5 Shermans 1 Tiger/Panther Myth?

[David Thompson]

An exchange of taunting posts with personal comments from Richard Anderson and paulrward were removed pursuant to the forum rule on civility:

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[Michael Kenny]

He had been in the 4th Armored Division, had trained in England, on M3 Lees,

So in 1944 the US shipped these M3 Medium gun tanks (you never specified ARV) to the UK with their Armored Divisions?

[Richard Anderson]

He had been in the 4th Armored Division, had trained in England, on M3 Lees,

So in 1944 the US shipped these M3 Medium gun tanks (you never specified ARV) to the UK with their Armored Divisions?

That would be odd, since the 4th Armd Div traded in its Medium Tanks M3 for Medium Tanks M4 when it transferred to the DTC in early February 1943. It turned its M4 in at Camp Bowie, Texas before it staged to Camp Myles Standish, Massachusetts 11-20 December 1943. It drew new Medium Tanks M4A1 from ETOUSA depots after it arrived in the UK on 11 January 1944 and began breaking them in during February at Salisbury and Avebury.

The only American units to bring Medium Tanks M3 to England were the 1st Armd Div, 751st Tk Bn, 752d Tk Bn, and 755th Tk Bn, and most of those they took to North Africa.

[Ironmachine]

I thought that what I wrote was very clear, but in any case, I will try to better clarify it: According to the
Sergeant I spoke with, ALL of the German tanks they ran into were superior to their M4 Shermans.

They didn't differentiate between one type or another. After the first few weeks of combat, ALL of the
German tanks scared the hell out of the American crews ( I can't speak for the British crews, I have never
spoken to any of them, and they may have been stupid enough to believe what they were told by their
officers ) and the American tankers got very wary of engaging German tanks. After all, ANY German tank
hiding in the underbrush might be a Tiger with an 88, which could rip through the front glacis of an M4
Sherman and knock it out at 2000 yards, while the Shermans had to close to less than 500 yards to have
a hope of killing the Tiger.

It seems you still can't see my point. It is one thing to say that all German tanks they ran into were superior (in fact your original words were "vastly superior in terms of gun power and armor protection"), it is a very different statement to say that all of the German tanks scared tem because any German tank hiding could be a Tiger. I hope you can see the difference.

This was the subjective perception of an enlisted man who enlisted after Pearl Harbor, and when he told
a Sergeant he knew how to drive a car, he was offered a transfer from the Infantry to the Armor.

Funny, I'm in no way an expert, but I used to think that men were assigned to branches through a very different procedure.

His statement that he and his fellow tank commanders were ordered to only attack with superior numbers
was an order given to either his platoon or his company, he didn't specify which, and it was given VERBALLY,
so there will be no records of it anywhere.

So an order given just to a platoon or company, and we don't know when and how many times it was repeated?

We just have to take his word for it, as I did.

In fact, we have to take your Word before taking his word
But no, we don't have to. That's the problem I have with your attitude, you show a marked tendency to believe tales that go against available evidence just because someone told you so.

After all, what reason would he have to lie, thirty years after the end of WW2 ?

He could have been lying, he could have been missremembering, you can be lying (not that I say you are), you can be missremembering,....
As for the reasons he could have to lie, any basic psychology manual can answer that.

in one village, they picked up a pair of French ' ladies of the evening ' and, with the help of some
filched mattresses, converted one of the M4 Shermans into a temporary bedroom for those men who wished
to partake of the ladies' services.....

Did he tell you if all the French ladies they ran into were vastly superior in terms of gun power and armor protection to U.S. ladies?
Sorry, couldn't help it.

so the game was in November of 1974

Do you even remember the month? That's awesome.
However, I'm sure there something to be said about the accuracy of the memories of a conversation that took place 45 years ago about events that had happened 30 years before.

I remember that I was starting to suffer from my second bout of Tuberculosis )

OMG, you have certainly lived an eventful life.

Mr. Ironmachine, as for my word, both you and Mr. Kenny have questioned that in the past.

And I will keep doing it if I thing your word is questionable.

Now, Mr. Kenny I can understand, as he lives in England, where they have no firearms, and so the sort of rudeness where one man calls another man a liar to his face is tolerated.

You certainly have a funny idea of England.

I live in the United States, in a portion of the country where we openly wear handguns at our belts.

Welcome to the jungle!

This means that our Society is a Polite Society. Rude people don't last long. Just think of it as Darwin in Action.

Actually, your posts say more about gullibility than about politeness.

In his final motion picture, actor John Wayne portrayed an aging gunfighter who was dying of an incurable disease. He is asked by a young boy why he had killed so many men.

