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Cult Icon » 09 Feb 2020 00:59

wow, a biased response, composed from prejudices.

"Monty's Men" by Buckley and "Stout Hearts" by Kite for part one.

The second part is my view.

Leprechaun
Member
Posts: 57
Joined: 21 Feb 2018 09:44
Location: Cardiff

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Leprechaun » 09 Feb 2020 01:50

I understand that this is an Axis forum and people like your self like to pretend that the Germans had the best equipment, best soldiers and if only the Generals were aloud to fight with out Hitler interfering they would have won.But as History show they didn't !!
If you can point out where the German showed he was better at close combat or where they were more fanatical ?
The SS were stopped and had high casualties on both occasions when the troops surrendered they were executed no prejudice its a fact, to pretend that one nation was better at close combat than another is disrespectful to all armies.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 574
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Max Payload » 09 Feb 2020 02:06

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
08 Feb 2020 13:56
The most important thing concealed is that the capitalist West - especially Britain - didn't lose its opportunity to stop/limit the war in Munich. No, it lost that opportunity when its anti-Communism prevented a '39 (or earlier) alliance with Stalin that would have prevented the war or made it a relatively short smashing of Germany.
There is a degree of hindsight in this again. In 1939 there was little for contemporary observers to chose between Adolf Hitler and Josef Stalin in terms of their ruthlessness, ambition, mendacity and callous disregard for human life.
Chamberlain was admittedly lukewarm about a deal with Stalin but the only deal that could be struck in 1939 was one that, in effect, would see Poland occupied by the Red Army. That was Stalin’s pre-condition, the Poles would have none of it, and that’s where the negotiations floundered.
Pre-Munich a similar problem existed with regard to Soviet offers of support to Czechoslovakia; they would be conditional on the Red Army crossing and maintaining supply routes through Polish and/or Romanian territory.
Last edited by Max Payload on 09 Feb 2020 02:31, edited 1 time in total.

Max Payload
Member
Posts: 574
Joined: 21 Jun 2008 14:37

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Max Payload » 09 Feb 2020 02:14

ljadw wrote:
08 Feb 2020 15:24
... the fact that Ivan dies from TBC at the age of 28, does not mean that Igor has less chance to live longer than 50 .
That’s correct. Life expectancy is not about individuals, it is about the statistics applied to a population.
A person who exercises, eats healthily, doesn’t smoke or drink alcohol dies of a heart attack at 30; while an alcoholic couch potato who smokes like a chimney lives to be 90. But they are the exceptions. On average people who exercise, eat healthily, don’t smoke or drink alcohol live longer than chain-smoking alcoholic couch potatoes.
The life expectancy of a child born into a particular population is typically calculated by adding together the ages of all the people in that population who died during that year and dividing that total by the number of people who died. Since women tend to live longer than men, if the child is a boy, a more accurate life expectancy would be calculated by only adding together the ages of all the males in that population who died during that year and dividing that total by the number of male deaths. If the boy was born with cystic fibrosis the calculation would be more accurate if it was limited to males born with cystic fibrosis who died that year.
Life expectancy is not fixed from birth; it changes as a person ages. Someone celebrating their 50th birthday may have a further life expectancy of 30 years even though they may have been born into a population with a life expectancy of 50. That ‘further life expectancy’ calculation would be done by adding together the ages of all the people of 50 years and older in that population who died during that year, dividing that total by the number of people in that age group who died and then subtracting 50 from the result. The person celebrating their 50th birthday could die the next day or live to be a hundred, but on average, if the further life expectancy is 30 years, only half the people in that population group celebrating their 50th birthday that day are likely to live to see their 80th birthday.
All of this assumes a stable population group, something that is rarely seen in practice. Lifestyle changes, standard of living changes, changes in medical procedures, war, famine and pestilence all affect the calculations on a continuous basis. Jewish children born in Poland in 1938 may have been expected to live to an average age of 50 or 60 but only a small fraction of them saw their sixth birthday.
Perhaps the best way to think about life expectancy is to consider 100 people all born on the same day from a particular population. Their life expectancy is an estimate based on the type of calculation described, of the number of years into the future when, assuming nothing of any significance happens to the population as a whole, only 50 of them will still be alive.
(Apologies for the long-winded off topic post. I’ll PM any further comments.)

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 2798
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Feb 2020 14:55

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:You've already conceded that the only economic advantage a continental German empire would have had is in potential manpower (and even that is debatable):
"Only manpower?" That's the whole ball game, that's what economies are made of. The rest is bottlenecks - having enough ore/coal/etc.

