U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

[Aida1]

A post from Aida1 was removed by this moderator because it contained remarks that could be seen as derogatory towards another member and their chosen user name. Please avoid this sort of thing in the future.

Terry Duncan

Aida1 , Terry had Said what need to be Said, dont make this bigger for what it's . The rules demands a polite and neat discussion. If you dont agree to ones opinion its OK, respond and give your view but nice.

Georg

[TheMarcksPlan]

More resources would be available for the Atlantic wall

IMO Germany doesn't build the Atlantic Wall except around some strategic points in Norway (Trondheim, Narvik).

Instead they'd station a standing force of ~40 divisions in France, with the Nomandy-Calais beaches heavily defended. Behind these forces would be cadre divisions with maybe a thousand men (rotating in and out) and full divisional equipment in depots. If the Allies are dumb enough to land in France, they take a bleeding on the beaches then are swamped after a couple weeks when the cadre divisions assemble via rail (No air superiority, let alone air supremacy, to slow up German mobilization).

Not building the wall frees up billions of RM and millions of tons of steel and cement (8 Hoover Dams IIRC). The French portion alone was 3.7bn RM, same cost as ~70,000 Me-109's.

With those resources and others, the Germans could build up for Sealion '44/5, which could involve building a causeway across the Channel followed by a 300-division invasion. The cement/steel of the A-wall alone would yield a fleet of thousands of cement ships, a measure that the U.S. used successfully during the war. U.S. would need to draft at least 10mil more men to defend Britain by land, which tanks the U.S. war economy because we didn't use foreign labor substitues (nor was so much substitute labor readily available).

when it does lend-lease will rearm the Soviet Union and Germany will be back to needing 150 divisions on its eastern border

I would request that you tie this claim to a feasible narrative about force generation given demographics and economics (here of the post-'45 SU). In this ATL:

• How does SU raise ~300 divisions from a population of 70mil at the most? (SU would need at least 300 divs to engage 150 German, that's ignoring Axis allies)
• When the SU begins raising those divisions, and begins quadrupling the Siberian Railway's capacity to move American LL goods, why doesn't Germany just take the Urals and invade Central Asia, immediately provoking the latter to leave the Union? With Urals and Central Asia gone, what does SU have left to fight with? Siberia east of the Urals was ~25mil pre-war.
• Given the foregoing, why would the SU want to destroy itself again to aid marginally the Wally side of intra-capitalist war?

which would be impossible to maintain while simultaneously attempting to defend the entire circumference of continental Europe.

From '42 until at least '45 the Wallies can't stop the Germans on land, which means Iberia/Gibraltar are gone as well as Suez.
Even if the Wallies hold North Africa (i.e. Germans don't want to waste time driving from Suez west after losing North Africa), the absence of a shipping route into Med means Southern Europe faces no serious threat of invasion.

To reopen the Med and mount a serious threat to southern Europe, they'll need to retake Iberia.
To do that, they have to be able to beat at least 150 German divisions at once, probably more.
Wallies had ~140 divisions around the world in '45. If 40 of these are in the Pacific, 20 in Africa/MidEast, 20 in US/UK, they need to >double the historical US Army (91 divs) to have numerical parity with a 150-div Westheer.
Given the need to have probably 50 divisions ashore within a few weeks of D-Day, they'd need multiples of their OTL landing craft production and twice OTL land weapons production. ...which has to come from somewhere.
An invasion concentration in Tangier/Ceuta could not be concealed (thousands of ships); moving so many resources there would remove serious threat to France and allow concentration of defending forces.

Plus to land in Iberia means only the southern coast of Spain: Fighters across the straits could provide air cover for invasion/supply ships but not anywhere else.

Your proposals about peripheral strategies - even were the Med somehow open - tend to ignore the advantages of interior lines.

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...I know this discussion is getting ahead of where we are... Just pointing out problems that I see as obvious for a peripheral strategy in this ATL.

[TheMarcksPlan]

But it is ironic that his username alludes to a plan which contradicts his favourite ATL which is all about much more focus to AGS which was examined but excluded by Marcks for certain very valid reasons which i mentioned and which he will not answer.

I'm guessing you'll keep posting "Just go for Moscow" until I respond.

