Der Alte Fritz on O'Brien's How the War was Won

[AbollonPolweder]

Well that would just be more muddled thinking uninformed by facts. Delivery to Naples or Brindisi was by Italian rail for the most part. It’s not like it could have done much to support the East. Delivery across the Med was in German and Italian merchants which were not going anywhere else either. The one big impact was on oil. But that didn’t come until early 1942.

So it doesn’t matter which way you want to slice it, the vast majority of transferable transport assets was in the east. Yes proportionally the Afrika-Korps had a higher slice. But it was only two divisions. The slice could have been 10 times higher and it would have been negligible, as shown.

Thank you sir! I appreciate your unmuddled thinking. But I remind you that you quoted Wagner's data for April 26, 1941. There is no war with the USSR yet. But British aircraft could bomb Italian ports and railway junctions. Right? Therefore, Italian merchants could simply not deliver that "small load" to the target. And one more moment. Are you sure that stg44 understood "transport assets" as "support apparatus"? I ask this question because of my poor knowledge of English.

[Yuri]

Well that would just be more muddled thinking uninformed by facts. Delivery to Naples or Brindisi was by Italian rail for the most part. It’s not like it could have done much to support the East. Delivery across the Med was in German and Italian merchants which were not going anywhere else either. The one big impact was on oil. But that didn’t come until early 1942.

So it doesn’t matter which way you want to slice it, the vast majority of transferable transport assets was in the east. Yes proportionally the Afrika-Korps had a higher slice. But it was only two divisions. The slice could have been 10 times higher and it would have been negligible, as shown.

Thank you sir! I appreciate your unmuddled thinking. But I remind you that you quoted Wagner's data for April 26, 1941. There is no war with the USSR yet. But British aircraft could bomb Italian ports and railway junctions. Right? Therefore, Italian merchants could simply not deliver that "small load" to the target. And one more moment. Are you sure that stg44 understood "transport assets" as "support apparatus"? I ask this question because of my poor knowledge of English.

In such cases, in Rossi saying: Raz poshla takaya p'yanka - rezh posledniy ogurets = Well, okay, if went such a binge - cut the last cucumber.
Let and me remind you of something.
Yes, 26.4.41 there is no war, but there is transportation of the 20th mountain Army to Northern Norway and Finland. Including by sea. "There is no war with the USSR yet. But British aircraft could bomb German, Danish and Norwegian ports and railway junctions. Right?"
At the same time, the number of the 20th mountain army is many times higher than the number of the Afrika Korps.

[Urmel]

Well that would just be more muddled thinking uninformed by facts. Delivery to Naples or Brindisi was by Italian rail for the most part. It’s not like it could have done much to support the East. Delivery across the Med was in German and Italian merchants which were not going anywhere else either. The one big impact was on oil. But that didn’t come until early 1942.

So it doesn’t matter which way you want to slice it, the vast majority of transferable transport assets was in the east. Yes proportionally the Afrika-Korps had a higher slice. But it was only two divisions. The slice could have been 10 times higher and it would have been negligible, as shown.

Thank you sir! I appreciate your unmuddled thinking. But I remind you that you quoted Wagner's data for April 26, 1941. There is no war with the USSR yet. But British aircraft could bomb Italian ports and railway junctions. Right? Therefore, Italian merchants could simply not deliver that "small load" to the target. And one more moment. Are you sure that stg44 understood "transport assets" as "support apparatus"? I ask this question because of my poor knowledge of English.

The war with the Soviet Union is two months away, and the numbers relate to those planned for that war. Transport through Italy to Naples was not affected by bombing. Naples and other southern ports were sometimes attacked, but neither those attacks nor the interdiction attempts stopped transports.

[AbollonPolweder]

...
The war with the Soviet Union is two months away, and the numbers relate to those planned for that war. Transport through Italy to Naples was not affected by bombing. Naples and other southern ports were sometimes attacked, but neither those attacks nor the interdiction attempts stopped transports.

You shouldn't have concentrated on the planned truck columns. The concept of "support apparatus", which was used by stg44, is much wider than transport. When we talk about a «support» or a «supply», we must take into account not only the number of machines, devices but also the number of personal. It is known that the Wehrmacht used Soviet steam locomotive brigades, not to mention HiVi.
Rommel is credited with the expression that the war in the desert is heaven for the commander, but hell for the intendant. Or was Rommel referring to the Italian intendants?
When discussing, it is desirable to adhere to the law of identity, that is, talk about the same subject that your counterpart is talking about.

