One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 02 Oct 2020 20:22

Peter89 wrote:if you have to move your airfields and lines of communication with your advance, then the difficulties will increase, higher rate of attrition is ensured.
Okay I took you to be making the far simpler claim that the mere fact of attacking implies higher losses for the attacker.

We know that's not true empirically (e.g. LW '41, W.Allies in MTO) but it's worth saying more about why. IMJ there's a supralinear relationship between combat loss ratio and force ratio. An air force that is numerically/qualitatively dominated can't defend its airfields so it loses many more AC on the ground. General conditions of numerical inferiority also make adverse tactical conditions more likely (e.g. outnumbered fighters having enemies on their six and bombers shooting at more planes than it has guns for).

My rough sketch of ATL LW combat losses assumes a linear relationship, which is conservative rather than optimistic IMO.

The advancing airfields factor would show an ATL-OTL difference only in those areas where the Germans advance ATL but didn't OTL in '42. Basically everything north of Voronezh. I've given a range of estimates for re-deployable Ost-LW in ATL '42 of 4,000-4,500. Combining the impact of advancing airfields and of supralinear attrition effects, that range still seems roughly correct.
in OTL MTO the LW has to attack into well-defended positions where the enemy is assisted by superior radar and intelligence networks. They have essentially no way to recover pilots, they can stay airborne for a shorter time than their adversaries and they will not enjoy numerical superiority.
I can't recall instances of SIGINT helping with tactical air battles. For longer-term Axis movements like convoys and planned offensives it was huge but even the geniuses at Bletchley usually took a few days to decode intercepts and then to assemble a narrative from pieces of traffic. Maybe a big set-piece operation like Bodenplatte could be intercepted but of course we know it wasn't.

My point about the MTO isn't that the Germans would necessarily dominate the air ATL, just that W.Allies wouldn't have sufficient superiority to devastate airfields and force unfavorable tactical situations across the board. An LW operating from well-supplied fields in Turkey (invasion WITH Turkey scenario) is a different ballgame from LW improvising from poorly protected/supplied Tunisian fields. Under conditions of aerial parity or even slight W.Allied superiority, the issues would be settled by the armies.

And unless the W.Allies can find the logistics to support thousands of planes in MTO, the LW might numerically dominate - with attendant supralinear loss ratio effects. Questionable whether there's shipping for that and for sufficient divisions to protect airfields from ground attack. IMO it's not questionable whether the foregoing can be done while maintaining the OTL posture against Japan.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 03 Oct 2020 07:12

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
02 Oct 2020 20:22
Peter89 wrote:if you have to move your airfields and lines of communication with your advance, then the difficulties will increase, higher rate of attrition is ensured.
Okay I took you to be making the far simpler claim that the mere fact of attacking implies higher losses for the attacker.

We know that's not true empirically (e.g. LW '41, W.Allies in MTO) but it's worth saying more about why. IMJ there's a supralinear relationship between combat loss ratio and force ratio. An air force that is numerically/qualitatively dominated can't defend its airfields so it loses many more AC on the ground. General conditions of numerical inferiority also make adverse tactical conditions more likely (e.g. outnumbered fighters having enemies on their six and bombers shooting at more planes than it has guns for).

My rough sketch of ATL LW combat losses assumes a linear relationship, which is conservative rather than optimistic IMO.

The advancing airfields factor would show an ATL-OTL difference only in those areas where the Germans advance ATL but didn't OTL in '42. Basically everything north of Voronezh. I've given a range of estimates for re-deployable Ost-LW in ATL '42 of 4,000-4,500. Combining the impact of advancing airfields and of supralinear attrition effects, that range still seems roughly correct.
in OTL MTO the LW has to attack into well-defended positions where the enemy is assisted by superior radar and intelligence networks. They have essentially no way to recover pilots, they can stay airborne for a shorter time than their adversaries and they will not enjoy numerical superiority.
I can't recall instances of SIGINT helping with tactical air battles. For longer-term Axis movements like convoys and planned offensives it was huge but even the geniuses at Bletchley usually took a few days to decode intercepts and then to assemble a narrative from pieces of traffic. Maybe a big set-piece operation like Bodenplatte could be intercepted but of course we know it wasn't.

My point about the MTO isn't that the Germans would necessarily dominate the air ATL, just that W.Allies wouldn't have sufficient superiority to devastate airfields and force unfavorable tactical situations across the board. An LW operating from well-supplied fields in Turkey (invasion WITH Turkey scenario) is a different ballgame from LW improvising from poorly protected/supplied Tunisian fields. Under conditions of aerial parity or even slight W.Allied superiority, the issues would be settled by the armies.

