The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Discussions on High Command, strategy and the Armed Forces (Wehrmacht) in general.
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Aida1
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 04 Mar 2020 13:13

ljadw wrote:
04 Mar 2020 12:31
dgfred wrote:
03 Mar 2020 22:13
I think they might have thought that the Russians would 'fold' up if they could capture Moscow the 1st year. After they didn't capture it... it was just wishful thinking to win the war.
This is not correct, it was the opposite : they were, justifiedly ,convinced that the collapse of the SU west of the DD line would result in the fall of Moscow .The capture of a capital does not result in the fall of a country .
Need not be west of that line you are so obsessed about. As long as the red army fought in the border area, which it did, it could at least be seriously damaged.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by dgfred » 04 Mar 2020 17:47

ljadw... I don't agree. I 'think' they felt the loss of Moscow would cause the rest of the Russian forces to give up the fight. Notice the 'think' which is my view... doesn't have to be yours.

Maybe you could answer- Why would Moscow 'fall' just because the units west of the DD line were destroyed? Still plenty of men and plenty of area still left to battle with/for.
It wasn't just because it was the capital. It was the 'symbol' of Russian, major rail head, major river going both N and S.

Sorry, but I just think both sides have merits of what 'might' have happened if Moscow is captured in the 1st year.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 04 Mar 2020 21:05

dgfred wrote:
04 Mar 2020 17:47
ljadw... I don't agree. I 'think' they felt the loss of Moscow would cause the rest of the Russian forces to give up the fight. Notice the 'think' which is my view... doesn't have to be yours.

Maybe you could answer- Why would Moscow 'fall' just because the units west of the DD line were destroyed? Still plenty of men and plenty of area still left to battle with/for.
It wasn't just because it was the capital. It was the 'symbol' of Russian, major rail head, major river going both N and S.

Sorry, but I just think both sides have merits of what 'might' have happened if Moscow is captured in the 1st year.
Moscow could only fall if the regime collapsed and the regime would not collapse if Moscow was captured ,but if the standing Soviet forces were going west of the DD line, if they were defeated west of the DD line and if the regime could not mobilise its superior manpower and industrial capacity .Everything depended on what would happen in June and July because Germany had not the strength to go before the winter to the Volga with an army of 150 divisions .
And, if there were still plenty of men and plenty of area left to battle with/for, it would be impossible to capture Moscow .
The Germans knew that the regime could and would mobilise millions of men ,thus winning was depending on the small period that was remaining before these millions would arrive at the front . Every day the Soviets would become stronger and everyday the Germans would become weaker . There was a window of opportunities open during 5/6 weeks. Not longer.Afterwards he would be closed .And as the Germans could not be at the Volga at the end of July,they were restricted to the border, the rest would depend on the willingness of the Soviet regime to collapse .
As Brauchitz said : a few weeks of big fighting at the border, followed by a pursuit of a defeated enemy . Only this, the defeat of the enemy in June/July would make possible the capture of Moscow and the advance to the Volga .
That Moscow was a major rail head was irrelevant, because at the moment of the capture of Moscow (September/October ) the enemy would be already defeated and there would be no need for a major rail head .The Germans could only capture Moscow in September/October ( if there was a need to capture Moscow in September/October, what is questionable ) if in August Ivan was on the run .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 04 Mar 2020 21:07

Aida1 wrote:
04 Mar 2020 13:13
ljadw wrote:
04 Mar 2020 12:31
dgfred wrote:
03 Mar 2020 22:13
I think they might have thought that the Russians would 'fold' up if they could capture Moscow the 1st year. After they didn't capture it... it was just wishful thinking to win the war.
This is not correct, it was the opposite : they were, justifiedly ,convinced that the collapse of the SU west of the DD line would result in the fall of Moscow .The capture of a capital does not result in the fall of a country .
Need not be west of that line you are so obsessed about. As long as the red army fought in the border area, which it did, it could at least be seriously damaged.
Which is irrelevant : the aim was not to damage seriously the Red Army ,but to destroy it and hoping that this would result in the fall of the regime . Because it was all that the Ostheer could do .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by dgfred » 04 Mar 2020 22:27

That was my point. The regime collapses with the capture of Moscow.

