The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

[Aida1]

That the Barbarossa plan/execution could not bring on Endsieg,is something that we know with hindsight: in August 1945 the German cities would be nuked .But,it is irrelevant,as Germany was in a desperate situation ,and needed a desperate solution .Rationality was a luxury Germany could not afford .
1 Germany's situation was desperate
2 The only chance ( very small chance ) was to defeat the SU .
3 The defeat of the SU could only be caused by the collaps of the regime.
4 The collaps of the regime could only happen if the Red army was defeated west of the DD line
5 The defeat of the Red Army west of the DD line depended on the willingness of Stalin to send the Red Army west of the DD line
The German leadership agreed with these points and started the war with the USSR with the belief that the Soviet regime would collaps in the summer
because it had to collaps in the summer ,as,if the war lasted east of the DD line the Soviet regime would not collaps, the Red Army would continue the war and Germany would lose .
The SU was potentially stronger than Germany , thus time was essential .

Your obsession that it needed to be this way. German planners were more flexible than that.

[ljadw]

Plans are depending on facts, facts are not depending on plans .
And, plans do not win wars .

[AbollonPolweder]

That is, the Germans from the spring of 1941 actively collaborated with the Russians in the "creation" of machina (Pact M-R), and at the end of August they were very surprised at the appearance of this machina, this "unexpected miracle" as you mean

Of course you mean 1939. Also, it is not within the power of Adolf to make Mr. Molotoff's signature appear on the papers in question.

As such, Sovjet Russia acquiescence to the Pact was completely outside of their control. That Molotoff-vRibentropp is not a fait accompli at the time Germany starts its mobilization against Poland was shown in 1940 Molotoff visit to Berlin. Sovjets COULD change their mind, that is.

The Deus ex Machina of vRibbentropp-Molotoff cannot happen without the negotiation; that is clear. But likewise the Deus ex Machina of Sovjet Collapse cannot happen without Barbarossa.

(Is there agreement that neither Barbarossa plan, nor Barbarossa execution could be rationally expected to bring on EndSieg?)

We are reduced to ljadw logic; once Germans chose their course of action everything depended on Sovjets, nothing on Germans.

1.Of course! I apologize for my typo. And yes, of course, Hitler could not force Molotov to sign the pact, just as Stalin could not force Ribbentrop. Hitler and Molotov did not just conclude a non-aggression pact, they made a deal to divide prey (Poland). Stalin was interested in this deal no less than Hitler.
2. This is a very controversial statement. In 1940, Stalin no longer needed Hitler; Adolf had already done his job of unleashing a war in Europe. And in 1939, Stalin (Molotov) was very negotiable and accommodating.
3. We have a different understanding of the expression Deus ex machina. For me, this is something incredible, almost a wonderful event. For example, in 1939 at the end of August after long negotiations with the USSR Hitler would conclude a pact with Poland on an attack ... on the USSR. That would be a real surprise for me. But I do not insist on such "radicalism."
4. I believe that Barbarossa could lead to an "EndSieg".
5. This is the logic of either a jollier or, more likely, a paid troll.

[Aida1]

Plans are depending on facts, facts are not depending on plans .
And, plans do not win wars .

You obviously win wars without plans. No source given as usual.

[ljadw]

Plans are depending on facts, facts are not depending on plans .
And, plans do not win wars .

You obviously win wars without plans. No source given as usual.

As usual a reply to what I did not say .
Continue .

[Aida1]

Plans are depending on facts, facts are not depending on plans .
And, plans do not win wars .

You obviously win wars without plans. No source given as usual.

As usual a reply to what I did not say .
Continue .

You made your usual unsourced posting which means not a thing

[BDV]

And yes, of course, Hitler could not force Molotov to sign the pact, just as Stalin could not force Ribbentrop. Hitler and Molotov did not just conclude a non-aggression pact, they made a deal to divide prey (Poland). Stalin was interested in this deal no less than Hitler.

2. This is a very controversial statement. In 1940, Stalin no longer needed Hitler; Adolf had already done his job of unleashing a war in Europe. And in 1939, Stalin (Molotov) was very negotiable and accommodating.