And unless the W.Allies can find the logistics to support thousands of planes in MTO, the LW might numerically dominate - with attendant supralinear loss ratio effects. Questionable whether there's shipping for that and for sufficient divisions to protect airfields from ground attack. IMO it's not questionable whether the foregoing can be done while maintaining the OTL posture against Japan.
Look, the aerial warfare in the MTO was kind of different than you describe. It was a battle of attrition, something that the Wallies were interested in.

In OTL, the LW possessed 2-300 fighters and 2-300 bombers in the MTO in this period. The attrition was about 5 times of that number.

While the protection of the Reich was adequate with moderate means in 1942/mid-1943 (thus your argument of increasing AC production in the period was unfounded), the attrition began at the peripheries: in the SU and the MTO. Let's say we redirect the LW from the SU to protect the Reich and go on the offensive in the MTO.

The "higher rates of attrition" didn't mean that the situation was a bit bad. It meant that the force you allocated to this theatre was good to delay the defeat for a few months. The LW lost 67 percent of the fighter crews present at the beginning of the year (01.01.1943-01.06.1943), in July, the Germans lost 16 percent of single-engine fighter pilots available on July 1; in August, they lost 15.6 percent. What we are talking about here is an approximate 100% attrition in pilots in 8 month. In the same period, the LW lost over 30% of its fighters and bombers for months. So a flat number of 1500 planes is good for what? Maybe to cover the losses for a few extra months (it might be enough to support a quick invasion of Turkey :D ), but don't think that this force is good to maintain a sustained aerial control in the MTO, plus exercising naval aviation.

Also, don't forget that the LW losses 40-45% were non combat losses, something that was quite inevitable when operating aircraft with primitive conditions of forward air bases, not adequately trained pilots, etc. The LW didn't even address the issue until 1944.

As for the naval warfare, it is true that most of the convoys reached their targets, but cargo was a big question. The aformentioned mines that sunk two cargo ships effectively destroyed the whole 2nd Panzer Division, putting it out of action from the Barbarossa order of battle, causing a way bigger damage (and implications) to the German war efforts in the SU than a sunk oiler or ammunition ship.

By 1942 / 1943 the Wallies KNEW what ships / convoys to sunk, so they could suffer disproportionate losses for the irreplaceable cargo.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 03 Oct 2020 07:52

Peter89 wrote:the aerial warfare in the MTO was kind of different than you describe. It was a battle of attrition, something that the Wallies were interested in.
The phrase "battle of attrition" is one of the most vague and misused terms in military history, IMO. What exactly is a battle of attrition versus a battle? It's usually used in two senses AFAICS: (1) a long campaign/war with many casualties but few dramatic operational outcomes [e.g. Western Front WW1] and (2) an IMO conclusory statement that one side's economic/demographic resources were pre-destined to prevail.

Sense (1) is under-inclusive because very operationally-dramatic campaigns like the Battle of France and '41 Barbarossa are battles of attrition in the sense that attriting the enemy is how Germany saw successive combat success. I.e. Fall Rot was enabled by Fall Gelb's attrition of the W.Allies. The Battles of Kiev and Viazma were only possible due to attrition inflicted in preceding battles.

Sense (2) I obviously mean pejoratively as an attempt to smuggle judgment into a purportedly neutral description.

That's perhaps a diversion but it's just to say I don't buy that "battle of attrition" has any real content distinguishing battles called "attritional" from other "non-attritional" battles. Armies and air forces are always trying to destroy/attrit each other.

So let's look at what would actually happen - in terms of attrition/destruction and operational outcomes - if the LW entered the Med in late '42, regardless of what label we put on the combat.

First, as discussed above, LW will have ~4,000 extra AC available.
For the purposes of our Med discussion, the campaign should be over by mid-'43.

You claim the attritional character of the battle precludes Axis success but OTL Med losses in first half of '43 were between 1,814 and 1,969 per Zamansky's figures. So that doesn't eat up even half of the ATL's additional planes saved by fewer Ostfront losses/deployment.

