What if Hitler made fighting Britain a serious consideration from the start..

[T. A. Gardner]

You could start here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... F-I-7.html

Thanks.

The combat losses of the German AF seem bearably low. Far below the 5% per sortie threshold. Operating losses were not mentioned. One would expect that rate to be higher from the difficult night flying conditions, but were they near a damaging level we might assume they would have been mentioned. The other side of the coin is the damage to the port and cargo ships is not high enough for any decisive strategic result. Or even a sustained operational result. Damaging, but not war winning. that leads me to the question of how loss might have increased had more damaging & aggressive tactics or operating methods been adopted.

But, losses weren't the only issue. Fuel was becoming an issue. Pilot shortages were becoming an issue. Maintenance of aircraft was becoming an issue. The Luftwaffe wasn't set up or prepared for high intensity, sustained operations. They could mount a serious air offensive as an impulse for a short period of time.

What the Luftwaffe needed was a major shift in how they operated. They needed a sustained and much larger pilot training program. They needed access to fuel, or the German economy, military and civilian, had to shift priorities to provide that, and they needed a much more robust maintenance and servicing system for aircraft.

Once they could reach a sustainable level of operations, they could afford 3 to 5% loss rates. The USAAF and RAF tried to keep theirs under 6%. That was calculated as sustainable. Much of the time they were around 3%.

[ljadw]

The LW needed more crew ( for bombers/fighters,..) and this in a shorter period . This could not be done .
The training took a year . To have more crew in June 1944, more men should have started the training in June 1943.
The only way to have more crew available in June 1944, was to shorten the training and to send the men who started their training in July 1943 ,to the front in June 1944. Robbing Peter to pay Paul .The result would be and was that it was needed to sent to the front in July 1944 those who started in August 1943 , etc .
But if you shorten the training, the result will be bigger losses, thus again shortage of crew, thus again the order to shorten the training,...
They were faced by the problem : how do I keep quality on the same level and do I increase quantity ?
Their solution was to sacrifice quality to increase quantity .
The result was that quantity and quality were going down .

[Carl Schwamberger]

You could start here: http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... F-I-7.html

Thanks.

The combat losses of the German AF seem bearably low. Far below the 5% per sortie threshold. Operating losses were not mentioned. One would expect that rate to be higher from the difficult night flying conditions, but were they near a damaging level we might assume they would have been mentioned. The other side of the coin is the damage to the port and cargo ships is not high enough for any decisive strategic result. Or even a sustained operational result. Damaging, but not war winning. that leads me to the question of how loss might have increased had more damaging & aggressive tactics or operating methods been adopted.

But, losses weren't the only issue. Fuel was becoming an issue. Pilot shortages were becoming an issue. Maintenance of aircraft was becoming an issue. The Luftwaffe wasn't set up or prepared for high intensity, sustained operations. They could mount a serious air offensive as an impulse for a short period of time.

What the Luftwaffe needed was a major shift in how they operated. They needed a sustained and much larger pilot training program. They needed access to fuel, or the German economy, military and civilian, had to shift priorities to provide that, and they needed a much more robust maintenance and servicing system for aircraft.

Once they could reach a sustainable level of operations, they could afford 3 to 5% loss rates. The USAAF and RAF tried to keep theirs under 6%. That was calculated as sustainable. Much of the time they were around 3%.

I'd only think of this strategy in terms of 1940-1941. Probably to late from 1942. The fuel & pilot training were not the same show stopper before 1942. Of course by it self a port bombing campaign is not decisive. It would have to be closely coordinated with the Navy, and require supporting operations outside port attacks. That level of complexity & inter service cooperation is difficult to see for any nations military in 1940 or 1941.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The LW needed more crew ( for bombers/fighters,..) and this in a shorter period . This could not be done .
The training took a year . To have more crew in June 1944, more men should have started the training in June 1943.
The only way to have more crew available in June 1944, was to shorten the training and to send the men who started their training in July 1943 ,to the front in June 1944. Robbing Peter to pay Paul .The result would be and was that it was needed to sent to the front in July 1944 those who started in August 1943 , etc .
But if you shorten the training, the result will be bigger losses, thus again shortage of crew, thus again the order to shorten the training,...
They were faced by the problem : how do I keep quality on the same level and do I increase quantity ?
Their solution was to sacrifice quality to increase quantity .
The result was that quantity and quality were going down .

You might look at how the RAF approached this early on. It seems to have worked.

[Yuri]

Robbing Peter to pay Paul.

