Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

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Carl Schwamberger
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#76

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 26 Feb 2020, 03:10

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 02:04
Avalancheon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 14:39
Theres no easy, reliable way of finding out how much ammo the enemy has. That kindof intelligence will not normally be available to an attacking force. The way to reduce the effect of enemy artillery is through decoy attacks and elaborate coordination.
There should be ways of estimating based prior on combat experience and monitoring signals traffic. German artillery was also equipped with flash spotting and other organs like their opponents. German documents do show that they had ways of estimating the amounts of enemy shells fired and approx how many tubes they had.

http://nigelef.tripod.com/directory.htm
Back when I was paid to do such things, as late as the 1990s; we knew what the basic unit of fire and the basic battery ammo load was, plus what might be in the division ammo train. Beyond that we were reduced to counting shell craters and guessing what sort of fire standards were used. Admin items like ammo planning seldom went via radio. Even with all the trick encryption and plethora of radios the S4 G4 passed that sort of traffic via telephone or more likely documents. Logistics data was usually to time consuming & error ridden to forward by voice & the 4 shop avoided it whenever possible.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#77

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 03:18

so how would you estimate such things, in your opinion?

We know from history that 10,000 shells + was used in various battlegrounds of significance.


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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#78

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Feb 2020, 05:14

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
25 Feb 2020, 20:40
Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 22:30
... Why is it "incomprehensible"? BTW, the evidence is that the Wehrmacht didn't become "ready to surrender" any more to the Western Allies than to the Soviets much before the last five weeks of the war or so.
The reasons why they were fighting vs surrendering have always intrigued me in these discussions of the effectiveness of the German ground combat forces 1944-45.
A combination of things.

Excellent propaganda, sometimes aided and abetted by Allied actions. Do you want to abandon the fight when the Allies are bombing you mother, father, sisters, brothers, wife, sweetheart? Do you want to abandon X, Y, Z to rapine by the Jewish-Bolshevik hordes? Or the slavering Schwartzes the British, Americans, and French used as cannon fodder?

Discipline, including a very evident recourse to capital punishment pour encourager les autres.

Widespread indoctrination in National Socialist ethos, from school to RAD to the Ersatzheer to the Feldheer.

Long-standing military culture, especially relevant to the officer class.
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#79

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 05:29

That's just a bunch of qualitative descriptions. You can't imagine that everyone embodies these traits, all the time?

The only clear way to pay attention to POW numbers throughout the war from small unit actions to larger actions.
Last edited by Cult Icon on 26 Feb 2020, 05:38, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#80

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 05:33

Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Feb 2020, 00:00
Really? What exactly do you think gets me my thrills? It certainly isn't interacting with fact free speculations masquerading as "what if" questions.
You have a monopoly on "facts"? You know what exactly the other person knows or doesn't know? You are welcome to leave the thread if you don't like it??? I encourage it :thumbsup:

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#81

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Feb 2020, 05:42

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 05:29
That's just a bunch of qualitative descriptions. You can't imagine that everyone embodies these traits, all the time?
No, I don't imagine that. What do you imagine?
The only clear way to pay attention to POW numbers throughout the war from small unit actions to larger actions.
Um, do you have an objective for that? How does it relate to Carl's question that I answered?
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#82

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Feb 2020, 05:45

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 05:33
Richard Anderson wrote:
25 Feb 2020, 00:00
Really? What exactly do you think gets me my thrills? It certainly isn't interacting with fact free speculations masquerading as "what if" questions.
You have a monopoly on "facts"? You know what exactly the other person knows or doesn't know? You are welcome to leave the thread if you don't like it??? I encourage it :thumbsup:
Nope, but you appear to have a monopsony on them so far. So who who made you the Thread Sheriff?
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#83

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 05:52

Richard Anderson wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 05:42
Um, do you have an objective for that?
Your comment on POWs in the preceding page. The POW data patterns and the nature of the last campaigns was different. I disagree with your prior statement. You seem to interpret it as a slight against the Allies. I do think you kind of have a pro-allied bias and I suspect that you find the OP offensive- like all the Moscow 41' what-ifs- despite not directly saying so. Leaving is appropriate, I don't think I can keep up with all your articles on side issues. Take this as you will.