Please take such discussion to a Barbarossa thread, such as: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557

[HistoryGeek2019]

With those resources and others, the Germans could build up for Sealion '44/5, which could involve building a causeway across the Channel followed by a 300-division invasion. The cement/steel of the A-wall alone would yield a fleet of thousands of cement ships, a measure that the U.S. used successfully during the war. U.S. would need to draft at least 10mil more men to defend Britain by land, which tanks the U.S. war economy because we didn't use foreign labor substitues (nor was so much substitute labor readily available).

This is completely delusional. Germany builds a causeway across the English Channel in 1945 and invades Britain with 300 divisions, requiring 10 million more men from the United States, which tanks the US economy?

Please tell me you are not serious.

[TheMarcksPlan]

With those resources and others, the Germans could build up for Sealion '44/5, which could involve building a causeway across the Channel followed by a 300-division invasion. The cement/steel of the A-wall alone would yield a fleet of thousands of cement ships, a measure that the U.S. used successfully during the war. U.S. would need to draft at least 10mil more men to defend Britain by land, which tanks the U.S. war economy because we didn't use foreign labor substitues (nor was so much substitute labor readily available).

This is completely delusional. Germany builds a causeway across the English Channel in 1945 and invades Britain with 300 divisions, requiring 10 million more men from the United States, which tanks the US economy?

Please tell me you are not serious.

Oh but I am.

I don't mean to have convinced you of the thesis already, I've barely put it forward and expected precisely this response.

I'd just ask that you keep an open mind to argument rather than digging into the gut reaction.

And it's just a statement of what would have been possible for Germany in this ATL.

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And I don't mean literally the U.S. economy collapses due to missing 10mil men. I just mean that withdrawing ~20% of the U.S. labor force would cause a ~20% decline in production. Then the U.S. needs to build multiples of its OTL land weapons and ammo programs, meaning it has to cut back its aircraft and/or naval output.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Quick sketch of the causeway idea, with reference to this chart: http://fishing-app.gpsnauticalcharts.co ... 813/1.3117

As you can see, we could very roughly ballpark average depth of the Channel at 100ft for the 20 miles from Cap Gris to Dover.

• 500ft-wide causeway
• 20mi long
• 100ft deep
• = 5.3bn ft3 of material
• density of crushed stone and sand/soil: ~100 lb/ft3
• = 240mn tons of stone/earth

Build 500 cement barges with deadweight of 10,000t at Liberty Ship price of ~5mn RM = 2.5bn RM. Still cheaper than the French A-wall and uses largely the same materials (concrete and steel, plus engines).

That fleet has carrying capacity of 5mn tons; ~50 roundtrips per ship to build the causeway. 1 RT/week gives ~1 year to build the causeway.
...that ignores landward building from Cap Gris... but we'll stick with a year to be safe.

Start in early '44 and defend the Channel during construction with:

• LW which is producing fighters at >5,000/mo
• 1,000 or more E-boats, "Channel Destroyers"
• Minefields
• Flak mounted on construction barges and small escorts - thousands of barrels in total (a Liberty-ship scale concrete barge could hold 40 Flak each).

Aerial attack against causeway construction will be immensely costly due to LW and Flak.
Light Flak (20, 37, and 40mm guns) was extremely efficient at cost per shootdown (see Westerman's Flak). Due to the ineffectiveness of high-level anti-ship bombing, aerial interdiction would have to come within range of light flak.
LW fighters extremely efficient trade against heavy or even medium bombers.
To be safe, build an extra 200 causeway construction barges to replace losses (1bn RM, bringing the barge program equal to the cost of French A-wall).

Masses of relatively cheap Eboats and "Channel Destroyers" [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/M-class_m ... _(Germany)], combined with minefields and the LW, would deter any Wallied entry into the Channel by heavy naval units. There's no point losing a cruiser to an Eboat's torpedo or to a mine.

If you start causeway construction in early '44, by Spring '45 it's ready to go.
Besides the causeway you'd build a few thousand MFP's and Siebel Ferry's to extend the initial invasion frontage; these would be supported by the causeway construction barges bearing Flak, mortars, and guns for landings. Causeway cuts off the eastern channel, Kriegsmarine and LW take care of the of the other side with massive mine fields, light naval units, and planes.

Once ashore around Dover, rail communications are quickly established over the causeway, removing any logistical limit on the size of the invasion force. It's an artillery slog through Kent and Sussex then eventually a breakout into the Midlands/Wessex and game over.

