Proboably the author included pre-war American "DD's" as fleet destroyers, not DDE's. And likely the British decommissioned some older DD's rather than taking their logistical burdens across 13,000 miles of sea lanes. DD's are fuel-hogs in fleet operations because of their high HP/ton ratios and the Admiral King, who wanted to British shut out of the Pacific denouement, would not have helped.Tom from Cornwall wrote:Appendix S - Strength of the navies of the British Commonwealth on 8 May, 1945. (Fleet Destroyers = 108; Escort destroyers = 83; Hunt Class destroyers = 66)
154 lost + 108 = 262. Plus 50 old U.S. DD's is 312. Would be surprised if the British didn't decommission some of these ancient, fuel-inefficient vessels rather than send them east. App. S says "nearly all" DD's were in commission - is 91% (98/108) "nearly all"?
These are good questions you're asking though.
You're out over your skis IMO. What is the author's contention? That the British used a certain number of DD's in the entire war, and that half of this force was committed to BoA. If he included Lend-Lease DD's as DD's (a reasonable move for Americans, to whom they were DD's) then he's at least within a few % points of the real figure.So, not a very scrupulous analysis that separates the allotment of British Commonwealth Fleet Destroyers (in terms of planning, construction, operation or losses) to the BoA as opposed to other RN commitments. In fact, not an analysis at all!
More important is the actual deployment of DD's. You still haven't provided any evidence that significantly more than half of Britain's DD's were deployed outside the Atlantic at any point in the war. If you can show such evidence, we can slightly revise downwards the author's warship cost.