Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

[Avalancheon]

Would that be a roundabout way of admitting the 8.8cm was in no way 'technical superior' to the contemporary US, Soviet and UK AA guns?

If you really wish to press the issue, then fine. The 88mm FLAK 36 wasn't superior to its Allied counterparts, but it was still a very good design.

I am pretty sure you have access to the overall total of German and Allied casualties for 'Normandy' I know there are quibbles about dates etc. but do they show German losses were less than Allied losses?

The myopic focus on Normandy is your convention, not mine. It is instructive to look at my original comment:

The Germans were never tactically outclassed by the Soviets or the Anglo-Americans. Their equipment was often superior, particularly by 1943 onward. And they always had better trained officers and soldiers, which is why they were able to consistently inflict higher casualties on their enemys than they endured themselves.

Which is when you then went with your pivot to the Normandy campaign:

So how many more casualties did the Allies endure in Normandy compared to the Germans?
And how is this reflected in German v Allied casualties in 1944-45?

There. Now your question has been suitably reframed to reflect what I actually said. Its not about the Normandy campaign in specific as it is about all the campaigns between Germany and the Western Allies. And to back up my point, I'll give another excerpt.

''It became evident that, on the average, German units had a 30 percent combat effectiveness superiority per man over the Americans and British at the time of the Salerno landing, and that this superiority had only dwindled to about 20 percent by mid-1944... This relationship, a 20 percent combat effectiveness superiority, and a 2 to 3 casualty inflicting superiority, was found to still be in effect during the 1944 fighting in Normandy and France, and as late as December 1944, at the time of the Germans Ardennes offensive.'' Trevor N. Dupuy.

[Richard Anderson]

Give the OP some time, I am interested in what you have to say on that.

I just did. The OP is apparently based upon misinformation on what the Germans actually did. They did make extensive use of experienced personnel, both convalescents and permanently disabled light-duty men, to staff the Ersatzheer and develop doctrine and TTP's to counter Allied superiority - Stauffenberg anyone? They came up with some good stuff, but ultimately failed. For example, they took the experience in the Great War, Ostfront, and so on to develop superb doctrine and tactics for a dispersed minimalist defense backed by mobile counterattack forces second to none. They also brought the use of mortars to a fine science.

Great, but the first was defeated simply by the ability of their enemies to mass against them and attrit them until the thin, dispersed lines collapsed. The mortars were eventually countered by technical means - counter-mortar radars - and the highly responsive communications within the Allied artillery fire control.

[Cult Icon]

I just did. The OP is apparently based upon misinformation on what the Germans actually did. They did make extensive use of experienced personnel, both convalescents and permanently disabled light-duty men, to staff the Ersatzheer and develop doctrine and TTP's to counter Allied superiority - Stauffenberg anyone? They came up with some good stuff, but ultimately failed. For example, they took the experience in the Great War, Ostfront, and so on to develop superb doctrine and tactics for a dispersed minimalist defense backed by mobile counterattack forces second to none. They also brought the use of mortars to a fine science.

Great, but the first was defeated simply by the ability of their enemies to mass against them and attrit them until the thin, dispersed lines collapsed. The mortars were eventually countered by technical means - counter-mortar radars - and the highly responsive communications within the Allied artillery fire control.

sources? All they did was modifications of the same things they did over and over again in Russia since 1942. It's just not significant enough and pales in comparison to the developments of their enemy. Take more time off, maybe you will have interesting ideas..

You are a follower of the "US Army replacement system good" rather than the "US Army replacement system bad" trope? Neither are precisely correct, probably "US Army replacement system necessary" is the closest to reality trope.

The "deep experience" effect seemed to be from early 1941 to about mid 1943, before attrition began eroding it.

I have a copy of "Warriors of the 106th". I'll comment later on this.

There were positives and negatives to the replacement system. The German army actually had both (they used to a small extent, march battalions with random groupings of personnel) but stuck to their habit of using formations until they were burnt out.

I attribute the sometimes incomprehensible performance of german units in the defense to their surviving officer and nco corps making the best of their limited situation. What the german army didn't lack was a martial culture and selecting effective people to lead their combat units. Their experience among most of their leadership corps was chiefly in struggling to survive and hold the line in Russia with limited resources. Significant portions made their way West for the final act. However the same units that fought tooth and nail in russia would be more ready to surrender to the "friends of humanity" when in duress. Being war weary may of had something to do with it.