And that's using OTL LW losses. The LW left >600 AC on the ground when it evacuated Tunisia; that doesn't happen in Turkey/Syria/Iraq. The Allies don't have air supremacy and therefore don't blow up as many AC on the ground (the disparity between AC and pilot losses in this period suggests that as many as half of LW AC losses were on the ground).
Peter89 wrote:The attrition was about 5 times of that number.
So is your thought that attrition would be 5x LW strength in this ATL as well? Impossible for me to see why.
Also, don't forget that the LW losses 40-45% were non combat losses, something that was quite inevitable when operating aircraft with primitive conditions of forward air bases, not adequately trained pilots, etc.
In OTL Tunisia where the Axis was starving for maintenance and airfield infrastructure. Not true of ATL MidEast.
The aformentioned mines that sunk two cargo ships effectively destroyed the whole 2nd Panzer Division, putting it out of action from the Barbarossa order of battle, causing a way bigger damage (and implications) to the German war efforts in the SU than a sunk oiler or ammunition ship.
400 men were lost IIRC. 2nd PzDiv was to return to its home Wehrkreiss (Austria IIRC) for equipment refitting, not to the Eastern Front. It was always intended to be part of OKH reserve on June 22nd.
By 1942 / 1943 the Wallies KNEW what ships / convoys to sunk, so they could suffer disproportionate losses for the irreplaceable cargo.
What about if Turkey is with the Axis or allows passage (the result I think is most likely by far)? For me the logistics for invading Turkey are necessary only to show that assembling the forces would be possible. Once they're there, Turkey doesn't immolate itself for the W.Allies. It takes Cyprus, Lesbos, and Kios (maybe more) as was discussed with the Germans during 1941/42, and at least lets them through.

In that case, no amount of good intelligence can sink Black Sea ships bound for Samsun, Zonguldak, Batumi, and Istanbul on an Axis lake.

Plus look at the broader picture: Even in the Central Med where W.Allies had good intel of Rommel's convoys and later of the Tunisian convoys, most of the supplies and even more of the men got through until the Wallies had massed air and naval forces astride the Sicilian Narrows. It wasn't intel that closed the route, it was plain old mass.
While the protection of the Reich was adequate with moderate means in 1942/mid-1943 (thus your argument of increasing AC production in the period was unfounded)
Huh? Are you saying the Germans didn't have a pressing need for more planes so they wouldn't have built them? Maybe restore Lederhosen production instead?
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 03 Oct 2020 16:20

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
03 Oct 2020 07:52
Peter89 wrote:the aerial warfare in the MTO was kind of different than you describe. It was a battle of attrition, something that the Wallies were interested in.
The phrase "battle of attrition" is one of the most vague and misused terms in military history, IMO. What exactly is a battle of attrition versus a battle? It's usually used in two senses AFAICS: (1) a long campaign/war with many casualties but few dramatic operational outcomes [e.g. Western Front WW1] and (2) an IMO conclusory statement that one side's economic/demographic resources were pre-destined to prevail.

Sense (1) is under-inclusive because very operationally-dramatic campaigns like the Battle of France and '41 Barbarossa are battles of attrition in the sense that attriting the enemy is how Germany saw successive combat success. I.e. Fall Rot was enabled by Fall Gelb's attrition of the W.Allies. The Battles of Kiev and Viazma were only possible due to attrition inflicted in preceding battles.

Sense (2) I obviously mean pejoratively as an attempt to smuggle judgment into a purportedly neutral description.

That's perhaps a diversion but it's just to say I don't buy that "battle of attrition" has any real content distinguishing battles called "attritional" from other "non-attritional" battles. Armies and air forces are always trying to destroy/attrit each other.

So let's look at what would actually happen - in terms of attrition/destruction and operational outcomes - if the LW entered the Med in late '42, regardless of what label we put on the combat.

First, as discussed above, LW will have ~4,000 extra AC available.
For the purposes of our Med discussion, the campaign should be over by mid-'43.

You claim the attritional character of the battle precludes Axis success but OTL Med losses in first half of '43 were between 1,814 and 1,969 per Zamansky's figures. So that doesn't eat up even half of the ATL's additional planes saved by fewer Ostfront losses/deployment.

And that's using OTL LW losses. The LW left >600 AC on the ground when it evacuated Tunisia; that doesn't happen in Turkey/Syria/Iraq. The Allies don't have air supremacy and therefore don't blow up as many AC on the ground (the disparity between AC and pilot losses in this period suggests that as many as half of LW AC losses were on the ground).
Peter89 wrote:The attrition was about 5 times of that number.
So is your thought that attrition would be 5x LW strength in this ATL as well? Impossible for me to see why.
Also, don't forget that the LW losses 40-45% were non combat losses, something that was quite inevitable when operating aircraft with primitive conditions of forward air bases, not adequately trained pilots, etc.
In OTL Tunisia where the Axis was starving for maintenance and airfield infrastructure. Not true of ATL MidEast.
The aformentioned mines that sunk two cargo ships effectively destroyed the whole 2nd Panzer Division, putting it out of action from the Barbarossa order of battle, causing a way bigger damage (and implications) to the German war efforts in the SU than a sunk oiler or ammunition ship.
400 men were lost IIRC. 2nd PzDiv was to return to its home Wehrkreiss (Austria IIRC) for equipment refitting, not to the Eastern Front. It was always intended to be part of OKH reserve on June 22nd.
By 1942 / 1943 the Wallies KNEW what ships / convoys to sunk, so they could suffer disproportionate losses for the irreplaceable cargo.
What about if Turkey is with the Axis or allows passage (the result I think is most likely by far)? For me the logistics for invading Turkey are necessary only to show that assembling the forces would be possible. Once they're there, Turkey doesn't immolate itself for the W.Allies. It takes Cyprus, Lesbos, and Kios (maybe more) as was discussed with the Germans during 1941/42, and at least lets them through.

