The Forgotten Story of Operation Anvil

[Gorque]

An opinion piece by Cameron Zinsou, doctoral candidate in history at Mississippi State University.

After the success of D-Day in June 1944, the high command relented, and Anvil was back on — and so was the fight between the Americans and British. Churchill utilized the entirety of his lexicon to argue for its cancellation. With the postwar order in mind, the prime minister claimed that going ahead with Anvil, and thereby drawing more Germans away from the Eastern Front, meant that Stalin could push deeper and faster into Central Europe.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/15/opin ... anvil.html

[OpanaPointer]

https://history.army.mil/html/books/007 ... index.html

[Carl Schwamberger]

Zinsou sounds very much like Atkinson in the last of his US Army trilogy. The latter sarcastically remarks the MTO-ETO operation with the least British support was the most successful. Is Zinsou inspired by Atkinson?

[daveshoup2MD]

ANVIL/DRAGOON opened up the largest Allied-controlled ports in Europe other than Antwerp, and brought the entire 6th Army Group into action against Germany. Given the outcome, the operations in Provence were - in terms of strategic "return" on the investment in lives, times, and opportunity costs, the most important operation in the Mediterranean littoral after TORCH - far more so than anything in Italian territory, from HUSKY to VE Day.

[Steve]

“With the postwar order in mind, the prime minister claimed that going ahead with Anvil, and thereby drawing more Germans away from the Eastern Front, meant that Stalin could push deeper and faster into Central Europe”.

If Churchill was worried that Anvil would allow Stalin to “push deeper and faster into Central Europe” why did he propose a landing at Bordeaux on the Atlantic coast? In February 1944 he told the Chiefs of Staff “Such a force let loose in the south and center of France would instantly arouse widespread revolt and would be of measureless assistance in the main battle” It was pointed out to him that the same argument applied to Anvil. Also that Bordeaux was a more difficult operation because of operating in the heavily defended Gironde estuary. Source is Churchill by Clive Ponting page 624 and his source is Cab 119/3, 2.2.44

On the day before D-Day Churchill proposed a twelve to fourteen division assault on the French coast from Bordeaux to St Nazaire with six divisions withdrawn from Italy. The chiefs of staff convinced him not to send the idea to Roosevelt.

If the reason given for Churchill’s objection comes from his memoirs then I would take it with a pinch of salt.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... If the reason given for Churchill’s objection comes from his memoirs then I would take it with a pinch of salt.

Theres other evidence in Eisenhowers papers. He received some memos or letters on the subject and was harrauged at a ftf meeting.

... On the day before D-Day Churchill proposed a twelve to fourteen division assault on the French coast from Bordeaux to St Nazaire with six divisions withdrawn from Italy. The chiefs of staff convinced him not to send the idea to Roosevelt. ...

That one was brought up again post D-Day. And he presented a argument at some point for shipping the 6th AG around to the French Atlatic ports instead of Op ANVIL. Never mind those ports were not yet operational & most still in German hands.