What prevented the QF 3.7-inch AA gun being used in the Anti Tank role.

[MarkF617]

Hello,

I am currently reading Gunners in Normandy by Will Townsend and Frank Baldwin. It appears that 3.7 inch AA guns were prioritised before medium guns as they could do both jobs. Once set up on the beaches they were tasked with(in order of priority) AA defence of the beach, bomardments in support of the advancing troops, anti S Boot protection for the beaches and only as a last resort in an anti tank role. Once the front moved inland they seem to be used more and more in the bombardment role. Taken from location 5549 in the Kindle edition:

HQ and 3 troops of the 107th HAA Regiment were attached to 3rd AGRA for counter battery and bombardment tasks and were not to fire in the AA role before the operation. Thereafter they could fire at observed hostile aircraft but not at the expense of their ground support tasks. The 80th AA Brigade was to engage the chimneys in Columbelles with airburst from first light 8th July to H+2, thereafter on call.

Every reference to the anti tank role for these guns (I'm up to Charnwood) is that it was only for last ditch self defence. This is a very detailed book and it has not once mentioned heavy AA actually firing at tanks yet but many uses for bombardments.

Thanks

Mark.

[Ружичасти Слон]

You was write

So the principle reasons given for the 3.7" being a more difficult weapon to employ - that it was cumbersome to move around, slow to get into action, difficult to produce adequate sights for - don't appear to be supported by the documentary evidence.

It seems to me when persons make comparison 3.7 inch on 88mm it was be mistake. Decisions by Germany army commanders and Britain army commanders was not make comparison gun on gun. 88mm was not on good side of tactical mobility and 3.7 inch on bad side of tactical mobility. Tactical mobility on 88mm was be bad to. It was be reason why Germany army commanders on Afrika was put 8 guns on fix antitank tasks and 4 on mobile antitank tasks.

Britain army commanders was decide 3.7 inch was have bad tactical mobilility on comparison with self tactical thinks and needs.

Yeah, but the statement I made that:

So the principle reasons given for the 3.7" being a more difficult weapon to employ

Was solely in reference to the 88mm. i.e. it should be read as:

So the principle reasons given for the 3.7" being a more difficult weapon to employ than the 88mm

Ok.

Principle reason given ?

I was not read somebody what was give reason on was not use 3.7 inch because less tactical mobile compare on 88mm.

Who was give that reason ?

I was read much persons what was give reason 3.7 inch Britain army commanders was think was be bad tactical mobility compare on what Britain army commander was think for to need.

I was read much persons was write questions and was write opinions Britain army commanders was must to use 3.7 inch on antitank role because Germany army was use 88mm on antitank role.

But i was read never somebody what was mix two. I was read never somebody who was write 88mm was have more tactical mobility compare on 3.7 inch and difference on compare was be reason.

Where you was read somebody who was write that ?

The British did not use the 3.7" in the A/T role because they did not want to, and any subsequent technical reasons suggesting that it would be more difficult to employ than the 88mm I think are spurious. If the 88mm had been a British weapon, would the British have used it in the A/T role? No, they obviously wouldn't have.

I agree on you Britain army commanders was not use 88mm on antitank role like they was not use 3 inch and was not use 3.7 inch on antitank role. I was write on topic already same words.

I agree on you for to make argument like that is spurious and not be correct.

[Don Juan]

Principle reason given ?

I was not read somebody what was give reason on was not use 3.7 inch because less tactical mobile compare on 88mm.

Who was give that reason ?

It's in the Wikipedia article on the 3.7" gun for example:

Like other British guns, the 3.7 had a secondary direct fire role for defending its position against tank attack. During the North African Campaign, the 3.7 was considered for use explicitly as an anti-tank weapon due to the shortage of suitable anti-tank guns. Sighting arrangements were improved for the anti-tank role, but the weapon was far from ideal. Its size and weight - two tons heavier than the German 8.8 cm - made it tactically unsuitable for use in forward areas. The mounting and recuperating gear were also not designed to handle the strain of prolonged firing at low elevations.

I think the fact that it was two tons heavier than the 88mm was irrelevant, because as I have shown these guns were being moved all over the place in Italy. Also the point about the mounting and recuperating gear not being "designed to handle the strain of prolonged firing at low elevations" is also irrelevant because the document I included in post #712 showed that these guns comfortably fired tens of thousands of rounds at ground targets.

So the wikipedia article is misleading, because the truth is that the British were not going to deliberately use any Heavy AA guns in the anti-tank role, because they had no tactical interest in doing so.

