The ideal Axis strategy

[ljadw]

About the DEI : on September 12 1940 ( long before the US oil embargo ) a Japanese delegation went to Batavia and asked an increase of its oil imports from 570000 tons to 3,750,000 tons , which was refused by the Dutch . And ...Japan accepted this refusal .
Five questions :
1 Why did Japan ask in September 1940 for an increase of its oil imports of 3,180,000 tons ? The decision to attack PH was taken only 14 months later .
2 Why did Japan ask this to the Dutch ? And why not to Mexico ,Venezuela,...
3 Why accepted Japan the Dutch refusal ?
4 Did Japan have the means to pay for this oil ?
5 What was the result of the Dutch refusal ? The Japanese economy did not collaps ,afaics .

You have confused tons with barrels...

The refusal was accepted, because Japan was using diplomacy first...If diplomacy failed, the military option would be exercised.

1. Japan was preparing to go to war, and was building up her strategic oil reserve. Estimates of oil consumption during her prospective war had shown that a greater reserve was needed.

2. Japan would be using her own tankers, and shorter trips allowed for a faster build up of the reserve. Also, these tankers would not be in possible "hostile" waters/ports if and when a recall order went out.

3. The refusal was "accepted", because, diplomatically, all avenues had been exhausted. Now, a military solution would be found, and it was.

4. To the best of my knowledge they did. However, Japan was going broke paying for her war in China, building up I the Army, and building up the Navy. In all likelyhood, Japan would have been insolvent by the end of 1942.

5. The economy wasn't expected to collapse because of the Dutch refusal...But, it was collapsing. Japan was putting 25% or more into her military matters, which for Japan was unsustainable.

I did not confuse tons with barrels : the source I consulted (Japan's need for oil and the embargo ) mentions very clearly that Japan demanded in September 1940 an increase of its oil imports from the DEI from 570000 tons to 3,75 million tons .
The reason is obvious : it was not to be able to attack the DEI in December 1941,but to replace the 28 million barrels ( =3.5 million ton ) they imported from the US , an import they feared to lose .In September 1940 Japan could very easily have started the war with bigger chances for winning in the first year,but it did not .That it did not start the war in 1940,proves that it did not need the oil of the DEI,otherwise it would have invaded the DEI .The first priority of Japan in 1940 was to finish the war in China .If this war was over successfully, Japan's economic problems would be over .But an invasion of the DEI would not finish the war in China ,neither would this invasion solve Japan's economic problems .

[Takao]

Japan had not made a decision to prepare to go to war ,otherwise they would not wait 14 months to start this war .Besides, the ideal situation to go to war was in 1940, not in 1941,when US and Britain were stronger .

Sigh...
The Japanese occupied Southern French Indo-China at the end of July, 1941...They did not wait 14 months to go to war.

[Takao]

I did not confuse tons with barrels : the source I consulted (Japan's need for oil and the embargo ) mentions very clearly that Japan demanded in September 1940 an increase of its oil imports from the DEI from 570000 tons to 3,75 million tons .
The reason is obvious : it was not to be able to attack the DEI in December 1941,but to replace the 28 million barrels ( =3.5 million ton ) they imported from the US , an import they feared to lose .

Funny...The Japanese strategic POL reserve was about 20 million barrels below what Japanese war planners expected to have at the start of the war.

In September 1940 Japan could very easily have started the war with bigger chances for winning in the first year,but it did not .

No. No, they couldn't. Because there chances at winning with an earlier start are less, not more.

The US Pacific Fleet is still together, not yet partially sent to the Atlantic.

The Shokaku and Zuikaku are not commissioned.

The A6M Zero has not yet spread to the fleet, the main fighter is the A5M4 Claude.

The D3A Val is only just entering service, and the main carrier divebomber is the D1A2.

That it did not start the war in 1940,proves that it did not need the oil of the DEI,otherwise it would have invaded the DEI .

Huh?

The Japanese did not need DEI oil to start the war...They needed DEI oil to finish the war.

The first priority of Japan in 1940 was to finish the war in China .If this war was over successfully, Japan's economic problems would be over .But an invasion of the DEI would not finish the war in China ,neither would this invasion solve Japan's economic problems .