You know movies are not real life, don't you?

Now, Mr. Ironmachine, your little ' Bio ' next to your username states that you live in Spain. All right, Mr. Ironmachine: Prove it to me. Prove to me that you live in Spain. After all, you might actually be from
Madagascar. Or you might be a resident of Tokyo. I have no evidence of either one.

There are a number of differences: as it is happening now, there is little possibility that I missremeber where I live; I can show you documental evidence that supports the statement; you can come here and actually see me; I have no interest at all in you believing that I live in Spain...

I am sure that you can see from this that it is impossible to Prove you are from Spain.

No, it is not impossible. It may be imposible to prove through an exchange of posts in a fórum, but it is not impossible to prove.

Thus, there is NO ' Proof ' that Darwin's Theory of Evolution Through Natural Selection is ' True ', there IS Evidence that the Theory is a correct description of the natural processes that gave rise to the current forms of life on Earth.)

I have been told that in the United States, in the portion of the country where you openly wear handguns at your belts, that kind of claim can get you into trouble. But surely one should not believe everything he is told. Oh, wait...

But, Mr. Ironmachine, despite our political differences, I have respect for you as an honorable gentleman who has chosen to be a part of this Forum in order that you can contribute your knowledge, insights, and resources to the general group as a whole.

We have no political differences. You may believe we have, but that's not true. I couldn't care less about politics. AFAICS, you have your particular view about some events of Spanish history and you have the manicheist belief that anyone who disagrees with you must have some very nasty political ideas. Well, that's not the case. Not my case, at least.

And for this, I am willing to accept those things you write as being based on the best, most accurate information you have available to you.

But I tend to refrain from posting hearsay...

I would NEVER go around calling you a liar.

You have called me far worse things in this same forum.

On the other hand, Mr. Richard Anderson and Mr. Michael Kenney, whenever they are disagreed with on this Forum, have responded with insults and ad hominen attacks. They use epithets such as ' Liar ',and ' Troll ', and Mr. Anderson is apparently very upset that I am still a member of this Forum. In my opinion this detracts from the dignity of this Forum. And any individual who would wish to be taken seriously as a scholar or researcher should know enough to refrain from such behavior. I would hope, Mr. Ironmachine, that you would not sully your good reputation by behaving in the manner of the above mentioned persons.

It's nice to see that you think that I have a good reputation, despite some of your previous comments in other threads about my person.

I hope that this clarifies my earlier posting.

Yes, it's all clear. It's a matter of faith. Of that, I have very little. But it was interesting, anyway.

I think that's all there is.
Regards.

[Delwin]

The problem from the American POV of course was that to them the 17-pdr was simply a repeat in size of the 3-inch M7, plus was British manufactured. As far as they were concerned the practical performance of the 3-inch and the 17-pdr were identical, which for all intents and purposes they actually were, given that a higher Mv in the 3-inch/76mm with the standard APC projectile would simply have resulted in more failures to penetrate due to shattering, deforming, and fuse failure, against the heavier and highly angled German plate in 1943, which of course was something unknown in the summer of 1942 (Tiger I was known, but was considered so complex, expensive, and thus built in such small numbers as to be no effective threat).

That's all correct with simple difference: in real life 17-pdr was significantly more powerful than its American equivalents. This is matter of choice whether to push the gun more or leave with performance deemed satisfactory. As far as I can recall there were ideas within Ordance (?) to push the gun further but they were not followed. So it was a conscious decision taken. I believe that shattering risks would have been spotted earlier but this is more a guess.

I am not sure why the "risk of failure of APDS programm" was so important because the American APDS program was initiated at the same time, summer of 1942, and as a development program always had the risk of failure. HVAP was again an expedient, developed in the course of about six weeks, beginning c. June 1944, when the full importance of the Panther's armor was realized. When fielded, it had the same practical effectiveness as 17-pdr AP and much greater accuracy than 17-pdr APDS. The real problem was that tungsten carbide was prioritized to machine tool fabrication, which meant only limited quantities were available to Ordnance initially and the restriction was always a limiter on production quantities. Oh, and then of course the projectile shape was not optimum versus the highly sloped armor, again something that Army Ordnance was late realizing. Again, the fundamental thing the American Army Ordnance was missing was fundamental experimental experience in the physics of projectiles versus armor. The greatest condemnation of its wartime experience is that they never improved the capabilities of the standard 76mm APC round...something the USN Ordnance establishment noted when testing Army spec 3-inch/76mm projectiles versus Navy spec ones in 1946.