[MarkF617]

The conclusion I have come to from reading this large thread is that I think it was not used because there was no requirement for it. It was only during operation crusader that the 2 pounder was found wanting, and only by some units. By the time it was universally considered inadequate the 6 pounder was on the way followed by the 17 pounder along with Grant abd Sherman tanks. There was also at this time a shortage of AA guns so they would obviously be used in their primary role. By the time there were enough AA guns the army was well equipped with 17 pounders so they were used to add to bombardments.

Thanks

Mark.

[Sheldrake]

The conclusion I have come to from reading this large thread is that I think it was not used because there was no requirement for it. It was only during operation crusader that the 2 pounder was found wanting, and only by some units. By the time it was universally considered inadequate the 6 pounder was on the way followed by the 17 pounder along with Grant abd Sherman tanks. There was also at this time a shortage of AA guns so they would obviously be used in their primary role. By the time there were enough AA guns the army was well equipped with 17 pounders so they were used to add to bombardments.

Thanks

Mark.

I would not draw that conclusion from Gunners in Normandy. By 1944 there were better anti tank guns available in larger numbers. However the Gunners recognised that the 3.7" HAA gun was a very versatile equipment capable of serving in the medium, coastal and anti tank roles.

If you look at my posts you will see evidence that the tactical value of HAA in the anti-tank role had been accepted by the Home Army since 1941.
103 HAA had been tasked with a secondary heavy anti-tank role since July 1941. Brooke CinC Home Forces and a tactically astute gunner took a personal interest. It took a year longer for the ideas to be recognised in the Middle East. One problem was the division of the Artillery into field and AA disciplines, which was reversed mid war.

[Ружичасти Слон]

It's in the Wikipedia article on the 3.7" gun for example:

Wiki is joke.

That can to explain why i was not read.

Like other British guns, the 3.7 had a secondary direct fire role for defending its position against tank attack. During the North African Campaign, the 3.7 was considered for use explicitly as an anti-tank weapon due to the shortage of suitable anti-tank guns. Sighting arrangements were improved for the anti-tank role, but the weapon was far from ideal. Its size and weight - two tons heavier than the German 8.8 cm - made it tactically unsuitable for use in forward areas. The mounting and recuperating gear were also not designed to handle the strain of prolonged firing at low elevations.

I think the fact that it was two tons heavier than the 88mm was irrelevant, because as I have shown these guns were being moved all over the place in Italy. Also the point about the mounting and recuperating gear not being "designed to handle the strain of prolonged firing at low elevations" is also irrelevant because the document I included in post #712 showed that these guns comfortably fired tens of thousands of rounds at ground targets.

So the wikipedia article is misleading, because the truth is that the British were not going to deliberately use any Heavy AA guns in the anti-tank role, because they had no tactical interest in doing so.

Text was write by person what not understand subject but was think he must to write some tosh.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Also the point about the mounting and recuperating gear not being "designed to handle the strain of prolonged firing at low elevations" is also irrelevant because the document I included in post #712 showed that these guns comfortably fired tens of thousands of rounds at ground targets.

Fires on ground targets not mean elevation must to be low for to make strain on gun.

Direct fire on antitank role must to be very low. Probable zero. Most strain.

Indirect fire on ground targets is most different.

3.7 inch when indirect fire on ground targets was have low elevation compare on field guns and field howitzers and mortars. But that not mean it was be so low for to make strain on gun.

[MarkF617]

I got the conclusion from reading this thread. Gunners in Normandy just confirms that when used in a secondry role HAA was not tasked as anti tank. I'll have to re-read wgat you wrote about 103rd HAA when I have time but iirc they were supposed to be used only in defence and only when desperate.

Thanks

Mark.

[Don Juan]

Fires on ground targets not mean elevation must to be low for to make strain on gun.

Direct fire on antitank role must to be very low. Probable zero. Most strain.

Indirect fire on ground targets is most different.

3.7 inch when indirect fire on ground targets was have low elevation compare on field guns and field howitzers and mortars. But that not mean it was be so low for to make strain on gun.

True, but it is also the case that in the anti-tank role the 3.7" will not fire many rounds, as the engagements will be short and sharp. i.e. it will not be firing tens of thousands of rounds at tanks.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Fires on ground targets not mean elevation must to be low for to make strain on gun.

Direct fire on antitank role must to be very low. Probable zero. Most strain.

Indirect fire on ground targets is most different.

3.7 inch when indirect fire on ground targets was have low elevation compare on field guns and field howitzers and mortars. But that not mean it was be so low for to make strain on gun.

True, but it is also the case that in the anti-tank role the 3.7" will not fire many rounds, as the engagements will be short and sharp. i.e. it will not be firing tens of thousands of rounds at tanks.

