Why didn't the US or UK fight on the Eastern Front?

[Sheldrake]

The US forces assigned to the MTO could have instead been moved to the USSR, while UK naval and air forces acted as a containment force in the Med to bomb and harass the Axis forces in the region. All German forces that had been assigned to defend Italy after the invasion of Sicily would have simply remained in the USSR, either way Americans still would have fought them.

If the US had really focused on attacking the Eastern Front using the Italian designated units with the USSR, I believe they could have sped up the end of the war by 6 months to a year. There was more space for the Soviets to attack along, thus the defending Germans were always at the disadvantage. Invading and liberating France was not necessary to reach Berlin and end the war, if the Germans are fighting the USSR and the US on the same front they would have most likely weakened their Western Front to compensate for their rapidly increasing losses in the East. UK and US forces based in England could still conduct D-Day without having lost any combat effectiveness.

There are three problems with this proposition

1. Logistics. The resources that could be sent to the USSR were limited by the extreme distances and shipping capacity. The allies used the limited cargo space sent to the USSR what would provide the biggest effect - logistic vehicles- Studebakers - tanks and aircraft. Imagine if a twelve division US Army group was going to fight in the Ukraine. Where does it get its 7,200 tons per day of supplies? What is the path of a infantry replacement from the Continental USA? How are US levels of artillery ammunition provided? It is over twice as far from New York to Kiev via Murmansk as it is to Algiers or the UK. It is even longer to get to Kiev from the West Coast of the USA while avoiding Japan. So the US could have a tiny army in the Ukraine or the big one they built to fight in Europe.

2. Politics. The US never allowed foreign governments to command their troops in WW2. In the MTO they were under an Allied Command structure with a balance of US and British commanders. Tunisia, Sicily and Normandy were mounted with Eisenhower as supreme commander with British land sea and air commanders at army group level. The idea that the democratic US government would dispatch half a million men under Koniev or Zhukov is nonsense. The Red Army had entirely different attitudes to risk and casualties to those of a democracy.

In June 1944, the distance to the Elbe was about the same from the "Omaha Beach" and from Vitebsk. Russians and Americans reached Elbe also about in the same time. However, the Americans along the way spent 15 tonnes of ammo per day per every 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month (KIA, WIA, MIA and POW included). Soviet troops spent three times less shells, but have losses of 8.5% men per month. I.e. speed was provided by spending lives.

https://forums.spacebattles.com/threads ... w2.308559/
There was enough political turbulence when the Texan National Guard lost a couple of thousand men at the Rapido river. Imagine the backlash if US soldiers had been sent forwards on the Seelow heights? Neither the British nor the US entirely trusted the USSR. Even if Roosevelt did Churchill certainly did not. Stalin never confided the details of plans with the allies. The shuttle bombing using airfields in the Ukraine was a disaster. The Red Army's inaction at Warsaw in 1944 made it obvious that Soviet and the west had different objectives.

3. Strategic logic. At any one time the soviets only launched operations on only a fraction of the huge Eastern Front. There were operations in other places as diversions or to tie up German troops. These troops may as well as be in Italy or Tunisia. It made a lot more logistic sense for the US to deploy its land and air forces where they could be supplied. Dead Germans were as dead in Tunisia as they were in the Ukraine.
The Allied strategy evolved through a series of planning conferences starting before the USA entered the war. They agreed to tackle Germany First and the US idea was to launch a cross channel assault as soon as possible. Axis success in the first half of 1942 put the allies on the defensive. Stalin pushed for a cross channel assault to distract the Germans - he didn't ask for troops for Stalingrad.
By mid 1942 Op Torch looked to be the best use of the forces that could be assembled across the Atlantic that year. The Tunisian campaign resulted in comparable strategic success to Stalingrad, and may have contributed to the latter operation by diverting German aircraft and troops from Stalingrad, arguably the main point of effort.

While the Italian campaign is controversial, it did result in the defection of Italy and the replacement of Italian troops by Germans on the Eastern Front and in the Balkans as well as the deployment of an army group to Italy. These took place during the summer battles of 1943. Counterfactuals cannot prove anything. Were a US Army to have been deployed on the Eastern front it would be as likely to postpone the end of the war as advance it.