You have arguments over those bottlenecks (e.g. Wallies would destroy Baku) but I certainly have not conceded those points.
And I have no idea why you would bring up puny Japan, which would have been knocked out of the war by the timeframe we are discussing (post-1945)
"Puny Japan" had a bigger economy than the SU by 1942, once you consider Korea, Manchukuo, and Taiwan (where Japan had a lot of heavy industry) plus the extractive resources of Southeast Asia.

The Wallies devoted at least a quarter of their war resources to fighting Japan. I have no idea why you'd think it possible to ignore it.

If the Axis forces a peace on the SU, Germany can support Japan over the Transsiberian railway, which would have solved a lot of Japan's problems. They can ship oil and arms by rail to Busan, for instance, which is separated from Japan by a narrow strait that was easier to defend from submarines.

Even if Japan surrenders in August '45 as in OTL, the millions of men, planes, and ships deployed to Asia won't be relevant in Europe until '46 at the earliest.

From '44 onward, there's going to be renewed threat of Sealion so it's not clear the Wallies can send so much against Japan anyway.

Yes, Sealion. Germany would have sufficient resources to threaten Britain's coast with a landing.
I'm tired of going in circles with you on this issue in thread after thread.
That's perfectly fine but the usual reaction is not to continue the argument; it's not to accuse the other side of bad faith for not coming over to your side. It looks like I'm not going to convince you that Germany controlling over twice the human resources would imply at least economic parity (saying nothing of Japan), so we should agree to disagree.
As for the will to fight, you are wrong. The German people don't have some extra will to fight that other people lack.
I said nothing of the sort regarding "German people", why fall back on a tired equation that equates judging relative military strength with judging moral/racial/ethnic traits?

All one needs to look at is (1) the willingness of the Germans to defend their territory and (2) the willingness of the Wallies to launch a large-scale invasion of it.

(1) is obvious: the Germans would defend to ruin as in OTL. Regarding (2):

To believe that the Wallies were willing to raise an army capable of defeating an undistracted German/Italian/Rumanian/Spanish(?) army is to posit something for which plans were never seriously considered by the U.S. or Britain. As I've cited numerous times, the Victory Plan of 1941 dismissed in a couple paragraphs the idea of invading Europe after Germany defeated the SU, requiring it to be bombed into near-collapse first. https://history.army.mil/html/books/093 ... _93-10.pdf

The UK sent 10 divisions to France in '40 and attempted to avoid a big land war until dragooned into Overlord by the Americans.

Is there precedent for the U.S. preferring the endurance of an evil regime to the indefinite continuance of bloody land war? Yes - who rules North Korea?

Finally, it's not my absolute position that Wallies wouldn't have tried an invasion of Europe given (1) defeat of SU and (2) defeat of Wallies conventional bomber offensive (which I judge inevitable if Germany can devote its greater ATL resources to fighter production). I lean towards no but that's not a definite conclusion. I'd just like to see any evidence of Wallied leaders/public saying something like, "Yes, we'd lose 5 million dead to beat Germany." Even if the Wallies launch such an invasion, however, I'm not convinced they'd succeed.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 2333
Joined: 08 Apr 2014 19:00

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Cult Icon » 09 Feb 2020 15:25

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
09 Feb 2020 14:55

I said nothing of the sort regarding "German people", why fall back on a tired equation that equates judging relative military strength with judging moral/racial/ethnic traits?

All one needs to look at is (1) the willingness of the Germans to defend their territory and (2) the willingness of the Wallies to launch a large-scale invasion of it.
Not sure that Alternate history is appropriate for a german strategy forum.

combat morale is composed of numerous subjective and quantifiable variables- from unit commander impressions to combat doctrine to ideological motivations to prospects of victory. It tended to rise and fall, depending on circumstances and it tended to vary. The performance of troops in the field, particularly in the attack and the willingness to press attacks, and the POW numbers make it quite clear whether or not high combat morale exists. Troops of moderate combat morale could still defend stubbornly for a long time. Low combat morale could see hundreds to thousands of troops into the prisoner cage after only a few hours of resistance. Troops with high combat morale had few of them being taken prisoner.

The German rating system of KW 1-IV has 1 and 2 being suitable for attack and the lower rating- 3 and 4 good only for defense.

User avatar
Aida1
Member
Posts: 1286
Joined: 04 Aug 2019 08:46
Location: Brussels

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Aida1 » 09 Feb 2020 15:47

Leprechaun wrote:
09 Feb 2020 00:54
Cult Icon wrote:
09 Feb 2020 00:17
The UK/CW forces were designed along the subjective beliefs of their leadership that the Germans were better at close combat, and that the UK/CW citizen-soldier wasn't as fanatical in combat. The British leadership also blamed "socialism" and the post-Great war fallout for making their soldiers "more soft" than those of the previous war.