Be that as it may, it was Germany that was mobilizing and thus unable to alter the timetable. Also, Sovjets/Comrade Vissarionovitch could be very accommodating until they weren't.

3. We have a different understanding of the expression Deus ex machina. For me, this is something incredible, almost a wonderful event. For example, in 1939 at the end of August after long negotiations with the USSR Hitler would conclude a pact with Poland on an attack ... on the USSR. That would be a real surprise for me. But I do not insist on such "radicalism."

Or Jucoff losing it after one last imbecilic directive from Djugashvilli and crushing his skull with a vase. We're in agreement. Point is, no Barbarossa, no Deus ex Machina.

As an aside, Sovjetunion had been thoroughly purged of disobedient or revolutionary elements. That is probably one of the "secrets" of the resiliency of Sovjetunion in WWII. By purging the state apparatus of tsarist elements, and then of old/revolutionary era bolsheviks and non-russian elements, Stalin eliminated both people with a strong incentive to rebel and those with the know-how of successful rebelling. Further, replacing those executed with post-revolution bolsheviks of largely russian extraction infused the state apparatus with a group of people both ideologically "trustworthy" and bound by ethnic solidarity.

I am unaware of proof this development was adequately understood by the Fuhrer and his underlings; given how they kept rambling about judeobolshevismus.

4. I believe that Barbarossa could lead to an "EndSieg".

Russians begged to differ. Barbarossa failed by a such wide margin from the task at hand, that major deviations from historical truth are needed to even faintly approach OstFront Endsieg with some non-zero probability.

[AbollonPolweder]

...

Be that as it may, it was Germany that was mobilizing and thus unable to alter the timetable. Also, Sovjets/Comrade Vissarionovitch could be very accommodating until they weren't.

Great ! Thank you sir for your outstanding irony. You made my day! As for the mobilization, Hitler easily changed the timetable. In the case of Poland, for example, he canceled the attack several times, and at the last moment.

Or Jucoff losing it after one last imbecilic directive from Djugashvilli and crushing his skull with a vase. We're in agreement. Point is, no Barbarossa, no Deus ex Machina.

No sir! Your alleged case of Zhukov would be not just Deus ex machina but Super-Deus ex Super-machina.

As an aside, Sovjetunion had been thoroughly purged of disobedient or revolutionary elements. That is probably one of the "secrets" of the resiliency of Sovjetunion in WWII. By purging the state apparatus of tsarist elements, and then of old/revolutionary era bolsheviks and non-russian elements, Stalin eliminated both people with a strong incentive to rebel and those with the know-how of successful rebelling. Further, replacing those executed with post-revolution bolsheviks of largely russian extraction infused the state apparatus with a group of people both ideologically "trustworthy" and bound by ethnic solidarity.

In my opinion, sir, you are very mistaken about the Soviet Bolsheviks, who were internationalists, and the same Zhukov energetically killed the rebellious Russian peasants in 1920. This is an interesting case of ethnic solidarity, isn’t it?!

Russians begged to differ. Barbarossa failed by a such wide margin from the task at hand, that major deviations from historical truth are needed to even faintly approach OstFront Endsieg with some non-zero probability.

"... historical truth ..."? Do you mean the actual outcome of Barbarossa and you think that there could be no other result? Under no circumstances?

[Max Payload]

No, that's a fact, and more than that - a common knowledge in relatively modern literature. See, for example, "Stalin's missed chance" by M. Meltyukhov (*). ...
(*) I would recommend this book to those interested in the organization history of the RA in 1939-41 on a serious level.