[Volyn]

There are three problems with this proposition

1. Logistics. The resources that could be sent to the USSR were limited by the extreme distances and shipping capacity. The allies used the limited cargo space sent to the USSR what would provide the biggest effect - logistic vehicles- Studebakers - tanks and aircraft. Imagine if a twelve division US Army group was going to fight in the Ukraine. Where does it get its 7,200 tons per day of supplies? What is the path of a infantry replacement from the Continental USA? How are US levels of artillery ammunition provided? It is over twice as far from New York to Kiev via Murmansk as it is to Algiers or the UK. It is even longer to get to Kiev from the West Coast of the USA while avoiding Japan. So the US could have a tiny army in the Ukraine or the big one they built to fight in Europe.

The point against the use of a large US Army ground force is valid, that is why it was far more feasible to use some sort of an Air Wing, or a smaller sized task force, to operate within the USSR with an air to ground attack role. There would have been plenty of opportunities for Allied pilots to attack German ground forces, and an air group is versatile enough that it can leave the region if required.

The example of the French air regiment shows that it worked out very well and they did have a meaningful contribution to the battles they fought in. If the US and UK had sent a spare air group they would have easily been supplied by the Soviets and material brought in by Lend-Lease, which was significant. As I said before, the Soviets were already using American P-39 aircraft so the Allied air group would be equipped with the same aircraft for simplicity; the P-39 had an excellent ground attack record on the Eastern Front in the hands of Soviet pilots. So the logistics issue is really a non-issue if related to smaller scale combat units, the Soviets had enough supplies to share with the French so this was never a problem.

2. Politics. The US never allowed foreign governments to command their troops in WW2. In the MTO they were under an Allied Command structure with a balance of US and British commanders. Tunisia, Sicily and Normandy were mounted with Eisenhower as supreme commander with British land sea and air commanders at army group level. The idea that the democratic US government would dispatch half a million men under Koniev or Zhukov is nonsense. The Red Army had entirely different attitudes to risk and casualties to those of a democracy.

In June 1944, the distance to the Elbe was about the same from the "Omaha Beach" and from Vitebsk. Russians and Americans reached Elbe also about in the same time. However, the Americans along the way spent 15 tonnes of ammo per day per every 10,000 personnel and lost an average of 3.8% of troops per month (KIA, WIA, MIA and POW included). Soviet troops spent three times less shells, but have losses of 8.5% men per month. I.e. speed was provided by spending lives.

https://forums.spacebattles.com/threads ... w2.308559/
There was enough political turbulence when the Texan National Guard lost a couple of thousand men at the Rapido river. Imagine the backlash if US soldiers had been sent forwards on the Seelow heights? Neither the British nor the US entirely trusted the USSR. Even if Roosevelt did Churchill certainly did not. Stalin never confided the details of plans with the allies. The shuttle bombing using airfields in the Ukraine was a disaster. The Red Army's inaction at Warsaw in 1944 made it obvious that Soviet and the west had different objectives.

All of this would preclude the use of a large number of formations sent to the USSR, but none of it would have stopped the use of a smaller sized battle group, a Corps or even a Division. What difference would it make to any American where a soldier lost their life considering the whole planet was a potential battlefield?

The point I am raising is to ask why US or UK combat forces were not deployed to battle in any kind of way along the Eastern Front? Small scale interventions would have been a major symbolic victory for the Allies and their cause, and that would have had much larger positive implications for the future of the war and geopolitics in general. The Flying Tigers in China shows us that such a force, albeit small, played a major role in delaying the Japanese and frustrating their plans of Chinese conquest for a sustained period of time. They are now immortalized in legend and the same would have been said for any other group operating in the USSR.

3. Strategic logic. At any one time the soviets only launched operations on only a fraction of the huge Eastern Front. There were operations in other places as diversions or to tie up German troops. These troops may as well as be in Italy or Tunisia. It made a lot more logistic sense for the US to deploy its land and air forces where they could be supplied. Dead Germans were as dead in Tunisia as they were in the Ukraine.
The Allied strategy evolved through a series of planning conferences starting before the USA entered the war. They agreed to tackle Germany First and the US idea was to launch a cross channel assault as soon as possible. Axis success in the first half of 1942 put the allies on the defensive. Stalin pushed for a cross channel assault to distract the Germans - he didn't ask for troops for Stalingrad.
By mid 1942 Op Torch looked to be the best use of the forces that could be assembled across the Atlantic that year. The Tunisian campaign resulted in comparable strategic success to Stalingrad, and may have contributed to the latter operation by diverting German aircraft and troops from Stalingrad, arguably the main point of effort.

