Statistics on German PoW hauls in latter October 1941?

[TheMarcksPlan]

Inherent force superiority won’t cause more POWs unless that force superiority is put to effective use.

Yes obviously.

But again that's why TDI tried to disaggregate force superiority from outcomes - i.e. tried to measure PoW effects when superiority was effectively used.

Re post-Taifun, we have a case of extraordinary force superiority (perhaps 5-1 in favor of Germans in mid-October), yet AGC advanced only slowly in this period - mostly due to rasputitsa.

So even on your terms, there appears to be little argument that force superiority was used effectively - i.e. that it translated into battle outcomes correlated with high PoWs.

I’m not sure of the relevance of Minsk

Soldiers were still returning to Soviet lines from Minsk in August 1941, as the example of General Boldin's group shows. Probably other returnees were less daring/skilled than Boldin and these folks probably would have taken longer to return.

Taking the calculation to 8 August requires a further .78x752x8=4,692 POWs giving a total of 61k, not 35k.

I still see a huge discrepancy between your figures and those provided by Glantz via Liedtke upthread [different cite than the August AGN communique, btw].

I also still see a huge discrepancy between the AGN figures cited by Richard Anderson and your/Krivosheev's figures: Anderson provides for 2,563 daily AGN losses through July 6th, almost all of which would have been bloody casualties (note the absence of PzGr3, which also engaged NWF, specifically its 11th Army). You say 738 daily "sick and wounded" for NWF. Assuming wounded is ~3x KIA then NWF would have had ~1,000 daily bloody casualties.

If that's so, then NWF's bloody casualty exchange ratio with the Ostheer shows it to have been >10x more combat-effective than the rest of the Soviet army (i.e. it was ~2.5x better than Ostheer whereas the Red Army as a whole was ~5x worse). That makes no sense to me; I suspect there's a data issue on your side.

Ironically (given the relative analytical quality of posts) it's [Cyrillic name]'s provision of the Kinzel figures that make the most convincing case for your point and against mine.

Kinzel exposes what is probably a data issue on my side: when I started this thread, I had no feeling for the front-wide rate of Ostheer PoW capture outside of the big kessels - other than Glantz's concededly-problematic citation to the August AGN communique (that now appears to be an undercount). In that context, AGC's post-Taifun PoW rate seemed jarringly abnormal.

Now I see that I have to revise this picture, though I'm more pausing for further analysis than conceding the entire point. Perhaps like AGC waiting out Rasputitsa, my final defeat requires further exploration:

Per Kinzel, AG's N/S captured 5,475 PoW's daily in June/July. That's more than AGC's 4,500 post-Taifun but (1) AGC was smaller than AGN+AGS, (2) AGC faced fewer enemies than AGN+S, (3) AGC advanced at a far slower rate, implying far worse battle outcomes than AGN+S, (4) AGN+S carried out many smaller-scale encirclements in June/July 1941, whereas the fairly-detailed Battle of Moscow sources (Zetterling, Stahel, Lopukhovsky) don't mention any significant encirclements post-Taifun IIRC.

Also (5) I would guess the Ostheer captured thousands of startled, out-of-position Soviets in the first few days of battle.

Given the foregoing factors, my hunch is that AGC's post-Taifun capture rate would remain significantly above normal (for Barbarossa) IF we had sufficient data/time to do a good analysis. I don't have that data/time at the moment but it'll be in the background of further reading. And of course others' thoughts/research on the issue are heartily welcomed/solicited.

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The broadest point is that an army doesn't see >1% of its soldiers surrender tactically every day unless it has a very serious morale problem. While initially I hypothesized that these morale problems manifested post-Taifun, it now seems clear that the Red Army was yielding tactical prisoners at an alarming rate long before Taifun, a defeat that may (or may not) have caused a further deterioration of the morale-related tactical surrender problem.

It seems that the Red Army recovered from this trend during Winter, backslid during Blau, and improved even further by the end of the war.

[Max Payload]

my final defeat requires further exploration

This is a discussion, not a competition.