[Urmel]

Thank you for the advice. It is also advisable to know what you're talking about, and we can clearly see that stg44 does not do so. He is throwing around concepts and ideas with zero idea of the underlying data. I counsel you not to follow his path.

If you want to add to the discussion instead, maybe take time and explain how the 'much larger support apparatus' was composed, and how much of it was actually Wehrmacht-owned or even German. The reason I focus on trucks is because that's where we have the numbers, and I have already dismissed the other elements. German merchants in the Med cannot help the Heer in Russia. The Italian railways cannot help the Heer in Russia. That leaves i) trucks and ii) transport planes.

[Ружичасти Слон]

When discussing, it is desirable to adhere to the law of identity, that is, talk about the same subject that your counterpart is talking about.

Stg44 and urmel was be discuss compare amount effort on front Soviet union and on front Libya.

Stg44 was write fallacious claim on mostest effort was be front Libya. He was not give some evidences or datas only wave on hand.

Urmel was give evidences and datas on mostest effort was be on front Soviet union.

Then you was write

Doesn’t it seem to you that speaking of a «support apparatus» stg44 means not so much a «transport tonnage» but a logistics of it? It is one thing to deliver cargo by land for several hundred km in peacetime and it is quite another thing to transport much less
cargo by sea for several thousand km, being at war? It is possible that the latter will cost more. If you count in dollars ... or marks.

Thank you sir! I appreciate your unmuddled thinking. But I remind you that you quoted Wagner's data for April 26, 1941. There is no war with the USSR yet. But British aircraft could bomb Italian ports and railway junctions. Right? Therefore, Italian merchants could simply not deliver that "small load" to the target. And one more moment. Are you sure that stg44 understood "transport assets" as "support apparatus"? I ask this question because of my poor knowledge of English.

When discussing, it is desirable to adhere to the law of identity, that is, talk about the same subject that your counterpart is talking about.

Have you some evidences and datas on topic compare effort front Soviet union and front Libya?

[AbollonPolweder]

Thank you for the advice. It is also advisable to know what you're talking about, and we can clearly see that stg44 does not do so. He is throwing around concepts and ideas with zero idea of the underlying data. I counsel you not to follow his path.

If you want to add to the discussion instead, maybe take time and explain how the 'much larger support apparatus' was composed, and how much of it was actually Wehrmacht-owned or even German. The reason I focus on trucks is because that's where we have the numbers, and I have already dismissed the other elements. German merchants in the Med cannot help the Heer in Russia. The Italian railways cannot help the Heer in Russia. That leaves i) trucks and ii) transport planes.

If you have noticed, I am only asking questions and expressing doubts, for I have never been seriously interested in the topics "Germany's war with the Allies" and "Germany's war in Africa". Especially that forum rules do not prohibit asking questions. Or I'm wrong?
Let me go back to Wagner's data on the number of trucks for Ost. I specially highlighted the word "planned". Wagner planned this amount because OKH initially relied on road transport in the East but then decided to actively use the USSR railways. Plans tend to be changeable. Don’t they? Could this affect the "planned use” of the tracks? This is a question, not a statement, just in case.

[Urmel]

I'm sorry, I'm not interested in answering your questions. Have a good day.

[TheMarcksPlan]

There may be another large oversight in O'Brien's analysis of land v. sea/air warfare expenditure:

Around page 23-28 of HWW he discusses, and gives tables for, German weapons and ammunition production, from which he argues that the Heer got only ~1/3 of German war production.

The oversight is that weapons and ammo aren't nearly the whole story: soldiers need clothing, non-weaponry equipment (e.g. field kitchens, clothing, shovels), engineering equipment (e.g. bulldozers, bridging), and food - military rations were up to twice as high as civilian.