This may be the reason why Eisenhower and his men were not sent to Moscow, but it does not preclude any use of US combat support on the Eastern Front. Was there any official reason cited for not allowing Americans to fight alongside the Soviets? If the main Allied contingent gets bottled up in Italy why is that helpful to the war effort?

Armored forces were hampered badly in Italy, so send a few to the USSR. Fighting in the Ukraine gives tank commanders and their crews the best opportunity to make use of their armored forces, this is why it would also have been feasible to send one or two US Armored Divisions to fight as part of a joint Soviet-US task force, no different then the UK-US variety.

These armor crews could also be trained to use Soviet tanks/weaponry, it would not be that difficult; these would be trained men receiving further training. Of course the Soviets had different strategies and morals with regards to use of their soldiers, however, that does not mean they would use the Americans in the same manner. Strategies would be agreed upon and it would be up to the US forces to fight their way to their objectives, using their own methods. Any US or UK General would have the authority and latitude to address any combat scenario as needed, no doubt such precautions would be agreed upon in advance of their arrival. American sentiment at home would have been accepting, there was no reason not to, the USSR never killed Americans in combat during WW2.

While the Italian campaign is controversial, it did result in the defection of Italy and the replacement of Italian troops by Germans on the Eastern Front and in the Balkans as well as the deployment of an army group to Italy. These took place during the summer battles of 1943. Counterfactuals cannot prove anything. Were a US Army to have been deployed on the Eastern front it would be as likely to postpone the end of the war as advance it.

The surrender of Italy was only a formality, they were totally useless to the Germans by that point in the war, also this had very serious negative consequences for the people of Italy and the Italian Jewish population due to the German occupation. Nothing was gained in Italy expect a reduction of German forces in the East, but that in itself does not mean it was the best use of the MTO forces. The only two legitimate reasons the Allies used to invade Italy was under the mistaken belief that it was poorly defended and that it would be quickly taken, both of which were proven disastrously false. Therefore, was the option of using these forces to fight in the Ukraine, provided certain issues were resolved, a better one? How could it have been any worse of a decision then to invade Italy?

[Volyn]

One should also note that British naval and air forces were in Murmansk Russia. Covering the vital port for Lend-Lease supplies into the Soviet Union.

No. 151 Wing RAF was part of a brief British contingent at Murmansk and they did have an affect on the early days of the battle, however, they only remained there for 5 weeks. Their mission was to train the Soviet pilots to use their aircraft and to defend the Allied ships that were in port, but not to actively participate in the defense of the USSR.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._151_Wing_RAF

The US and UK could have easily dispatched a few combat Squadrons or even an Air Wing to the Caucasus region in mid to late 1942 to assist during that campaign. If 1942 is too early, then by 1943 there was certainly enough air power in the MTO and ETO to potentially siphon off a few to the USSR.

I agree that employment of Allied air force was the most realistic option. For reasons of logistics that force would be most easy to operate in the Far North (Murmansk) or in the South (Caucasus). Possible tasks for the Murmansk force could include German shipping along the Norwegian coast, nickel mines at Petsamo and fighter protection of the Murmansk port. Possible tasks for the Caucasus force - Axis shipping in the Black Sea, Romanian oil fields, fighter protection of Soviet ships and port. These were areas where some important material results could be achieved.

The UK was able to get an air group to Murmansk and it did achieve some combat success while it was there, then how was it Stalin could not convince Churchill to send a more permanent or semi-permanent air group to help defend the region?

Churchill knew how necessary it was for the USSR to maintain air security, considering he underwent the same ordeal previously in London. The Battle of Britain was over, and the threat to the UK was lessened enough that it would have allowed a few RAF squadrons to fight in the Arctic of North Russia.

[Art]

No. 151 Wing RAF was part of a brief British contingent at Murmansk and they did have an affect on the early days of the battle, however, they only remained there for 5 weeks. Their mission was to train the Soviet pilots to use their aircraft and to defend the Allied ships that were in port, but not to actively participate in the defense of the USSR.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No._151_Wing_RAF

British submarines operated from Murmansk as well.

[LineDoggie]

I have not seen this topic discussed before so I am not sure which thread is best -

1. If Lend-Lease materials could be brought to the USSR via Murmansk or Iran, why didn't the US or UK commit any military forces to fight the Germans on the Eastern Front?