I think maybe we are saying the same thing in different ways but I don't like arguing with my buddy anyway so I am dropping it.

All the best, Greg

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 05 Mar 2020 16:57

Maybe someone will remember the name of the topic and say a few words about the logistics of the Wehrmacht … “or lack of it? :milwink:
How simple everything is for the gentlemen who have not read a single original document of OKW or OKH. Maybe they should have compared the logistics of the Wehrmacht with the logistics of the Red Army, the British Army or the US Army.
For a better understanding, so to speak.
What a brilliant logic! If Germany lost the war, it means that it had poor logistics, poor command and control and useless intelligence.
Great!
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 05 Mar 2020 17:15

AbollonPolweder wrote:
04 Mar 2020 16:17

2. The situation with logistics is even simpler. Prewar logistics plans were built on the basis of operational plans of the OKH, that is, to Smolensk. In early July, they began planning already to Moscow.
«3 July. … Future plans: a) For the continuance of the Russian operations it will be of primary importance to gain a new jump-off line between Smolensk and Moscow, and another base around Leningrad. From here we could proceed to the capture of Northern Russia and the industrial region around Moscow and subsequently, in conjunction witn AGp. South, of the Donjets industrial region.
… Wagner (Gen Qu) : a) Summary of casualty reports, booty reports etc. b) Organization of Rear Areas and assignment of troops to these c) Review of plans for moving forward our supply bases after the Dvina Dniepr line has been gained. d) Spare parts for tanks and tank replacements.”
10 July. “b) AGp. North: Main- supply base has been shifted forward to the Dvina. AGp. Center: Main supply base has been shifted forward to the line Borrisov-Dniepr. AGp. South: Situation at present not.yet settled enough for firm planning.”
Note Wagner’s phrase: “AGp. South: Situation at present not yet settled enough for firm planning.”
It is useless to prepare logistic plans from Berlin to the Volga before the war. As Wagner said, the situation may not be clear.
It seems to me operations plans of Germany army was strongly based on strategic logistics studys not other way.

It is not possible to make tactical level plans for logistics or something else long time in advance because not to know what will to be situation. But must to make strategic studys to calculate if campaign is possible.

Nobody can to give datas on strategic logistics studys for invasion after NN-Dniepr line. Marcks was in originally study estimate 3-6 weeks pause at NN-Dniepr line to prepare logistics for invasion after NN-Dniepr line. Paulus was find in wargames that was need 3 weeks pause.

When was arrive NN-Dniepr line no pause. Where is datas to explain is possible to invade after NN-Dniepr line and not pause?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 05 Mar 2020 18:30

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
05 Mar 2020 17:15

I

When was arrive NN-Dniepr line no pause. Where is datas to explain is possible to invade after NN-Dniepr line and not pause?
There was a pause as the advance in the center did not continue much further east after the beginning of july. Meanwhile the logistical base was shifted forward.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Aida1 » 05 Mar 2020 18:40

ljadw wrote:
04 Mar 2020 21:07
Aida1 wrote:
04 Mar 2020 13:13
ljadw wrote:
04 Mar 2020 12:31
dgfred wrote:
03 Mar 2020 22:13
I think they might have thought that the Russians would 'fold' up if they could capture Moscow the 1st year. After they didn't capture it... it was just wishful thinking to win the war.
This is not correct, it was the opposite : they were, justifiedly ,convinced that the collapse of the SU west of the DD line would result in the fall of Moscow .The capture of a capital does not result in the fall of a country .
Need not be west of that line you are so obsessed about. As long as the red army fought in the border area, which it did, it could at least be seriously damaged.
Which is irrelevant : the aim was not to damage seriously the Red Army ,but to destroy it and hoping that this would result in the fall of the regime . Because it was all that the Ostheer could do .
Semantics. Destroying the red army in the first phase was allways only the most optimistic scenario.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 06 Mar 2020 15:45

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
05 Mar 2020 17:15
...
It seems to me operations plans of Germany army was strongly based on strategic logistics studys not other way.

