Soviet Army's automobile stocks, losses and deliveries

[Der Alte Fritz]

First point to note that the overall size of the fleet on 9th May 1945 is smaller than that of 22nd June 1941 and with losses of 600,000+ vehicles and another 150,000 worn out. Against this is the Soviet home production of 205-212,000, imports of 312,000 and captured enemy vehicles of 60,000 a total of around 570,000 vehicles, leaving a deficit of 200,000 vehicles.

This position backs up the previous tables that I posted showing that the transfer of vehicles from civil economy to the military plus the diverting of almost all the production to the Army was what kept the military going especially in 1942 and 1943 when the deficit over the pre-war stock was at its highest of up to 400,000 vehicles.

[Art]

Soviet import of motor transport 22.6.1941-31.12.1945 by year and country of origin:

Motor vehicles import.png (49.36 KiB) Viewed 1190 times

Also not included in import numbers were vehicles given to Soviet agencies in Iran:
6200 trucks
400 (scout vehicles) jeeps
19 special purpose
8 passenger cars
66 road vehicles
40 motorcycles

From a statistical digest on wartime import and export (Ministry of Foreign Trade, Moscow, 1946)
http://istmat.info/node/40607

Comparing with the report of GAVTU discussed above:
- imported by 1.1.45 according to foreign trade statistics - 297 700 automobiles
- accepted by the Red Army by 1.1.45 according to the GAVTU - 267 600
The difference of 30 000 can be due to natural time lag or acceptance by Navy, NKVD and civil agencies.

[Art]

And from the same source - breakdown of import by type, country and mode of import:

That can be compared with an American source ("Report on war aid furnished by the United States to the U.S.S.R."):

We see a reasonable agreement, although numbers don't fully coincide.

[Der Alte Fritz]

The total number of vehicles listed in the first report: 460,390 compares well with the US Report to Congress figure of what was despatched.

The important aspect to note here are the dates as the first reports go to the end of 1945 and so include the 60,000 odd vehicles supplied directly to the Far East across the Pacific to fight Japan. Moreover there is a time lag between delivery of crates of unassembled automobile parts and the finished vehicles arriving at the front after assembly in Soviet factories. So the GATVU report figure of 297,700 by 1.1.45 still looks credible allowing for 60,000 vehicles going to the Pacific and deliveries to European Russia between January and the end of 1945

The second report goes to 20 September 1945 which makes comparison of the reports harder but does give us an indication of what was despatched. The figure for vehicles lost enroute seems low as does the figure for vehicles diverted enroute as these are usually put at 10% and 5% respectively wheras the report shows 14,712 and 4,932 which is 3.5% and 1.1%. Again the timing of the report may be that these percentage figures relate to an earlier and shorter period.

[Art]

So the GATVU report figure of 297,700 by 1.1.45 still looks credible

That's foreign trade stats. GAVTU gave 267,700 vehicles accepted by that moment (1 January 1945). They probably omitted some types of vehicles (repair workshops on truck chassis, dump trucks etc) which explains a part of the difference.
Another source is a US War Department's report on LL shipments which gives some 434 thousand trucks and jeeps sent to the Soviet Union:
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/ref ... ip-3B.html
So again close to the Soviet import stats, a minor difference is probably due to inclusion of some types of vehicles.

[Art]

A comparison between lend-lease shipments according to the Soviet foreign trade digest and two American reports (adding those vehicles which were not counted in "Motor transport" section of the Soviet digest):

LL shipments.png (26.41 KiB) Viewed 1132 times

Notes:
(1) Including 77 537 Ford, 63 347 Chevrolet, and 8 880 dodge trucks
(2) Including 87 452 4x2, 60 475 4x4, 10 6x6 trucks, and 3 096 2x4 trucks, Stake&Platform
(3) Including 179 459 Studebaker, 2 995 International Harvester, and 8 650 GMC trucks
(4) Including 79 145 4x6, 104 485 6x6 Studebaker trucks, 5 992 6x6 short wheel base trucks, 2 6x6 15-ft body trucks.
(5) Including 757 10-ton 6x6 trucks (Mack) and 101 M1 Heavy wreaking trucks
(6) Including 471 M19 12-ton 6x4 truck tractors and 234 20-ton 6x4 tank transporters
(7) Including 90 trucks for road machines and 14 7.5-ton tractors with trailers.
(8) Including 90 5-6-ton 4x4 FWD-SU prime-movers and 14 7.5-ton 6x6 prime-movers
(9) Including 410 Studebaker 2.5-ton, 82 GMC 2.5-ton, 20 Diamond 4-ton and 1235 5-ton International Harvester dump trucks
(10) Including 494 2.5-ton, 20 4-ton, and 1243 5-ton dump trucks
(12) Including 11 fire trucks, 71 refueling vehicles, and 698 gas tank trucks
(13) 90 automotive repair type A, 95 automotive repair type B, 171 electrical repair, 187 machine shop A, 35 machine shop B, 100 signal repair, 80 spare parts load A, 39 tool&bench, 131 M12 welding
(14) Including 5 975 2.5-ton chassis and 20 1.5-tone chassis.