In that case, no amount of good intelligence can sink Black Sea ships bound for Samsun, Zonguldak, Batumi, and Istanbul on an Axis lake.

Plus look at the broader picture: Even in the Central Med where W.Allies had good intel of Rommel's convoys and later of the Tunisian convoys, most of the supplies and even more of the men got through until the Wallies had massed air and naval forces astride the Sicilian Narrows. It wasn't intel that closed the route, it was plain old mass.
While the protection of the Reich was adequate with moderate means in 1942/mid-1943 (thus your argument of increasing AC production in the period was unfounded)
Huh? Are you saying the Germans didn't have a pressing need for more planes so they wouldn't have built them? Maybe restore Lederhosen production instead?
No, you don't get it. 40-45% (and certainly more if operated from forward air based) was an overall non combat loss rate. So by any means, your ATL has to count with that, even before the extra planes arrive to the MTO. 4000 EXTRA PLANES with aircrew and infrastructure is a bit funny number for me as the LW was not capable to operate that number for quite a long time. How many of those will be present in Eastern med, I cannot fathom, but it doesn't really matter: we have EVIDENCE that aerial warfare in the MTO was an unnecessary attrition for the LW, that was a prelude for their final defeat above the Reich approximately a year later.

Yes, most of the cargo reached its destination, but it's true for any battles of attrition: a 10-15% loss is unsustainable.

What really happened was that the 2.1m GRT of Italian merchant marine suffered a 1.7m GRT loss (~80%), while the new ships were good for 0.8m GRT (~38%) including captured. Of course not counting the initial loss of 1.2m GRT. It meant that the Italian shipping capacity decreased by 40%+ during this timeframe and by cca. 70% compared to the prewar level.

This is what we call battle of attrition: where the replacement capacity of matériel and men is the decisive factor to win a battle.

Instant and full scale redeployment of 4000 extra planes to the peripheries immediately after a successful Soviet campaign was out of the question. Also, what the mechanized units (but any units, really) needed after such a campaign was an operational pause for training, maintenance, refit with modern weapons and whatnot.

You keep quoting the 600 planes of the LW as if it was avoidable in your OTL: the Germans were not able to operate their planes in Tunisia, and an invasion via or against Turkey doesn't help it (on the contrary). Have you ever read about the maintenance of german armoured units in NA?
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Oct 2020 17:04

Peter89 wrote:
03 Oct 2020 16:20
No, you don't get it. 40-45% (and certainly more if operated from forward air based) was an overall non combat loss rate. So by any means, your ATL has to count with that, even before the extra planes arrive to the MTO. 4000 EXTRA PLANES with aircrew and infrastructure is a bit funny number for me as the LW was not capable to operate that number for quite a long time.
I admit I am mildly curious how the Luftwaffe manages to field an "extra" 4,000 planes anywhere during this time period? You know, given that its average monthly operational combat aircraft strength from December 1939 through December 1942 was 2,725.51? Oh, and that apparently the production of 8,007 Ju 88, more than half the total 2-engine bomber production of 14,849, gets cancelled in favor of magically producing 1,000 Panzers instead?

I can't quite put my finger on it, but there appears to be a bit of a logical disconnect here?
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 03 Oct 2020 17:28

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Oct 2020 17:04
Peter89 wrote:
03 Oct 2020 16:20
No, you don't get it. 40-45% (and certainly more if operated from forward air based) was an overall non combat loss rate. So by any means, your ATL has to count with that, even before the extra planes arrive to the MTO. 4000 EXTRA PLANES with aircrew and infrastructure is a bit funny number for me as the LW was not capable to operate that number for quite a long time.
I admit I am mildly curious how the Luftwaffe manages to field an "extra" 4,000 planes anywhere during this time period? You know, given that its average monthly operational combat aircraft strength from December 1939 through December 1942 was 2,725.51? Oh, and that apparently the production of 8,007 Ju 88, more than half the total 2-engine bomber production of 14,849, gets cancelled in favor of magically producing 1,000 Panzers instead?

I can't quite put my finger on it, but there appears to be a bit of a logical disconnect here?
It was be very simple for to understand.