The situation when the solution of one problem creates another is called of the Russian proverb - "Trifon Kaftan".
A guy named Tryphon got a caftan that has the right sleeve of normal length, but the left sleeve is short. The guy solved the problem as follows: cut off the right sleeve and sewed to the left. It is clear that solving the problem with the left sleeve in this way creates a problem with the right sleeve. The guy solved the problem with the length of the right sleeve in the same way, cutting off the left sleeve, and increased the right and one so many times. As a result of all these manipulations, both sleeves of the caftan became short.

When you solve Paul's problem by robbing Peter, you are solving Paul's problem for not your own resources. The Russian proverb more fully describes the situation with the resources of the Luftwaffe.
In addition, the Russian proverb is much shorter - just two words, whereas in "Robbing Peter to pay Paul" as many as five words. Be economical.

[T. A. Gardner]

I'd only think of this strategy in terms of 1940-1941. Probably to late from 1942. The fuel & pilot training were not the same show stopper before 1942. Of course by it self a port bombing campaign is not decisive. It would have to be closely coordinated with the Navy, and require supporting operations outside port attacks. That level of complexity & inter service cooperation is difficult to see for any nations military in 1940 or 1941.

What the Germans needed if they were going to make a serious campaign against England was a multi-pronged approach that realistically assessed their capabilities and how they could seriously hurt England without invasion. I'd say this would involve:

1. Maintain a bomber campaign that is sustainable. Doesn't matter much what the targets are. Bomb the snot out of coastal cities. Keep bombing in range of heavy escort by fighters in daytime and switch to area bombing at night.

2. Develop methods and equipment to slam the RAF's bombing campaign against Germany.

3. On land, finish the British in North Africa and the Med.

4. Make maritime attacks on shipping a priority. This doesn't require large numbers of bombers, it simply requires effective ones with good range. Britain isn't going to suddenly have a naval air force that can counter this and they don't have the arms industry to quickly supply merchant ships with AA defenses that are going to be effective. If the Luftwaffe ups the tonnage loss by say about a million tons in 1940 and again in 1941, the British are hurting pretty bad on that score.

5. Continue to make preparations for an invasion even if it is never launched. These don't have to be frenetic, they just need to be obvious. This forces Britain into retaining larger forces in England along with continuing to make defensive preparations.

6. Expand the U-boat fleet.

7. Keep the US out of the European war.

The Luftwaffe would need to expand pilot training, and develop longer ranged fighters along with better bombers. On the later, they need to not try for the cutting edge of technology but accept what works and can be put into service in a reasonable time. For example, Henkel is let manufacture a He 177 with four engines and can't dive bomb, the resulting plane is close to something akin to a Lancaster instead.
Introduce drop tanks and develop a new single-seat fighter that can range over most of Britain.

Even slightly more U-boats at sea at any time, even just Type VII's, is a move towards really putting the screws to British shipping. If you have maritime aircraft supporting them, particularly ones capable of attacking an RN escort like a Flower and crippling or sinking it, that becomes another big multiplier. Fewer U-boats get sunk, more merchants go down, and manufacture and maintenance of sufficient escorts becomes harder.

[Yuri]

What the Germans needed if they were going to make a serious campaign against England was a multi-pronged approach that realistically assessed their capabilities and how they could seriously hurt England without invasion. I'd say this would involve:

1. Maintain a bomber campaign that is sustainable. Doesn't matter much what the targets are. Bomb the snot out of coastal cities. Keep bombing in range of heavy escort by fighters in daytime and switch to area bombing at night.

2. Develop methods and equipment to slam the RAF's bombing campaign against Germany.

3. On land, finish the British in North Africa and the Med.

4. Make maritime attacks on shipping a priority. This doesn't require large numbers of bombers, it simply requires effective ones with good range. Britain isn't going to suddenly have a naval air force that can counter this and they don't have the arms industry to quickly supply merchant ships with AA defenses that are going to be effective. If the Luftwaffe ups the tonnage loss by say about a million tons in 1940 and again in 1941, the British are hurting pretty bad on that score.

5. Continue to make preparations for an invasion even if it is never launched. These don't have to be frenetic, they just need to be obvious. This forces Britain into retaining larger forces in England along with continuing to make defensive preparations.

6. Expand the U-boat fleet.

7. Keep the US out of the European war.

And there is a short Russian proverb about this - measure seven times and cut once.

[ljadw]

The LW needed more crew ( for bombers/fighters,..) and this in a shorter period . This could not be done .
The training took a year . To have more crew in June 1944, more men should have started the training in June 1943.
The only way to have more crew available in June 1944, was to shorten the training and to send the men who started their training in July 1943 ,to the front in June 1944. Robbing Peter to pay Paul .The result would be and was that it was needed to sent to the front in July 1944 those who started in August 1943 , etc .
But if you shorten the training, the result will be bigger losses, thus again shortage of crew, thus again the order to shorten the training,...
They were faced by the problem : how do I keep quality on the same level and do I increase quantity ?
Their solution was to sacrifice quality to increase quantity .
The result was that quantity and quality were going down .