Simple answer, Why would they?

2. The Free French sent Escadron de Chasse 2/30 Normandie-Niemen and they used Soviet fighter aircraft/weaponry; was it not possible for either the US or UK to have done something similar, perhaps by sending armored troop regiments and supplied them with Soviet armor?

Since WW1 US forces fought as a homogeneous Army under American Commanders, Why fight at the end of a long logistical tail under a unfamiliar leadership and lets call a spade a spade- a Tyrannical USSR who didnt give a rats rectum for the lives of their own men....

3. Could Italy have been bypassed in 1943 after the Allies had cleared North Africa, and instead send those Divisions to the USSR in order to help speed up the liberation of Soviet territory until France could be invaded in 1944?

Possibly but again Why Would they?

[Sheldrake]

The surrender of Italy was only a formality, they were totally useless to the Germans by that point in the war, also this had very serious negative consequences for the people of Italy and the Italian Jewish population due to the German occupation. Nothing was gained in Italy expect a reduction of German forces in the East, but that in itself does not mean it was the best use of the MTO forces. The only two legitimate reasons the Allies used to invade Italy was under the mistaken belief that it was poorly defended and that it would be quickly taken, both of which were proven disastrously false. Therefore, was the option of using these forces to fight in the Ukraine, provided certain issues were resolved, a better one? How could it have been any worse of a decision then to invade Italy?

Two problems with this statement

1. It is factually inaccurate. While the Italian armed forces were not the equivalent of the German, Soviet, British or American forces they were far from useless. As an Ally of the Germans the Italians garrisoned Italy itself and much of the Balkans. In June 1942 there were three German divisions in north Africa, none in Italy and nine in the Balkans. By June 1944 there were twenty eight German divisions in Italy and twenty four in the Balkans - that is forty divisions more than two years earlier - enough to have made a big difference in Normandy or on the east front.

2. The main reason for the invasion of Italy was to remove Italy from the war. It was the rationale behind Op Avalanche. The British CIGS saw Italy as a useful side show to engage German troops at a point where they could not bring overwhelming force to expel the allies.

[Yuri]

... and lets call a spade a spade- a Tyrannical USSR who didnt give a rats rectum for the lives of their own men....[/b][/color]

If the "tyrannical USSR", and you are all so morally democratic, how can your morally democratic principles be combined with a request to this tyrant to start a war against your enemy in the Pacific?
Russians in such cases say so: "Ty ili krestik snimi ili trusiki oden'" =
= You either take off the small cross or put on your small underpants.
Rude, of course, but very accurate for your sentence.

[Volyn]

1. If Lend-Lease materials could be brought to the USSR via Murmansk or Iran, why didn't the US or UK commit any military forces to fight the Germans on the Eastern Front?

Simple answer, Why would they?

Because they are Allies and even a small task force would be a significant symbolic event.

2. The Free French sent Escadron de Chasse 2/30 Normandie-Niemen and they used Soviet fighter aircraft/weaponry; was it not possible for either the US or UK to have done something similar, perhaps by sending armored troop regiments and supplied them with Soviet armor?

Since WW1 US forces fought as a homogeneous Army under American Commanders, Why fight at the end of a long logistical tail under a unfamiliar leadership and lets call a spade a spade- a Tyrannical USSR who didnt give a rats rectum for the lives of their own men....

American soldiers do have a history of fighting under direct British control, see my previous post:

The US has a history of allowing its regiments and divisions to fight under British command during WW1...

Specifically in WW1 the US II Corps comprising both the 27th Infantry Division and the 30th Infantry Division fought under the command of the British 2nd Army in Belgium and then the British 4th Army in France during the final months of the war. They were also outfitted with British helmets, rifles and food rations, so in essence they were trained to fight as British and live like them.

If any US force were in the USSR it would only be adjoined to the overall Front command structure similar to what happened with the II Corps. However, any likely American combat units that would be sent to the USSR would have been pilots, making the transition for command and control easier. Soviet and American personnel would not be integrated into composite units, they would simply fight in their own assigned sector according to whatever strategy the Soviet Front commander has decided upon. Air units could also operate on a rotational basis, with different units fighting for a few weeks or months at a time until they rotate out.

