Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

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paulrward
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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#16

Post by paulrward » 09 Mar 2020, 22:24

Hello Mr. Schwamberger :

Now, we must remember, I am a chemist by training and an engineer by profession, I analyse data by
looking at dates, time stamps, and the numbers. And, from this, I often have to make inferences and
deductions.

Lloyd Fredendall, whose father, a serving officer in the West who had made many powerful political
connections, received a Senatorial appointment to West Point. Arriving there in September, 1901,
he lasted exactly ONE semester, and then was politely asked to get lost. His father pulled the same
string a year later, and Fredendall was back at the Point in the Autumn of 1902, and had exactly the
same result: Failure. Each time for the same reason: Academic Failure.

Fredendall then entered M.I.T. in the Autumn of 1903, which he attended for exactly ONE YEAR.
He dropped out ( or possibly was dropped for poor performance, I have been unable to determine ),
and then he took two years off, attending no college, and, unless he was getting private tutoring,
not improving his education.

Then, he takes the competitive exam for Direct Commission Officers. And, Lo and Behold !, he
scores First in a field of some seventy other applicants. And is commissioned as a Second Lieutenant.....

HMMMMMMMM...... For three straight years, he is an academic washout, he takes two years off
to do nothing, and then suddenly scores the top marks in the test and snags a commission. Very
strange indeed. After all, his father is a commissioned officer, with lots of friends in the Army,
and apparently a lot of political connections......

If I had to guess, I would say that somewhere along the line, someone got hold of a copy of the
Direct Commission Officers Test, passed it along to someone else, and then it ended up on the desk
of young Mr. Fredendall, who studied it assiduously and then walked into the Exam Room with all of
the answers already memorized.

But, then again, I am renowned for having a nasty turn of mind......


As to why Fredendall really failed, he entered the Army around 1906-1907. Peacetime. He served in
the U.S. during WW1, doing training. Then, in the 1920s and 1930s, he served in numerous training
schools and also attended lots of schools. When he had commands, they were garrison commands,
not commands that were carrying out combat operations in the Field.

Face it, Fredendall was a soldier. That is, in peacetime, his uniform was pressed, his buttons were
polished, and his shoes shined to a mirror gloss. He was, to quote Gilbert and Sullivan, ' The Very Model
of the Modern Major General...' The perfect Peacetime Soldier.

Then along came WW2. And, Fredendall is sent to war. Now, in Wartime, you don't need Soldiers. You
need WARRIORS ! Guys who live in a tent, crap in a latrine, and drink the stale sewage from their
canteen. For Fredendall, this was anathema. He set up his HQ in the Grand Hotel of Oran and
all of the communiques he sent out were headed with " II Corps – In the Field " .

Then, as his army moved forward, he built himself a new underground Grand Hotel to live in. Which
embarrassed the hell out of Eisenhower. It wasn't Marshall who fired Fredendall, it was Ike. George
Marshall wanted to push Fredendall forward into command for the same reason he had gotten Short his
command in Hawaii: Marshall, Short, and Fredendall were NOT Ring Knockers.

When Ike relieved Fredendall, he arranged to have him sent back to the States, with no reprimand or
any other comments regarding his competence. Why? Because, throughout their careers, Fredendall
had OUTRANKED Eisenhower, and, even when Ike was commanding Fredendall in North Africa,
Fredendall's rank in the Regular Army ( permanent rank ) was greater than Eisenhower's, even though
Eisenhower's rank in the 'Army of the United States' ( brevet rank ) was greater then Fredendall's. In
other words, Ike knew that, when Fredendall went back to the U.S., he would revert to a lower permanent
rank ( Major General )that was STILL higher than Eisenhower's permanent rank of Lieutenant Colonel.

There is a very old rule in every hierarchical bureaucracy : The Ass you KICK today might be the Ass you
have to KISS tomorrow.....

Later, when Ike got a few more stars, and it was getting more and more obvious that his brevet stars
would become permanent stars, he was not so inclined to be nice to Fredendall.


Yes, I AM a very nasty person.