In real history it was not be possible. But topic is not on real history. Topic is on tmp imagination story. On tmp imagination story all things tmp was imagine must to be possible.

Example. Can to have extra 1.000 tanks when was make decision on early time for to make extra 1.000 tanks.

Example. Can to have 4.000 extra aircraft when was make decision on 1928 for to make more aircrafts.

Simple.

Maybe tmp will to have different explains on different date and many words on who was make decision and how excellent was descision ect ect but process will to be same.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 03 Oct 2020 19:19

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Oct 2020 17:04
Peter89 wrote:
03 Oct 2020 16:20
No, you don't get it. 40-45% (and certainly more if operated from forward air based) was an overall non combat loss rate. So by any means, your ATL has to count with that, even before the extra planes arrive to the MTO. 4000 EXTRA PLANES with aircrew and infrastructure is a bit funny number for me as the LW was not capable to operate that number for quite a long time.
I admit I am mildly curious how the Luftwaffe manages to field an "extra" 4,000 planes anywhere during this time period? You know, given that its average monthly operational combat aircraft strength from December 1939 through December 1942 was 2,725.51? Oh, and that apparently the production of 8,007 Ju 88, more than half the total 2-engine bomber production of 14,849, gets cancelled in favor of magically producing 1,000 Panzers instead?

I can't quite put my finger on it, but there appears to be a bit of a logical disconnect here?
My point exactly. However, it was possible to operate them in the Reich, and it took some time for the Wallies until they've been able to challenge the Germans (weakened by both the eastern and mediterran fronts) over the skies of Germany. To commit aerial units on the med periphery, was in essence, to repeat the same mistake as the Germans have done.

But I think the question here is twofold: one, were the Wallies able to defeat the Axis on their own after a Soviet collapse in 1942, and two, was Axis defeat inevitable against the Wallies' fully ran war machine. I think the answer to both of that is yes, independently of the A-bomb project.

In my opinion, however, a Soviet defeat could have made the invasion of Europe much harder for the Wallies, but that's about it.

In 1940/1942 the Axis had the theoretical opportunity to deal serious damage to the British Empire, but with the US and the SU in the game, it was game over, and only a question of time until it realized.

The Germans could have made a lot more good decisions in the strategic defense of the Reich. First, do not attack the British only via air. Second, do not attack the SU at all. Third, do not invade or try to hold positions which could be maintained only via endangered lines of communication / supply.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 03 Oct 2020 19:30

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
03 Oct 2020 17:28
Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Oct 2020 17:04
Peter89 wrote:
03 Oct 2020 16:20
No, you don't get it. 40-45% (and certainly more if operated from forward air based) was an overall non combat loss rate. So by any means, your ATL has to count with that, even before the extra planes arrive to the MTO. 4000 EXTRA PLANES with aircrew and infrastructure is a bit funny number for me as the LW was not capable to operate that number for quite a long time.
I admit I am mildly curious how the Luftwaffe manages to field an "extra" 4,000 planes anywhere during this time period? You know, given that its average monthly operational combat aircraft strength from December 1939 through December 1942 was 2,725.51? Oh, and that apparently the production of 8,007 Ju 88, more than half the total 2-engine bomber production of 14,849, gets cancelled in favor of magically producing 1,000 Panzers instead?

I can't quite put my finger on it, but there appears to be a bit of a logical disconnect here?
It was be very simple for to understand.

In real history it was not be possible. But topic is not on real history. Topic is on tmp imagination story. On tmp imagination story all things tmp was imagine must to be possible.

Example. Can to have extra 1.000 tanks when was make decision on early time for to make extra 1.000 tanks.

Example. Can to have 4.000 extra aircraft when was make decision on 1928 for to make more aircrafts.

Simple.

Maybe tmp will to have different explains on different date and many words on who was make decision and how excellent was descision ect ect but process will to be same.
Maybe it's just me as a non-native speaker of english, but I have a hard time to understand what you want to say.

What TMP does here is an ATL for the invasion against the SU, an ATL that succeeds. A Soviet defeat was not out of the realm of possibilities, but I have my serious doubts that any such defeat would leave the Wehrmacht intact or in good shape.

The most likely scenario is that the Wehrmacht's offensive capabilities are exhausted, the Reich is outproduced and German defeat comes to the Wallies at a higher price.
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 Oct 2020 20:09

Peter89 wrote:
03 Oct 2020 19:19

My point exactly. However, it was possible to operate them in the Reich...
No, I think you missed the point. Those are the actual LW strength figures. How do they get anywhere close to that while decreasing bomber production in half. While increasing op tempo to defeat the USSR?