I cannot recall the way of thinking in this particular case but I can imagine following:

- we are fielding solid enough 3-inch/76 mm (noting that it was also intended for TDs)
- in case there are some tougher threats: we are working on superb ammo.

Sound like a plan. The difference is that US tried shortcut and unfortunately failed with APDS. That's OK they tried but they should follow UK approach: ok, we work on the APDS but in the meantime we create "limited standard" HVAP project just in case we need to produce it. Or even product few thousands rounds "just in case": noting however that this is really expensive safety net. In case of UK approach they simply fielded a gun that even without APDS was good enough.

BTW, no the British did not include the 17-pdr "in the troops/platoons from the very beginning", there was in fact considerable controversy initially as to how exactly the Sherman 17-pdr would be employed, especially since most regiments received them in late April and May and had very little chance to work out an actual tactical doctrine for them. Initially they were deployed as a HQ Troop under the regimental commander...when they were available at all. As more became available and were issued in July and August, tactical experience led them to be deployed down to the squadron and then troop. Interestingly enough, the 2d and 3d AD were also cautious when deploying their first issue of Medium Tanks M4A1 (76mm). "The 2d AD organized one platoon of 76mm in each of its twelve Medium Tank companies, which obviously left some of the platoons with five and some with four 76mm tanks. The 3d AD organized two 76mm tanks in each of its thirty-six Medium Tank platoons, which obviously left some platoons with one and some with two 76mm tanks."

But still within tank units - in theory one can imagine placing M10/M36 as elements of the tank units. Maybe not as part of the single platoon but on higher levels (company): a bit similarly to German approach with Pz IV as "tank supporting tanks".

[Carl Schwamberger]

...

But still within tank units - in theory one can imagine placing M10/M36 as elements of the tank units. Maybe not as part of the single platoon but on higher levels (company): a bit similarly to German approach with Pz IV as "tank supporting tanks".

I recall some TD battalions were attached to armored divisions. Don't know the details, tho I recall one example being the 4th AD when at Arracourt. Perhaps Rich can clarify this.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Anyone encountered this story. Any collaboration? Any indication it happened more than once?

In Wolfgang Schneider's Tigers in Combat I (2004), p. 303, it is said that on 9 April 1945 four Tigers of Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 507 were "knocked out by phosphorous grenades".
On page 202 it says that on 12 April 1945 "Tiger 211 (Unteroffizier Kaiser) [Schwere Panzer-Abteilung 504] is immobilized after being hit by phosphorus grenades."

In Steven J. Zaloga's Panzer IV vs Sherman - France 1944 you can find the following information:

... By mid-June 1944, the use of “Willy Pete” in tank fighting was disseminated widely in US tank units in Normandy as a useful tactic and became SOP (standard operating procedure) in some units.

Thanks. I had no idea the tactic was so well known. Had only seen the single anecdote from 1945.

The use to blind the enemy was a different matter, thats one of the two major reasons to carry smoke ammunition. Target marking being the other. I've seen plenty of accounts and school docs on those two, but not on the use of the WP as neutralization ammo vs tanks.

[Delwin]

...

But still within tank units - in theory one can imagine placing M10/M36 as elements of the tank units. Maybe not as part of the single platoon but on higher levels (company): a bit similarly to German approach with Pz IV as "tank supporting tanks".

I recall some TD battalions were attached to armored divisions. Don't know the details, tho I recall one example being the 4th AD when at Arracourt. Perhaps Rich can clarify this.

Yes, they were but not sure how they were employed i.e. as separate units (even as smaller elements within combat groups) or directly attached to low level tactical units. I believe the former but this the area where Rich may clarify.

[Richard Anderson]

That's all correct with simple difference: in real life 17-pdr was significantly more powerful than its American equivalents. This is matter of choice whether to push the gun more or leave with performance deemed satisfactory. As far as I can recall there were ideas within Ordance (?) to push the gun further but they were not followed. So it was a conscious decision taken. I believe that shattering risks would have been spotted earlier but this is more a guess.

Um, not exactly. In real life the 17-pdr was significantly larger and heavier than the 76mm, and more similar to the 3-inch M7. It had a larger chamber than either and developed greater chamber pressure and Mv. It also fired a solid AP shot, less prone to deformation and shatter than the American APC (which to the British was APHE). US Army Ordnance was all in on APC as far back as 1940; again it was not gun decisions that were the problem, but projectile decisions and poor testing and analysis, linked to a lack of practical experience in such physical testing, as well as the funding and equipment to do so. It wasn't until 1943 before the superiority of the German 75mm projectile was confirmed, but even then it was a case of "good enough" being accepted in order not to disrupt production. And it wasn't until May 1944, after testing at Balleroy demonstrated the fuzing problems in all the APC rounds, and the analysis of the Panther was completed, before the full realization of the problem sunk in.