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#17

Post by Nickdfresh » 09 Mar 2020, 22:57

I think Mr. Ward and already covered some of the points I might otherwise have, especially Harmon's (who essentially took over the souring battle at Kasserine as Lloyd went seemingly catatonic). This is all from a distant memory or Reading Atkinson's An Army at Dawn, many of Fredendall's subordinates not only found him "abrasive" but downright confounding. His battle paralysis manifested itself into old Lloyd seemingly speaking in tongues to his commanders on the radio using a bizarre code that only he could understand that of course led to mass confusion. i.e.:
He also issued orders using wording that no one understood. His intention was to confuse the enemy if he was listening in, but orders such as “Move your command, i.e., the walking boys, pop guns, Baker’s outfit and the outfit which is the reverse of Baker’s outfit and the big fellows to M, which is due north of where you are now, as soon as possible. Have your boys report to the French gentleman whose name begins with J at a place which begins with D which is five grid squares to the left of M,” only managed to baffle his own people.
https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2019/ ... rine-pass/

Obviously, none of the above radiates an image of an effective battle manager form 70 miles behind the front in a palatial, well defended dugout...


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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#18

Post by rcocean » 10 Mar 2020, 02:24

I think Fredendahll gets way too much grief for building a command post underground. The Allies did NOT have air superiority during this time period (IRC Patton's HQ got bombed a close aide killed). Had the Germans known where his HQ was, they could've plastered it, putting the whole HQ out of business. It wasn't just for him, it was the entire II Corps Staff. Not only that, but this Ike knew about the HQ, visited it, and said nothing.

Fredendall did an excellent job previous to North Africa, which is why he was given the Central Task Force command. And that was also a success. The problem is that his divisional commanders didn't have confidence in him, and neither did Anderson. But that wasn't a problem as long as Fredendall was winning. You can be "abrasive" S.O.B - but you'd better be an S.O.B. who wins, otherwise no one is going to stick up for you when you lose. To put it another way, Fredendall seems to have gotten to be Corps commander because he constantly impressed his superiors. If his subordinates didn't like/trust him, no one cared. When he got to II Corps he was dealing with Harmon, Orlando Ward and Terry Allen, men who were almost as well respected as himself. And when Kasserine Pass happened no one wanted to put in a good word for him, quite the opposite. Who knows how he would've done, if he'd taken over II Corps as Bradley did, when the Allies were constantly on the offensive.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#19

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 10 Mar 2020, 03:30

Duplicate Post

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#20

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 10 Mar 2020, 03:56

paulrward wrote:
09 Mar 2020, 22:24
Hello Mr. Schwamberger :

Now, we must remember, I am a chemist by training and an engineer by profession, I analyse data by
looking at dates, time stamps, and the numbers. And, from this, I often have to make inferences and
deductions.

....

Later, when Ike got a few more stars, and it was getting more and more obvious that his brevet stars
would become permanent stars, he was not so inclined to be nice to Fredendall.
I've been reading the bios of the WWII Generals & few of the junior ranks & have my own thoughts on this. For the moment I'm focusing my thoughts on the October 1942 - February1943 months & what events then reveal.
Nickdfresh wrote:
09 Mar 2020, 22:57
I think Mr. Ward and already covered some of the points I might otherwise have, especially Harmon's (who essentially took over the souring battle at Kasserine as Lloyd went seemingly catatonic). This is all from a distant memory or Reading Atkinson's An Army at Dawn, many of Fredendall's subordinates not only found him "abrasive" but downright confounding. His battle paralysis manifested itself into old Lloyd seemingly speaking in tongues to his commanders on the radio using a bizarre code that only he could understand that of course led to mass confusion. i.e.:
He also issued orders using wording that no one understood. His intention was to confuse the enemy if he was listening in, but orders such as “Move your command, i.e., the walking boys, pop guns, Baker’s outfit and the outfit which is the reverse of Baker’s outfit and the big fellows to M, which is due north of where you are now, as soon as possible. Have your boys report to the French gentleman whose name begins with J at a place which begins with D which is five grid squares to the left of M,” only managed to baffle his own people.
https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/2019/ ... rine-pass/

Obviously, none of the above radiates an image of an effective battle manager form 70 miles behind the front in a palatial, well defended dugout...
The Speedy Valley mine was one solution to the air threat problem. Back in the 1980s those of us who thought about such things went for the dispersal - camouflage - emcon route. We had a idea frequent discrete movement would help too. I suspect this would have been a adequate solution for keeping disruption and casualties low. The big advantage being it frees up that engineer unit for more important tasks.