At around the time of this post you also posted
“Of 177 existing divisions 99 were organized as 4/100 (mostly border districts) and 78 as 4/120 (mostly interior districts).”
“There was no 12000 mobilization level or a peace-time division organization with 12 000 men.”
“… there was no Soviet mobilization in 1941 prior to 22 June, since organization and TO&E still remained those of the peace-time type.”
29&30/10/19
And “My point, repeating it once again time, is that in by June 41 there were two levels of authorized strength established for the rifle division - 10300 and 5900. Actual strength of regular military personnel … more or less corresponded to this authorized level.” 01/11/19

Near the end of the chapter - Советское военное планирование в 1940-1941 гг.
Metlyukhov’s writes the following -
По пункту 1. Еще 8 марта 1941 г. было утверждено постановление СНК СССР, согласно которому предусматривалось произвести скрытое отмобилизование 903,8 тыс. военнообязанных запаса под видом "больших учебных сборов". Осуществление этих мер в конце мая - начале июня 1941 г. позволило призвать 805,2 тыс. человек (24% приписного личного состава по плану [409] мобилизации). Это дало возможность усилить 99 стрелковых дивизий в основном западных приграничных округов: 21 дивизия была доведена до 14тыс. человек; 72 дивизии- до 12 тыс. человек и б дивизий - до 11 тыс. человек при штате военного времени в 14 483 человека. Одновременно пополнились личным составом части и соединения других родов войск, и войска получили 26 620 лошадей{1309}.
{1309}Горьков Ю.А. Указ. соч. С.70-71; 1941 год - уроки и выводы. С.82; Владимирский А.В. На киевском направлении. М.,1989. С.50: Боевой и численный состав Вооруженных Сил СССР в период Великой Отечественной войны (1941-1945 гг.). Статистический сборник ? 1 (22 июня 1941 г.). М.,1994. С.10-12.

Presumably the 99 divisions he is referring to are the same 99 divisions “organized as 4/100”. Those 99 divisions, according to Metlyukhov (unless I have misunderstood the text) had an average personnel complement of 12,400.
So we have Metlyukhov with 12,400 (ranging from 11 to 14 thousand); the 4/100 authorised strength of 10,300; Zhukov citing 8-9 thousand; and Sharp (referring to 1/6/41) citing 8-9 thousand.
Eighty years on there still seems to be no consensus on this, so perhaps some of the inaccuracies in FHO’s pre-Barbarossa assessments are understandable.

[BDV]

Be that as it may, it was Germany that was mobilizing and thus unable to alter the timetable. Also, Sovjets/Comrade Vissarionovitch could be very accommodating until they weren't.

As for the mobilization, Hitler easily changed the timetable. In the case of Poland, for example, he canceled the attack several times, and at the last moment.

I meant alter it for one or two years, not one or two weeks. France, Britain and US were also mobilizing; and Italy did get (IIRC) whiffed for mobilization, preparing for a war in 1935.

In my opinion, sir, you are very mistaken about the Soviet Bolsheviks, who were internationalists, and the same Zhukov energetically killed the rebellious Russian peasants in 1920. This is an interesting case of ethnic solidarity, isn’t it?!

Socialismus in one country was proposed by Joseph Stalin in 1924, and the last of the opponents were executed in Gulag in 1940; the last surviving proponent of the permanent revolution outside Russia received his fatal icepick-to-eyesocket blow in 1940.

Russians begged to differ. Barbarossa failed by a such wide margin from the task at hand, that major deviations from historical truth are needed to even faintly approach OstFront Endsieg with some non-zero probability.
"... historical truth ..."? Do you mean the actual outcome of Barbarossa and you think that there could be no other result? Under no circumstances?

Not without a (or a few) big fat Deus ex Machina, which SURELY could not happen without Barbarossa.

[Art]

Near the end of the chapter - Советское военное планирование в 1940-1941 гг.
Metlyukhov’s writes the following -
По пункту 1. Еще 8 марта 1941 г. было утверждено постановление СНК СССР, согласно которому предусматривалось произвести скрытое отмобилизование 903,8 тыс. военнообязанных запаса под видом "больших учебных сборов".

The problem is that neither the text of this decree linked above nor the directives issued following the decree ever used the words "большие учебные сборы" or "hidden mobilization" or any synonyms. Which makes this description a little dubious.