To make this perfectly clear, the Dekade figures from the RLM on Luftwaffe serviceable combat aircraft strength is what I just gave. On hand is of course higher, an average of 4356.42 during the same period. Of those, bombers (mostly twin-engine and a very few four engine) serviceable average 788.39 to an on hand of 1,409.87. Thus, overall serviceability was roughly 62.56% and was 55.92 for bombers.

That was real life. Now we are expected to believe that halving production of bomber aircraft, thus likely halving the number serviceable and on hand during this period, will somehow result in the Luftwaffe having MORE aircraft on hand and serviceable in 1943? My assumption would be that the Luftwaffe under these circumstances would be forced to attempt an even higher operational tempo in BARBAROSSA to achieve something close to its historical performance, which would result in higher attrition, both on hand and serviceable. My guesstimate would be the strength of the entire Luftwaffe in this scenario would be somewhere south of 3,600 aircraft of which perhaps 2,000 would be operational.

However, this may be another case of the same asset being in two places at once?
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 03 Oct 2020 23:48

Peter89 wrote:
03 Oct 2020 19:30


What TMP does here is an ATL for the invasion against the SU, an ATL that succeeds. A Soviet defeat was not out of the realm of possibilities, but I have my serious doubts that any such defeat would leave the Wehrmacht intact or in good shape.

The most likely scenario is that the Wehrmacht's offensive capabilities are exhausted, the Reich is outproduced and German defeat comes to the Wallies at a higher price.
What tmp was do was be for to decide nazis was win war and was want for to write imagination story on nazi win. Tmp was write much things on ahf for to test imagination ideas and for to get other mens to do research for tmp.

What is problems.

1) Ahf says it is history forum for serious history discusses. Every time somebody was can to write tmp imagination story was not be possible tmp was change history some more. How can to have serious history discuss when history was be mostest problem on tmp imagination story ?

2) Much tmp ideas and discuss tactics was be complete anti-intellectual. How can to have serious discusses ?

When somemens want for to write imagination story on nazi win war on Soviet union and have 1.000 year reich why to change history on so much places and so much ways ? Much more simple for to write imagination story like was real history Germany army expects. Germany army was expect on Red army and Soviet government for to collapse and surrender very quick. So can to write imagination story on nazi win war and not for to change any history on Germany side until Soviet collapse on end august 1941.year.
Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Oct 2020 20:09

No, I think you missed the point. Those are the actual LW strength figures. How do they get anywhere close to that while decreasing bomber production in half. While increasing op tempo to defeat the USSR?
It seems to me you was miss point. Tmp was not write on real history and real history datas. Tmp was write on tmp imagination story and everything is possible just like he was write. Germany airforce can to have any number aircraft tmp was imagine on his imagination story.

Example.
On 1928.g Germany was make different decision for to design and build new type aircraft called Me.AS1. It was be first on new type hybrid fighter bomber. For to make Me.AS1 Germany was also decide on 1930.year for to increase migrant workers and was decide on 1932.year for to make amazement trade deal for to get resources on very low prices. On 1940.year Germany was on Me.AS8 type hybrid fighter bomber. Because Germany aryan was so clever for to make decision on 1928.year when was attack Soviet union on 1941.year Germany was not need any Ju.88 aircraft and was can make 1.000 more tanks on otl and many thousand Me.ASB aircrafts and much more signals equipments for to make Balkan railways stronger for to atrack Turkey and Syria and Iraq and India and for to make siebel ferrys for to attack north africa and for to build cauzway to England to win war on England.

Until you can to prove imagination story was not be possible you must to accept atl story was possible and excellent ideas for nazis to win war.

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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 Oct 2020 00:02

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
03 Oct 2020 23:48
Until you can to prove imagination story was not be possible you must to accept atl story was possible and excellent ideas for nazis to win war.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 04 Oct 2020 00:33

Peter89 wrote:4000 EXTRA PLANES with aircrew and infrastructure is a bit funny number for me as the LW was not capable to operate that number for quite a long time.
...which is why I've always said 1,500 AC supporting the MidEast drive. Put another 1,000 or so elsewhere (Aegean and Sicily primarily).

The LW operated ~2,500 in the East continuously into 1943 and that this operating capacity is free after SU's fall.

The remaining ~1,500 AC can be used for training - the pilots too.
No, you don't get it. 40-45% (and certainly more if operated from forward air based) was an overall non combat loss rate.
Again that's OTL not ATL. O'Brien discusses this factor at length in Chapter 8 of HWwW. A primary cause of losses was new pilots inadequately trained and the primitive conditions from LW was forced to operate in Tunisia. The Stalingrad and Tunisia airlifts, in particular, forced early withdrawals from flight training programs and consequent losses to undertrained aircrews in accidents. ATL we have lower German losses from no later than the beginning of '42 due to a weakened VVS. We have the LW operating from relatively secure and well-supplied bases in Turkey, rather than from insecure and abominably-supplied bases in Tunisia. Re base security, the redeployment of the Ostheer's immense light Flak resources alone makes LW bases significantly better-defended.