You might look at how the RAF approached this early on. It seems to have worked.

The difference is that the RAF existed already before 1935, while the LW was created in 1935 and existed only 4 years at the start of the war,the LW had a strong active force in 1939, but its reserves were very weak .And the big problems did not start in 1944 with the Big Week,but already in 1940 : big commitments, heavy losses

[Carl Schwamberger]

The LW needed more crew ( for bombers/fighters,..) and this in a shorter period . This could not be done .
... .
But if you shorten the training, the result will be bigger losses, thus again shortage of crew, thus again the order to shorten the training,...
They were faced by the problem : how do I keep quality on the same level and do I increase quantity ?
Their solution was to sacrifice quality to increase quantity .
The result was that quantity and quality were going down .

You might look at how the RAF approached this early on. It seems to have worked.

The difference is that the RAF existed already before 1935, while the LW was created in 1935 and existed only 4 years at the start of the war,the LW had a strong active force in 1939, but its reserves were very weak .And the big problems did not start in 1944 with the Big Week,but already in 1940 : big commitments, heavy losses

That was technically true, tho the RAF reserves were not close to a solution for the war, nor for 1940. My understanding is the RAF 1935-1938 was training 500 or fewer pilots a year. That is its reserve was large in proportion to active service strength, in raw numbers its was still small. The other more important course was to rework the training program. In 1939 the pilot training syllabuses were pared down to the essentials. The peace time syllabus was designed to produce what was thought to be a well rounded 'Airman'. Lots of items that were useful for six or three years of active service or a career. Aircraft engineering, meteorology theory, long range navigation... All that pushed the schooling out towards a year or more. The RAF cut the fighter pilot program to a 90 day syllabus (5-6 months total for all pilot training) that focused only on what a fighter pilot needed to know to be effective as a fighter pilot defending the UK. The logic was to train a good fighter pilot now rather than a perfect airman later. Once sufficient fighter pilots were available broader training could be taken. The result was close to 7,000 pilots & flight engineers received flight training in 1940.

The German practice of 1939 - 1942 was to retain the full syllabus, and to temporarily drawn down the air crew training for each major campaign. This went so far as to draw instructors from the schools to temporarily boost combat unit strength. IIRC this occurred three times, for the Polish, Western, and Eastern campaigns. It was not until 1942 the German air force leaders began reorganizing training to better meet long term needs.

The RAF initially did not match the Germans in school flight hours. 15-20% less in 1940 IIRC. This was increased by 1941, & again several more times. In 1943 the RAF rookie fighter pilot had over 340 flight hours by the time he left the schools. vs 200-240 in 1939 & 190 in 1940. The German rookie in 1939 had a syllabus with closer to 250 hours. For much of 1939-40 the RAF lacked sufficient modern fighters at the schools. The trainee should have had all his 40 flight hours at the final stage in a Hurricane or Spitfire. Most had closer to 20 hours and some as few as ten.

Precisely who had the better fighter pilot in August-September 1940 had been debated. Tho arguing the nuances rather misses the point that it can be debated. The RAF was sending rookies with training complete in five months or less, while the Luftwaffe schools had been for practical purposes shut down.

Here is a extract from a Luftwaffe leaders (Ulrich Steinhilper) comments on the Battle of Britain. It illustrates the problem of the curtailed school training in the summer of 1940.

High also on the list of losses as the battle wore on were the replacement pilots. They simply didn't have the experience that we pre-war regulars had acquired. In our Gruppe at the beginning of the French Campaign we had thirty-six experienced pilots, none of whom had less than three years flying experience. Now we were getting replacements for the experienced pilots we had lost straight from Jagdfliegerschule (fighter school]. At that time we still tried our best to take care of these fledglings until they could accrue some experience.

