Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

[Ружичасти Слон]

Can anyone help to me to understand what was German estimation of Soviet mobilization timeframe. I did not find anywhere what this is and it seems to me it is most critical to the plan.
...
Does anybody know what German estimation is for time to mobilize total war times Red Army of 11-12 millions mens and about 400 divisions?

Thank you.

1. Hitler and his generals were convinced that the USSR was weaker than France. And why should they have thought differently?
General Marcks believed that Barbarossa would take from 9 to 17 weeks. During this time, the USSR would have lost most of its territory and population. And this means that any mobilization would be already ineffective.
Read this source about the mobilization process in Leningrad in 1939.
http://eprints.tversu.ru/7159/1/%D0%92% ... 23-135.pdf
I give a few quotes:

Many military enlistment offices simply reigned in chaos.Railways were also unprepared for mobilization. The mobilization of vehicles and horses was unsatisfactory.

“The work of the couriers was hampered by the absence of sufficient street lighting. ” It was about the outskirts of the city - Forest, Specific, Ozerki, Shuvalovo. Therefore, according to the source, one hundred couriers did not find the necessary streets and houses and "a huge amount of summons was brought ... back ".

The mobilization mechanism kept failing. It turned out that among those registered in the military commissariats there are many "dead souls". For example, in the Soletsky village council of the Soletsky district such were 67 people out of 269 registered. In the Slutsk region, according to the report of the head of the military department of the regional committee D.N. Sobolev, 924 summons out of 3,223 were returned. … In the Kingisepp District out of 400 summons 180 were returned back - that is, almost half. “Numerous cases of disorder and confusion in registering the military-obligated population,” Sobolev reported, “were also found in other areas of the region”

In some military enlistment offices and at individual assembly points, simply chaos reigned. The Kingisepp District was particularly distinguished. There, according to Sobolev, "the work of the assembly point could not begin due to the lack of ink, pens and preprinted forms of documents ...".

1939! No war in the USSR! No fac..ng Barbarossa! And the "colossus" already has a huge number of dead souls and the absence of pens and ink. And this is in the "capital" city Leningrad. But what about ink and pens in a small town? That's what Adolf had in mind when he mentioned some colossus.
2. One division of the Red Army in 1941 totaled approximately 15,000 soldiers. Let's divide 12 million by 15,000. 12,000,000: 15,000 = 800 divisions. Or am I wrong? How did you calculate?

I know Germany army very much make mostest underestimate of Soviet war fighting motivations. It seems to me they think Red Army will to run away and surrender at first battles.

But not answer problem. How to know victory before war times Red army mobilized if no timescale for war times mobilization. Marcks was write 9-17 weeks for to victory. How to think Red Army need more than 9 weeks?

[AbollonPolweder]

...
I know Germany army very much make mostest underestimate of Soviet war fighting motivations. It seems to me they think Red Army will to run away and surrender at first battles.

But not answer problem. How to know victory before war times Red army mobilized if no timescale for war times mobilization. Marcks was write 9-17 weeks for to victory. How to think Red Army need more than 9 weeks?

1. There were no underestimations from the German military. Do not repeat the propaganda of Kremlin agitators about "Untermenschen". See the Kinzel report from 1.1. 41:

Troops with certain advantages due to their strength and saturation with fire weapons will fight bravely. But the requirements of modern offensive combat, especially in areas of interaction of all military branches, the mass of soldiers is not responding; a solitary fighter will often lack his own initiative. In defense, especially prepared well in advance, the Red Army will be sturdy and stubborn, able to achieve good results. The ability to withstand defeats and provide passive resistance to enemy pressure is particularly characteristic of the Russian character.

The strength of the Red Army lies in the large number of weapons, unpretentiousness, training and courage of a soldier. The natural ally of the army are the vastness of the country and the bad roads.

Weakness lies in the slowness of commanders of all degrees, attachment to a scheme, insufficient for modern conditions of education, fear of responsibility and a perceptible lack of organization everywhere.

2. "But not answer problem". You have invented this problem.

[Ружичасти Слон]

2. "But not answer problem". You have invented this problem.

I not understand.