The USSR was not at the end of a logistical tail, they have their own supplies in addition to the Lend-Lease equipment by 1943. The Soviets armed and equipped the 1st Tadeusz Kościuszko Infantry Division, an all Polish unit, and the French air regiment. An American air group like the Flying Tigers (3 Squadrons or about 180-200 aircraft) could have been easily sustained if they used the P-39 for example, the Soviets received 4,719 of them (Hardesty 1991, p. 253.), so this would not be a problem for Soviet logistics to handle.

3. Could Italy have been bypassed in 1943 after the Allies had cleared North Africa, and instead send those Divisions to the USSR in order to help speed up the liberation of Soviet territory until France could be invaded in 1944?

Possibly but again Why Would they?

Because Italy was no longer vital to the German war effort by the end of the North Africa campaign, and of no strategic value to the invasion of Germany, the Americans finally had enough of it when they invaded Southern France with Operation Dragoon. Potentially, a portion of the MTO forces could have made a 3-4 month trip to the Caucus/Ukraine regions and begun combat operations in the Fall of 1943. The heavy armored divisions specifically would have been more effective fighting on the Ukrainian flat lands than the Italian hillside.

[ROLAND1369]

I think that the best answer is the severe problem of logistics and interoperability in the Russian theater. In the area of logistics you would need an entirely seperate system of depots, transportation, maintenance for everything from vehicles to food. This in parallel with the lendlease system necessary to support the soviet military. Al imposed on an already war damaged and stressed Russian infrastructure. The additional problem of introducing a foreign tactical and communication system loaded on a totally different military system speaking a different language. The result would have been in modern terms a counterproductive result and would have contributed little to the total effort while requiring the investment of a greater amount of assets better used in the west. The later attempt at the shuttle bombing campaign by air units was a more viable concept but the lack of Russian cooperation in this operation shows the likely Russian reception for such a plan. Finely how much assistance would such a force, as could supported logistically, give to an acclimatized and homogeneous Russian Army that the supply of western weapons, petroleum products, and food was not already accomplishing.

[Volyn]

The surrender of Italy was only a formality, they were totally useless to the Germans by that point in the war, also this had very serious negative consequences for the people of Italy and the Italian Jewish population due to the German occupation. Nothing was gained in Italy expect a reduction of German forces in the East, but that in itself does not mean it was the best use of the MTO forces. The only two legitimate reasons the Allies used to invade Italy was under the mistaken belief that it was poorly defended and that it would be quickly taken, both of which were proven disastrously false. Therefore, was the option of using these forces to fight in the Ukraine, provided certain issues were resolved, a better one? How could it have been any worse of a decision then to invade Italy?

Two problems with this statement

1. It is factually inaccurate. While the Italian armed forces were not the equivalent of the German, Soviet, British or American forces they were far from useless. As an Ally of the Germans the Italians garrisoned Italy itself and much of the Balkans. In June 1942 there were three German divisions in north Africa, none in Italy and nine in the Balkans. By June 1944 there were twenty eight German divisions in Italy and twenty four in the Balkans - that is forty divisions more than two years earlier - enough to have made a big difference in Normandy or on the east front.

By the time the Axis surrender in Tunisia in MAY 1943 there are virtually no Italian expeditionary military forces left, and the Regia Marina was resting on the bottom of the Adriatic and the Med. Italy was a handicapped war participant from then on, with no industrial value for Germany whatsoever, forcing them out of the war was just a formality because they were already finito.

The German divisions in the Balkans were getting torn to shreds by Tito and his partisan pals, and the Soviets still had to fight them in the Belgrade Offensive and other relevant operations throughout the region. MTO forces applied in the East would have caused more damage to the German military, which in turn would have forced them to reduce their Western reserves to compensate.

American units were able to repeatedly rout the Germans whenever they met on open terrain, there is no reason why this would not have been the case in the USSR, regardless the Allied armor would have performed better there then they did in Italy. There was nothing that the Wehrmacht did against the Soviets that the Americans did not also have to face, there would have been no disadvantage to any US forces operating in the East. If they can fight in China, Burma and everywhere else in the world that is remote and inhospitable, then any potential issue with an intervention in the USSR would have been overcome.

2. The main reason for the invasion of Italy was to remove Italy from the war. It was the rationale behind Op Avalanche. The British CIGS saw Italy as a useful side show to engage German troops at a point where they could not bring overwhelming force to expel the allies.

Yes, but in reality it was not necessary, and proved to become a significant problem of the Allies own making. The Italians were already removed sufficiently from the war that it was a pointless waste of lives, and the unintended traumas inflicted upon the Italians and the ethnic minorities as a result of the German occupation made the Italian Campaign a ridiculous "side show".