[Hiryu-]

Soviet import of motor transport 22.6.1941-31.12.1945 by year and country of origin:

Motor vehicles import.png

Also not included in import numbers were vehicles given to Soviet agencies in Iran:
6200 trucks
400 (scout vehicles) jeeps
19 special purpose
8 passenger cars
66 road vehicles
40 motorcycles

From a statistical digest on wartime import and export (Ministry of Foreign Trade, Moscow, 1946)
http://istmat.info/node/40607

Comparing with the report of GAVTU discussed above:
- imported by 1.1.45 according to foreign trade statistics - 297 700 automobiles
- accepted by the Red Army by 1.1.45 according to the GAVTU - 267 600
The difference of 30 000 can be due to natural time lag or acceptance by Navy, NKVD and civil agencies.

Thanks for the table Art.

[Art]

Interesting document on the Motor Park of the USSR 1913-1945 and with breakdown by Commissariat of the Motor Fleet in August 1945
http://istmat.info/node/45251
Screenshot 2017-06-30 12.55.04.png

From this table we've got the average number of automobiles in the USSR (both civil and military) by year:
1932 - 64.3 thousand
1933 - 96.6
1934 - 149.9
1935 - 223.5
1936 - 325.5
1937 - 478
1938 - 665
1939 - 839
1940 - 964.4

At the same time production of the automobile tires was:
1932 - 552.6 thousand
1933 - 679.2
1934 - 1 547.0
1935 - 2 083.6
1936 - 2 209.1
1937 - 2 698.0
1938 - 3 594.6
1939 - 4 220.6
1940 - 3 007.1
(see https://istmat.org/files/uploads/36634/ ... _22-33.pdf for a source of stats)

Or in terms of tires per one vehicle available:
1932 - 8.6
1933 - 7.03
1934 - 10.3
1935 - 9.3
1936 - 6.8
1937 - 5.6
1938 - 5.4
1939 - 5.0
1940 - 3.1

In other words the production of tires failed to keep up with increase of the motor park and the year 1940 was especially problematic. One of the reason was stagnation of synthetic rubber production at about 90-100 thousand tons annually after a fast progress in 1933-1937. Another reason was apparently a decline of natural rubber import in 1940 (from about 30 in the previous years to 18 thousand tons) due to war and worsening of relation with Britain. A number of sources indicate that by 1941 tires were in short supply and seriously limited serviceability of motor vehicles.

[Stiltzkin]

Another reason was apparently a decline of natural rubber import in 1940 (from about 30 in the previous years to 18 thousand tons)

These were forwarded to Nazi-Germany as part of the appeasement plans, 15,000 tons of India rubber, in the summer of 1940.

[Art]

No, that seems to be exclusively import for domestic consumption. According to the same custom stats there was no export of natural rubber from the USSR worth to speak about in 1940 or in any of the previous years.

In June 1941 general Fedorenko (chief of the Auto-Armor-Tank Administration) reported that all available military stocks of tires were used up in 1939-40 (apparently in military campaigns of these years). Allocations of new tires from the industry were insufficient to meet current demands. The situation in civil motor park was hardly better.
Curiously, the post-war report of the GAVTU posted above noted that wartime supply of tires improved consideably and almost 3 times more tires were recieved per one available vehicles compared with the pre-war period.

[Art]

After 1941 a large part of tires were supplied from lend-lease. Soviet production and import from the USA were (in thousands)
1941 - 3389 (domestic production) + 11.2 (import)
1942 - 1417 + 274.7
1943 - 949 + 1115.1
1944 - 1243 + 1475.1
1945 - 1370 + 794.3
https://istmat.org/node/41711

So in 1942-45 LL made more than 40% of the total supply. The rubber for tires were also largely recieved from foreign sources. In 1944-45 domestic production of synthetic rubber (114 thous. tons) was about equal to import from Brittish colonies (116 thous. tons). I suppose that a larger proportion of natural rubber was benefitial for resistance to wear, although there is no positive data on this.