Anyway I'm back to the question of why Fredendall is not portrayed as failing in November? I used to be paid to do amphib ops & the idea the TORCH landings were 'routine', 'administrative' in nature, a 'by the book' operation is a lot naive. If he was a deeply flawed leader or manager what warning signs turned up during that difficult preparation and execution? I don't recall anything in Atkinsons 'Army at Dawn' that specifically dinged the subject, but I'll be rereading the pertinate chapters tonight & see what might resurface.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#21

Post by Steen Ammentorp » 10 Mar 2020, 20:03

Though it doesn’t answer Carl’s question regarding the actual landings in November it may be interesting to notice that Fredendall came to TORCH rather late. I am wondering whether Marshal was having doubts about his suitability prior to TORCH?
Commander of II Corps since August 1941 he was slated to go to UK with his Corps, when he in July 1942 was replace by Clark. What is not told in Taffee’s book is the reason given for his reassignment to XI Corps by Marshall to Fredendall himself, which I think is telling in view of later events.
It was intended that you should take your Corps abroad. However, as events developed, and particularly in our relationship with the British, it became evident that Clark could better serve our purpose because of his intimate knowledge of the various factors involved. I found that he had made an immense impression in England and inspired great confidence in himself personally at a time when it was very important that our leaders over there should force developments at a more rapid rate than was then in progress. As the issues were of too vital importance for me to speculate in any degree, therefore the rearrangement directed.
My emphasis.

Only after Clark became deputy to Eisenhower and could not manage the dual function with II Corps’ roll in TORCH did Fredendall come into play again, and then he wasn’t neither Eisenhower nor Marshalls first choice. Originally Eisenhower intended for the Central Task Force to be commanded by general Hartle, the commander of V Corps in the UK. However Marshall did have strong objections against Hartle, so he wrote to Eisenhower:
I am now even more disturbed over the selection of Hartle for a vital command. I think he did all right in Ireland but I think he gave a decidedly mediocre performance in cleaning up his unit and providing adequate leadership. To put him in charge of the key operation disturbs me greatly. If you can’t use Clark for this I will send you practically anyone you name. Dawley, Simpson, Griswold, Hodges, Lucas, Fredendall, Richardson or White. Dawley made a tremendous impression on McNair as a corps commander and leader in the North Carolina maneuvers. However please think this over but make your own decision.

And from this I would think in a Freudian way, that Marshall himself wouldn’t select Fredendall as his first choice in this list. Eisenhower then picked Fredendall.
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The Generals of World War Two

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#22

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 11 Mar 2020, 14:34

Steen Ammentorp wrote:
10 Mar 2020, 20:03
Though it doesn’t answer Carl’s question regarding the actual landings in November it may be interesting to notice that Fredendall came to TORCH rather late. I am wondering whether Marshal was having doubts about his suitability prior to TORCH?
Commander of II Corps since August 1941 he was slated to go to UK with his Corps, when he in July 1942 was replace by Clark. What is not told in Taffee’s book is the reason given for his reassignment to XI Corps by Marshall to Fredendall himself, which I think is telling in view of later events.
It was intended that you should take your Corps abroad. However, as events developed, and particularly in our relationship with the British, it became evident that Clark could better serve our purpose because of his intimate knowledge of the various factors involved. I found that he had made an immense impression in England and inspired great confidence in himself personally at a time when it was very important that our leaders over there should force developments at a more rapid rate than was then in progress. As the issues were of too vital importance for me to speculate in any degree, therefore the rearrangement directed.
My emphasis.
....
Probably more to it, but there was a amphibious op coming on and Clark as a assistant to the G3 of the 3rd Division had gained notice planning and executing a amphib operation October 1939 - January 1940. It seems at one level a stretch to pin this on one division exercise three years earlier, but Clark had done well in what amounted to the US Armys first large amphib exercise since the Spanish American War. I'd have to check but Clark may have been deeply involved in the planning for the GYMNAST Operations. By the time of the preparation for TORCH he was one of the few in the US Army with much experience at amphib ops. Kruger was another. I'm not seeing that sort of depth in this subject with Fredendal. The division commanders of the Army 1, 3, 9 ID had acquired experience as part of Amphibious Force Atlantic Fleet, but there may have been good reasons not to change them around.

The date of Eisenhower favorable evaluation of Fredendal would be useful. It looks like the remarks section from a routine performance evaluation. Regular PEs probably were due on officers in January and if this was one of those it would have reflected performance Oct-December.

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#23

Post by LineDoggie » 12 Mar 2020, 02:40

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 Mar 2020, 01:18
IIRC Ward did recieve command of another ArmDiv. Allen may have as well.

Trivia note Allen's son died in Viet Nam when his bn forward CP & two of his rifle companies were attacked by a NVA info regiment.
Allen took over 104th Inf div and drilled them for night ops. When they finally got to the ETO his division performed well in night time operations in its 195 days of combat.