All of that MTO combat potential could have been employed on the Eastern Front and engaged by early 1944. Notwithstanding the logistical issues, there were no enemies from Africa to Iran to the USSR, so any troop transport or flow of material would have gone unhindered. This was a fully mechanized force that could have been immediately useful at any front from Moscow to the Black Sea. Lastly, there is no reason why any British or American soldier could not be effectively trained on Soviet armor, the T-34 was easy enough to use and there were plenty of them - it would have also been a significant upgrade to the American M4. Which begs the question, why didn't the Soviets share the plans to build the T-34 with the West so they could use it?

It would have been feasible for the US to ship the MTO tanks and armor sets back to the UK for use at D-Day, and send the MTO soldiers along with their air support to the USSR. They could be equipped with US weaponry from the stocks in Iran and learn how to use Soviet armor. Hitler would have been forced to commit everything he had to fight an accelerating war in the East, inherently weakening his forces in the West, which is what the Allies really needed.

The invasion of Southern Europe did not affect the Western Front, therefore, in order to weaken the West you need to fight in the East.

[LineDoggie]

Because they are Allies and even a small task force would be a significant symbolic event.

By the same token why no RKKA units at North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, Holland.... you have it one sided as is typical

As to putting US troops under Soviet control?

Finally, most of the Soviet citizens and possibly all, forcibly repatriated from Germany by US troops appear to have been men who had been captured in German uniform. On 19 January 1946, a detail of Third Army troops -men and officers far from pleased with their assignment- undertook to put 399 former Soviet soldiers aboard a train at Dachau. The Russians refused to leave their quarters and, after tear gas was used to force them out, 9 were found to have hanged themselves, 2 had stabbed themselves to death, and 20 others had to be hospitalized for self-inflicted wounds. Of the 368 Russians eventually put aboard the train, 11 were found at the last minute not to be Soviet citizens and six escaped en route. In a dismal final scene in the Soviet zone, Russian soldiers threatened to shoot the American guards if they attempted to leave the train. Hoping to avoid another such series of events, Third Army postponed further shipments while it reworked its procedures and awaited the results of appeals from the Russian Orthodox clergy to the President and the Pope.60

Some Allies huh?

(60)
Foreign Relations, 1946, vol. V, p. 141f. (2) Hqs, Third Army, AG, to Distribution, sub: Procedure for Repatriation of Russian Nationals, 22 Jan 46, in USFET, Hist Div, U-11068/69. (3) Opns Rpt, Third Army, CofS Sec, 1 Jan-31 Mar, in EUCOM, P-120, 66-98.

[LineDoggie]

... and lets call a spade a spade- a Tyrannical USSR who didnt give a rats rectum for the lives of their own men....[/b][/color]

If the "tyrannical USSR", and you are all so morally democratic, how can your morally democratic principles be combined with a request to this tyrant to start a war against your enemy in the Pacific?
Russians in such cases say so: "Ty ili krestik snimi ili trusiki oden'" =
= You either take off the small cross or put on your small underpants.
Rude, of course, but very accurate for your sentence.

FDR had numerous soviet symps and agents in his admin and the Soviets had spies in the USA stealing secrets because as usual the small underpants were made in the urals

[LineDoggie]

By the time the Axis surrender in Tunisia in MAY 1943 there are virtually no Italian expeditionary military forces left, and the Regia Marina was resting on the bottom of the Adriatic and the Med.

If Regia Marina was all at the bottom then why did the Luftwaffe have to sink Roma? Why were Andrea Doria, Caio Duilio, Giulio Cesare, Vittorio Veneto, Italia (renamed Littorio) still afloat? The Italian Co Belligerent Navy had 9 cruisers, 33 destroyers, 39 submarines, 12 motor torpedo boats, 20 escorts, 3 mine-layers, and a seaplane tender Giuseppe Miraglia on issue. also the specialists of Decima MAS X Flotilla

[Volyn]

I think that the best answer is the severe problem of logistics and interoperability in the Russian theater. In the area of logistics you would need an entirely seperate system of depots, transportation, maintenance for everything from vehicles to food. This in parallel with the lendlease system necessary to support the soviet military. Al imposed on an already war damaged and stressed Russian infrastructure. The additional problem of introducing a foreign tactical and communication system loaded on a totally different military system speaking a different language. The result would have been in modern terms a counterproductive result and would have contributed little to the total effort while requiring the investment of a greater amount of assets better used in the west. The later attempt at the shuttle bombing campaign by air units was a more viable concept but the lack of Russian cooperation in this operation shows the likely Russian reception for such a plan.