Typical of these youngsters was a young Gefreiter who arrived in late September. His flying time was minimal - he had only fired a few shots at a ground target, had never flown on oxygen and still had no idea how to use his radio. We tried to increase their experience before they actually came along on combat missions by taking them up on patrols between missions. Then we would talk on the radio, climb to altitudes in excess of 8,000 metres (25,000 ft) and make them use oxygen. Of special importance was teaching them how to change the pitch of their propeller to get maxmum pull from the engine at high altitude. A flat pitch would allow the engine to rev up to its maximum so that the super-charger would deliver the maximum volume of air to the cylinders and produce optimum power; changing to a coarser pitch would have that engine power converted into more pull and consequently speed our rate of climb. It was vital they mastered this technique if they were to keep up in a battle-climb or at high altitude.5

After about ten hours of 'tuition' we would take them out over the Channel to shoot at shadows on the water or cross to Dungeness and shoot at a black medieval tower which stood there (the old Dungeness Lighthouse). Finally when we could not excuse them combat duty any more we would have to take them along with us. This became the case with the Gefreiter and so I took him as my Rottenhund Iwingman]. We began our climb almost immediately after take-off and he was constantly using the radio to ask us to slow down so that he could keep up. It was obvious that he wasn't manipulating the pitch control with the skill of the more seasoned pilots to produce the same power as our machines. We tried to tell him what to do on the radio but to no avail. Eventually, about half-way across the Channel and at 4,000 metres (13,000 ft) Kiihle told him to leave the formation and return to base. He broke away but in his confusion he turned not for home but towards Dover. Kiihle realised what was happening and ordered me to give chase and take him home. I rolled out and soon overhauled him, just before we reached the balloon barrage at Dover. I had tried to raise him on the radio but he was in such a state of anxiety that he wouldn't or couldn't respond. Positioning myself in front of him I rocked my wings, using the signal for him to follow me. He dutifully hung onto my tail and we were soon back at Coquelles. This was one of only two missions I missed during the whole of our time in the Battle of Britain.

As a result we decided that we would not take any more replacements on high altitude missions until we could give them more, much more, training. They were supposed to be replacements but in the event they were more of a problem for us than reinforcement for the squadron.

Its easy to digress into various rabbit paths here. My point is the OP asks about 'better preparing to fight Britain'. Much of that points to preparation for a War & not a single quick campaign. To comply with that the German air force leaders would need to depart from their training policy NLT 1939 & instal a effective training program for a sustained war with multiple campaigns & offensive 1940-41

[T. A. Gardner]

And there is a short Russian proverb about this - measure seven times and cut once.

But the Germans followed the rigid bureaucratic procedure here:

Measure it with a micrometer. Mark it with a crayon. Cut it with an axe. When things came up short, their solution was to cut it again in hopes they'd get it right the next time.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Measure it with a micrometer. Mark it with a crayon. Cut it with an axe.

In the artillery we marked with chalk, but other wise the procedure was the same.

[glenn239]

What the Germans needed if they were going to make a serious campaign against England was a multi-pronged approach that realistically assessed their capabilities and how they could seriously hurt England without invasion. I'd say this would involve:

1. Maintain a bomber campaign that is sustainable. Doesn't matter much what the targets are. Bomb the snot out of coastal cities. Keep bombing in range of heavy escort by fighters in daytime and switch to area bombing at night.

2. Develop methods and equipment to slam the RAF's bombing campaign against Germany.

3. On land, finish the British in North Africa and the Med.

4. Make maritime attacks on shipping a priority. This doesn't require large numbers of bombers, it simply requires effective ones with good range. Britain isn't going to suddenly have a naval air force that can counter this and they don't have the arms industry to quickly supply merchant ships with AA defenses that are going to be effective. If the Luftwaffe ups the tonnage loss by say about a million tons in 1940 and again in 1941, the British are hurting pretty bad on that score.

5. Continue to make preparations for an invasion even if it is never launched. These don't have to be frenetic, they just need to be obvious. This forces Britain into retaining larger forces in England along with continuing to make defensive preparations.

6. Expand the U-boat fleet.

7. Keep the US out of the European war.

The Luftwaffe would need to expand pilot training, and develop longer ranged fighters along with better bombers. On the later, they need to not try for the cutting edge of technology but accept what works and can be put into service in a reasonable time. For example, Henkel is let manufacture a He 177 with four engines and can't dive bomb, the resulting plane is close to something akin to a Lancaster instead.
Introduce drop tanks and develop a new single-seat fighter that can range over most of Britain.

Even slightly more U-boats at sea at any time, even just Type VII's, is a move towards really putting the screws to British shipping. If you have maritime aircraft supporting them, particularly ones capable of attacking an RN escort like a Flower and crippling or sinking it, that becomes another big multiplier. Fewer U-boats get sunk, more merchants go down, and manufacture and maintenance of sufficient escorts becomes harder.

All points look correct, except that 7 should read, "keep the US and USSR out of the European war." Probably more realistic to keep Stalin on the sidelines than the US though.

[glenn239]

Yes, Glenn...Note the phrase "up to". But, no instances are given of this occurring.