I think that actual war- based on seeing countless POW stats and studying the details of battles- showed that the German combat morale really plummeted badly in 44/45 in the West Front while in the East they fought with the so-called "courage of desperation". German combat morale and fighting spirit seemed high while Germany was still winning battles in 39-42. CW and US troops had much higher combat morale and fighting spirit than the Germans in the last year of the war.
LOL your source for this ?? The SS weren't that clever at close combat in 1940 that's why they resorted to massacring un-armed soldiers on at least two accounts in France.
So where are these battles where the Germans won in close combat ??
Jack
Close combat rarely happened in modern war so you are not making sense here.

User avatar
Aida1
Member
Posts: 1286
Joined: 04 Aug 2019 08:46
Location: Brussels

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by Aida1 » 09 Feb 2020 15:52

Leprechaun wrote:
09 Feb 2020 01:50
I understand that this is an Axis forum and people like your self like to pretend that the Germans had the best equipment, best soldiers and if only the Generals were aloud to fight with out Hitler interfering they would have won.But as History show they didn't !!
If you can point out where the German showed he was better at close combat or where they were more fanatical ?
The SS were stopped and had high casualties on both occasions when the troops surrendered they were executed no prejudice its a fact, to pretend that one nation was better at close combat than another is disrespectful to all armies.
Very simplistic. :lol:

HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 09 Feb 2020 17:11

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
09 Feb 2020 14:55
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:You've already conceded that the only economic advantage a continental German empire would have had is in potential manpower (and even that is debatable):
"Only manpower?" That's the whole ball game, that's what economies are made of. The rest is bottlenecks - having enough ore/coal/etc.

You have arguments over those bottlenecks (e.g. Wallies would destroy Baku) but I certainly have not conceded those points.
And I have no idea why you would bring up puny Japan, which would have been knocked out of the war by the timeframe we are discussing (post-1945)
"Puny Japan" had a bigger economy than the SU by 1942, once you consider Korea, Manchukuo, and Taiwan (where Japan had a lot of heavy industry) plus the extractive resources of Southeast Asia.

The Wallies devoted at least a quarter of their war resources to fighting Japan. I have no idea why you'd think it possible to ignore it.

If the Axis forces a peace on the SU, Germany can support Japan over the Transsiberian railway, which would have solved a lot of Japan's problems. They can ship oil and arms by rail to Busan, for instance, which is separated from Japan by a narrow strait that was easier to defend from submarines.

Even if Japan surrenders in August '45 as in OTL, the millions of men, planes, and ships deployed to Asia won't be relevant in Europe until '46 at the earliest.

From '44 onward, there's going to be renewed threat of Sealion so it's not clear the Wallies can send so much against Japan anyway.

Yes, Sealion. Germany would have sufficient resources to threaten Britain's coast with a landing.
I'm tired of going in circles with you on this issue in thread after thread.
That's perfectly fine but the usual reaction is not to continue the argument; it's not to accuse the other side of bad faith for not coming over to your side. It looks like I'm not going to convince you that Germany controlling over twice the human resources would imply at least economic parity (saying nothing of Japan), so we should agree to disagree.
As for the will to fight, you are wrong. The German people don't have some extra will to fight that other people lack.
I said nothing of the sort regarding "German people", why fall back on a tired equation that equates judging relative military strength with judging moral/racial/ethnic traits?

All one needs to look at is (1) the willingness of the Germans to defend their territory and (2) the willingness of the Wallies to launch a large-scale invasion of it.

(1) is obvious: the Germans would defend to ruin as in OTL. Regarding (2):

To believe that the Wallies were willing to raise an army capable of defeating an undistracted German/Italian/Rumanian/Spanish(?) army is to posit something for which plans were never seriously considered by the U.S. or Britain. As I've cited numerous times, the Victory Plan of 1941 dismissed in a couple paragraphs the idea of invading Europe after Germany defeated the SU, requiring it to be bombed into near-collapse first. https://history.army.mil/html/books/093 ... _93-10.pdf

The UK sent 10 divisions to France in '40 and attempted to avoid a big land war until dragooned into Overlord by the Americans.

Is there precedent for the U.S. preferring the endurance of an evil regime to the indefinite continuance of bloody land war? Yes - who rules North Korea?

Finally, it's not my absolute position that Wallies wouldn't have tried an invasion of Europe given (1) defeat of SU and (2) defeat of Wallies conventional bomber offensive (which I judge inevitable if Germany can devote its greater ATL resources to fighter production). I lean towards no but that's not a definite conclusion. I'd just like to see any evidence of Wallied leaders/public saying something like, "Yes, we'd lose 5 million dead to beat Germany." Even if the Wallies launch such an invasion, however, I'm not convinced they'd succeed.
Going in circles means that instead of picking up where we left off, you keep going back to the starting point and ignore crucial points that have been repeatedly made (e.g., relying on pre-war GDP figures for occupied countries whose economies collapsed under German occupation, ignoring the distinction between potential manpower and actual manpower, reliance on Japan no matter how many times I say we are discussing a post-1945 timeframe where Japan has long been knocked out of the war), not to mention blatant inaccuracies such as claiming that Japan ever had an economy larger than the Soviet Union, when your copy of Harrison Table 1.3 clearly shows Japan was never even close.