Given the foregoing factors, my hunch is that AGC's post-Taifun capture rate would remain significantly above normal (for Barbarossa) IF we had sufficient data/time to do a good analysis. I don't have that data/time at the moment but it'll be in the background of further reading. And of course others' thoughts/research on the issue are heartily welcomed/solicited.

Your hunch may well be correct but the available data, so far presented, does not adequately support the claim of a collapse in morale. Keep digging by all means. Meanwhile, Yuri is working on the same general topic and hopefully his work will include some analysis of the Moscow axis post Typhoon.

[TheMarcksPlan]

This is a discussion, not a competition

Say you. I say that I will win the argument or die face down in the mud.

...in person the tongue-in-cheekness of the battle analogy in this post and the last would have been more clear... c'est la internet

Your hunch may well be correct but the available data, so far presented, does not adequately support the claim of a collapse in morale.

Which is why I call it a hunch...

[Max Payload]

I say that I will win the argument or die face down in the mud.

28 May, 1940 - Churchill said it more eloquently, “... let it end only when each one of us lies choking in his own blood upon the ground.”

[Ружичасти Слон]

Given the foregoing factors, my hunch is that AGC's post-Taifun capture rate would remain significantly above normal (for Barbarossa) IF we had sufficient data/time to do a good analysis. I don't have that data/time at the moment but it'll be in the background of further reading. And of course others' thoughts/research on the issue are heartily welcomed/solicited.

No tmp was not have hunch.

Tmp was make deliberate imagination story to mislead peoples on history.

Tmp have big imagination story on Nazi Germany for to win. Story was not be true on real history because many factors. So tmp must to change many factors from real history on tmp imagination story. Topic on low morale was be one small factor he was must to change. But for to change he was invent ideas for to ignore datas tmp was not like.

Kinzel exposes what is probably a data issue on my side: when I started this thread, I had no feeling for the front-wide rate of Ostheer PoW capture outside of the big kessels - other than Glantz's concededly-problematic citation to the August AGN communique (that now appears to be an undercount). In that context, AGC's post-Taifun PoW rate seemed jarringly abnormal.

Tmp was write explain on why i was write tmp was make anti-intellectual theory and was be dishonest on arguments.

Tmp was try to compare tmp imagination story on good academic science research and anaysis by meteorology. Meteorology conclusions and understands was come from much years on datas collection analysis and understands. Tmp imagination story was come from I had no feeling for history datas. Tmp was just invent ideas to dismiss datas he not like and was choose datas on bias confirmation.

Anti-intellectual.

Also must to note tmp was misrepresent Glantz. Glantz was not give datas on AGN communique.

[Ружичасти Слон]

On book Drive on Moscow by Zetterling and Frankson i was find

During the second half of October, more and more German units were reporting that the enemy seemed to be growing stronger. Battles were more bitterly fought and the enemy appeared to be fighting to the last man and bullet.

Can this be evidence for low morale ?

I was not look on original Germany army documents for to research exact datas.

Maybe tmp will can to do some research on original Germany army documents for to confirm exact datas on low morale.

[Kelvin]

Does anyone have access to AGC's PoW hauls in latter October and November 1941?

Anybody does:
https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/ru/ ... ect/zoom/6

The statistics are broken down conveniently into the periods I'm wondering about. Thanks again.

AGC's total PoW haul from October 19 to November 14 was

116,073


That's an extremely high total for an army crawling forward amidst the rasputitsa. It's ten times the number of Germans reported missing in all of 1941.

More relevant to the morale issue, it's far in excess of the missing/PoW captured by other German formations earlier in the war, absent operational encirclements. AGN captured only 35,000 PoW through August 6, for example (From Glantz's Leningrad, citing AGN communique on page 27).

During the immediate post-Taifun period, AGC captured ~4,500 PoW/day.

During November 15 to Jan 12, 1942 AGC captured only 71,827 PoW or ~1,260/day. Although the Red Army was advancing for most of the later period, the Ostheer was launching frequent counterattacks.