You are improperly assuming that the ~1,500 AC/pilots not killed in the East suffer accident rates equal to the new and under-trained pilots deployed under OTL emergency conditions.

The war's OTL course forced the LW to take short-term emergency steps that undermined its long-term viability. The ATL war gives Germany much more breathing room. The LW would have maintained normal training flows, suffered fewer losses in the East and in the Med, and would have been on a much better footing at the end of '43 even if it had to concede local air superiority to reinforced W.Allied air armies in the MidEast by 1944.

---------------------------------------------

We're again having the problem of under-specified ATL conditions so let me clarify:

I am absolutely committed to the idea that the LW would maintain at least parity over the MidEast during late '42 and the first half of '43. This plus Heer numerical/qualitative superiority allows Germany to take at least Syria, Iraq, Suez, and northern Iran by mid-'43. W.Allied logistics are insufficient either to assemble a dominant air presence or enough divisions to stop the Heer in the Levant and Mesopotamia.

As we approach '44, however, the W.Allied position should improve. They could have sufficient shipping to stop the Heer somewhere south of Suez and Mesopotamia, as well as in eastern Iran. They would probably achieve local air superiority in the theater as well. I doubt, however, that they would be willing/able to send the ground forces necessary to recover Levant/Suez/Mesopotamia/Tehran, even under conditions of local air superiority. Air superiority has only so much payout in a ground war; W.Allied air dominance over Italy and France was a secondary factor to their eventual victories there. In the end, ground forces are primary means of taking territory and winning wars.

-----------------------------------------
we have EVIDENCE that aerial warfare in the MTO was an unnecessary attrition for the LW, that was a prelude for their final defeat above the Reich approximately a year later.
Again, OTL not ATL. The OTL '43 MTO was an emergency defensive war waged under improvised and shabby logistical conditions.
This is what we call battle of attrition: where the replacement capacity of matériel and men is the decisive factor to win a battle.
Whatever we call the battle, attrition is caused by enemy forces (primarily), not by some metaphysical attritive character attaching to a battlefield. To show that OTL outcomes would result in W.Allied air dominance by mid-'43 (i.e. during my positied MidEast campaign), you'd have to show that W.Allied forces - perhaps win combination with increased ATL non-combat losses - would destroy another 4,000 LW planes over OTL (1,500 deployed initially, the rest coming as replacements if needed). One obstacle to such a showing is the shipping logistics of deploying the 100k's of men needed to support a giant W.Allied air force in the MidEast. That's an issue you've resolutely refused to face.
Instant and full scale redeployment of 4000 extra planes to the peripheries immediately after a successful Soviet campaign was out of the question.
Again, 1,500 initially. I'm fine with pushing back the timeline for redeployment of the 1,500 as well: As my shipping analysis has shown, the W.Allies simply don't have enough shipping to meet a German MidEast push with powerful forces in September. We can specify a gradual buildup of German forces in the MidEast in the second half of '42.
Also, what the mechanized units (but any units, really) needed after such a campaign was an operational pause for training, maintenance, refit with modern weapons and whatnot.
AGS's units operated almost continuously from June to March '43 OTL. I've specified 20 divisions in Turkey, half mechanized so 10 mech.divs. That's only a quarter of the Ostheer's mech.divs. The initial Ostheer '42 push from Gorkiy and Stalingrad starts in May, by the end of July the RKKA is so weak that Ostheer can pull 10 mech.divs. and start resting/redploying them.
You keep quoting the 600 planes of the LW as if it was avoidable in your OTL: the Germans were not able to operate their planes in Tunisia, and an invasion via or against Turkey doesn't help it (on the contrary). Have you ever read about the maintenance of german armoured units in NA?
Again we need to specify what's happening in the ATL. If Torch happens, the Mideast can't be defended. Not enough W.Allied forces, let alone shipping, for that. If the MidEast is defended strongly, Torch doesn't happen.