I do not accept the argument about logistics being an issue, it is easily solved when you use smaller formations. They did not have to fight anyone from Africa to the USSR from MAY 1943 - MAY 1945, so who will stop them? The foreign language problem is overcome when you do not use composite units, Allied units would have translators, etc. to communicate with the Front Commanders, but it would be their responsibility to fight to the objective according to their own American tactics. The Polish II Corps commanders were able to communicate and operate with the British, so it is entirely possible that Americans could have done the same with the Soviets.

Finely how much assistance would such a force, as could supported logistically, give to an acclimatized and homogeneous Russian Army that the supply of western weapons, petroleum products, and food was not already accomplishing.

Manpower and symbolism, had there been any US or UK force fighting in the East it would have been a significant act, and it would have had many positive consequences that would have lasted to the present day. By not committing any forces whatsoever to the East, the US missed a major chance to have a deeper influence on the Soviet society and Stalin was left to crow about "his victory over the Germans".

Please take a moment to read about the Escadron de Chasse 2/30 Normandie-Niemen -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escadron_ ... die-Niemen

If they could fight in the USSR from 1943-1945 then any US air group could have done the same. They were always fully supplied and they were present at several of the most contested battles on the Eastern Front, they absolutely helped to secure victory in those battles. Are the French somehow so superior that only they could accomplish this feat?

[Volyn]

Because they are Allies and even a small task force would be a significant symbolic event.

By the same token why no RKKA units at North Africa, Sicily, Italy, Normandy, Holland.... you have it one sided as is typical

The Soviets were not needed in those locations, the main force of the Wehrmacht was in the USSR, fight the enemy where he is. Any sized force would have been a welcome addition, just as Yuri pointed out in a previous post, that symbolism is a massive force multiplier in all wars. The symbolism of UK or US soldiers storming Crimea or US fighter pilots attacking panzers on the Ukrainian Steppe would have been a huge boost to the morale of all parties involved. The symbolism of bombing Tokyo gave Americans reassurance that Japan was not invincible, and it was simultaneously humiliating to the Japanese that they allowed a carrier based bomber group to attack their homeland.

As to putting US troops under Soviet control?

Finally, most of the Soviet citizens and possibly all, forcibly repatriated from Germany by US troops appear to have been men who had been captured in German uniform. On 19 January 1946, a detail of Third Army troops -men and officers far from pleased with their assignment- undertook to put 399 former Soviet soldiers aboard a train at Dachau. The Russians refused to leave their quarters and, after tear gas was used to force them out, 9 were found to have hanged themselves, 2 had stabbed themselves to death, and 20 others had to be hospitalized for self-inflicted wounds. Of the 368 Russians eventually put aboard the train, 11 were found at the last minute not to be Soviet citizens and six escaped en route. In a dismal final scene in the Soviet zone, Russian soldiers threatened to shoot the American guards if they attempted to leave the train. Hoping to avoid another such series of events, Third Army postponed further shipments while it reworked its procedures and awaited the results of appeals from the Russian Orthodox clergy to the President and the Pope.

Some Allies huh?

What does this have to do with the discussion? This is a post-war detail unrelated to the topic of US troops operating under a joint Soviet-US command structure.

By the time the Axis surrender in Tunisia in MAY 1943 there are virtually no Italian expeditionary military forces left, and the Regia Marina was resting on the bottom of the Adriatic and the Med.

If Regia Marina was all at the bottom then why did the Luftwaffe have to sink Roma? Why were Andrea Doria, Caio Duilio, Giulio Cesare, Vittorio Veneto, Italia (renamed Littorio) still afloat? The Italian Co Belligerent Navy had 9 cruisers, 33 destroyers, 39 submarines, 12 motor torpedo boats, 20 escorts, 3 mine-layers, and a seaplane tender Giuseppe Miraglia on issue. also the specialists of Decima MAS X Flotilla

You forget to add that Italy had no fuel for their ships, so what are they useful for, floating artillery battalions? The Allies can still sink these ships, they would not have abandoned the Med, they just would not invade Italy.