Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

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Max Payload
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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Max Payload » 05 Jul 2020 11:54

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Jul 2020 07:27
The early battles between Rundstedt and Kirponos were marked by the latter's need to comply with deluded demands to drive to Lublin and to launch counterattacks wily-nily, before proper assembly of forces. Absent Stavka's interference, Uman never would have happened and Southwest Front would have retreated in good order
That latter assertion that may not be justified. Kirponos was obliged to conduct hasty attacks in the first few days of the invasion, but the attack he conducted on 26 June was reasonably well prepared. When that failed Stavka approved the withdrawal to the Stalin Line on 30 June. Kirponos was an aggressively minded commander and I am unaware of any serious disagreements with Stavka in July. During the second week of July Kirponos was, perhaps understandably, preoccupied with Mackensen’s advance from Zhitomir towards Kiev. It was only on 15 July when Kempf’s corps reached Kazatin that Kirponos recognised the encirclement threat to his Front’s southern wing, and within 48 hours he had begun to prepare plans to pull the threatened armies back to the Dnepr. But by then Kempf’s forces had advanced a further 100km southeast and were less than 100km from Uman. Kirponos was authorised to conduct a partial withdrawal to the east and Second Mechanised Corps was transferred north from Southern Front on 19 July. By then, with the bulk of First Panzer Group advancing to the southeast from the Zhashkiv area north of Uman, and Seventeenth Army’s mountain corps advancing south of Vinnytsya between the Bug and Dnestr, Kirponos’ options were to either to try to break out to the east in conjunction with 26 Army attacks from the west, or to retreat to the southeast towards Pervomaysk and into the Southern Front zone. The latter would have required Stavka approval but since Sixth and Twelfth Armies were subordinated to Southern Front six days later anyway, it seems unlikely Stavka would have refused. Kirponos chose to have Podenelin try to break out to the east and on 21 July ordered 26 Army to redirect its attacks from the northwest to the southwest in the direction of Uman.
I have seen nothing to suggest that Kirponos’ operational options in the period 15-25 July were constrained by either Stavka or Budenny’s new Southwestern Direction Command. After 25 July the fate of Ponedelin’s forces were no longer Kirponos’ operational responsibility.

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Art » 08 Jul 2020 08:40

DavidFrankenberg wrote:
27 Mar 2020 14:04
USSR mobilized like 100 millions men from 41 till 45.
The number of men of draftable ages (b.1891-1927) at the start of 1941 was about 54 million (Andreyev, Darskiy and Kharkova "Population of the Soviet Union 1922-1991"). That was a theoretical maximum, while real induction was considerably smaller for various reasons. Official numbers (about 35 million) look pretty reasonable.

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by steevh » 11 Jul 2020 12:35

In response to the original question:

Hitler's premise in Barbarossa was that the invasion would lead to a quick collapse, and he was very nearly right.

All the strategic blunders are part and parcel of this assumption -- the lack of winter clothing, the failure to gear industry up for total war etc etc. If the Russians had collapsed by the end of 1941 none of this would have been necessary.
Hitler was planning for a Blitzkrieg victory, not for a WWI-style 4-year trench battle.

Likewise the Russian mobilization -- given time, USSR could mobilize 12 million soldiers (and more). But the idea was to defeat them before they had chance to get started.

In December 1941 Hitler would have realized he got things wrong, but by then it was too late.

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Urmel » 14 Jul 2020 15:05

On 26 April 1941 the OKH estimated Russian strength of the full peace time army at 170 divisions, all full up at wartime strength in manpower, but requiring material and with supply infrastructure not activated yet. No indication of mobilisation potential, but given that the expectation was to defeat the Red Army and close the campaign in 2-2.5 months, that maybe isn't surprising, mad as it is.
The enemy had superiority in numbers, his tanks were more heavily armoured, they had larger calibre guns with nearly twice the effective range of ours, and their telescopes were superior. 5 RTR 19/11/41

The CRUSADER Project - The Winter Battle 1941/42

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 14 Jul 2020 17:13

steevh wrote:
11 Jul 2020 12:35
In response to the original question:

Hitler's premise in Barbarossa was that the invasion would lead to a quick collapse, and he was very nearly right.

All the strategic blunders are part and parcel of this assumption -- the lack of winter clothing, the failure to gear industry up for total war etc etc. If the Russians had collapsed by the end of 1941 none of this would have been necessary.
Hitler was planning for a Blitzkrieg victory, not for a WWI-style 4-year trench battle.

Likewise the Russian mobilization -- given time, USSR could mobilize 12 million soldiers (and more). But the idea was to defeat them before they had chance to get started.