Осуществление этих мер в конце мая - начале июня 1941 г. позволило призвать 805,2 тыс. человек (24% приписного личного состава по плану [409] мобилизации)

As of 22 June 41 the authorized wartime strength of the Red Army was approaching 9.3 million.
viewtopic.php?p=2248013#p2248013
That means that mobilization requirement was already about 5 million reservists, not 4. Hence 800 thousand made 16% of these 5 million.

Presumably the 99 divisions he is referring to are the same 99 divisions “organized as 4/100”

No that was a incidental coincidence. In general 4/120 divisions received 5000-6000 reservists, 4/100 - 2000. Which brought their strength to 11-12 000 (either 6 000 + 6 000 or 10 000 + 2000).

21 дивизия была доведена до 14тыс. человек; 72 дивизии- до 12 тыс. человек и б дивизий - до 11 тыс. человек

The first part of the sentence is an artifact (it would take too long to explain its origin) and should be read as "12 thousand" instead of "14 thousand". In other respects it's the same that I said.

[Max Payload]

Near the end of the chapter - Советское военное планирование в 1940-1941 гг.
Metlyukhov’s writes the following -
По пункту 1. Еще 8 марта 1941 г. было утверждено постановление СНК СССР, согласно которому предусматривалось произвести скрытое отмобилизование 903,8 тыс. военнообязанных запаса под видом "больших учебных сборов".

The problem is that neither the text of this decree linked above nor the directives issued following the decree ever used the words "большие учебные сборы" or "hidden mobilization" or any synonyms. Which makes this description a little dubious.

I also find his argument that Stalin approved the 15 May War Plan 'a little dubious'.

Presumably the 99 divisions he is referring to are the same 99 divisions “organized as 4/100”

No that was a incidental coincidence. In general 4/120 divisions received 5000-6000 reservists, 4/100 - 2000. Which brought their strength to 11-12 000 (either 6 000 + 6 000 or 10 000 + 2000).

It is surprising that Meltyukhov’s “99 infantry divisions in mainly western border districts” that the 8 March resolution “made it possible to strengthen”, are not the same 99 divisions “organized as 4/100 (mostly border districts)” to which you referred last year. Nonetheless Meltyukhov seems clear that only 99 of the 177 divisions were “strengthened” by the reservists and seems content to include those reservists in his calculation of divisional personnel strength figures.

[ljadw]

Thge Red Army was not ready for an attack in 1941.It was not even able to expel the Germans in 1941 .There was a shortage of everything : ammunition, fuel, officers, NCOs,some tank divisions had no tanks, others had too many tanks, etc, etc .

[BDV]

4 The collapse of the regime could only happen if the Red army was defeated west of the DD line
5 The defeat of the Red Army west of the DD line depended on the willingness of Stalin to send the Red Army west of the DD line.

That is incorrect representation of the German POV. Sovjets DID send their forces west of DD line (well, west of Narva-Nevel - Dniepr line). It was the Germans who abandoned the battle west of NN-Dniepr line in the July 7-10 timeframe and decided to panzer-test Russian backfield's emptiness (it wasn't; hilarity ensued).

This German decision in turn created the known logistical problems of 1941; furthermore, the tactically-driven deployment of road and rail repair assets to the AGN sector in 1941 snowballed into the logistical problems of 1942.

[Art]

It is surprising that Meltyukhov’s “99 infantry divisions in mainly western border districts” that the 8 March resolution “made it possible to strengthen”, are not the same 99 divisions “organized as 4/100 (mostly border districts)” to which you referred last year.

Sometimes a coincidence is just a coincidence. Those 99 included 77 4/120 divisions (almost all available save for one division in Central Asia), 16 4/100 divisions in the Kiev District, and 6 mountain divisions (4/140) also in the Kiev district. In addition to about 493 000 reservists allocated to rifle divisions there were
8100 called to GHQ artillery
9400 to army and corps HQ
18 000 to fortified regions
4300 to bridging units
28 600 to corps and divisional sapper battalions (employed for construction of fortifications)
6000 to construction battalions (the same)
20 700 to air defense
7700 to survey units
1600 - signal units
20 300 - various service and supply elements
121 000 were called for training of reserve NCOs or privates of rare specialties
about 45 000 were trained as reserve officers