USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

[T. A. Gardner]

But, you can discount as not useful for offensive purposes almost all infantry, all Volksgrenadier, bodenstande, and other such divisions. That leaves the Germans with panzer, panzergrenadier, and few infantry divisions as all they have that can win a ground campaign. Holding ground / defending doesn't equate to a win.

With the panzer and panzergrenadiers, these units varied in capability considerably, particularly the panzergrenadier divisions. But, they represent the actual forces that will do the fighting, and potentially the winning. The rest are just place holders and organized bunches of POW's looking for a place to surrender.

That leaves something like 20 or so divisions in the West by 1944 that are worth anything. The rest are just holding ground waiting to be wiped out in combat or take prisoner in an encirclement. Building a 10 to 12,000 man VG division that has some obsolescent or captured artillery, maybe a dozen Hetzers if they're lucky, and barely enough trucks and wagons to supply the unit when it is in defense, is not one that's really any sort of threat to the W. Allies.

So, as it was it was more like 3 or 4 to 1 in favor of the Allies. You can similarly see in the East that by 1944 the Soviets had gotten a similar advantage in well-equipped mechanized units over the Germans and that the leg infantry divisions on both sides were really just place holders.

[Carl Schwamberger]

But, you can discount as not useful for offensive purposes almost all infantry, all Volksgrenadier, bodenstande, and other...

We are just circling back to the point that counting ground combat divisions is a poor metric for determining combat power & the ability to defend in this scenario. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' lined up industrial production & made some guesses at potential. The metrics there were from counting cannons & trucks or tanks built, tons of ammunition of various calibers, tons of aluminum, ect... Ellis point being the actual difference in firepower and mobility between the Axis or Germans and the three principle Allies.

[Cult Icon]

That leaves something like 20 or so divisions in the West by 1944 that are worth anything.

Have you ever read a German divisional history? They "defended" by continuously counterattacking from platoon sized upward. This is why they were able to hold such extended fronts, East and West, with such small forces.

Maybe it's time for you to study the Germans, so you won't make the same posts for another 10-15 years.

[T. A. Gardner]

Have you ever read a German divisional history? They "defended" by continuously counterattacking from platoon sized upward. This is why they were able to hold such extended fronts, East and West, with such small forces.

Maybe it's time for you to study the Germans, so you won't make the same posts for another 10-15 years.

Defending, however you do it, doesn't win wars. Tactical defense is largely irrelevant if that's all you can do, and that's what you're talking about. Name a German infantry division or divisions that on their own were able to defeat a Western Allied division on the attack at the regimental or division level.

[T. A. Gardner]

But, you can discount as not useful for offensive purposes almost all infantry, all Volksgrenadier, bodenstande, and other...

We are just circling back to the point that counting ground combat divisions is a poor metric for determining combat power & the ability to defend in this scenario. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' lined up industrial production & made some guesses at potential. The metrics there were from counting cannons & trucks or tanks built, tons of ammunition of various calibers, tons of aluminum, ect... Ellis point being the actual difference in firepower and mobility between the Axis or Germans and the three principle Allies.

Yes, exactly. Bean counting divisions is nearly meaningless as are total troops engaged, etc. Iraq in Desert Storm mobilized close to 1 million troops and was crushed in a matter of days, if not hours, because a million men with rifles led by incompetents in units that can't act in an organized fashion are just POW's looking for a place to surrender. The Italian Army in N. Africa in 1940 was nearly as bad.

Yet, we still get the bean counters saying that German infantry divisions had real worth beyond being mere place holders on a line that once penetrated meant they were going to the POW cage.

[Cult Icon]

Have you ever read a German divisional history? They "defended" by continuously counterattacking from platoon sized upward. This is why they were able to hold such extended fronts, East and West, with such small forces.

Maybe it's time for you to study the Germans, so you won't make the same posts for another 10-15 years.

Defending, however you do it, doesn't win wars. Tactical defense is largely irrelevant if that's all you can do, and that's what you're talking about. Name a German infantry division or divisions that on their own were able to defeat a Western Allied division on the attack at the regimental or division level.

Yes, on numerous occasions, more often in 1940-1943, less so in 44-45 (when they were on the defensive). Your predictable response, of course, is to rant on your allied never-defeated theory, which is factually incorrect. Save yourself the time and save me the headache. I don't want to read another one of your bad tactical posts, vintage 2000s, again.

It's time for you to answer the main question, is that if you read German divisional histories. From your comments it seems like you have NEVER read a German divisional history. Your confusion and endless stream of errors about how the war was fought, tactically, would start unraveling from there. This makes it very difficult for me to take anything you say on tactics seriously.

