HistoryGeek2019 wrote:I dispute the plausibility of Stalin agreeing to any settlement that requires him to disarm, cede territory that hasn't yet been occupied by the Germans, allow German inspectors in his territory, or pay occupation costs. He would rather kill half his own population and keep absolute control over a remnant state centered on Irkutsk than give Hitler a free ticket to occupy the entire USSR. The most he will agree to in any scenario is a cease-fire along the current front-line, with the possible creation of a 100-200 KM demilitarized zone.
Responding to this has given some pause because I felt like I had already established the Urals inspection/occupation regime and you had called it reasonable. But looking back I suppose I hadn't been quite so specific.
I'm going to respond to your objections in a couple ways:
First, I will argue that the SU's predicament in ATL September '42 is so bad that Stalin would have no choice but to accept something like the terms I described - we can disagree on the details and I invite you to propose a revision. To that end, I will argue that a Soviet refusal to accept something like the terms I describe would obviously lead to continuation of the war, which would predictably lead to the end of Stalin's regime. I challenge you to articulate a framework in which Stalin's rational interests would lie with continuation of the war rather than a peace that maintains his internal power.
Second, I will respond to your prompt about Hitler's course of action if Stalin refuses something like the peace terms I sketched.
Third, I will gesture at a compromise between our views of possible Nazi-Soviet compromise, ranging from a slightly later armistice to no Nazi-Soviet armistice. If you find my arguments about the September '42 armistice unconvincing, we'll have to end this discussion or agree on a suitable substitute armistice/Ostkrieg. I hope we can find agreement for an interesting discussion...
I'll do the German response to Soviet intransigence in September '42 first because it informs the other discussions:
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:Hitler responding to Stalin's stance as I've outlined it above.
Destroy Urals factories during fall/winter 42-43 via bombing and begin the advance into the Urals and Central Asia.
As I've linked elsewhere, the LW showed the ability to destroy Soviet factories in its raids on GAZ in Gorky, which cost the LW little and shut down production in that factory. In comparison to those raids, the ATL raids on the far more important Urals factories would be (1) of far lower range and thus easier to generate sorties and bomb tonnage and (2) opposed by a weaker VVS, due to the SU being weaker overall in this ATL (i.e. 25% weaker VVS at start of '42 assuming uniform distribution of Soviet production reductions from OTL).
Regarding the Fall/Winter campaign into the Urals/Kazakhstan:
Previously I had ended this ATL in September with the Germans at a Perm-Ufa-Orenburg-Ural River line.
Soviet intransigence at this point leaves the Germans another month or so of campaign season to continue their advance before Rasputitsa, and the whole winter as well - if needed.
The Urals are not a great physical barrier - especially in their critical central sector containing the most important cities. See, for instance, the topographical map in Wiki:
From Perm to Sverdlosk (Yekaterinburg) and Nizhny Tagil is ~150 miles. Over normal terrain, the Ostheer could easily cover that in a month. Here is Google Streetview of the highway into Yekaterinburg, about 30 miles from the city:
https://www.google.com/maps/@56.8041849 ... 312!8i6656
As you can see, this is not very imposing terrain.
Furthermore, the "mountains" sheltering Chelyabinsk to its East are only ~20 miles wide, with a wide incursion of flat, arable land (marked with a red circle below):
Through the central Urals, an advance averaging 2 miles per day from September 1 means the Ostheer takes those cities during mid-November. Given the narrowness and/or tameness of the "mountains" in this region, I think that's a reasonable prediction of Ostheer progress.
That advance through the Central Urals takes Nizhny Tagil, Chelyabinsk, and Yekaterinburg, after which there is no great natural obstacle to the Ostheer until Lake Baikal.
Elsewhere on the front:
-East of Ufa the Urals are higher and thicker, so Ostheer would hold the front there and reinforce the Central Urals drive.
-South of the Urals, along the Ural River itself and in a Southeasterly direction into Kazahkstan, there is only some rolling hills and wide steppe perfect for the Ostheer.
The drives by AGC through the Central Urals and AGS to the south of the Urals would encircle the Southern Urals, Magnitogorsk, and the last remaining centers of Soviet heavy industry. It would look something like this (black arrows added):
If the Ostheer has taken the Central Urals and flanked the Southern Urals by the mid-November, then Magnitogorsk will fall before the end of '42. In any event, it and all other non-occupied industrial centers will already have been destroyed by the LW.
Meanwhile, the Ostheer will be advancing into Central Asia and the populations of those countries will be in revolt. By the end of '43, the SU will have lost the Urals, will be losing control of, or will have lost control of, Central Asia, and will have no prospect of building an army to stop the Ostheer.
For historical reference, consider the Russian Civil War and the long retreat of the Whites from the Urals to Transbaikal:
As you can see, once the Reds broke through the Urals it took about a year to reach Lake Baikal. That advance was primarily along the Trans-Siberian railroad, similar to the advance I sketched upthread re continuation of the war (only I specified 2 years for the Ostheer out of a too-pessimistic abundance of caution).
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I'll return to my other points about Stalin's rational interest calculus later, just wanted to present this scenario to you first.
I wonder what you think the Soviet response is once (1) the Central Urals have fallen and (2) the Southern Urals have been flanked. It's seems clear to me at that point that Stalin would perceive resistance as futile and would take almost any deal that would allow him to remain in power instead of beginning a long retreat across Siberia similar to what his comrades inflicted on the Whites.
A reasonable compromise between us might be a December/January armistice instead of September.
I don't think this changes much: the Iberian campaign doesn't launch until Spring '43 in my ATL, while the ~30 divisions assigned to the Turkey/Iran theaters are superfluous to the drive through/around the Urals.