This seems pretty clear evidence that Red Army soldiers were much more willing to surrender tactically during the post-Taifun period than either earlier in Barbarossa or later, after the Red Army started pushing the Germans back. It indicates that the Red Army may have been on the brink of morale collapse in October '41, which the fall of Moscow might have accelerated.

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As an aside:

Interesting that of the 673,000 PoW's listed as the German total for Taifun, AOK 2 and PzGr 2 accounted for only ~147k or ~22% of the total. Taifun was mostly about Vyazma, with a Bryansk kicker. Given Guderian's task of a single-envelopment in the southern sector, it's to be expected that he had less success bagging PoW's. But 25 divisions were in his encirclement at one point or another and only 8 of these were disbanded after the battle. The rest escaped with sufficient personnel to merit rebuilding. Probably Guderian would have done his country better by sealing his pocket instead of sending much of his group on the deep raid towards/through Mtsensk. Just as in Minsk and Smolensk, he was always more focused on racing ahead than on destroying the enemy.

Given the outcome of the Bryansk battle, it seems more likely that the Ostheer would have been better served had it stuck with Hitler's original plan and committed PzGr2 to AGS's battle during October. They probably could have achieved a big encirclement around Kharkov and/or Donbas. Of course the logistical situation may not have allowed for that (no rail ops beyond the Dniepr until November).

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Hi, Briansk and Trubsbuck pockets both contained 140,000 POW, I think it is almost finished as 3rd and 13th Armies each had around 45000 men and 50th Army had 90000 men, each army had 10000-13000 remnants escaped, that mean Guderian almost completed the annhilation of three Armies in both pockets.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Hi, Briansk and Trubsbuck pockets both contained 140,000 POW, I think it is almost finished as 3rd and 13th Armies each had around 45000 men and 50th Army had 90000 men, each army had 10000-13000 remnants escaped, that mean Guderian almost completed the annhilation of three Armies in both pockets.

Thanks. What's your source on escapees? If only 30-39k escaped that seems inadequate to maintain the 17 divisions not disbanded after the battle. Though of course it's completely possible they were rebuilt around small cadres.

[Kelvin]

Hi, Briansk and Trubsbuck pockets both contained 140,000 POW, I think it is almost finished as 3rd and 13th Armies each had around 45000 men and 50th Army had 90000 men, each army had 10000-13000 remnants escaped, that mean Guderian almost completed the annhilation of three Armies in both pockets.

Thanks. What's your source on escapees? If only 30-39k escaped that seems inadequate to maintain the 17 divisions not disbanded after the battle. Though of course it's completely possible they were rebuilt around small cadres.

Hi, TheMarcksPlan,

Regarding the number of escapees, it is quoted from book Viaz'ma Catastrophe by Lev Lopukhovsky :

03rd Army had 13,000 escaped

13th Army had 10,000 escaped

50th Army had 12000 escaped

3rd Army had 42844 men on 01st Oct 1941 and 13th Army had 30255 men on 20th Sept 1941. those data from AHF. Thank

[Kelvin]

Hi, Briansk and Trubsbuck pockets both contained 140,000 POW, I think it is almost finished as 3rd and 13th Armies each had around 45000 men and 50th Army had 90000 men, each army had 10000-13000 remnants escaped, that mean Guderian almost completed the annhilation of three Armies in both pockets.

Thanks. What's your source on escapees? If only 30-39k escaped that seems inadequate to maintain the 17 divisions not disbanded after the battle. Though of course it's completely possible they were rebuilt around small cadres.

Hi, TheMarcksPlan,

Regarding the number of escapees, it is quoted from book Viaz'ma Catastrophe by Lev Lopukhovsky :

03rd Army had 13,000 escaped

13th Army had 10,000 escaped

50th Army had 12000 escaped

3rd Army had 42844 men on 01st Oct 1941 and 13th Army had 30255 men on 20th Sept 1941. those data from AHF. Thank