Actually, no. Japanese economic problems would be just beginning...Not solved. She would still need to maintain a large standing army to keep China subjugated. She would still need a large navy to match the US Two-Ocean Navy, that was being funded. She would need to rebuild the crippled Chinese economy. She would still be dependent on the US for oil - and Japan we demand would only be increasing, not decreasing. The list goes on and on.

[daveshoup2MD]

[/quote]It's true that Germany couldn't attack Great Britain or the United States. But it could defend. Defend, defend, defend. The United States fielded only 86 divisions in WW2. Germany had more than that already in 1941. Germany could defend, defend, defend until the United States gave up like it did in Vietnam. Or at least, that would have been a more rational strategy than invading the USSR.[/quote]

The US raised 97 divisions for overseas service in 1939-43, and sustained 95 of them through to VJ Day; the Philippine (ie. 12th Infantry Division) was destroyed in action and the 1943-44 iteration of the 2nd Cavalry Division was broken up in the MTO to provide replacements and theater/army group/army-level support and service elements to help sustain 15th AG and 5th Army in 1944-45.

Likewise, the US organized and deployed into action (as "square" brigades or division-sized task forces) the equivalent of (at least) two more divisions in 1944-45, in the MTO (7th Airborne TF/2nd Airborne Brigade) or the CBI (5332nd/MARS TF). At the same time, the US deployed 11 separate infantry and separate four parachute regiments (15 regiments total) to the ETO or PTO, plus the headquarters companies of 14 armored groups, 13 cavalry groups, a tank destroyer brigade, and 14 tank destroyer groups, largely to the ETO. If (and its a big if, but given the size of most Axis "divisions" by 1944-45, it's not that huge) each of these is considered roughly the equivalent of a 3-battalion regiment (or Commonwealth brigade), then that's 61 "extra" regimental equivalents, or (roughly) 20 divisions. That's a stretch, of course, but not an unreasonable one if one is trying to measure division equivalents.

That also doesn't include the fact the 12th Division was being re-raised in 1944-45 with liberated manpower in the Philippines, or the reality the US essentially equipped at least eight French divisions in 1943-45 (and was re-quipping eight more), plus a Brazilian division to US standards, and somewhere between 2 and 30 ROC "light" divisions in the same period.

The point being, even setting aside the Allied formations fully or partly-equipped by the US, US manpower alone generated (roughly) 102 division equivalents for overseas service, which is significantly more than 86.

[daveshoup2MD]

The ideal Axis strategy to ... do what, exactly?

Avoid war?

Avoid defeat?

What's the desired end state?

[ljadw]

I did not confuse tons with barrels : the source I consulted (Japan's need for oil and the embargo ) mentions very clearly that Japan demanded in September 1940 an increase of its oil imports from the DEI from 570000 tons to 3,75 million tons .
The reason is obvious : it was not to be able to attack the DEI in December 1941,but to replace the 28 million barrels ( =3.5 million ton ) they imported from the US , an import they feared to lose .

Funny...The Japanese strategic POL reserve was about 20 million barrels below what Japanese war planners expected to have at the start of the war.

In September 1940 Japan could very easily have started the war with bigger chances for winning in the first year,but it did not .

No. No, they couldn't. Because there chances at winning with an earlier start are less, not more.

The US Pacific Fleet is still together, not yet partially sent to the Atlantic.

The Shokaku and Zuikaku are not commissioned.

The A6M Zero has not yet spread to the fleet, the main fighter is the A5M4 Claude.

The D3A Val is only just entering service, and the main carrier divebomber is the D1A2.

That it did not start the war in 1940,proves that it did not need the oil of the DEI,otherwise it would have invaded the DEI .

Huh?

The Japanese did not need DEI oil to start the war...They needed DEI oil to finish the war.

The first priority of Japan in 1940 was to finish the war in China .If this war was over successfully, Japan's economic problems would be over .But an invasion of the DEI would not finish the war in China ,neither would this invasion solve Japan's economic problems .

Actually, no. Japanese economic problems would be just beginning...Not solved. She would still need to maintain a large standing army to keep China subjugated. She would still need a large navy to match the US Two-Ocean Navy, that was being funded. She would need to rebuild the crippled Chinese economy. She would still be dependent on the US for oil - and Japan we demand would only be increasing, not decreasing. The list goes on and on.