Ward got 20th Armored division
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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#24

Post by Nickdfresh » 12 Mar 2020, 19:33

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
10 Mar 2020, 03:56
....
Anyway I'm back to the question of why Fredendall is not portrayed as failing in November? I used to be paid to do amphib ops & the idea the TORCH landings were 'routine', 'administrative' in nature, a 'by the book' operation is a lot naive. If he was a deeply flawed leader or manager what warning signs turned up during that difficult preparation and execution? I don't recall anything in Atkinsons 'Army at Dawn' that specifically dinged the subject, but I'll be rereading the pertinate chapters tonight & see what might resurface.
Hi Carl, I do not have the book handy myself as it's in storage that I will be raiding soon.

However, here is a citation from the Wiki page that lists AAAD. There were some warning signs perhaps, "5" is Army at Dawn:
Tunisia, Oran, and Kasserine Pass
After the Torch landings, Fredendall became the de facto military governor in Oran. Orders from his headquarters in the Grand Hotel of Oran were headed with "II Corps – In the Field," which prompted derision from his troops, who were living in spartan conditions.[5]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lloyd_Fre ... erine_Pass

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#25

Post by Nickdfresh » 12 Mar 2020, 19:43

rcocean wrote:
10 Mar 2020, 02:24
I think Fredendahll gets way too much grief for building a command post underground.

The Allies did NOT have air superiority during this time period (IRC Patton's HQ got bombed a close aide killed). Had the Germans known where his HQ was, they could've plastered it, putting the whole HQ out of business. It wasn't just for him, it was the entire II Corps Staff. Not only that, but this Ike knew about the HQ, visited it, and said nothing...
You're perhaps alone in this opinion. It sapped large numbers of combat engineers that could've been far more useful elsewhere for one thing, and last time I checked it's hard to lead from the rear, 70 miles behind the lines. I don't recall German commanders building large bunkers because the Allies had air supremacy...
Fredendall did an excellent job previous to North Africa, which is why he was given the Central Task Force command. And that was also a success.
At what? A lot of "deadwood" could mask their inadequacies at leadership in administrative menageries.
The problem is that his divisional commanders didn't have confidence in him, and neither did Anderson. But that wasn't a problem as long as Fredendall was winning. You can be "abrasive" S.O.B - but you'd better be an S.O.B. who wins, otherwise no one is going to stick up for you when you lose. To put it another way, Fredendall seems to have gotten to be Corps commander because he constantly impressed his superiors. If his subordinates didn't like/trust him, no one cared. When he got to II Corps he was dealing with Harmon, Orlando Ward and Terry Allen, men who were almost as well respected as himself. And when Kasserine Pass happened no one wanted to put in a good word for him, quite the opposite. Who knows how he would've done, if he'd taken over II Corps as Bradley did, when the Allies were constantly on the offensive.

What did Fredenhall "win" against? Whom? Static, half hearted Vichy French forces? I'm pretty sure that isn't much of a measure...

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#26

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Mar 2020, 16:27

Nickdfresh wrote:
12 Mar 2020, 19:43


You're perhaps alone in this opinion. It sapped large numbers of combat engineers that could've been far more useful elsewhere for one thing, and last time I checked it's hard to lead from the rear, 70 miles behind the lines. I don't recall German commanders building large bunkers because the Allies had air supremacy. ...
Actualy there were. When Rommel moved his HQ to La Roche Gyon late winter 1944 a large underground group of bunkers was built there. Large enough to accomadate The staff of Army Group B

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#27

Post by Richard Anderson » 13 Mar 2020, 16:51

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
13 Mar 2020, 16:27
Nickdfresh wrote:
12 Mar 2020, 19:43


You're perhaps alone in this opinion. It sapped large numbers of combat engineers that could've been far more useful elsewhere for one thing, and last time I checked it's hard to lead from the rear, 70 miles behind the lines. I don't recall German commanders building large bunkers because the Allies had air supremacy. ...
Actualy there were. When Rommel moved his HQ to La Roche Gyon late winter 1944 a large underground group of bunkers was built there. Large enough to accomadate The staff of Army Group G.
Minor nitpick Carl. It was Heeresgruppe B, not G.
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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#28

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Mar 2020, 18:14

Spank me

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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#29

Post by Richard Anderson » 13 Mar 2020, 20:47

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
13 Mar 2020, 18:14
Spank me
I didn't know you were into rough trade Carl? :thumbsup:
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Re: Lloyd Fredendall Behind the Failure

#30

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 13 Mar 2020, 21:10

New GF, met on FetLife.

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