[HistoryGeek2019]

Why don't you start by giving an overview of Germany's military strength as requested above, and how you see it changing over time. It's impossible to have a conversation with you if your response to every scenario is "Germany will send 150 divisions and crush the puny Wallie army."

It's easy to keep conjuring divisions out of nowhere when you refuse to even commit to how many divisions Germany has overall and where they are deployed (and the effect that maintaining these divisions has on the LW and KM).

[TheMarcksPlan]

Why don't you start by giving an overview of Germany's military strength as requested above, and how you see it changing over time. It's impossible to have a conversation with you if your response to every scenario is "Germany will send 150 divisions and crush the puny Wallie army."

It's easy to keep conjuring divisions out of nowhere when you refuse to even commit to how many divisions Germany has overall and where they are deployed (and the effect that maintaining these divisions has on the LW and KM).

Yeah I'm in the midst of that but we're having a fun diversion to peak at the future. If you don't need to explain how Siberia generates an RKKA requiring the entire OTL Ostheer, you can't really object to very general statements about forces.

[HistoryGeek2019]

I mean, it's not that hard. It's been 2 days since I asked. Germany had approximately 200 divisions in the OTL when Barbarossa started, and about 150 of them were deployed against Russia. How many divisions will Germany have in 1943? In 1944? In 1945? Where will they be deployed?

[TheMarcksPlan]

I mean, it's not that hard. It's been 2 days since I asked. Germany had approximately 200 divisions in the OTL when Barbarossa started, and about 150 of them were deployed against Russia. How many divisions will Germany have in 1943? In 1944? In 1945? Where will they be deployed?

Context - Turkey joins Axis in August/Sept. '42 to gain Lesbos, Cyprus, other Greek isles, northern Iraq. And to avoid being dismembered by Bulgaria, Armenia, Georgia, Greece, Italy, Iraq, Kurdistan, Iran, Syria. Axis pressure on Palestine in 8th Army's rear compels retreat from Western Desert, Axis advances into Mesopotamia as well, and over Iranian Plateau from Azerbaijan.

As of July 1, 1943 frontline forces of 125 divisions plus occupation, rear, and training personnel:

• 5 German divisions in Iberia (Spanish army mobilized and Axis-allied after threat of overwhelming invasion)
• 15 German divisions in Iran moving towards Abadan
• 5 German divisions in Iraq moving towards Basra
• 10 German divisions in Hejaz moving towards Yemen
• Italian army moving up Nile and down Red Sea Coast towards Sudan
• 10 German divisions in Tunisia, 10 Italian as well
• 20 German divisions facing de-militarized Soviet Urals behind Romanian, Hungarian, Italian, Finnish armies
• 40 German divisions in France/Low Countries
• 10 German divisions in Norway
• 10 German divisions in OKH Reserve
• 500k German personnel on occupation duty in Balkans/SU (garrison divisions and other formations).
• 1mil Heer in Ersatz, administrative, misc.
• 150k in 150 cadre divisions stationed mostly in Western Europe (1,000 men per division at a time, rotating from economy)
• Total Heer manpower of 4.15mil (125 div * 20k slice + 1.5mil + 150k cadres)

How many men have been demobilized? To answer that we have to look at OTL 7-1-43 strength, plus fewer casualties in East, minus Heer remainder:

As I said above, I'd estimate ~500k fewer bloody casualties from extra encirclements during '41 (due to capturing 2mil soldiers instead of attriting them).
During Jan-April '42, I'd estimate at least 50% decline in German casualties due to inability of RKKA to sustain winter offensives similar to OTL. Instead of grinding attrition against freezing and under-supplied Ostheer, Red Army units would run into a well-stocked and full-strength Ostheer that would cut off and encircle its vangaurds, quickly ending winter offensives. 50% fewer casualties in Jan.-May '42 means ~200k saved. (Actual casualties are disputed but wiki has a good overview of tables from the major authors https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/German_ca ... rld_War_II).

The final Summer '42 campaign should see ~2/3 of OTL casualties for months of May-September (when the armistice hits). That means ~100k dead, ~equal number permanently wounded: 200k permanent losses.

Up 7-1-43, I estimate the Heer suffered 2mil permanently lost. Here, I estimate it loses ~700k - 1.3mil fewer.

As of OTL 7-1-43, Heer personnel strength was low-7's million IIRC (where's that GD link?). Adding back 1.3mil men, then subtracting 4mil, means at least 4mil men have been returned to the economy.

