glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
Source says that refuelling was done at up to 10kt.
Yes, Glenn...Note the phrase "up to". But, no instances are given of this occurring.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
You say otherwise.
Wrong, Glenn. Your source says otherwise, and I have previously quoted you the passages where it does.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
I don't care either way
Yes Glenn, I know you don't care what a source says when it proves you wrong.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
- the KM could do at sea refuelling in WW2
That was not your argument and no one was arguing that they could not...Your argument was that the Kriegsmarine did UNREP as the USN understands it. An argument which has been proven wrong.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
, so the Italians could learn from the Germans.
Maybe they could, and maybe they couldn't. They certainly did not when it came to submarine operations & tactics.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
Key bottlenecks identified are the demonstated ability of the RN to take out tankers at sea, and the question of fuel oil vs. crude oil.
You forgot a lack of suitable tankers.
Fuel oil vs. Crude oil is not a bottleneck until you conclusively prove that there was a European source of crude oil that could be burned as bunker oil, as Borneo oil could. And that such a field was producing large quantities like those in Borneo.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
Apparently I somehow thought Germany occupied Syria in WW2 and now I discover that I did not know the LW bombed Liverpool. :^)
Glenn, it is readily apparent that, unfortunately, you do not know much about the subject material. But, more on that later.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
My take is that an increased surface threat in the BoA will force the British to adapt larger convoys in order to concentrate escorts. Larger convoys will tax port facilities more heavily since these cause greater stress than smaller convoys, so the knock on effect of combined arms warfare is more than you assume it might be.
Ahhh...more of that Magic Juju "combined arms".
The argument of convoys overstressing ports has been around for sometime and has thoroughly been disproved. Convoy arrival can be planned for, so that ports are stressed as little as possible & cargo can be unloaded in a timely fashion. Loss of productivity is far less with convoys as opposed to replacing sunken ships & lost cargo.
So, no Magic Juju for you.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
LW bombing of dockyards will not be significantly effective outside any combined arms effect WRT to oversized convoys, but it will be more effective than mining in 1941.
Problem was the Luftwaffe could only really pound one port at a time. So, you put one port out of action, and the others take up the slack. So, the the LW pounds the second port and put it out of action - but, by then the first port is back online. Second verse, same as the first. Wash, rinse, repeat. The LW is too small to effectively conduct a bombing campaign that requires it to hit multiple targets over, and over, and over.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
However, by 1942, mining will start to become a more serious threat as better mines are used, especially after the combat debut of aerial pressure mines in 1944, and free floating minelet types introduced around 1942. (Damaged shipping requiring repair was a big problem for the UK).
Excedrin POD Headache #5,311.
Not seeing it...
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Losses_ ... e_Atlantic
Mines become less effective, not more effective.
Perhaps this is an "opposite alternative history"...more means less, less means more, you get the gist.
glenn239 wrote: ↑19 Mar 2020, 20:37
How did you arrive at the conclusion that a AH Luftwaffe campaign against British port infastruture into at least 1946 would accomplish less than the historical campaign that largely wrapped up by May 1941?
Ummm....Because the thread title is
What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..
Thus...If you are dragging this war out that long...You really are not making fighting Britain a serious consideration.