Physics and math must to determine how much forces on each plane on each angle on elevation.

Design on gun and design on mounting and design on travel carriage must to determine how forces must to stress gun and mounting and travel carriage. On each elevation will to be critical number on fires when stress will to be to much and failure will for to occur.

I not know what was be critical number of fires on elevations for fires on field artillery ground target. Maybe was 100 maybe 1.000 maybe 10.000.

I not know what was be critical number of fires on zero elevation. Maybe was 10 maybe 100 maybe 1.000.

But can to be big mistake for to make some assumptions on numbers for to make argument.

It seems to me that critical number of fires on zero elevation was be enough low for to was make Britain army commanders was think not good for to be use much on antitank role.

[Sheldrake]

It seems to me that critical number of fires on zero elevation was be enough low for to was make Britain army commanders was think not good for to be use much on antitank role.

No - re-read the thread, or at least, read my posts.

[Don Juan]

Design on gun and design on mounting and design on travel carriage must to determine how forces must to stress gun and mounting and travel carriage. On each elevation will to be critical number on fires when stress will to be to much and failure will for to occur.

I not know what was be critical number of fires on elevations for fires on field artillery ground target. Maybe was 100 maybe 1.000 maybe 10.000.

I not know what was be critical number of fires on zero elevation. Maybe was 10 maybe 100 maybe 1.000.

But can to be big mistake for to make some assumptions on numbers for to make argument.

It seems to me that critical number of fires on zero elevation was be enough low for to was make Britain army commanders was think not good for to be use much on antitank role.

I can think of no physical reason why guns that can fire tens of thousands of rounds over periods of weeks at 25 deg. are incapable of firing a few dozen rounds for an hour or less at 0 deg. without becoming over-stressed.

What magical force do you think intervened to make such a difference? Was it invisible dwarves?

[Ружичасти Слон]

It seems to me that critical number of fires on zero elevation was be enough low for to was make Britain army commanders was think not good for to be use much on antitank role.

No - re-read the thread, or at least, read my posts.

You was write on mythics on 1.000 3 inch on storage mythics on 1.000 3.7 inch on storage on mythics 3 inch was send on Russia. Why must to read tosh again ?

You was write week evidences for one regiment for to have antitank role for short time on Uk for to fight on unlikely Germany invasion. Why must to read again ? Your evidences was show what i was write.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Design on gun and design on mounting and design on travel carriage must to determine how forces must to stress gun and mounting and travel carriage. On each elevation will to be critical number on fires when stress will to be to much and failure will for to occur.

I not know what was be critical number of fires on elevations for fires on field artillery ground target. Maybe was 100 maybe 1.000 maybe 10.000.

I not know what was be critical number of fires on zero elevation. Maybe was 10 maybe 100 maybe 1.000.

But can to be big mistake for to make some assumptions on numbers for to make argument.

It seems to me that critical number of fires on zero elevation was be enough low for to was make Britain army commanders was think not good for to be use much on antitank role.

I can think of no physical reason why guns that can fire tens of thousands of rounds over periods of weeks at 25 deg. are incapable of firing a few dozen rounds for an hour or less at 0 deg. without becoming over-stressed.

What magical force do you think intervened to make such a difference? Was it invisible dwarves?

Maybe you can to ask your invisible dwarves what is historical datas and evidences on what was think Britain army commanders on topic and what was be real mechanical stress datas not Juan wave on hands mechanical stress datas.

But must to remember. Britain army commanders was not use stress datas as reasons. They was use bad tactical mobilitys and bad avails as reason. Bad avails and bad tactical mobilitys are primary and secondary reasons for not use on antitank role.

I was write on mechanical stress topic my speculation for other considers after primary and secondary reasons. Bad tactical mobility was can for to explain reason on not have on mobile formations on front line. Maybe mechanical stress problem was help on decision for not to put on fix defensive position like Germany army stutzpunkt. Britain army was not often put on fix defensive position.

[Don Juan]

Maybe you can to ask your invisible dwarves what is historical datas and evidences on what was think Britain army commanders on topic and what was be real mechanical stress datas not Juan wave on hands mechanical stress datas.

But must to remember. Britain army commanders was not use stress datas as reasons. They was use bad tactical mobilitys and bad avails as reason. Bad avails and bad tactical mobilitys are primary and secondary reasons for not use on antitank role.

I was write on mechanical stress topic my speculation for other considers after primary and secondary reasons. Bad tactical mobility was can for to explain reason on not have on mobile formations on front line. Maybe mechanical stress problem was help on decision for not to put on fix defensive position like Germany army stutzpunkt. Britain army was not often put on fix defensive position.

Come back Gooner1, all is forgiven.