+the unintended consequence of SS historians is that they managed to uncover what the human network of a german division looked like, what they were credited on doing (via their detailed award system) and what held them together- with one's reservation, of course.

[Michael Kenny]

The myopic focus on Normandy is your convention, not mine. It is instructive to look at my original comment..............


Which is when you then went with your pivot to the Normandy campaign................

I just want you to give the evidence that shows German casualties were lower than Allied casualties in Normandy. If German losses were 'always' lower than Allied casualties then it should be reflected in the Normandy numbers.
Surely (no, I prefer to call you Shirley) the Normandy numbers would validate you claim?

[Richard Anderson]

The Germans were never tactically outclassed by the Soviets or the Anglo-Americans. Their equipment was often superior, particularly by 1943 onward. And they always had better trained officers and soldiers, which is why they were able to consistently inflict higher casualties on their enemys than they endured themselves.

The problem with absolutes is that real life is rarely absolute. Let me re-write this so it's accurate to reality:

The Germans were rarely tactically outclassed by the Soviets or the Anglo-Americans. Some of their equipment was sometimes superior, particularly by 1943 onward, but they never were able to produce or sustain enough of it, so were also forced to rely on obsolescent makeshifts until the end of the war. And they frequently had better trained officers and soldiers, and a doctrine based upon obtaining direct-fire superiority that was carefully matched to their weapons of choicewhich is why they were able to on average inflict higher casualties on their enemys [sic] than they endured themselves. However, because they never had sufficient manpower, eventually they were forced to degrade the training of officers and soldiers, which began to erode their edge after 1943

There. That's closer to reality now.

There. Now your question has been suitably reframed to reflect what I actually said. Its not about the Normandy campaign in specific as it is about all the campaigns between Germany and the Western Allies. And to back up my point, I'll give another excerpt.

''It became evident that, on the average, German units had a 30 percent combat effectiveness superiority per man over the Americans and British at the time of the Salerno landing, and that this superiority had only dwindled to about 20 percent by mid-1944... This relationship, a 20 percent combat effectiveness superiority, and a 2 to 3 casualty inflicting superiority, was found to still be in effect during the 1944 fighting in Normandy and France, and as late as December 1944, at the time of the Germans Ardennes offensive.'' Trevor N. Dupuy.

Yeah, too bad Trevor never really had a chance to confirm that with the ACSDB data. The results of the eleven engagements he did run is somewhat ambiguous, but tend to reflect the degradation caused by the wholesale inclusion of ill-trained and often unsuitable manpower from the LW and KM into the Heer and SS. Later research also demonstrated that the casualty estimates in some of those engagements greatly understated German losses...the most significant being when the 90th ID crushed the remnants of the 5. FJD and elements of 1. SS in January.

[Avalancheon]

Yep. Trevor also recognized the reductio ad absurdam that many people created from that statement...he knew full well how and why despite the truth of his statement, the Germans still lost the war.

It is only logical to conclude that the German army was more proficient than the British and Americans. Far from being a reductio ad absurdam, as you characterise it. The idea that they were a superior fighting force can be supported by the fact that their soldiers and officers received more thorough and rigorous training, and by the differences in their command principles and troop replacement systems.

It can also be supported by the fact that the Heer was able to hold their own against an enemy that greatly outnumbered them, had a massive superiority in material, total control of the air, and the ability to read their mail. The fact that they could still win battles in such circumstances supports the conclusion that the Germans were a more skilled, proficient army.

The Germans didn't use gas because it would have incapacitated their horses? Who knew?

All joking aside, this was an important consideration. Wikipedia mentions that during an interogation of Hermann Goering, an officer from the OSS asked him why the Germans did not use chemical weapons at Normandy. His answer was that: ''the Wehrmacht was dependent upon horse-drawn transport to move supplies to their combat units, and had never been able to devise a gas mask horses could tolerate; the versions they developed would not pass enough pure air to allow the horses to pull a cart. Thus, gas was of no use to the German Army under most conditions.''

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_o ... zi_Germany

The functional weapons in that list aided and abetted German tactics, but they did not solve the operational and strategic dilemmas faced by the Wehrmacht.