US were militarily stronger in December 1941 than in September 1940 ,in September 1940 US mobilisation had only started .Japan started its war preparations in July 1941, AFTER and BECAUSE the US oil embargo .Til July 1941 Japan had no oil problems,the oil situation was even becoming better .
Oil consumption
April 1933-March 1934 : 19,6 million barrels of which 4,2 million for the military
April 1936-March 1937 :27,7 million barrels of which 5,5 million for the military
April 1937-March 1938 : 29,9 million barrels of which 6,3 million for the military
April 1938-March 1939 :28 million barrels,of which 7,1 million for the military
April 1939-March 1940 :25,2 million barrels of which 7,8 million for the military
Til the Summer of 1941 Japan succeeded to increase and its civilian and its military oil consumption ( Source :Bankrupting the Enemy ) .
Even in 1941 the US oil exports to Japan (annualized ) were on the same level of those of 1935 .
There was no need for Japan to start a war in 1940 and its invasion of Southern Indo-China was no preparation for war,it was not caused by the oil embargo as it preceded the oil embargo .

[ljadw]

Japanese POL reserves were in March 1941 42,7 million barrels, sufficient for two years without war with the US and after the oil embargo . Without the oil embargo ,there would be no problem .If there was a war,and Japan could use the oil of the DEI, the POL reserves would be sufficient for almost 3 years ,

[nota]

the real trick to an axis victory in WW2
is to keep the USA out of the war by any mean necessary
while fighting one nation at a time england and her empire first
as in 1940 after the fall of france england is the war
getting england out of the war is JOB #1
china is not a real threat to japan and japan can pull back and try to con the USA
by starting troop withdrawals from less important areas of china rural and inland citys
and fake peace talks with china to limit USA fears and buy time
and not invade or occupy SE Asia yet

the only real quick way is to invade england
but the euro axis does not have the ships to do it

japan does have a fleet on the other side of the world
remember this is a world war
winning requires total commitment and total efforts from all axis nations at great risk
that is something the axis never planned for or even thought of doing
and why they lost WW2 with their no plans or coordinated world wide actions
by attacking too many countrys at the same time instead of a one nation at a time war
often attacking without notice to other axis members let alone joint planning beforehand

[nota]

oil in 1940 was coming from russia to the euro axis nations
japan was able to buy world market oil inc from the USA and other markets
once they jump in to the war that will change quickly
but a quick knock out of england will free up mideastern and DEI oil even if the USA cuts them off
likely a near empty axis reserves short term but war is risk no risk no win

[ljadw]

oil in 1940 was coming from russia to the euro axis nations
japan was able to buy world market oil inc from the USA and other markets
once they jump in to the war that will change quickly
but a quick knock out of england will free up mideastern and DEI oil even if the USA cuts them off
likely a near empty axis reserves short term but war is risk no risk no win

1 (oil from Russia ) is much exaggerated :its importance was only marginal
2(Japanese oil imports from the US ) : this stopped already before PH = in July 1941
3 Defeat of Britain will not free the oil of the ME and the DEI : the DEI were a Dutch colony, not a British colony .
4 If Britain was defeated, Germany would need less oil, not more oil .

[Peter89]

oil in 1940 was coming from russia to the euro axis nations
japan was able to buy world market oil inc from the USA and other markets
once they jump in to the war that will change quickly
but a quick knock out of england will free up mideastern and DEI oil even if the USA cuts them off
likely a near empty axis reserves short term but war is risk no risk no win

3 Defeat of Britain will not free the oil of the ME and the DEI : the DEI were a Dutch colony, not a British colony .

He meant that the defeat of the european colonial empires whose colonies possessed oil production would mean those colonies and their oil production will be there for taking, which is correct.

However, sailing the IJN around the globe is impossible, because in the end, the european axis did not want a competitor. Hitler correctly calculated that a German-British peace in Europe would mean a European world domination, but a prolonged war with Britain would mean the rise of the US and Japan.