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Anyway, short answer is 125 first-line divisions in mid-'43, after Germany has intimidated Spain into joining up, has pushed the Wallies to the edges or Iraq/Iran and out of Palestine, and has stabilized the Tunisian Front. Another 150 divisions will be available mobilization, using 3mil of the 4mil men returned to the economy by mid-'43. I could have said 200 divisions, especially when considering increased recruitment of Hiwis (thus 300-division invasion is feasible, especially if Axis allies are included).

It's going to stay that way indefinitely - until one or the other side crosses the Channel or does something else dramatic.

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One critical advantage for Germany here is those cadre divisions. The trip from work in Germany to a front in France is no more than a day or two, so the soldiers can work while still being a strategic deterrent. American soldiers have a longer trip to a port, then a ship, then to the front - they either mobilize and ship out or stay at home making guns/butter.

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If you find this situation plausible (or modified as you like), what's your next move as Wallied supreme commander?

How many divisions do US/UK need to raise to invade Europe? Can they raise them? Can they maintain sufficient air/marine assets for invasion if they raise and equip the larger army? IMO they can't before '46 at the earliest.

If Germany threatens invasion of England - causeway or not - can the U.S. maintain its 91-division army? Does it want to risk a land army on Britain, knowing it'll be lost completely if defeated? Or is better telling Britain that it won't put millions of men on the island, and won't risk its bluewater fleet in the narrow waters around it? Therefore does UK make peace before German invasion?

On the periphery, what it the Wallied move? Do they strenuously defend in the Middle East? Or concentrate in Europe? Do they have to divert resources over OTL from the Pacific?

Looking ahead to '45, German Type XXI campaign will launch from March or so (Earlier than OTL due to adequate Baltic training grounds for crews). Threat to supply lines will make deployment of a massive army from USA extremely risky, inviting biggest-ever military disaster.

[HistoryGeek2019]

Thanks. Can you fill in the gap between Sept 1942 and July 1943 in your ATL? How many divisions does Germany have at the start of Barbarossa in your ATL, and how are they allocated? How does this change by the time of the cease-fire in 1942? How does Germany get from its deployment at the time of the cease-fire to the deployment at July 1943?

For example, if you posit Germany having 150 OstHeer divisions and 50 dispersed elsewhere when the cease-fire is agreed to in Sept 1942, how does Germany redeploy them to threaten Spain, Turkey and Persia, and how do you anticipate this going down?

[Avalancheon]

Germany would have achieved temporary security on land, for maybe 5-10 years. But in the long-run they would remain a landlocked, blockaded country trying to occupy millions of starving people with growing resistance, and technological inferiority to the Allies in almost every area except ICBMs (which the Allies could easily surpass them in if they chose). Japan will still ultimately fall to the United States, and when it does lend-lease will rearm the Soviet Union and Germany will be back to needing 150 divisions on its eastern border, which would be impossible to maintain while simultaneously attempting to defend the entire circumference of continental Europe.

You could certainly make a strong case for such a scenario.[] But World War 2 would, in any case, still be a German victory. And one of the most impressive victorys in military history, at that. They would have defeated a powerful coalition of enemys, conquering most of Europe and securing their territorial gains.

But like you said. Just because Germany manages to avoid defeat doesn't mean Japan can do the same. Especially since the U.S.A. would likely put much greater effort into the Pacific campaign. Theres not much the Reich can do to help them, even after their defeat of the Soviet Union. They are a land bound country that has limited ability to project power. Unless the Russians agree to facilitate trade through the Trans Siberian railway, Germany has no way to re-establish meaningful trade with Japan.

In any case, they will still be busy tying up all their lose ends in other theaters. Operation Torch would force them to dispatch more troops to North Africa and stabilise the situation there. Its not clear whether or not they could pull out an actual win there, given that the Nazis were fighting on two fronts (the British in Libya, and the Americans in Algeria). Hitler would likely try to square things up with Franco, and force Spain to finally join the Axis. The Wehrmacht would march through the country and take over Gibraltar, with various consequences for the Anglo-Americans.

The Luftwaffe has a good chance of stopping the strategic bombing campaigns, especially once all those fighter wings get transferred from Russia to Germany. The Kriegsmarine might do a bit better in the battle of the Atlantic, but they will still get stomped eventually, especially once the Allies cover the Mid-Atlantic gap.