In December 1941 Hitler would have realized he got things wrong, but by then it was too late.
Hitler and everybody what was think for quick collapse was not be very nearly right. They was be complete 100% wrong.

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 14 Jul 2020 17:21

Urmel wrote:
14 Jul 2020 15:05
On 26 April 1941 the OKH estimated Russian strength of the full peace time army at 170 divisions, all full up at wartime strength in manpower, but requiring material and with supply infrastructure not activated yet. No indication of mobilisation potential, but given that the expectation was to defeat the Red Army and close the campaign in 2-2.5 months, that maybe isn't surprising, mad as it is.
On 1.page on topic was discuss for size on plan for peacetimes Red army on plan for wartimes Red army and on actual size on Red army.

I can to understand when think 2-2.5 months was be to short for to make new army on not planned untrained persons from civilian lifes.

But nobody was find evidences and datas on times for to mobilize planned wartimes army.

It seems to me for was be complete 100% mad for not to consider how long for to mobilize wartimes army and for to think it was not be possible in 2-2.5 months.

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Thoddy » 04 Aug 2020 16:01

I have read in a publication of the Nationale Volksarmee during my service in the eighties (Translation from soviet origins) that the Wehrmacht completeley crushed more than the complete red army (personal wise) available on 22.06.1941 until 09/41 including some 15.000 "armed vehicles".

During the first stages of the war the red army used large parts of available lokal civilians to join regular army units without weapons and taking these from dead soldiers during battle.


But about 1.6 mio soldiers from the far east became available in autumn by the soviet-japanese treaty
"Meine Herren, es kann ein siebenjähriger, es kann ein dreißigjähriger Krieg werden – und wehe dem, der zuerst die Lunte in das Pulverfaß schleudert!"

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Art » 04 Aug 2020 20:23

Thoddy wrote:
04 Aug 2020 16:01
I have read in a publication of the Nationale Volksarmee during my service in the eighties (Translation from soviet origins) that the Wehrmacht completeley crushed more than the complete red army (personal wise) available on 22.06.1941 until 09/41
Definitely not:
GenQu POW.png
POW 31Jul41.jpg
In general, the initial stage of "Barbarossa" in the zones of Army Groups North and South was not such a huge success as it is commonly believed. Both failed to destroy the opposing Soviet forces or even a larger part of them.
But about 1.6 mio soldiers from the far east became available in autumn by the soviet-japanese treaty
There was never such a number of troops there. Partial transfers from the Far East were made but they were offset by mobilization.
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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Thoddy » 05 Aug 2020 05:20

Thank you, that seem to me a , there was a considerable misinformation (from the soviet side) in the book i read.

But as it is long ago i read this- my memory may fail.
"Meine Herren, es kann ein siebenjähriger, es kann ein dreißigjähriger Krieg werden – und wehe dem, der zuerst die Lunte in das Pulverfaß schleudert!"

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 05 Aug 2020 14:21

Thoddy wrote:
04 Aug 2020 16:01
I have read in a publication of the Nationale Volksarmee during my service in the eighties (Translation from soviet origins) that the Wehrmacht completeley crushed more than the complete red army (personal wise) available on 22.06.1941 until 09/41 including some 15.000 "armed vehicles".

During the first stages of the war the red army used large parts of available lokal civilians to join regular army units without weapons and taking these from dead soldiers during battle.


But about 1.6 mio soldiers from the far east became available in autumn by the soviet-japanese treaty
Many peoples was want for to believe Germany people was be ubermenschen and Slavic people was be untermenschen.

Many peoples was want for to believe Germany army was mostest best army in all world for all time and was be some conspiracy for to lose war.

Those peoples was like for to read and for to believe imagination storys.

Many peoples was write many books and many texts for to help those peoples believe imagination storys.

It is most easy for to use some historical datas and compare with other historical datas. It is most easy for to compare datas what is not compatible but can to make very excellent imagination story.

You can to read on axishistory forum many persons what still believe imagination storys and many persons what dream for it will to be true.

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 05 Aug 2020 14:23

Thoddy wrote:
05 Aug 2020 05:20
Thank you, that seem to me a , there was a considerable misinformation (from the soviet side) in the book i read.

But as it is long ago i read this- my memory may fail.
Misinformations was be from peoples what want everybody for to believe Germany people was ubermenschen.

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Thoddy » 05 Aug 2020 19:10

For better understanding.
The document / book I read was a translation from a book printed in the Sovietunion, it was classified "Nur für Dienstgebrauch", it had no german origins, as far as i could conclude at that time.
"Meine Herren, es kann ein siebenjähriger, es kann ein dreißigjähriger Krieg werden – und wehe dem, der zuerst die Lunte in das Pulverfaß schleudert!"