I don't think Torch happens, here's why:
  • In the last thread I mentioned that the hobbling of the SU by July '42 allows Germany to take Malta in September or so. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&start=135#p2294600
  • I also discussed the Turkey push meaning that Rommel's Alam Halfa offensive is cancelled: it becomes unnecessary for taking Egypt/Suez and is inefficient compared to the push FROM Turkey, which has better logistics. With Rommel on the defensive and Malta gone, Axis ships to Tripoli instead of Benghazi/Tobruk, meaning much lower shipping losses. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&start=120#p2294338
  • 8th Army can't launch Second Alamein in November, as its Levantine rear is already crumbling and at least some of its force will be required to slow the German push on Suez.
  • In this ATL condition, a German defense of Tunisia has much more secure shipping (Malta accounted for half of Axis shipping sunk on the Tunisian route).
  • The Spanish are likely to join the Axis now or at least allow passage to Gibraltar. If Spain joins after Torch is launched, the W.Allies forward armies are logistically screwed and their best hope is safe escape to western Morocco.
For all these reasons, ATL Torch would be a gamble with a downside of losing most of British First Army in a chaotic withdrawal across Algeria, an upside of orderly withdrawal to Western Morocco. Ike and Marshall were prudent men, I don't see OTL Torch being launched.

Their best course would be (1) a smaller landing limited to Casablanca and Western Morocco ("Torchlite") where sea LoC's are secure regardless of Gibraltar and Spain, plus (2) a defense of the MidEast hoping to slow the German advance and retain bases for long-term buildup to hold something in the theater.
Peter89 wrote:To commit aerial units on the med periphery, was in essence, to repeat the same mistake as the Germans have done.
Again, you're assuming any Med commitment is a mistake ATL because it was a mistake OTL. For the reasons stated above, not true.
Soviet defeat could have made the invasion of Europe much harder for the Wallies
Now that's an understatement. I've said elsewhere that I think it might have been possible for the Wallies to invade Europe if Germany beats the SU but the path there is deeply daunting.

Minimum size of U.S. Army would be 300 divisions. At OTL division slice, that means ~11mil more men drafted compared to OTL 91-division army. That removes ~25% of America's non-agricultural labor force.

The only remotely feasible route to equipping 300 divisions with 25% smaller labor force includes abandoning heavy bomber production (just for a start). Absent the bombing campaign, the German/European economy is roaring...

--------------------------------

EDIT and BTW - Perhaps it would be best to split this off into a new thread where I set forth the envisioned ATL push FROM a non-hostile or Axis Turkey. Depending on IRL factors and desired level of initial detail, could be done in a few days.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 04 Oct 2020 00:40

Richard Anderson wrote:How do they get anywhere close to that while decreasing bomber production in half.
@Peter89 and others reading along...

Hopefully you can all see why this is a mis-statement of the ATL. If anyone else (who isn't on my ignore list) wants me to clarify why, I will do so.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 04 Oct 2020 06:47

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 Oct 2020 20:09
Peter89 wrote:
03 Oct 2020 19:19

My point exactly. However, it was possible to operate them in the Reich...
No, I think you missed the point. Those are the actual LW strength figures. How do they get anywhere close to that while decreasing bomber production in half. While increasing op tempo to defeat the USSR?

To make this perfectly clear, the Dekade figures from the RLM on Luftwaffe serviceable combat aircraft strength is what I just gave. On hand is of course higher, an average of 4356.42 during the same period. Of those, bombers (mostly twin-engine and a very few four engine) serviceable average 788.39 to an on hand of 1,409.87. Thus, overall serviceability was roughly 62.56% and was 55.92 for bombers.

That was real life. Now we are expected to believe that halving production of bomber aircraft, thus likely halving the number serviceable and on hand during this period, will somehow result in the Luftwaffe having MORE aircraft on hand and serviceable in 1943? My assumption would be that the Luftwaffe under these circumstances would be forced to attempt an even higher operational tempo in BARBAROSSA to achieve something close to its historical performance, which would result in higher attrition, both on hand and serviceable. My guesstimate would be the strength of the entire Luftwaffe in this scenario would be somewhere south of 3,600 aircraft of which perhaps 2,000 would be operational.

However, this may be another case of the same asset being in two places at once?
I got your point Richard, I know it was impossible to reach 4000 extra aircraft in this ATL, but even if it was possible, it wasn't possible to operate them all at once in the MTO. (Not even 1500 extra.)

We agree on the rest btw. My argument just eliminated the possibility of such numbers and outcome.
Last edited by Peter89 on 04 Oct 2020 06:51, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

Post by Peter89 » 04 Oct 2020 06:48

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Oct 2020 00:40
Richard Anderson wrote:How do they get anywhere close to that while decreasing bomber production in half.
@Peter89 and others reading along...

Hopefully you can all see why this is a mis-statement of the ATL. If anyone else (who isn't on my ignore list) wants me to clarify why, I will do so.
Please don't use me in your personal debates, either of you. Talk to each other in private or leave each other be in public, huh? :wink:
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