And it might be better said that the "Wunderwaffe" only had the effect of modifying some Allied tactics and operations.

No one said otherwise.

Yep, it's the elephant in the room in any discussion of tactical or weapons superiority.

Are you adamantly opposed to such discussion?

It's too bad that for the winning of wars the individual capability of one army versus another "on a man per man basis" is not always the path to victory.

Indeed, if this were not so, the Allies would never have won the war.

[Aida1]

I just did. The OP is apparently based upon misinformation on what the Germans actually did. They did make extensive use of experienced personnel, both convalescents and permanently disabled light-duty men, to staff the Ersatzheer and develop doctrine and TTP's to counter Allied superiority - Stauffenberg anyone? They came up with some good stuff, but ultimately failed. For example, they took the experience in the Great War, Ostfront, and so on to develop superb doctrine and tactics for a dispersed minimalist defense backed by mobile counterattack forces second to none. They also brought the use of mortars to a fine science.

Great, but the first was defeated simply by the ability of their enemies to mass against them and attrit them until the thin, dispersed lines collapsed. The mortars were eventually countered by technical means - counter-mortar radars - and the highly responsive communications within the Allied artillery fire control.

sources? All they did was modifications of the same things they did over and over again in Russia since 1942. It's just not significant enough and pales in comparison to the developments of their enemy. Take more time off, maybe you will have interesting ideas..

I think you are getting a bit arrogant here. :roll: The germans did adapt defensive tactics to deal with red army offensives. Actually, it is the same way they needed to adapt in world war I to massive artillery fires.
You need to read german documents on offensive and defensive tactics.See for example Dokumentation eines Soldatenlebens GFM Walter Model Hans Georg model and Dermot Bradley Biblio 1991 pp 170-191 where you find a number of orders by Walter Model with instructions on tactics.

[Richard Anderson]

sources? All they did was modifications of the same things they did over and over again in Russia since 1942. It's just not significant enough and pales in comparison to the developments of their enemy. Take more time off, maybe you will have interesting ideas..

Sources for the use of convalescents and disabled in the Ersatzheer? MI14-149h. „Verfügbar Anfang 1945 (ausgebildetes Personal)“. AHA/Stab II, 20.12.44 touches on it, but the process of combing-out rear-area units of useful personnel and replacing them with convalescents and disabled personnel was ongoing throughout the war.

Anyway, I'm semi-retired, so I have all the time in the world to comment on ideas like using rubber inflatables as tactical decoys.

I have a copy of "Warriors of the 106th". I'll comment later on this.

Excellent.

There were positives and negatives to the replacement system. The German army actually had both (they used to a small extent, march battalions with random groupings of personnel) but stuck to their habit of using formations until they were burnt out.

The Marsch Batallionnen and Kompanien were not "random groupings of personnel". They were the replacement personnel, Ersatz und Genesene, meant for specific units and often consisted of very specifically required replacement specialists. They were the primary method of returning personnel to a unit (even those returning from leave, Urlauber, were normally assigned to a Marsch Batallion for security and ease of transport).

The American Army also "had both", replacement battalions in theory were the holding units for replacements, but in practice direct replacement, shipping drafts of various sizes to units directly, was employed.

The real difference was the lack of a Replacement Battalion assigned to divisions to take in and acclimatize and provide final instructions to replacements. As I mentioned, the 29th ID - and probably others - attempted to do so, but it was impossible to maintain in the tempo required.

I attribute the sometimes incomprehensible performance of german units in the defense to their surviving officer and nco corps making the best of their limited situation. What the german army didn't lack was a martial culture and selecting effective people to lead their combat units. Their experience among most of their leadership corps was chiefly in struggling to survive and hold the line in Russia with limited resources. Significant portions made their way West for the final act. However the same units that fought tooth and nail in russia would be more ready to surrender to the "friends of humanity" when in duress. Being war weary may of had something to do with it.

Why is it "incomprehensible"? BTW, the evidence is that the Wehrmacht didn't become "ready to surrender" any more to the Western Allies than to the Soviets much before the last five weeks of the war or so.

[Michael Kenny]

the evidence is that the Wehrmacht didn't become "ready to surrender" any more to the Western Allies than to the Soviets much before the last five weeks of the war or so.