And no, strangely enough I'm discussing things- largely on topic- like a normal poster on a What-If thread.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#84

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:05

[/quote]The Germans were never tactically outclassed by the Soviets or the Anglo-Americans. Their equipment was often superior, particularly by 1943 onward. And they always had better trained officers and soldiers, which is why they were able to consistently inflict higher casualties on their enemys than they endured themselves. Being strategically outclassed was largely a function of being heavily outnumbered, fighting on multiple fronts, and having all their secrets compromised by ULTRA.[/quote]

And yet they lost every battle and campaign of significance against the Anglo-Americans from 1943 onwards, and essentially the same against the Soviets in the same time period.

Interesting historical reality, that...
Last edited by daveshoup2MD on 26 Feb 2020, 07:47, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#85

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:08

Avalancheon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 14:39
Their equipment was often superior............
Indeed it was. The German Horse Gas Masks were a generation in advance of the Allied horse gas masks.
Avalancheon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 14:39

Being strategically outclassed was largely a function of.................
................. being stupid enough to think you could start a war the UK, USA & Soviet Union and win?
[/quote]

I bet their farriers were far more experienced, as well. ;)

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#86

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:14

Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 15:28
daveshoup2MD wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 09:29

Germany was outclassed economically from 1941 onwards; by 1943-45, it was pointless. They should have surrendered on Dec. 11, 1941, not declare war on the US.
Germany winning WW2 is not the point of the thread...it is not even relevant. It is about what can be done in a military dilemma.
"Surrender, you fools!"

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#87

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:15

Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 15:43
daveshoup2MD wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 09:29

Inflatable decoys require:
a) rubber;
b) compressors;
c) fuel for the compressors;
d) vehicles to move a-c and the necessary personnel around.

Horse-drawn wagons aren't going to cut it, as demonstrated by the fate of Army Group D.
There were trucks in all divisions.
Which is why, of course, the German military still depended on horses in 1945.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#88

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 07:20

The spirit of this thread is examining tactics and operational potentials, not jingoism.

There are sufficient trucks in German divisions to haul decoys.....

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#89

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:20

T. A. Gardner wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 18:03
A great example of the problem the Germans have versus the W. Allies is the use of panzer brigades in October 1944 in the Lorraine.

If you look, for example, at the 106th Panzer Brigade there--led by panzer ace Franz Bake and having some of the most experienced panzer leaders commanding portions of it-- the Germans simply weren't playing at the same level.
The 106th attacked into the 90th US Infantry Division. The 90th, while having some combat experience, was by no means an elite US unit. Bake split his command into two columns of roughly battalion strength each and sent them forward against the 90th with no artillery support, no prior reconnaissance, and only a vague set of objectives. He was, as he had in the East, relying on speed and local combat power to win the day.
As they encountered the 90th's units, these began to get on their communications net and word quickly spread across the front of the German attack. Rather than becoming disorganized and fighting piecemeal, often being surprised, the 90th began to solidify their defense and methodically counterattack the German columns in strength.
At Mairy, the 1st battalion of the 358th, with supporting 3" AT guns from the 607th TD battalion and 105mm howitzers from the regimental cannon company, had been alerted to the German advance and were to use the vernacular, loaded for bear. The Germans rolled up, unaware of what was defending the town. Instead of surprised and confused defenders, the US forces trashed the German panzer column in short order. The Germans tried to flank the town only to run into the 105's and more casualties. While it took the US defenders about 30 minutes to get artillery support once they did the divisional artillery pummeled the now stalled column into wreckage.

It wasn't artillery that made the US successful here, it was telephones and radios. Other parts of the division already engaged, had spread the word and let them know the Germans were coming and gave them even a good idea of what to expect. The US Army's "green book" on the Lorraine barely mentions this battle while from the German perspective it was considered far more important.

Organization and communications make a huge difference, far more than having lots of artillery or firepower.
Arracourt is another obvious example of how good the US Army was in action against the Germans in mobile warfare in 1944, even when "the odds were even" and in bad weather.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#90

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 07:21

looks like the thread is ruined..!

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