That British gun BTW, could not be fitted in the Medium Tank M4 any more than the 3-inch M7 could. It too had to go through a "slimming down" process in order to fit, and such a model, the Mark IV, was not completed until August 1943, long after the development of the 76mm and its fitting in the M4 was completed, along with production plans and phased retooling at the arsenals.

I cannot recall the way of thinking in this particular case but I can imagine following:

- we are fielding solid enough 3-inch/76 mm (noting that it was also intended for TDs)
- in case there are some tougher threats: we are working on superb ammo.

Sound like a plan. The difference is that US tried shortcut and unfortunately failed with APDS. That's OK they tried but they should follow UK approach: ok, we work on the APDS but in the meantime we create "limited standard" HVAP project just in case we need to produce it. Or even product few thousands rounds "just in case": noting however that this is really expensive safety net. In case of UK approach they simply fielded a gun that even without APDS was good enough.

The actual thinking was a bit more complex and also suffered from competing and contrary requirements from different agencies. Ordnance had one "solution" for the need for greater penetration, a bigger gun, and pushed for the 90mm. However, AGF, via the Armored Force wanted to keep a "3-inch caliber" for the ease of handling, the ergonomics in the turret and thus rate of fire, along with greater ammunition stowage. APDS and all projectile development was essentially a back-burner issue, Ordnance believed penetration issues would be solved by bigger projectiles and the Armored Force believed higher velocities was the solution. Both were wrong, the actual key was improved projectile design and manufacture. APDS was an end around to get better penetration without increasing overall projectile size, but never got beyond the separation problem until the Canadians solved the problem postwar. APCR was a simple brute force solution, which had its own problems. It was such a simple "solution" that it required only six weeks for development (although another year or so of refinement went on as well). In the end, 76mm/3-inch APCR and 17-pdr AP/APC/APCBC all performed about the same...17-pdr was "better", but only when it hit.

On top of that you had competing personalities. In American Ordnance, Gladeon Barnes was the final arbiter for tank development decisions, and was convinced he knew best (he also got to write the historical narrative that became popular and was able to paint McNair as the "villian" with no evidence, McNair being conveniently dead and the organization he led non-existent). So APC was "better" because it had better behind-armor effect...that it might not get behind armor was a secondary problem. Armor wanted better penetration? Well, no, don't develop better projectiles and higher velocity guns, just put in a bigger gun. And so on.

But still within tank units - in theory one can imagine placing M10/M36 as elements of the tank units. Maybe not as part of the single platoon but on higher levels (company): a bit similarly to German approach with Pz IV as "tank supporting tanks".

Um, the British had effectively four Sherman 17-pdr in a regiment of c. 60 medium tanks. In the armoured division they also had 12 M10 3-inch and 12 M10 17-pdr (in theory), so the four Sherman 17-pdr could be augmented by possibly four M10 3-inch or 17-pdr. In the American corps, typically the Tank Battalion could depend on pairing with a TD battalion...at the least as in the armored division, a tank battalion with 53/54 medium tanks could be paired with a company of 12 SP TD, 3", 76mm, or later 90mm. How is that different?

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, they were but not sure how they were employed i.e. as separate units (even as smaller elements within combat groups) or directly attached to low level tactical units. I believe the former but this the area where Rich may clarify.

The initial theoretical tactical and operational deployment of the Tank Destroyers was only followed, for a relatively short time, in Tunisia, Sicily, and the initial campaign in Italy. It envisaged a TD Group attached to a corps, with one TD battalion per division, plus at least one more, that would be deployed as required to defeat massed German tank attacks...which rarely occurred. The TD doctrine was highly centralized and managed from the top, with TDs attached to tank and infantry units only when required to defeat an anticipated tank attack. Practically speaking it was unworkable. That led to War Department Training Circular No. 88 in late 1943, which advocated a much more practical and decentralized doctrine, with the battalions attached directly to divisions. The misguided shift back to towed TDs, initiated in fall/winter 1943, was also rethought in theater.

[Carl Schwamberger]

A few minutes of refresher reading on the Arracourt battle found a couple remarks describing Tank Destroyers mixed in to battalion or Task Force level. ie: TF Hunter on 19th Sept had a company of M4 Medium tanks, two platoons of M10 (8 TD), and a company of armored infantry. The text did not say if any of the armored cars organic to the TD battalions were present in TF Hunter.