[Art]

Number of motor vehicles in the Red Army as of 1 January 1936:

Tanks (T-35, T-28, T-26, BT, T-37) - 9170
T-27 tankettes - 2547
Armored cars - 886
Chemical and engineer tanks - 595
Total AFVs - 13 738

Cars - 4330
Trucks - 19 530
Special purpose vehicles - 12 360
Total automobiles - 36 220

Motorcycles - 1620

So in five years the number of autmobiles in the military increased almost 8-fold (to 281 thousand in June 1941*), while the number of civil automobiles - only about 3.5-fold (from about 230 thousand in January 1936 to 820 thousand in June 1941). Militarization is obvious.

* while the personnel strength grew from about 1.1 to 4.6 million men.

[Der Alte Fritz]

I would put it the other way round since the bulk of the production between 1930 and 1941 went to the civilian sector, while the Red Army was a relative latecomer and grew very quickly. Nonetheless in June 1941 the Red Army was supposed to have 755,000 vehicles plus 95,000 tractors, which on the outbreak of war was supposed to be met from the Red Army fleet 272,000 plus 208,000 taken up from the cvilian sector (ie.about a quarter).

The problem was that many of the civilian vehicles owned by smaller concerns, particularly in agriculture were in a poor state of repair and many should have been written off but were kept on the books to meet targets. Scrappage rates were running at around 70,000 a year by 1940 as the ealier machines now over 10 years old ended their useful life.

[Art]

Nonetheless in June 1941 the Red Army was supposed to have 755,000 vehicles plus 95,000 tractors, which on the outbreak of war was supposed to be met from the Red Army fleet 272,000 plus 208,000 taken up from the cvilian sector (ie.about a quarter).

To expand on that in June 1941 general Fedorenko reported the following numbers

Automobiles in the army as of June 41:
Cars and pickups - 17280
GAZ trucks (1.5-2 ton) - 117415
ZIS trucks (3-4 ton) - 75803
Type A mobile workshops (GAZ trucks) - 2729
Type B mobile workshops (ZIS trucks) - 1556
Gasoline tankers - 11252
Recharging trucks - 725
Other special purpose vehicles - 45380
Total 272,140

At the same time the peacetime/wartime establishment was:
Cars and pickups - 26001/49305
GAZ trucks - 95231/213571
ZIS trucks - 116689/257256
Type A mobile workshops - 5423/7972
Type B mobile workshops - 3648/4378
Gasoline tankers - 19683/60914
Recharging trucks - 1860/2571
Other special purpose vehicles - 81240/159911
Total 349,775/755,878

Expected mobilization of the civil transport in wartime:
Cars - 23864
Trucks - 209880
Special purpose vehicles - 6000
Total 239,744
/A little different but similar mobilization targets were established by the Defense Committee in 1940 - 25400 cars and pickups, 151723 GAZ trucks, 65023 ZIS trucks, 578 ambulance trucks, 621 buses, 1029 "A" and 335 "B" workshops, 2791 other special purpose vehicles/

which wasn't sufficient neither in quantity nor in quality.

Fedorenko further commented that the shortfall couldn't be expected to be covered by mobilization from the civil economy, because as the experience of Polish and Finnish campaigns demonstrated the vast numbers of vehicles will be arriving arrive to the acceptance points in poor technical conditions and with worn out tires (almost a literal quote).

The problem was that many of the civilian vehicles owned by smaller concerns, particularly in agriculture were in a poor state of repair and many should have been written off but were kept on the books to meet targets

The thing that I don't understand here (apart from where all these 750+ thousand wartime vehicles were supposed to be) is why the state of the civil transport was so bad. Most of vehicles were quite new, not older than 5 years. That cannot be explained by normal wear&tear and indicate some serious structural problems, possible including the lack of maintenance and repair facilities, lack of qualified personnel, poor roads, deficit of spare parts and tires and similar things.

[Der Alte Fritz]

What's the source for 'June 1941 general Fedorenko'?

The condition of the fleet was very variable but overall stemmed from a misunderstanding about the role of vehicles in general. The reality was that to keep a vehicle working requires serious infrastructure in terms of a) roads b) supplies of petrol and lubricants, tyres, spare parts c) access to well equipped workshops d) knowledgeable drivers who can do minor repairs and are able to identify problems as they occur and 'tweak' the machine (this is afterall the 1930s and 1940s level of technology) to get the best out of it.

This level of support was available in industry in large cities and in the countryside at the Tractor Machine Stations but several elements of it, particularly driver knowledge was lacking across the countryside and in many smaller towns. In the USSR there was simply not the number of experienced drivers able to man the fleet and more importantly to keep it running. Many machines received into the military were found to have minor defects (illustrating a shortage of spares) but many were off the road through abuse (lack of regular lubrication, ability to change a wheel, etc, illustrating lack of driver training or access to infrastructure,) and this remained unreported due to concerns about punishment for 'breaking' a peice of State property.