For the U.S. Army, Engineering and Quartermaster procurement was ~1/3 of the total. (depending on how you slice Eng. and Quarter between ground and air forces). See Global Logistics and Strategy, 1940-43 appendex B. https://history.army.mil/html/books/001 ... ub_1-5.pdf

O'Brien's source for the relevant diagrams is the USSBS European Report. I don't a copy handy and couldn't find the specific report online (anyone have it?). But in other USSBS reports it appears clear that weapons and ammo mean those items only - not quartermaster etc.

Obviously if O'Brien completely overlooked these other factors it's another big hole in the analysis.

[Urmel]

Thanks. Nice find.

[tramonte]

In a review of O'Brien's book, Mark Harrison opines that, "If the Soviet Union had lost the war on the Eastern front, the air-sea battle that
was fought in the Atlantic and Pacific would have become far more difficult." https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics ... rrison.pdf

Allied beat Germany in fall of 1918 completely and i won't see things anyway different in 1944 even if their primitive land army (let us not be fooled by their panzer propaganda films, focus their million horses) with down falling Luftwaffe somehow have managed to smash Soviet Union. They were lacking oil and they were lacking strategic weapons to shake Allied. Even their man pool (thanks to Weimar Republic's very low birthrate era) was far more smaller than that of Kaiser. In fact Germany had much better chances to win in 1914-1918 than in 1939-45. Mobile warfare, much more advanced air war made Germany generally more vulnerable.

[tramonte]

It's worth to reckon that actually Japan outproduced Soviet Union until US Navy and US Navy Air Force cut links between Japan and their strategic resources in East India.

1943:
Steel ingots: Japan 8.8 million metric tons, USSR 8.5 million
Coal: 117 million metric tons, USSR 93 million
Iron ore: Japan 7.5 million metric tons, USSR 9.3 million
Aluminium: Japan 144 thousand metric tons, USSR 62 thousand metric tons

And when it comes to technology level Japan was far more advanced than USSR.

[TheMarcksPlan]

In a review of O'Brien's book, Mark Harrison opines that, "If the Soviet Union had lost the war on the Eastern front, the air-sea battle that
was fought in the Atlantic and Pacific would have become far more difficult." https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/economics ... rrison.pdf

Allied beat Germany in fall of 1918 completely and i won't see things anyway different in 1944 even if their primitive land army (let us not be fooled by their panzer propaganda films, focus their million horses) with down falling Luftwaffe somehow have managed to smash Soviet Union. They were lacking oil and they were lacking strategic weapons to shake Allied. Even their man pool (thanks to Weimar Republic's very low birthrate era) was far more smaller than that of Kaiser. In fact Germany had much better chances to win in 1914-1918 than in 1939-45. Mobile warfare, much more advanced air war made Germany generally more vulnerable.

Opinion noted. Thanks.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Time for more debunking of O'Brien...

Here's the U.S.-focused table, in the intro chapter "The Preponderane of Air and Sea Production," from which he sets up his entire high-level argument:



Notice something obviously weird about these figures? I do: U.S. munitions production nearly quadruples between 4Q '42 and 1Q '43. Huh?

I don't have access to the given source - "FDR PSF 172-2." (probably in the FDR papers collection?)

I do, however, have a source for total procurement by the Army, broken down between Army Air Forces and Ground Forces ("Service Troops" or "ASF" below - a confusing label given that term's use to denote logistical troops in other documents):



Now this is for total procurement, so a different standard from O'Brien's "combat munitions" - pointed out analytical error of looking only at combat munitions upthread.

We get a sense of ASF/AGF "combat munitions" procurement as a proportion of total further down in the same document:



As you can see by combining my two images, ASF's ordnance procurement was not quite half ($33-34bn) of its '42-'45 ~$68.9mil total procurement.

For the AAF, the same source (U.S. Army statistical summary on procurement) says 82.5% of procurement was for aircraft (p.14): $35.9bn out of $43.5bn total.

The U.S. Army spent as much (~$35bn) on ordnance procurement for ground forces as it did on procuring aircraft.

-------------------------------------------

This combination of errors - ignoring non-ordnance expenditure and using facially absurd tables as a paramount source - further calls into question O'Brien's central argument.

To complete the U.S. analysis, I'd need similar procurement statistics for the Navy, especially one that breaks out expenditure on naval aircraft (note, however, that the Army analysis states it includes aircraft re-assigned to the Navy so already includes at least some naval aircraft expenditure).

Does anyone have such a source?