I notice that missing from all these discussions of US vs German 'armor' is any analysis of the M10 vs Panther or Tiger tanks.

Zaloga is cited as saying this, which I've not checked:

"Of the 262 tanks and assault guns deployed by the German units in the week of fighting near Arracourt, 86 were destroyed, 114 were damaged or broken down, and only 62 were operational at the end of the month". By comparison "4th Armored Division's Combat Command A, which had borne the brunt of the 5th Panzer Army's counter-offensive at Arracourt, lost 25 tanks and 7 tank destroyers.[1] As a division, the 4th AD lost some 41 M4 medium tanks and 7 M5A1 light tanks during the whole month of September, with casualties of 225 killed and 648 wounded."[18]

Whats missing from the above is how many of the 86 tanks destroyed were Panthers or MkIV, or assualt & AT vehicles. Neither does it give a clear picture of the US tanks broken down, or losses of M10 TD or armored cars.

Arracourt is the best known of the post Normandy armored battles, & is one of the largest. Anyone have any information on the others?

[Michael Kenny]

the British had effectively four Sherman 17-pdr in a regiment of c. 60 medium tanks.

Depends on date but 4 per squadron was the target.

[Richard Anderson]

Zaloga is cited as saying this, which I've not checked:

"Of the 262 tanks and assault guns deployed by the German units in the week of fighting near Arracourt, 86 were destroyed, 114 were damaged or broken down, and only 62 were operational at the end of the month". By comparison "4th Armored Division's Combat Command A, which had borne the brunt of the 5th Panzer Army's counter-offensive at Arracourt, lost 25 tanks and 7 tank destroyers.[1] As a division, the 4th AD lost some 41 M4 medium tanks and 7 M5A1 light tanks during the whole month of September, with casualties of 225 killed and 648 wounded."[18]

Whats missing from the above is how many of the 86 tanks destroyed were Panthers or MkIV, or assualt & AT vehicles. Neither does it give a clear picture of the US tanks broken down, or losses of M10 TD or armored cars.

Of the 201 Panthers committed by 5. Panzerarmee in September, 118 were lost and 57 were in repair 1 October. Of the 194 Pz IV, 101 were lost and 65 were in repair. Of course, not all those were sustained versus 4th Armd Div.

Arracourt is the best known of the post Normandy armored battles, & is one of the largest. Anyone have any information on the others?

Mairy, elements of the 90th Inf Div and Pz.Brig. 106. Possibly 15 of 22 Panthers and 2 of 11 Pz IV/70(V) were lost...in a fight with the Division TAC HQ and DIVARTY HQ, supported initially by Company A, 712th Tk Bn and three infantry companies and later counterattacked by two infantry battalions. Two American tanks were knocked out and probably "lost", while another four were "knocked out".

Dompaire, elements 2d FF Armd Div and Pz.Brig. 112. In two days the Germans lost all but 4 Panthers out of the 46 it started with 2 of 45 Pz IV were lost and only 17 were still operational.

[Richard Anderson]

the British had effectively four Sherman 17-pdr in a regiment of c. 60 medium tanks.

Depends on date but 4 per squadron was the target.

Ooops, sorry, yes, bad maths on my part. It was either 22 or 34/36 intended per brigade c. D-Day, so 12 per regiment, except in the DD regiments.

In 2 CAB 22 of 193 medium tanks were Sherman 17-pdr on 6 June. 8.77 to 1
Ditto in 4 AB.
In 8 AB it was 34 of 189 on 11 June. 5.56 to 1
In 27 AB it was 29 of 186 on 6 June. 6.41 to 1
In 33 AB it was 31 of 165 on 15 June. 5.32 to 1
In 5 Gds AB it was 36 of 188 on 3 July. 5.22 to 1
In 29 AB it was 37 of 224 on 31 May. 6.05 to 1

[Carl Schwamberger]

Mairy, elements of the 90th Inf Div and Pz.Brig. 106. Possibly 15 of 22 Panthers and 2 of 11 Pz IV/70(V) were lost...in a fight with the Division TAC HQ and DIVARTY HQ, supported initially by Company A, 712th Tk Bn and three infantry companies and later counterattacked by two infantry battalions. Two American tanks were knocked out and probably "lost", while another four were "knocked out". ...

So the US tanks are out numbered 2-1, inflict 50% losses on the German uber tanks, taking 35% losses. Of course its not clear what losses are executed by towed AT guns, or the 'rocket guns' carried by the infantry..