Takao, you wondered why I said UNREP, then I show you, and now you're arguing with the interrogation of the actual oiler refuelling crews themselves in British custody. They said up to 10kt.

Yes Glenn, I know you don't care what a source says when it proves you wrong.

The source states refuelling at up to 10kt. How you think that "proves" the refuelling was done at 0kt, I have no idea.

That was not your argument and no one was arguing that they could not...Your argument was that the Kriegsmarine did UNREP as the USN understands it. An argument which has been proven wrong.

I don't recall saying that KM refuelling methods were "as the USN understands it". USN methods were the most advanced in the world. KM methods to my eye looked far more primitive in comparison.

Fuel oil vs. Crude oil is not a bottleneck until you conclusively prove that there was a European source of crude oil that could be burned as bunker oil, as Borneo oil could. And that such a field was producing large quantities like those in Borneo.

You've stated that Italian and German warships could not run on Romanian oil, except after refining for the bunker fuel, but you have provided no citation for your claim.

The argument of convoys overstressing ports has been around for sometime and has thoroughly been disproved. Convoy arrival can be planned for, so that ports are stressed as little as possible & cargo can be unloaded in a timely fashion. Loss of productivity is far less with convoys as opposed to replacing sunken ships & lost cargo.

The larger the convoys arriving and the stronger the enemy bombing and mining campaigns, the harder it gets, the idea being.

BTW - damaged ships awaiting repairs were always the largest drain on merchant shipping at any given time.

Problem was the Luftwaffe could only really pound one port at a time. So, you put one port out of action, and the others take up the slack. So, the the LW pounds the second port and put it out of action - but, by then the first port is back online. Second verse, same as the first. Wash, rinse, repeat. The LW is too small to effectively conduct a bombing campaign that requires it to hit multiple targets over, and over, and over.

So now you do understand the Luftwaffe is a part of the BoA even if the convoy routes change. Good.

Mines become less effective, not more effective.

It is not my understanding that late war German pressure mines were "less effective".

Thus...If you are dragging this war out that long...You really are not making fighting Britain a serious consideration.

Since the Germans did not have a war with Russia, the Anglo-Americans click their heels and Dorthy still has the war over in 1945, does she?

[paulrward]

Mr. T.A.Gardner wrote :

Measure it with a micrometer. Mark it with a crayon. Cut it with an axe. When things came up short, their solution was to cut it again in hopes they'd get it right the next time.

Actually, the correct quote is:

" Measure with a Micrometer, Mark with a Chalk, Cut with an Axe ! Hammer to Shape, File to Fit, Paint to Match,
Get it Waived by Q.C., and Ship it to the Customer ! "

I was an engineer and chemist in the electronics industry for four decades. Does it show ?

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[John T]

Um yes it was done stationary. The two ships stopped then a hose was trailed astern to refuel.

No, not according to German sources.

Some more "not underway" replenishment from the same meeting:

You have any idea how many times Graf Spee was refueled by Altmark between September 1 and December 6 1939 ?

What do you prove by photos from one occurrence?
It could be done in calm weather, yes.

But please feel free to provide any photographic evidence of the KM using UNREP (actual underway replenishment, not two or more ships meeting at a rendezvous and stopping to exchange supplies). I'd be curious to see what you uncover as my search hasn't turned up anything remotely similar to what you want to have happen.

Well, your might be better at suppression techniques, than searching freely for data that does not support your point of view?

EDIT:
Went and pulled a copy of a book I forgot i had called Under Three Flags by Geoffrey Jones. It's a history of the Nordmark, Altmark, Ermland and Dithmarschen. It describes the refueling method used and also contains more pictures of KM vessels refueling as well as U-Boats. Again the method used is as shown in the pictures above. The vessels manoeuvre stern to bow, then they hold stationary postion while hoses are connected and fuel exchanged. They do not do as the Allies did and proceed underway to replenish. The method the KM used required near perfect weather conditions as well so there are cases of resupply taking three days in some cases because the seas were too rough.

And what sources did the author use?
I am always a bit skeptical of books about Germany in ww2 written by Anglo-Saxons.
Too much was too biased by wartime propaganda even into the seventies.


What about reading K G Lochners Als das eis brach page 20ff ?
That's a German source from a German author who read the German war diaries and Captain Daus report on refueling at sea.
In short, it confirms Glenns source.
Altmark devised a method to tow Graf Spee and transferred stores and fuel and lowest speed, but still at speed.

So they could do that in more adverse weather than just drifting in dead calm,
How do you expect two very different ships that catch the wind differently, keep at a fixed distance long enough to refuel?

But if you need photographic evidence out of suppression technique, I can't provide it.

Cheers
/John T