I remember Darrin making the claim decades back that the Western Allies took more German POWs than the Russians. Being Darrin the first reaction was 'that can not be right' but upon checking it turned out he was right!

[Richard Anderson]

It is only logical to conclude that the German army was more proficient than the British and Americans. Far from being a reductio ad absurdam, as you characterise it. The idea that they were a superior fighting force can be supported by the fact that their soldiers and officers received more thorough and rigorous training, and by the differences in their command principles and troop replacement systems.

Sorry, I was being too telegraphic I suppose? The reductio ad absurdam is the popular notion, despite all evidence, that the Germans were always "more proficient" when the evidence actually is they were on average more proficient. It usually goes along with hagiographic histories that extol the German fighting man holding a bulwark against Bolshevism and other such claptrap.

Were they a "superior fighting force"? Superior to what? The armed forces that defeated them?

Did they receive "more thorough and rigorous training"? They were intended too, but that broke down frequently, viz the complaints of poor quality junior officers and NCOs following the Polish and French campaigns, the wholesale re-jiggering of personnel during the winter of 1940/1941 to improve frontline personnel quality, and then the increasingly desperate measures to get replacements forward as the war progressed and German manpower eroded away. It's also how they were able to do that which matters. Those "useless" (in certain posters worldview) divisions in France made an excellent pool for dumping raw recruits into and extracting trained personnel. Ditto using the Reserve Divisionen both as training and occupation troops. That was part and parcel of their replacement system. However, by fall 1944 that system was breaking down.

In any case, the German replacement system would not have worked for the U.S. Army in World War II.

The difference in the command "system" is that the Germans more or less practiced what they preached, while the British tended to stay in the prewar lanes of the FSR and the Americans parroted German doctrine, but had troubles practicing what they preached until the mass of the Army gained about a years expereince.

It can also be supported by the fact that the Heer was able to hold their own against an enemy that greatly outnumbered them, had a massive superiority in material, total control of the air, and the ability to read their mail. The fact that they could still win battles in such circumstances supports the conclusion that the Germans were a more skilled, proficient army.

There is the not so small problem that the Western Allies first had to get across oceans to get at the Germans, deploy well-equipped but inexperienced armies against them, maintain naval superiority, and achieve and maintain air superiority against them. Or that the main ground army they faced was thrashed by them almost to destruction in their first year in combat and had to be re-built from ashes.

All joking aside, this was an important consideration. Wikipedia mentions that during an interogation of Hermann Goering, an officer from the OSS asked him why the Germans did not use chemical weapons at Normandy. His answer was that: ''the Wehrmacht was dependent upon horse-drawn transport to move supplies to their combat units, and had never been able to devise a gas mask horses could tolerate; the versions they developed would not pass enough pure air to allow the horses to pull a cart. Thus, gas was of no use to the German Army under most conditions.''

Because Dicke Hermann knew that of course...

Yes, seriously, the reason the Germans did not deploy their large arsenal of chemical weapons, especially nerve agents, was primarily because they knew the Allies had a large and probably larger arsenal of conventional chemical weapons and they had to suppose, given their lack of hard intelligence, that they also had nerve agents. Given that the Allies also had a much more robust system for delivery of massed chemicals against the Germans and the known limitations to the use of chemical weapons - they hurt you almost as much as your enemy - they wisely chose not to indulge in first use, while preparing for a possible enemy first use.

No one said otherwise.

Excellent. It always pays to be clear, otherwise you can get confused by which reductio ad absurdam is meant.

Are you adamantly opposed to such discussion?

No, so long as it doesn't hie off in odd diversions about Wunderwaffe and other Fanbois subjects.

Indeed, if this were not so, the Allies would never have won the war.

Again with the absolutes Moriarty!

[Cult Icon]

Sources for the use of convalescents and disabled in the Ersatzheer? MI14-149h. „Verfügbar Anfang 1945 (ausgebildetes Personal)“. AHA/Stab II, 20.12.44 touches on it, but the process of combing-out rear-area units of useful personnel and replacing them with convalescents and disabled personnel was ongoing throughout the war.

Anyway, I'm semi-retired, so I have all the time in the world to comment on ideas like using rubber inflatables as tactical decoys.