Maybe it's time for you to stop making the same bad posts for another 15 years and start hitting the books?

I have one for you:

https://www.amazon.com/Victory-Beyond-T ... 696&sr=8-1

if you have no interest in German (and or US/UK) divisional/tactical histories you have no business making sweeping and inaccurate generalizations over and over again in forums. Some newbie could read your posts, written in a confident rhetorical style ( confidence man antics), and get misinformed thinking that you are one of those people who know their stuff...

[T. A. Gardner]

Have you ever read a German divisional history? They "defended" by continuously counterattacking from platoon sized upward. This is why they were able to hold such extended fronts, East and West, with such small forces.

Maybe it's time for you to study the Germans, so you won't make the same posts for another 10-15 years.

Defending, however you do it, doesn't win wars. Tactical defense is largely irrelevant if that's all you can do, and that's what you're talking about. Name a German infantry division or divisions that on their own were able to defeat a Western Allied division on the attack at the regimental or division level.

Yes, on numerous occasions, more often in 1940-1943, less so in 44-45 (when they were on the defensive). Your predictable response, of course, is to rant on your allied never-defeated theory, which is factually incorrect. Save yourself the time and save me the headache. I don't want to read another one of your bad tactical posts, vintage 2000s, again.

It's time for you to answer the main question, is that if you read German divisional histories. From your comments it seems like you have NEVER read a German divisional history. Your confusion and endless stream of errors about how the war was fought, tactically, would start unraveling from there. This makes it very difficult for me to take anything you say on tactics seriously.

Maybe it's time for you to stop making the same bad posts for another 15 years and start hitting the books?

I have one for you:

https://www.amazon.com/Victory-Beyond-T ... 696&sr=8-1

if you have no interest in German (and or US/UK) divisional/tactical histories you have no business making sweeping and inaccurate generalizations over and over again in forums. Some newbie could read your posts, written in a confident rhetorical style ( confidence man antics), and get misinformed thinking that you are one of those people who know their stuff...

Then, by all means give me a couple of examples....

A regimental or divisional win on the offensive without panzer division involvement, just infantry divisions.

[David Thompson]

T. A. Gardner and Cult Icon -- Drop the personal remarks or watch your posts disappear.

[Michael Kenny]

This is why they were able to hold such extended fronts, East and West, with such small forces.

Where did they 'hold' a front (extended or otherwise) in NWE 1944?
Normandy was in no way an 'extended front and was a very dense dense concentration of German forces. Given the large number of Panzer Division there and the small front it should have been easy for a 'continuously counterattacking' military to make some significant advances. Where did this happen?

[T. A. Gardner]

T. A. Gardner and Cult Icon -- Drop the personal remarks or watch your posts disappear.

I'm simply asking for examples, nothing more. I know of only one, that's the defeat of the 106th ID in the Ardennes. There were no other examples of German infantry divisions on their own defeating their W. Allied counterparts post defeat of France.

The 272nd didn't gain any significant ground in the Hurtgen Forest. They did well defending, but that isn't an offensive action where they drove back or outright defeated a W. Allied division on the offensive.

I did find the battle of Kesternich 13 - 16 Dec which just qualifies where a regiment of the 272nd VG division took the village of Kesternich in the Ardennes using a regiment and defeated a single battalion of the 78th ID, the 2/310th. This was clearly a regimental sized attack that succeeded in producing a minor tactical victory.

[Michael Kenny]

I have one for you:

https://www.amazon.com/Victory-Beyond-T ... 696&sr=8-1

I can't find any examples (in the above book) of them 'holding an extended front' with any great success. It is more of an account of an exercise in futility.
In return I recommend Yelton:

https://www.amazon.co.uk/Hitlers-Volkss ... 0700611924

to read about how much worse it can get.

In my opinion most German Unit accounts are like 'Bloody Streets'. That is tales of the defenders beating off all attacks whilst killing hundreds of enemy soldiers and destroying dozens of tanks. Then a retreat to a position in the rear where there is another stunning defeat/wipe-out of the attackers-followed by more retreats and more stunning victories........

DSC0292f5.jpg

[Tom from Cornwall]

So sure, you can call it my opinion.

It's based on my judgment ...

It's obvious to me that the Wallies could have won the war earlier by invading Europe earlier. It can't have escaped the attention of contemporary leaders that this was true. If everything I've said is true …

So again, your opinion backed up by your interpretation inspired by the way you perceive information available to us only due to hindsight?

The Allies invaded Europe in July 1943, do you mean earlier than that?

It certainly doesn't appear that either Churchill or Brooke thought the war against Germany would have been brought to a swifter conclusion by an unsuccessful premature attempt to invade NW Europe. That absolutely doesn't mean they considered it advantageous to the UK (or British Empire if you prefer) for the war to go on any longer than necessary.