[Peter89]

Can anyone help to me to understand what was German estimation of Soviet mobilization timeframe. I did not find anywhere what this is and it seems to me it is most critical to the plan.
...
Does anybody know what German estimation is for time to mobilize total war times Red Army of 11-12 millions mens and about 400 divisions?

Thank you.

1. Hitler and his generals were convinced that the USSR was weaker than France. And why should they have thought differently?
General Marcks believed that Barbarossa would take from 9 to 17 weeks. During this time, the USSR would have lost most of its territory and population. And this means that any mobilization would be already ineffective.

I would rephrase this, because The German High Command deliberately ignored all reports that implied that Soviet mobilization of resources, the transfer of complete factories and industrial assets might be possible, and that many of these already working factories are outside the reach of the Wehrmacht, or even outside their imaginative A-A line. France has been preparing for a war with Germany since 1919, they had alliances, supply routes, fortifications, etc. while the SU was relatively isolated, their offensive performance was abysmal and a lot of their weaponry was obsolate or disfunctioning.

The Barbarossa was always based on wishful thinking and not on hard facts. They didn't care too much about the Soviet mobilization, and even if they did, they would have launched the same offensive with the same units at the same time. The Soviets managed to double their standing army and weaponry between 1939-1941, thus giving a bashing capacity to replace their losses. The Germans were more or less aware of this, maybe not the exact figures, but they knew for sure that the Red Army is in numerical and replenishment superiority. But they ignored these facts.

You can always point out the weaknesses of your enemy to raise hope, but it is not an objective assessment. The Hungarian Minister of Defence had the same experience when he visited Hitler in 1942 (see: Nagybaczoni Nagy Vilmos: Végzetes Esztendők), and Hitler failed to mention any problems with his own position and any strengths of the Soviets'. He specifically mentioned that the Soviets lacked manganese, because the Reich took it from them. Which is a very stupid argument, because the Soviets could import it.

If you take a look at the quality and equipment of the Axis divisions that participated in the Barbarossa, you'll see that it was a miracle that they performed as they did.

In 1942 the Germans strategy changed once again, and instead of destroying as much Soviet units as possible from supply bases as close to the front as possible, they tried to take more and more territories in a year when the US entry into the war guaranteed the safety of the sea routes and Allied control over the seas. And by mid-1943, when they shifted their strategy once more and tried to pinch off the Kursk salient full of Soviet troops, the war was fundamentally lost, so they once again ignored their own weaknesses and the strengths of their enemies.

[AbollonPolweder]

2. "But not answer problem". You have invented this problem.

I not understand.

I will try to explain.
1. Why German generals before the start of the Barbarossa did not consider in detail the mobilization capacities of the USSR and did not prepare plans to combat the new formations? The answer can be found in Halder's diary.

«8 July 1941. … Activation of new units, certainly on any larger scale will fail for lack of officers, specialists and Artillery materiel. This holds particularly for their Armor, which even before the war was sadly lacking in officers, drivers and radio operators, as well as signal equipment.”

. «6 July. … Russian attack method : three-minute artillery barrage, then pause, then Infantry attacking as much as twelve ranks deep, without heavy weapon support; the men start hurrahing from far off. Incredibly high Russian losses.”

Thus we can conclude that the German command took into account the possible mobilization of the enormous human resources of the USSR, but believed that this would be the mobilization of "cannon fodder". Of course, you can argue that the Halder quote of July 8 cannot be an example of the OKH's pre-war plans. It's true. But Halder’s opinion could not have appeared impromptu on July 8, right?
2. The situation with logistics is even simpler. Prewar logistics plans were built on the basis of operational plans of the OKH, that is, to Smolensk. In early July, they began planning already to Moscow.

«3 July. … Future plans: a) For the continuance of the Russian operations it will be of primary importance to gain a new jump-off line between Smolensk and Moscow, and another base around Leningrad. From here we could proceed to the capture of Northern Russia and the industrial region around Moscow and subsequently, in conjunction witn AGp. South, of the Donjets industrial region.
… Wagner (Gen Qu) : a) Summary of casualty reports, booty reports etc. b) Organization of Rear Areas and assignment of troops to these c) Review of plans for moving forward our supply bases after the Dvina Dniepr line has been gained. d) Spare parts for tanks and tank replacements.”

