An example of one of the numerous, ever increasing strawmen- did you really think you know what I really meant by that statement? could it be that what you thought I said was wrong? Will this have to spin off into another article written and another side discussion? Maybe segway into the battle worthiness of the 106th Infantry division or whether the Popeye's fried chicken sandwich is spicy enough?Richard Anderson wrote: ↑26 Feb 2020, 08:24That would astonish the 39., 57., 106., 161., 255., 282., 320., and 332. ID and the 3. and 5. FJD, 12., 26., 272., 352., and 560. VGD, to name but a few.
Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
Icon (or is Cult your last name?) I understand that. However, a "what if" not based upon actual historical events is a fairy tale for children. I'm not sure why you guys that always winge about that never seem to twig to that?Cult Icon wrote: ↑26 Feb 2020, 08:41Anderson, this is a "What if" thread, not a history thread. It's meant to be speculative- the German OKW never did such a thing as to examine the problems with allied fire supremacy and orchestrate changes to doctrine. My OP shows that I aimed to go after tactical and operational issues & hear what interested persons had to say on the military dilemma.
The Germans did do a lot to examine and try to solve the problems with allied fire supremacy...things like lets build a better tank that solves the problem of Allied armor supremacy. Lets build jet fighters that solves the problem of Allied air supremacy. Lets build better assault rifles that solves the problem of Allied infantry supremacy. Lets attack at night or in poor weather so that solves Allied air and artillery observation supremacy. Nebelwerfer, improved artillery and artillery rounds...better mousetrap after better mousetrap.
However, none of that solved the basic problems that enabled the Allies to gain that fire supremacy in the first place.
I went off on tangents because I'm interested in tangents...and I happen to believe that incorrect assumptions about "various issues" lead to tail-chasing exercises. Like this one.You went after a lot of tangents on differences we have on various issues (the 106th Infantry,, etc. and such as this recent on, POW data patterns)- not really necessary and valid to the OP, which you never bothered to address. You also are attributing views that I never held or stated by pulling out comments and expanding on "What you think I mean" and then going forward with "this is why you are wrong". That's strawman stuff and off topic. I accept differences of opinion and won't correct every nonfactual statement I see. There are so many in this thread now from posters other than me. You don't have to pull the trigger on everything and challenge all views that you don't agree with. Maybe even your exalted self is ignorant of some things. I don't get the sense that you are much interested in the Red Army and the East, for example.
I gave you my views on the "OP". You didn't like them and so chose to attack the messenger. Grow up.
That you get the "sense" I'm not "much interested in the Red Army and the East" is a pretty damned poor inference on your part and a good indicator of just where you go haywire.
What "premise"? You declared the usual smoke and mirrors of a what-iffer, "hey, the Germans are gonna think real hard and come up with some nifty ways to get around their basic strategic failing, which is the inability to come even close to matching the capabilities of the coalition against them". Then you asked others to comment on nifty ideas.You don't have to post if you don't find the premise valid and that's simple. I think it's a valid one- that the Germans failed to figure out how to break-through due to Soviet/allied developments and could have done better, after studying so many problems with German attacks in 43-45. Do you believe that they did the best they could have?
Given that they only degraded tactically by perhaps 30% between roughly 42 and 44 despite horrific levels of attrition, I think the Germans did pretty well against long odds. However, basic shortages of manpower and fuel worked against them. I doubt they could have done much better by resorting to a bag of tricks like inflatable decoys or waiting for lulls in Allied based upon some unknown method of counting Allied artillery ammunition inventories.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
All what ifs are fantasy..? Are there new rules that only Anderson follows?
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
You asked a question that implied that you think "German Pz and PzG divisions are motorized and they were the primary units that performed attacks in 43-45". Or did you mean something else than that?Cult Icon wrote: ↑26 Feb 2020, 08:50An example of one of the numerous, ever increasing strawmen- did you really think you know what I really meant by that statement? could it be that what you thought I said was wrong? Will this have to spin off into another article written and another side discussion? Maybe segway into the battle worthiness of the 106th Infantry division or whether the Popeye's fried chicken sandwich is spicy enough?Richard Anderson wrote: ↑26 Feb 2020, 08:24That would astonish the 39., 57., 106., 161., 255., 282., 320., and 332. ID and the 3. and 5. FJD, 12., 26., 272., 352., and 560. VGD, to name but a few.