Regards

Tom

[Ружичасти Слон]

So sure, you can call it my opinion.

It's based on my judgment ...

It's obvious to me that the Wallies could have won the war earlier by invading Europe earlier. It can't have escaped the attention of contemporary leaders that this was true. If everything I've said is true …

So again, your opinion backed up by your interpretation inspired by the way you perceive information available to us only due to hindsight?

Yes. When one was read careful what was write tmp you can to see so much is opinion what he want peoples for to believe is fact.

It is trick for to mislead peoples. He often was write datas and source datas and source and then opinion no source but must to believe.

Example on other thread.
Data: Here is evidence from book Filtzer that was be increase in starvation for x%.
Data: Here is evidence from book Filtzer that was x starvation deaths in x factory on x date?
Tmp Opinion: When Germany army was take x land on x date Soviet peoples must to die on starvation so much for to lose war.

It is trick use very often by Amerikan lawyers to win on court. In Amerika court is not about facts is all about who can to sell best story to jury. Lawyers think jury was be to stupid for to understand complex context so lawyers decide to make simple story for to win. Here is evidence suspect was buy knife. Here is evidence suspect was have arguement with wife. Here is evidence suspect was have other girlfriend. Now you can to see suspect was kill wife. Can you to prove suspect was not kill wife? No. So you must to believe me.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Apropos the origins of FDR's desire for the USA to produce huge numbers of aircraft, in David Reynolds book "From Munich to Pearl Harbour" (pp.44-45) he quotes FDR talking at a conference with 'the military and senior administration officials' on 14 November 1938:

the recrudescence of German power at Munich had completely reoriented our own international relations...the United States now faced the possibility of an attack on the Atlantic side in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. He said that this demanded our providing immediately a huge air force so that we do not need to have a huge army to follow that air force. He considered that sending a large army abroad was undesirable and politically out of the question.

Unfortunately, the book isn't referenced - could anyone help with a primary source reference for the minutes (if that is where these words were recorded)?

EDIT to add: I think this article might contain a hint: Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: The Search for United States Policy 1937-42
Mark M. Lowenthal, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 3, The Second World War: Part 2 (Jul., 1981), pp. 413-440.

Has anyone got access to that?

Regards

Tom

[Ружичасти Слон]

Apropos the origins of FDR's desire for the USA to produce huge numbers of aircraft, in David Reynolds book "From Munich to Pearl Harbour" (pp.44-45) he quotes FDR talking at a conference with 'the military and senior administration officials' on 14 November 1938:

the recrudescence of German power at Munich had completely reoriented our own international relations...the United States now faced the possibility of an attack on the Atlantic side in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. He said that this demanded our providing immediately a huge air force so that we do not need to have a huge army to follow that air force. He considered that sending a large army abroad was undesirable and politically out of the question.

Unfortunately, the book isn't referenced - could anyone help with a primary source reference for the minutes (if that is where these words were recorded)?

EDIT to add: I think this article might contain a hint: Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: The Search for United States Policy 1937-42
Mark M. Lowenthal, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 3, The Second World War: Part 2 (Jul., 1981), pp. 413-440.

Has anyone got access to that?

Regards

Tom

Hello Tom

I not know how for to send document to you. Here are some datas.

On page 418 was write

At a meeting with top civil and military advisers on 14 November 1938, the President stated his desire to have an air force in being of 10,000 planes, backed by an annual productive capacity for 10,000 more which could be doubled, to serve as a striking force in support of foreign policy. Roosevelt’s plans were general at best, citing round, almost off-the-cuff figures of types of aircraft, ignoring military concerns about the need for a balanced and effective force. Roosevelt was not interested in a balanced fighting force, but rather a visible deterrent to safeguard the Western Hemisphere.21

Here was a significant change in Roosevelt’s approach, a recognition of the need for military support for his foreign policy. Interviews from the post-Munich period confirmed this shift in the President’s thinking. He now spoke more harshly of Chamberlain, emphasizing what he saw as the Prime Minister’s pessimism.22 Not a natural pessimist himself, Roosevelt resented it in others, especially when he felt he had found a means of solving the problem. Visible air power was such a means.

Notes is

21. Memorandum of White House Conference, 14 November 1938, Miscellaneous Conferences, 1938-1942. RG 165/30. NA.
22. Ickes. op. cit., It, 571; Letter, Roosevelt to Prof. Roger B. Merriman, 15 February 1939, PSF, Box 35: Diplomatic Correspondence, Great Britain. 1939. Franklin D. Roosevelt [hereafter FDR] Library, Hyde Park, NY.