[] Out of curiosity, though, what makes you so certain the Germans would fall behind the West in the technology race?

[HistoryGeek2019]

In the OTL the Germans were behind the Allies fighter technology and radar/electronics. The Allies had higher octane aviation fuel that the Germans didn't know how to make, and Allied fighters were faster and more agile than the Germans. The Germans didn't really have any new good fighter designs after the FW-190, while the Allies kept churning out newer and better fighters until the end of the war. As for jets, the Me 262 was a heavy fighter designed to attack Allied bombers rather than a pure fighter, and it suffered from a lot of reliability issues, and the Americans deemed it too dangerous even for their test pilots to fly after the war. The British and Americans were already working on jet fighters and had more resources and a larger brain pool on which to draw. This chart from the Oxford Compendium to the Second World War shows the Allied advantage in fighter technology late war:

The Allies also had a larger pool of trained pilots while German pilots were being shot down as soon as they got any experience, as described here: https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AA ... html#index

I don't think anyone in Germany would consider this scenario a victory. Russia might agree to a temporary cease-fire, but the British and Americans would be blockading and bombing them (at least at night) and building up forces in every corner of Germany's "empire". Economic conditions in occupied Europe were appalling and Germany's economic leaders were clueless as to how to alleviate them, even with grain from the Ukraine. The war might just have ended WW1 style where the hardship inside Germany after years of blockade was too great to endure.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Unless the Russians agree to facilitate trade through the Trans Siberian railway, Germany has no way to re-establish meaningful trade with Japan.

That'd be the idea... Germany would have tremendous leverage if it conquered most of SU's agriculture and basically all its oil, so it would demand trans-Siberian concessions in exchange for food, oil, lower occupation costs (which would be paid in kind to Germany, given the uselessness of money in a command economy). Japan can't advance anywhere once the USN is built up but if Germany can send it enough cheap fighters and avgas, it can make it extremely difficult for the USN to establish the air superiority required to land in force anywhere.

Operation Torch would force them to dispatch more troops to North Africa and stabilise the situation there.

Losing everything west of Suez doesn't matter much, IMO, if Germany controls Suez and Gibraltar - after driving south from Turkey. Wallies need a big navy to be a threat in the Med but can't operate in Med if they can't enter it. Even they built up rail infrastructure to supply forces in Tunisia via ports in western Morocco, those forces can't reach Sicily or anything else without a navy.

The Kriegsmarine might do a bit better in the battle of the Atlantic, but they will still get stomped eventually, especially once the Allies cover the Mid-Atlantic gap.

Since we're talking a war extending into the latter 40's, the Type XXI's and successors could be an existential threat to Britain as a military power and as an American force-projection base. T21 was the basis of post-war submarine designs well into the Sixties, including the Foxtrot class of Soviet subs that nearly caused Armageddon in the Cuban Missile Crisis. If Gemany put a thousand of them to sea it's hard to see how the British economy can continue or how a substantial American presence in ETO can be maintained.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The Allies also had a larger pool of trained pilots while German pilots were being shot down as soon as they got any experience, as described here:

That's certainly true OTL but probably not if the Germans have Russia's oil, allowing them to train more pilots. We can even set aside Baku for this discussion, as Maikop, Grozny, and Kuibyshev should have been good for ~10mil tons while the OTL LW burned about 2mil tons/year. https://i.imgur.com/dJAFt8s.jpg

bombing them (at least at night)

Even the attrition rates of night bombing were unsustainable were Germany able to build more fighters. Wilde Sau tactics, pre-radar, were at least 1:1 tradeoff of cheap fighters for ~10x more expensive heavy bombers.

As for jets, the Me 262 was a heavy fighter designed to attack Allied bombers rather than a pure fighter, and it suffered from a lot of reliability issues, and the Americans deemed it too dangerous even for their test pilots to fly after the war.

WW2 jet fighters aren't an area of my expertise but it seems like the Huckbein, at least, was a sophisticated design that would have rivaled western designs if fully developed. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Focke-Wulf_Ta_183. It's very similar to the Mig-15 that gave us problems in Korea. The swept wing reflects appreciation of transonic effects, which is a step-change over traditional aerodynamics and which wasn't appreciated by the U.S. fighters deployed a half-decade after ww2 in the early Korea years.