If that is what you really meant, then how can my reply be a strawman? If that is not what you really meant then why did you say it? Are you trying to be deliberately opaque and unwilling to engage in a actual conversation? Yes, I thought what you said was wrong, because it was. Are you being intentionally rude just to cover up the inconsistencies in your replies?
BTW, a "segway" is a two-wheeled, electric-driven, personal transporter. I think you meant segue, which sounds like segway, but is something very different.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
Who are these "guys" you are talking about? I rarely start What-If threads. I think you have an agenda and if I state it you will of course deny it. So I won't state it, even if you ask.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑26 Feb 2020, 09:09Icon (or is Cult your last name?) I understand that. However, a "what if" not based upon actual historical events is a fairy tale for children. I'm not sure why you guys that always winge about that never seem to twig to that?
However, none of that solved the basic problems that enabled the Allies to gain that fire supremacy in the first place.
And this thread is about confronting that....that's the mystery and military dilemma.
I went off on tangents because I'm interested in tangents...and I happen to believe that incorrect assumptions about "various issues" lead to tail-chasing exercises. Like this one.
I gave you my views on the "OP". You didn't like them and so chose to attack the messenger. Grow up.
My main complaint is your never ending generation of time consuming tangents and side discussions.
Did I attack you? You should check you post history on seeing who was doing the attacking. I advise that you leave, since you openly stated you don't enjoy this subject.
That's a start. So you don't have much to say about it then?Given that they only degraded tactically by perhaps 30% between roughly 42 and 44 despite horrific levels of attrition, I think the Germans did pretty well against long odds. However, basic shortages of manpower and fuel worked against them. I doubt they could have done much better by resorting to a bag of tricks like inflatable decoys or waiting for lulls in Allied based upon some unknown method of counting Allied artillery ammunition inventories.
Last edited by Cult Icon on 26 Feb 2020, 09:26, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
Are you actually saying that you believe all what-ifs are fantasy? They aren't so long as they have a strong basis in facts and a logical historical departure. That's all I've ever asked for. Then, if they can't stand up to simple questions...like how do you get from A to Z? What happens at B, C, D, and so on...they tend to collapse of their own weight. However, they also for some reason generate incredible volumes of invective from those whose balloons get popped.
I just see a lot of hot air leaking out of balloons here.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
No, a "what if" worth the name looks at alternatives that were possible with the economics, politics, diplomacy, and correlation of military forces at the given time - not whatever handwaved unobtanium one can conjure up out of thin air.
An obvious one is what "could" the Germans have done with the mobile forces they assembled (historically) for WATCH ON RHINE in the winter of 1944-45, roughly 10 motorized divisions - not what they could have done with 100 such divisions that didn't exist.
Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
Wait, so you are the "What If " regulator? ALL What ifs are fantasy- The extents may differ but they are all fantasy. On ACG we have "What if" and an X-treme "what if".Richard Anderson wrote: ↑26 Feb 2020, 09:26
Are you actually saying that you believe all what-ifs are fantasy? They aren't so long as they have a strong basis in facts and a logical historical departure. That's all I've ever asked for.
What if's are ALL fantasy, they didn't happen- case closed.
Clearly you have a lot of feuds here with many individuals. Could it be that you initiate the aggression, annoy other people. The core of what ifs is to illuminate historical aspects. Most people play along and speculate based on what they know.
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
If you don't start what-if threads or participate in them, then you are unlikely to know who I refer to.
Now I have an "agenda"? BUt you won't tell me what it is if I ask? Am I on double-secret probation? Given you started with the rudeness, I gotta wonder what your agenda might be?
Confronting what? That the basic problems that enabled the Allies to gain that fire supremacy in the first place were strategic deficits that Germany suffered from and was unable to make up? That's a mystery? The only dilemma for the Germans was apparently in for a penny on for a pound.And this thread is about confronting that....that's the mystery and military dilemma.
Time consuming? Do you have a train to catch? Are you on a budget and can only post so often because they charge your internet by the minute? It is precisely those time consuming tangents that usually impart actual information in these threads.