[nota]

oil in 1940 was coming from russia to the euro axis nations
japan was able to buy world market oil inc from the USA and other markets
once they jump in to the war that will change quickly
but a quick knock out of england will free up mideastern and DEI oil even if the USA cuts them off
likely a near empty axis reserves short term but war is risk no risk no win

1 (oil from Russia ) is much exaggerated :its importance was only marginal
2(Japanese oil imports from the US ) : this stopped already before PH = in July 1941
3 Defeat of Britain will not free the oil of the ME and the DEI : the DEI were a Dutch colony, not a British colony .
4 If Britain was defeated, Germany would need less oil, not more oil .

1 oil is oil no matter where it is from they had sufficient oil to invade england in 1940 an excess NO but enough
2 prime time is before july 41 not after by then it is too late
3 germans were in the dutch homeland and in charge
the dutch could do nothing about any invasion of the DEI with england out there is no real defense
4 russia they need world free trade and oil to invade russia once england is out of the war
remember this is a one at a time plan NOT all at once

[nota]

oil in 1940 was coming from russia to the euro axis nations
japan was able to buy world market oil inc from the USA and other markets
once they jump in to the war that will change quickly
but a quick knock out of england will free up mideastern and DEI oil even if the USA cuts them off
likely a near empty axis reserves short term but war is risk no risk no win

3 Defeat of Britain will not free the oil of the ME and the DEI : the DEI were a Dutch colony, not a British colony .

He meant that the defeat of the european colonial empires whose colonies possessed oil production would mean those colonies and their oil production will be there for taking, which is correct.

However, sailing the IJN around the globe is impossible, because in the end, the european axis did not want a competitor. Hitler correctly calculated that a German-British peace in Europe would mean a European world domination, but a prolonged war with Britain would mean the rise of the US and Japan.

there is no other way to invade england in 1940 without the fleet japan has if they want to win
sailing that fleet would be hard and a huge risk but the other options DO NOT WIN

granted japan would not do it politically
that doesnot mean it could not be done practically

the USA sailed it's fleet round the world in 1890 50 years before 1940

[Takao]

oil in 1940 was coming from russia to the euro axis nations
japan was able to buy world market oil inc from the USA and other markets
once they jump in to the war that will change quickly
but a quick knock out of england will free up mideastern and DEI oil even if the USA cuts them off
likely a near empty axis reserves short term but war is risk no risk no win

3 Defeat of Britain will not free the oil of the ME and the DEI : the DEI were a Dutch colony, not a British colony .

He meant that the defeat of the european colonial empires whose colonies possessed oil production would mean those colonies and their oil production will be there for taking, which is correct.

However, sailing the IJN around the globe is impossible, because in the end, the european axis did not want a competitor. Hitler correctly calculated that a German-British peace in Europe would mean a European world domination, but a prolonged war with Britain would mean the rise of the US and Japan.

there is no other way to invade england in 1940 without the fleet japan has if they want to win
sailing that fleet would be hard and a huge risk but the other options DO NOT WIN

granted japan would not do it politically
that doesnot mean it could not be done practically

the USA sailed it's fleet round the world in 1890 50 years before 1940

Ummm...The Great White Fleet did so using mostly British coal from mostly British/Foreign colliers. It could not have been done during wartime.

Further, being able to purchase crude oil on the open market, does not mean buying warship bunker oil. The crude oil is taken home and refined into bunker oil. Few nations could supply that much bunker oil, Russia was not one of them.

[ljadw]

oil in 1940 was coming from russia to the euro axis nations
japan was able to buy world market oil inc from the USA and other markets
once they jump in to the war that will change quickly
but a quick knock out of england will free up mideastern and DEI oil even if the USA cuts them off
likely a near empty axis reserves short term but war is risk no risk no win

3 Defeat of Britain will not free the oil of the ME and the DEI : the DEI were a Dutch colony, not a British colony .

He meant that the defeat of the european colonial empires whose colonies possessed oil production would mean those colonies and their oil production will be there for taking, which is correct.

This is not correct : Japan had not the means to restart the oil production in the ME and to transport this oil to Japan .
For the DEI : in 1940 the Netherlands were occupied by the Germans , but Japan was still unable to grab the oil of the DEI .It could only do this by starting a war against the US .The defeat of the european colonial empires (UK/Netherlands ) would not help Japan as long as the US were there .
Besides, why would Japan need the oil of the ME/DEI ?