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 05 Aug 2020 22:08

Thoddy wrote:
05 Aug 2020 19:10
For better understanding.
The document / book I read was a translation from a book printed in the Sovietunion, it was classified "Nur für Dienstgebrauch", it had no german origins, as far as i could conclude at that time.
I was write before
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
05 Aug 2020 14:21
It is most easy for to use some historical datas and compare with other historical datas. It is most easy for to compare datas what is not compatible but can to make very excellent imagination story.
Data set 1
Mr Art was give datas from Germany archives on how many was be Red army prisoners on each month and totals.

Data set 2
I give datas from БОЕВОЙ И ЧИСЛЕННЫЙ СОСТАВ ВООРУЖЕННЫХ СИЛ СССР В ПЕРИОД ВЕЛИКОЙ ОТЕЧЕСТВЕННОЙ ВОЙНЫ (1941-1945 гг.) Статистический сборник № 1 (22 июня 1941 г.) on how many was be Red army on west border not include Finland on 21.june 1941.year.

Before was be mobilization for to defend Germany attack
СЗФ 325.559
ЗапФ 599.450
ЮЗФ 764.941
9А 171.570
= total 1.861.520

Total mobilized persons on БУС until 21.june 1941.year
to СЗФ 44.143
to ЗапФ 71.715
to ЮЗФ 142.105
to 9А 3.050
= total 261.013

= total total 2.122.533

###

Analysis for to make imagination story on Germany people ubermenschen:
Germany army was capture 2.481.513 until end september 1941.year what was 360.000 more persons than all of Red army on border districts on 21.june 1941.year. WOW!!!! Germany army must to be super top excellent menschen.

###

Comment
How is serious for to compare datas ?
All datas are historical correct datas.
But datas can not to be compare for serious historical discuss. Can only for to compare to make imaginary storys and agendas.
For to win war Germany army was must to defeat all Red army AFTER was be mobilized 100%.
It was not be any success for Germany army for to capture more troops until september than was be on border districts on day one of attack.

###

Any person what was write comparison like that or what use or quote comparison like that on serious topic was show he not understand topic or he want to make imaginary story.

###

It is most easy for to use some historical datas and compare with other historical datas. It is most easy for to compare datas what is not compatible but can to make very excellent imagination story.

###

I was write topic because i was want for to understand what was be Germany army plans and assumes on how fast was can Red army for to mobilize. Nobody know nothing. Mr maxpayload was write something that he was read on Paulus assumes and not more.

How can Germany people be ubermenschen when they was so mad for to not think Soviets was can mobilize big army ?

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Aug 2020 05:27

Art wrote:the initial stage of "Barbarossa" in the zones of Army Groups North and South was not such a huge success as it is commonly believed. Both failed to destroy the opposing Soviet forces or even a larger part of them.
So true, such an important point.

In the last decade or so it's become de rigeur to claim that WW2 was determined by fundamentals rather than battles (e.g. Tooze and O'Brien).

Yet a mostly-failed Barbarossa nearly destroyed the SU; had Germany succeeded in its goal of destroying most of the Red Army west of the Dniepr/Dvina the war's course would have been vastly different.
Art wrote:Definitely not:
Can you recommend a study of Soviet casualties that focuses specifically on the first year or so? I'm aware of the Krivosheev breakdown of figures and of the welter of convincing criticisms of his work. But I haven't seen an alternate month-by-month or battle-by-battle reconstruction of the timeline of Soviet losses.
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

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Re: Barbarossa. German estimation of Soviet mobilization

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 07 Aug 2020 15:13

Art wrote:
04 Aug 2020 20:23


In general, the initial stage of "Barbarossa" in the zones of Army Groups North and South was not such a huge success as it is commonly believed. Both failed to destroy the opposing Soviet forces or even a larger part of them.
Was also fail to destroy Red army on Army group center.

Germany was not get close for to win. Was fail everywhere from begin of attack.

For to win Barbarossa Germany army must to win on wartimes Red army. Germany army was not be close for to destroy wartimes Red army.

Many many mans like for to write full mobilized wartimes Germany army was be top excellent ubermenschen when they was destroy most of peacetimes Red army and some of Stavka reserve.

When Germany army was think can to win when was destroy only peacetimes army Germany army must to be on aa line until 3 or 4 weeks maximum. Where was Germany army on middle july ? Was they be on aa line ? Was they be close onn aa ine ? No !

When not on aa line until 4 weeks Red army was can to mobilize full wartimes army.

Barbarossa was be very big failure on real history. Only on imagination storys was br Germany army close for to win.

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