My main complaint is your never ending generation of time consuming tangents and side discussions.
Why yes, indeed you did. Yesterday in post #71, "Well, what gets you your thrills is well known but could it not be at the expense of others?" That apparently in reply to my poking fun at the idea of dragging about rubber inflatable decoys. Yes, decoys - scarecrows in some contexts - have an ancient role in warfare, but are mainly used for strategic deception in modern warfare.Did I attack you? You should check you post history on seeing who was doing the attacking. I advise that you leave, since you openly stated you don't enjoy this subject.
Up to then I thought we were having an interesting and rewarding conversation, until you spiraled out of control. I was actually enjoying the subject and its tangents up to then...I dislike poor what-ifs and dislike even more poor defenses of poor what ifs. This was neither. It was inchoate, but with some honest conversations and tangents it could be interesting.
Instead, you've turned it into a series of personal attacks on me, T.Gardner, and daveshoup2MD. Why?
Do you want a start or for me not to have much to say and go away? You really need to work on the consistency of your message.That's a start. So you don't have much to say about it then?
No, trying to count shells and only attack between lulls is unworkable on many levels. Given the limitations of using dummies for tactical deception, I don't think that is workable either, especially against an enemy with the firepower and willing to shoot up all your dummies to ensure they get the real target.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell
Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
Heh, predictable. My comment on "thrills" was a nice way to tell you to cool it with the off-topic/anti-topic thread derailing and I was smelling something coming- which did. You didn't take it that way. Too bad.
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
There's also the minor issue that despite all those "mousetraps," when push came to shove and the western Allies deployed and sustained three army groups and eight field armies ashore in northwestern Europe, it took them all of 11 months to get from Normandy to the Elbe, because of that fire supremacy, most of which was sustained - ultimately - from 3,000 miles across the North Atlantic.Richard Anderson wrote: ↑26 Feb 2020, 09:09The Germans did do a lot to examine and try to solve the problems with allied fire supremacy...things like lets build a better tank that solves the problem of Allied armor supremacy. Lets build jet fighters that solves the problem of Allied air supremacy. Lets build better assault rifles that solves the problem of Allied infantry supremacy. Lets attack at night or in poor weather so that solves Allied air and artillery observation supremacy. Nebelwerfer, improved artillery and artillery rounds...better mousetrap after better mousetrap. However, none of that solved the basic problems that enabled the Allies to gain that fire supremacy in the first place.
The Germans on the best day managed to get about less than a squad equivalent of ultimately useless infiltrators ashore in North America over about 40 months.
Last edited by daveshoup2MD on 27 Feb 2020, 07:52, edited 1 time in total.
Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
Those are just pieces of equipment- not significant at all. the dilemma would have had to be approached at the operational level- hence the OP.
What I did not mention yet was their FKL units.
What I did not mention yet was their FKL units.
Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
Not about that. There was a tendency by Hitler to prefer setting up new units to keeping up to strength the existing ones. Guderian was opposed to this for good reasons.daveshoup2MD wrote: ↑26 Feb 2020, 07:38It's almost like the Germans had a bad organization for refitting units that had seen combat and even worse doctrine for getting replacements into the field.Aida1 wrote: ↑24 Feb 2020, 18:20
The panzer brigades were a bad idea , set up against the advice of Guderian . They were far too weak . Too many units were being setup in general instead of keeping up to strength the existing ones.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... rig106.htm
In a note to Hitler of 13.8.1944, it is mentioned that pz brig 105-108 have a lot of officers without experience on the western front and no experience in commanding armored forces. It is proposed that the pz brigades be incorporated in existing pz div( Die Panzer Brigade 106Friedruch Bruns 1982 pp 29-30) .
Concerning the operation mentioned, the history of the pz br 106 mentions a lack of air recce on the enemy dispositions so that the brigade operated without knowing anything about the enemy and his positions . The own recce by wheeled vehicles was too incomplete( Die Panzer Brigade 106 Friedruch Bruns 1982 p 79).
Makes the travails of the Americans and British look minor in comparison, doesn't it?
Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower
The Germans were very low on trucks and they did know the concept of decoys.