If you would acknowledge the results of our countless conversations and begin new discussions along the lines of: "A Germany in control of continental Europe would have had the potential to mobilize more industrial labor than the Allies, and here's why I think they would be able to, and why raw materials wouldn't be an issue because ...", that would be a fruitful place to continue our conversation. But for you to repeatedly claim Germany would have an economic advantage over the Allies and copy and paste Harrison Table 1.1 - that is extremely tiresome.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 2798
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: The State of the Ostheer - May 1942

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 09 Feb 2020 20:53

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:Going in circles means that instead of picking up where we left off, you keep going back to the starting point and ignore crucial points that have been repeatedly made
I have addressed every single one of your points in our past discussions, and have perceived you as refusing even to consider revising your initial take that German/European production could have rivaled Anglo-American. I have perceived futility in my efforts on that front and, for that reason, haven't initiated discussions on these topics (agree to disagree) for several months until you intervened recently. For example:
e.g., relying on pre-war GDP figures for occupied countries whose economies collapsed under German occupation
I have repeatedly made the point that German oil acquisitions (Caucasus) and fertilizer production (instead of ammo/powder for the Ostheer) would have revived European agriculture. With that revived, coal miners could go back to work, which revives basic industry, which revives everything else (you also need more rolling stock but that's easy absent Ostheer production, where just a small fraction of ammo expenditure alone could double rolling stock production - and often these were done by the same heavy industry firms).

You have countered that the Allies would have bombed Baku out of relevance, something with which I disagree for numerous deeply-reasoned points that I won't repeat here (and you have responded as well... Point is the debate was far from settled between us, I just let it lie).
blatant inaccuracies such as claiming that Japan ever had an economy larger than the Soviet Union, when your copy of Harrison Table 1.3 clearly shows Japan was never even close.
My quote was
"Puny Japan" had a bigger economy than the SU by 1942, once you consider Korea, Manchukuo, and Taiwan (where Japan had a lot of heavy industry)" plus the extractive resources of Southeast Asia..
Look at table 1-1: Japanese colonies had $63bn GDP in 1938 (37% of Japan's).
It's not well-known the extent of Japanese investment in its colonies, partially because the formerly colonized don't like to talk about it. For example: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korea_und ... ploitation, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Showa_Steel_Works

Japan '42 GDP at 197 (growth of 16% over '38). If colonies grew by 16% as well, Japan + Colonies GDP = $270bn in 1942.

SU '42 GDP = 274.

Does captured Southeast Asia make up a $4bn difference?
Easily - DEI alone was 77.4bn in '38.
Just the oil, rubber, and tin extracted from SE Asia by Japan makes up the difference. To say nothing of food stolen from the inhabitants (Records of local occupations are sparse but just ask my grandma, who lived in the Philippines at the time, whether the Japanese took food.)
ignoring the distinction between potential manpower and actual manpower
What the heck is that distinction?

A resource is a resource whether it's mobilized or not.

I said "the balance of resources" would favor the Axis upon the SU's fall in '42, not "German production would magically skyrocket when the SU fell."

If the distinction relates to how much manpower is actually used, that's a mobilization issue.

The next step would be to discuss likely mobilization levels, which would circle back to my points about reviving occupied economies with oil, fertilizer, and transport. Again that's a circle I got off of until you accused me of misrepresentation.
reliance on Japan no matter how many times I say we are discussing a post-1945 timeframe where Japan has long been knocked out of the war
No matter how many times you say it, I can still make a statement about resources in '42.

...and I don't concede that Germany hasn't won the war by VJ-day anyway, especially if the Wallies go as hard at Japan as OTL despite a much stronger Germany.

-----------------------------------------------

You're blatantly misreading my statements and inventing concessions that I haven't made. I know you'll call this an "ad hom," but consider whether a built-in resistance to abandoning your initial position is causing this. Like it's just so inconceivable, it's just so obviously correct that Wallied industrial resources were incomparable, that nothing can shake you from the position.

We all have "myside" bias, it takes an active effort to beat it. Studies show that there is no correlation between intelligence and "myside" bias (i.e. being smarter isn't a way out of it), so don't take that the wrong way. https://www.globalcognition.org/intelli ... tive-bias/
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

Return to “German Strategy & General German Military Discussion”