Thank you for the reference, Richard.Richard Anderson wrote:I would recommend Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army 1775-1945. Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1955
Having read the chapters of the book focusing on industrial mobilization and logistics, I see lots of references to AGF equipment shortfalls and some blaming of Lend-Lease for those shortfalls. For example:
p.681The diversion of equipment to lend-lease and the consequent shortages of equipment for American units in training was a calculated
risk. The PMP had planned and hoped for balance between personnel
and equipment procurement. The failure to achieve this part of the
PMP was not due to faulty planning but to the unforeseen and tremendous allocations of materiel to lend-lease and its predecessor foreign
aid programs.
What I don't see is any explicit discussion of grand strategy re army vs. air force production. Closest excerpt is this reference to FDR's desire for a smaller army:
p.624The Victory Program achieved its chief purpose by establishing
munitions production goals for American industry. Its corollary
purpose of establishing a long-range troop basis was not so successful at first, for in the fall of 1941 the President was inclined to decrease rather than to increase the Army. The Japanese attack on
Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 prevented the reduction of the
Army from being put into effect and converted the Victory Program
into the War Munitions Program. The preparation of intermediate
troop bases became necessary.
To the extent that there is mention of AGF v. AAF grand strategy, it occurs in mid-'43, well after a decision to build a larger army could have made a difference to invasion of Europe in '43:
p.627In its
report the special committee considered the changed strategic situation
in mid-1943 contrasted with that at the beginning of the war when
the first Victory Program had been drawn up. Russia, contrary to
expectations, had not collapsed and was launching massive offensives
which were pinning down large numbers of Axis divisions; the Allied
air offensive had achieved air superiority sooner and more successfully
than anticipated. These favorable factors, the committee reasoned,
had lessened the need for American ground forces and especially combat divisions.
None of the above-quoted excerpts bear on the period identified as critical by O'Brien: The Summer '42 correspondence of Roosevelt in which he ordered absolute priority for aircraft production, a decision characterized by O'Brien as follows: "In a matter of months, to protect aircraft construction, the US army had lost half of its planned strength."
Of course this mid-'43 decision does touch on the question of whether the decision for a smaller army was justified. With Russia still fighting in mid-'43, there's obviously no need to plan for hundreds of American divisions to defeat Germany.
But the distinction I'm drawing throughout this thread remains: whether it was justified to choose a smaller American army is irrelevant to whether choosing a larger army would have meant a smaller air force and/or navy (the latter less likely, given lead times in naval construction).
Nothing in the book's logistics/industry chapters remotely touches on the issue of whether any increase in historical AGF forces would have caused a reduction in AAF or USN air forces.