10 July. “b) AGp. North: Main- supply base has been shifted forward to the Dvina. AGp. Center: Main supply base has been shifted forward to the line Borrisov-Dniepr. AGp. South: Situation at present not.yet settled enough for firm planning.”

Note Wagner’s phrase: “AGp. South: Situation at present not yet settled enough for firm planning.”
It is useless to prepare logistic plans from Berlin to the Volga before the war. As Wagner said, the situation may not be clear.

[Ружичасти Слон]

I will try to explain.
1. Why German generals before the start of the Barbarossa did not consider in detail the mobilization capacities of the USSR and did not prepare plans to combat the new formations? The answer can be found in Halder's diary.

«8 July 1941. … Activation of new units, certainly on any larger scale will fail for lack of officers, specialists and Artillery materiel. This holds particularly for their Armor, which even before the war was sadly lacking in officers, drivers and radio operators, as well as signal equipment.”

. «6 July. … Russian attack method : three-minute artillery barrage, then pause, then Infantry attacking as much as twelve ranks deep, without heavy weapon support; the men start hurrahing from far off. Incredibly high Russian losses.”

Thus we can conclude that the German command took into account the possible mobilization of the enormous human resources of the USSR, but believed that this would be the mobilization of "cannon fodder". Of course, you can argue that the Halder quote of July 8 cannot be an example of the OKH's pre-war plans. It's true. But Halder’s opinion could not have appeared impromptu on July 8, right?

I think not possible to say right or not right. Halder was write many things about that time. Not much coherent. One day war is won and Red army already destroyed and nothings for to fight. Next day complaining about Red army fighting very hard and making much problems.

What means Halder "activation of new units"? What was "new" unit?

Germany army intelligence was estimate 11-12 millions troops and about 400 divisions already in january 1941. Who was new units? Was Halder think already destroy 11-12 millions and 400 divisions? Was Halder think already destroy total war times mobilization?

No. Halder was think units already explained to him 6 months before are "new" units. So what that means?

2. "But not answer problem". You have invented this problem.

I not understand.

I still not understand.

[Aida1]

I will try to explain.
1. Why German generals before the start of the Barbarossa did not consider in detail the mobilization capacities of the USSR and did not prepare plans to combat the new formations? The answer can be found in Halder's diary.

«8 July 1941. … Activation of new units, certainly on any larger scale will fail for lack of officers, specialists and Artillery materiel. This holds particularly for their Armor, which even before the war was sadly lacking in officers, drivers and radio operators, as well as signal equipment.”

. «6 July. … Russian attack method : three-minute artillery barrage, then pause, then Infantry attacking as much as twelve ranks deep, without heavy weapon support; the men start hurrahing from far off. Incredibly high Russian losses.”

Thus we can conclude that the German command took into account the possible mobilization of the enormous human resources of the USSR, but believed that this would be the mobilization of "cannon fodder". Of course, you can argue that the Halder quote of July 8 cannot be an example of the OKH's pre-war plans. It's true. But Halder’s opinion could not have appeared impromptu on July 8, right?

I think not possible to say right or not right. Halder was write many things about that time. Not much coherent. One day war is won and Red army already destroyed and nothings for to fight. Next day complaining about Red army fighting very hard and making much problems.

What means Halder "activation of new units"? What was "new" unit?

Germany army intelligence was estimate 11-12 millions troops and about 400 divisions already in january 1941. Who was new units? Was Halder think already destroy 11-12 millions and 400 divisions? Was Halder think already destroy total war times mobilization?

No. Halder was think units already explained to him 6 months before are "new" units. So what that means?

You are confused. The 11 million was an estimation of the total number of men that could theoretically be mobilised. But it was doubted so many could effectively be mobilised because of the resulting lack of labour and the lack of officers and material( Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion E Klink Fischer 1991 p 255). The strength of the field army in case of war was estimated at 4 million men (Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion p 256).

[Aida1]

2. The situation with logistics is even simpler. Prewar logistics plans were built on the basis of operational plans of the OKH, that is, to Smolensk. In early July, they began planning already to Moscow.