It is not possible to make tactical level plans for logistics or something else long time in advance because not to know what will to be situation. But must to make strategic studys to calculate if campaign is possible.

Nobody can to give datas on strategic logistics studys for invasion after NN-Dniepr line. Marcks was in originally study estimate 3-6 weeks pause at NN-Dniepr line to prepare logistics for invasion after NN-Dniepr line. Paulus was find in wargames that was need 3 weeks pause.

When was arrive NN-Dniepr line no pause. Where is datas to explain is possible to invade after NN-Dniepr line and not pause?
1. Give a definition of the concept of "strategic logistics." Please, provide examples of German or Russian strategic logistics plans.
I propose not to subordinate operational plans to logistics, but to acknowledge that they are interdependent.
2. So "tactical level plans" are impossible but "strategic level plans" are possible and necessary. Because you always know exactly what the strategic situation will be. :)
"studys" could be not only strategic but also operational and tactical. You see, you have already imperceptibly replaced the "plans" of "studys". This is not good!
3. You are mistaken about Marcks. His "Operationsentwurf Ost" is on the Internet and I read it. I can’t say anything about Paulus. I have no materials for his staff studies. If you have, please give a link.
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 07 Mar 2020 13:58

AbollonPolweder wrote:
06 Mar 2020 15:45
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
05 Mar 2020 17:15
...
It seems to me operations plans of Germany army was strongly based on strategic logistics studys not other way.

It is not possible to make tactical level plans for logistics or something else long time in advance because not to know what will to be situation. But must to make strategic studys to calculate if campaign is possible.

Nobody can to give datas on strategic logistics studys for invasion after NN-Dniepr line. Marcks was in originally study estimate 3-6 weeks pause at NN-Dniepr line to prepare logistics for invasion after NN-Dniepr line. Paulus was find in wargames that was need 3 weeks pause.

When was arrive NN-Dniepr line no pause. Where is datas to explain is possible to invade after NN-Dniepr line and not pause?
1. Give a definition of the concept of "strategic logistics." Please, provide examples of German or Russian strategic logistics plans.
I propose not to subordinate operational plans to logistics, but to acknowledge that they are interdependent.
2. So "tactical level plans" are impossible but "strategic level plans" are possible and necessary. Because you always know exactly what the strategic situation will be. :)
"studys" could be not only strategic but also operational and tactical. You see, you have already imperceptibly replaced the "plans" of "studys". This is not good!
3. You are mistaken about Marcks. His "Operationsentwurf Ost" is on the Internet and I read it. I can’t say anything about Paulus. I have no materials for his staff studies. If you have, please give a link.
I understand words you was write. I not understand logics and thoughts and meanings behind words.

Germany army high command was make strategic logistic studys about what was possible what was not possible. Paulus and Wagner was have wargames to test ideas. Studys and wargames show must to pause when get to about NN-Dniepr line. Pause for to logistics to build up before invasion next stage. Studys and wargames not plans. Strategic not tactical.

Germany high command was make strategic logistic plans how move logistics to front.

Germany army groups and armies and corps and divisions make tactical logistic plans how for to move what things what quantitys what units what time on front.

Marcks strategic studys was find must to pause.
Paulus and Wagner wargames was find must to pause.
When Germany army was arrive NN-Dniepr line not pause.

Who was make decision not to pause and what was logistic study and or plan what says possible to invade after not pause?

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by ljadw » 07 Mar 2020 20:24

Who was making decision not to pause ?
Answer : The Red Army .
Pause was only possible AFTER the Red Army was defeated ,and it was not defeated .

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 09 Mar 2020 13:46

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
07 Mar 2020 13:58
AbollonPolweder wrote:
06 Mar 2020 15:45
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
05 Mar 2020 17:15
...
It seems to me operations plans of Germany army was strongly based on strategic logistics studys not other way.

It is not possible to make tactical level plans for logistics or something else long time in advance because not to know what will to be situation. But must to make strategic studys to calculate if campaign is possible.

Nobody can to give datas on strategic logistics studys for invasion after NN-Dniepr line. Marcks was in originally study estimate 3-6 weeks pause at NN-Dniepr line to prepare logistics for invasion after NN-Dniepr line. Paulus was find in wargames that was need 3 weeks pause.