Well, what gets you your thrills is well known but could it not be at the expense of others? I would like to hear of your ideas- this is a What-if after all- and put yourself out there rather than trying to impale people on speculative and creative points. It can be fun for all and not an attempt to win win win win win win win win win win arguments. I don't know the answer to my OP. However one can work their way towards it.

The Marsch Batallionnen and Kompanien were not "random groupings of personnel". They were the replacement personnel, Ersatz und Genesene, meant for specific units and often consisted of very specifically required replacement specialists. They were the primary method of returning personnel to a unit (even those returning from leave, Urlauber, were normally assigned to a Marsch Batallion for security and ease of transport).

The American Army also "had both", replacement battalions in theory were the holding units for replacements, but in practice direct replacement, shipping drafts of various sizes to units directly, was employed.

The real difference was the lack of a Replacement Battalion assigned to divisions to take in and acclimatize and provide final instructions to replacements. As I mentioned, the 29th ID - and probably others - attempted to do so, but it was impossible to maintain in the tempo required.

Why is it "incomprehensible"? BTW, the evidence is that the Wehrmacht didn't become "ready to surrender" any more to the Western Allies than to the Soviets much before the last five weeks of the war or so.

I have read from many German divisional/east front combat histories of them receiving these random bodies of people as reinforcements- often just company strength. Also, there was a noted tendency for a lot of prisoners in routine combat in the West, which bloated up the numbers compared to in the East, where the pow count was accumulated through encirclement- operational art. It was a different war.

[Richard Anderson]

Well, what gets you your thrills is well known but could it not be at the expense of others? I would like to hear of your ideas- this is a What-if after all- and put yourself out there rather than trying to impale people on speculative and creative points. It can be fun for all and not an attempt to win win win win win win win win win win arguments. I don't know the answer to my OP. However one can work their way towards it.

Really? What exactly do you think gets me my thrills? It certainly isn't interacting with fact free speculations masquerading as "what if" questions.

Your "what if" question doesn't have a workable answer as is demonstrated by your tentative suggestions. The deception measures you refer to were strategic, not tactical. The Germans did do what you think they should do, use experienced personnel to develop new TTPs for improved weapons systems and to train recruits. The idea of "waiting for lulls" in artillery fire is unworkable and implies a Godlike level of intelligence capability.

That there is no good answer for your question is not my problem.

I have read from many German divisional/east front combat histories of them receiving these random bodies of people as reinforcements- often just company strength. Also, there was a noted tendency for a lot of prisoners in routine combat in the West, which bloated up the numbers compared to in the East, where the pow count was accumulated through encirclement- operational art. It was a different war.

No, that is not the way the Ersatzheer and German replacement system worked, despite what you have taken in through reading anecdotes in combat histories. Replacements were not "random" they were planned, often months in advance and overall replacement planning for the Heer was done in half-yearly increments. You appear to be basing your what if argument on a pretty shaky foundation when it comes to understanding the reality.

What do "prisoners" in the West have to do with the German replacement system? "Routine combat...bloated up the numbers"? What is that supposed to even mean? You don't think there were encirclements in the West or operational art?

I'm afraid this sounds like just more of the usual Wehrmacht/Soviet Practitioners of Operational Art fanboism that is all too common.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Why is it "incomprehensible"? BTW, the evidence is that the Wehrmacht didn't become "ready to surrender" any more to the Western Allies than to the Soviets much before the last five weeks of the war or so.

The reasons why they were fighting vs surrendering have always intrigued me in these discussions of the effectiveness of the German ground combat forces 1944-45.

[Cult Icon]

The reasons why they were fighting vs surrendering have always intrigued me in these discussions of the effectiveness of the German ground combat forces 1944-45.

what do you think?

[Cult Icon]

Theres no easy, reliable way of finding out how much ammo the enemy has. That kindof intelligence will not normally be available to an attacking force. The way to reduce the effect of enemy artillery is through decoy attacks and elaborate coordination.

There should be ways of estimating based prior on combat experience and monitoring signals traffic. German artillery was also equipped with flash spotting and other organs like their opponents. German documents do show that they had ways of estimating the amounts of enemy shells fired and approx how many tubes they had.

http://nigelef.tripod.com/directory.htm

Also, aerial recon, pow interrogations, etc.