«3 July. … Future plans: a) For the continuance of the Russian operations it will be of primary importance to gain a new jump-off line between Smolensk and Moscow, and another base around Leningrad. From here we could proceed to the capture of Northern Russia and the industrial region around Moscow and subsequently, in conjunction witn AGp. South, of the Donjets industrial region.
… Wagner (Gen Qu) : a) Summary of casualty reports, booty reports etc. b) Organization of Rear Areas and assignment of troops to these c) Review of plans for moving forward our supply bases after the Dvina Dniepr line has been gained. d) Spare parts for tanks and tank replacements.”

10 July. “b) AGp. North: Main- supply base has been shifted forward to the Dvina. AGp. Center: Main supply base has been shifted forward to the line Borrisov-Dniepr. AGp. South: Situation at present not.yet settled enough for firm planning.”

Note Wagner’s phrase: “AGp. South: Situation at present not yet settled enough for firm planning.”
It is useless to prepare logistic plans from Berlin to the Volga before the war. As Wagner said, the situation may not be clear.

Explained in detail in Der Angriff auf die Sowjetunion Fischer 1991 pp 1138-1168.

[DavidFrankenberg]

USSR mobilized like 100 millions men from 41 till 45.

In june 41 5 millions were mobilized.

[AbollonPolweder]

USSR mobilized like 100 millions men from 41 till 45.

In june 41 5 millions were mobilized.

As for the 100 million mobilized men, you greatly exaggerate. Most likely about 50 million men, women and minors were mobilized.

[mezsat2]

The critical point is not the quantity of mobilization, but it's quality. Diverting the panzers from Moscow in Aug. 41 turned out to be a tactical victory but a strategic disaster. The horde of Soviet troops around Kiev posed no danger to the flank of Army group center because they were poorly led and equipped, and were nevertheless pinned down on the Dnieper by Von Rundstedt's forces.

Taking all those prisoners was more of a hindrance than a benefit at the time, as the system of utilizing them as Hiwis and/or labor in the Reich had yet to be developed.

That being said, the underestimation of Soviet forces became a huge problem once those forces had been pumped full of new Russian armor and Allied lend/lease supplies.

[Max Payload]

The horde of Soviet troops around Kiev posed no danger to the flank of Army group center because they were poorly led and equipped, and were nevertheless pinned down on the Dnieper by Von Rundstedt's forces.

The forces of Central Front were not facing von Rundstedt, they were a threat to the AGC flank and they were adequately equipped.

[Art]

A horde of Soviet troops at Kiev inflicted heavy casualties to the German 6 Army at Kiev and Malin - almost 34 000 men in August 1941. Which was more than monthly casualties of the same 6 Army in the battle of Stalingrad and more than monthly losses suffered by any other German army in "Barbarossa". It should also be noted that the abortive attack on Kiev was one of few German operations of such scale in that period which happened to be a complete failure. So problems at Kiev were quite real

[TheMarcksPlan]

A horde of Soviet troops at Kiev inflicted heavy casualties to the German 6 Army at Kiev and Malin - almost 34 000 men in August 1941. Which was more than monthly casualties of the same 6 Army in the battle of Stalingrad and more than monthly losses suffered by any other German army in "Barbarossa". It should also be noted that the abortive attack on Kiev was one of few German operations of such scale in that period which happened to be a complete failure. So problems at Kiev were quite real

Is there a good compendium of monthly German casualties by army?

I completely agree with your assessment that Southwest Front was a serious challenge to Ostheer before its destruction. Kirponos was an excellent general who might have become as famous as Zhukov had he found his way out of the trap (and assuming Stalin didn't shoot him). The early battles between Rundstedt and Kirponos were marked by the latter's need to comply with deluded demands to drive to Lublin and to launch counterattacks wily-nily, before proper assembly of forces. Absent Stavka's interference, Uman never would have happened and Southwest Front would have retreated in good order while significantly bloodying Army Group South. If it's then allowed to abandon the Kiev salient when Guderian turns south (as Kirponos begged), the '41 story would have been massively different. The Red Army probably holds the Donbas and Kharkov and Kirponos - rather than Timoshenko - leads stronger forces in Spring '42 that might have precluded any success in Blau.

[Art]

Is there a good compendium of monthly German casualties by army?

https://web.archive.org/web/20161102103 ... dec41.html