When was arrive NN-Dniepr line no pause. Where is datas to explain is possible to invade after NN-Dniepr line and not pause?
1. Give a definition of the concept of "strategic logistics." Please, provide examples of German or Russian strategic logistics plans.
I propose not to subordinate operational plans to logistics, but to acknowledge that they are interdependent.
2. So "tactical level plans" are impossible but "strategic level plans" are possible and necessary. Because you always know exactly what the strategic situation will be. :)
"studys" could be not only strategic but also operational and tactical. You see, you have already imperceptibly replaced the "plans" of "studys". This is not good!
3. You are mistaken about Marcks. His "Operationsentwurf Ost" is on the Internet and I read it. I can’t say anything about Paulus. I have no materials for his staff studies. If you have, please give a link.
I understand words you was write. I not understand logics and thoughts and meanings behind words.

Germany army high command was make strategic logistic studys about what was possible what was not possible. Paulus and Wagner was have wargames to test ideas. Studys and wargames show must to pause when get to about NN-Dniepr line. Pause for to logistics to build up before invasion next stage. Studys and wargames not plans. Strategic not tactical.

Germany high command was make strategic logistic plans how move logistics to front.

Germany army groups and armies and corps and divisions make tactical logistic plans how for to move what things what quantitys what units what time on front.

Marcks strategic studys was find must to pause.
Paulus and Wagner wargames was find must to pause.
When Germany army was arrive NN-Dniepr line not pause.

Who was make decision not to pause and what was logistic study and or plan what says possible to invade after not pause?
I understand words you was write. I not understand logics and thoughts and meanings behind words.
It seems to me that you do not understand exactly the words. This is very easy to prove.
1.The plan must have an exact title, authors and date. I asked you to give examples of specific logistics plans. What is incomprehensible here?
2. General Marcks did not write about the REQUIREMENT of a pause on the Dniepr - line. What is incomprehensible here? How can one ascribe to Marcks ideas that he did not have. You are fantasizing. :roll:
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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 10 Mar 2020 14:51

AbollonPolweder wrote:
09 Mar 2020 13:46

It seems to me that you do not understand exactly the words. This is very easy to prove.
1.The plan must have an exact title, authors and date. I asked you to give examples of specific logistics plans. What is incomprehensible here?
2. General Marcks did not write about the REQUIREMENT of a pause on the Dniepr - line. What is incomprehensible here? How can one ascribe to Marcks ideas that he did not have. You are fantasizing. :roll:
I was ask if somebody knows datas for Germany army strategic logistics studys and plans and tactical plans for invasion after NN-Dniepr line.

You was write again i must to give examples of title author and date of plans and studys. I not understand why i must to do this.

Can you to give exact title author and date of Germany army logistics studys and plans to help me find datas?

I understand words you was write. I not understand your logics thoughts meanings and points.

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Re: The Logistics of Barbarossa (or lack of it)

Post by AbollonPolweder » 10 Mar 2020 21:19

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
10 Mar 2020 14:51
AbollonPolweder wrote:
09 Mar 2020 13:46

It seems to me that you do not understand exactly the words. This is very easy to prove.
1.The plan must have an exact title, authors and date. I asked you to give examples of specific logistics plans. What is incomprehensible here?
2. General Marcks did not write about the REQUIREMENT of a pause on the Dniepr - line. What is incomprehensible here? How can one ascribe to Marcks ideas that he did not have. You are fantasizing. :roll:
I was ask if somebody knows datas for Germany army strategic logistics studys and plans and tactical plans for invasion after NN-Dniepr line.

You was write again i must to give examples of title author and date of plans and studys. I not understand why i must to do this.

Can you to give exact title author and date of Germany army logistics studys and plans to help me find datas?

I understand words you was write. I not understand your logics thoughts meanings and points.
Germany high command was make strategic logistic plans how move logistics to front.

Germany army groups and armies and corps and divisions make tactical logistic plans
Whose words are these? If such plans were up to Dniepr-line, as you say, then show them. As soon as you do this, I will explain to you why there was no pause on the Dnieper - line. ОК?
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