One more panzer group in Barbarossa, plans for a two-year campaign

[Peter89]

4000 EXTRA PLANES with aircrew and infrastructure is a bit funny number for me as the LW was not capable to operate that number for quite a long time.

...which is why I've always said 1,500 AC supporting the MidEast drive. Put another 1,000 or so elsewhere (Aegean and Sicily primarily).

The LW operated ~2,500 in the East continuously into 1943 and that this operating capacity is free after SU's fall.

The remaining ~1,500 AC can be used for training - the pilots too.

No, you don't get it. 40-45% (and certainly more if operated from forward air based) was an overall non combat loss rate.

Again that's OTL not ATL. O'Brien discusses this factor at length in Chapter 8 of HWwW. A primary cause of losses was new pilots inadequately trained and the primitive conditions from LW was forced to operate in Tunisia. The Stalingrad and Tunisia airlifts, in particular, forced early withdrawals from flight training programs and consequent losses to undertrained aircrews in accidents. ATL we have lower German losses from no later than the beginning of '42 due to a weakened VVS. We have the LW operating from relatively secure and well-supplied bases in Turkey, rather than from insecure and abominably-supplied bases in Tunisia. Re base security, the redeployment of the Ostheer's immense light Flak resources alone makes LW bases significantly better-defended.

You are improperly assuming that the ~1,500 AC/pilots not killed in the East suffer accident rates equal to the new and under-trained pilots deployed under OTL emergency conditions.

The war's OTL course forced the LW to take short-term emergency steps that undermined its long-term viability. The ATL war gives Germany much more breathing room. The LW would have maintained normal training flows, suffered fewer losses in the East and in the Med, and would have been on a much better footing at the end of '43 even if it had to concede local air superiority to reinforced W.Allied air armies in the MidEast by 1944.

---------------------------------------------

We're again having the problem of under-specified ATL conditions so let me clarify:

I am absolutely committed to the idea that the LW would maintain at least parity over the MidEast during late '42 and the first half of '43. This plus Heer numerical/qualitative superiority allows Germany to take at least Syria, Iraq, Suez, and northern Iran by mid-'43. W.Allied logistics are insufficient either to assemble a dominant air presence or enough divisions to stop the Heer in the Levant and Mesopotamia.

As we approach '44, however, the W.Allied position should improve. They could have sufficient shipping to stop the Heer somewhere south of Suez and Mesopotamia, as well as in eastern Iran. They would probably achieve local air superiority in the theater as well. I doubt, however, that they would be willing/able to send the ground forces necessary to recover Levant/Suez/Mesopotamia/Tehran, even under conditions of local air superiority. Air superiority has only so much payout in a ground war; W.Allied air dominance over Italy and France was a secondary factor to their eventual victories there. In the end, ground forces are primary means of taking territory and winning wars.

-----------------------------------------

we have EVIDENCE that aerial warfare in the MTO was an unnecessary attrition for the LW, that was a prelude for their final defeat above the Reich approximately a year later.

Again, OTL not ATL. The OTL '43 MTO was an emergency defensive war waged under improvised and shabby logistical conditions.

This is what we call battle of attrition: where the replacement capacity of matériel and men is the decisive factor to win a battle.

Whatever we call the battle, attrition is caused by enemy forces (primarily), not by some metaphysical attritive character attaching to a battlefield. To show that OTL outcomes would result in W.Allied air dominance by mid-'43 (i.e. during my positied MidEast campaign), you'd have to show that W.Allied forces - perhaps win combination with increased ATL non-combat losses - would destroy another 4,000 LW planes over OTL (1,500 deployed initially, the rest coming as replacements if needed). One obstacle to such a showing is the shipping logistics of deploying the 100k's of men needed to support a giant W.Allied air force in the MidEast. That's an issue you've resolutely refused to face.

Instant and full scale redeployment of 4000 extra planes to the peripheries immediately after a successful Soviet campaign was out of the question.

Again, 1,500 initially. I'm fine with pushing back the timeline for redeployment of the 1,500 as well: As my shipping analysis has shown, the W.Allies simply don't have enough shipping to meet a German MidEast push with powerful forces in September. We can specify a gradual buildup of German forces in the MidEast in the second half of '42.

Also, what the mechanized units (but any units, really) needed after such a campaign was an operational pause for training, maintenance, refit with modern weapons and whatnot.

AGS's units operated almost continuously from June to March '43 OTL. I've specified 20 divisions in Turkey, half mechanized so 10 mech.divs. That's only a quarter of the Ostheer's mech.divs. The initial Ostheer '42 push from Gorkiy and Stalingrad starts in May, by the end of July the RKKA is so weak that Ostheer can pull 10 mech.divs. and start resting/redploying them.

You keep quoting the 600 planes of the LW as if it was avoidable in your OTL: the Germans were not able to operate their planes in Tunisia, and an invasion via or against Turkey doesn't help it (on the contrary). Have you ever read about the maintenance of german armoured units in NA?

Again we need to specify what's happening in the ATL. If Torch happens, the Mideast can't be defended. Not enough W.Allied forces, let alone shipping, for that. If the MidEast is defended strongly, Torch doesn't happen.

I don't think Torch happens, here's why:

• In the last thread I mentioned that the hobbling of the SU by July '42 allows Germany to take Malta in September or so. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&start=135#p2294600
• I also discussed the Turkey push meaning that Rommel's Alam Halfa offensive is cancelled: it becomes unnecessary for taking Egypt/Suez and is inefficient compared to the push FROM Turkey, which has better logistics. With Rommel on the defensive and Malta gone, Axis ships to Tripoli instead of Benghazi/Tobruk, meaning much lower shipping losses. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&start=120#p2294338
• 8th Army can't launch Second Alamein in November, as its Levantine rear is already crumbling and at least some of its force will be required to slow the German push on Suez.
• In this ATL condition, a German defense of Tunisia has much more secure shipping (Malta accounted for half of Axis shipping sunk on the Tunisian route).
• The Spanish are likely to join the Axis now or at least allow passage to Gibraltar. If Spain joins after Torch is launched, the W.Allies forward armies are logistically screwed and their best hope is safe escape to western Morocco.

For all these reasons, ATL Torch would be a gamble with a downside of losing most of British First Army in a chaotic withdrawal across Algeria, an upside of orderly withdrawal to Western Morocco. Ike and Marshall were prudent men, I don't see OTL Torch being launched.

Their best course would be (1) a smaller landing limited to Casablanca and Western Morocco ("Torchlite") where sea LoC's are secure regardless of Gibraltar and Spain, plus (2) a defense of the MidEast hoping to slow the German advance and retain bases for long-term buildup to hold something in the theater.

To commit aerial units on the med periphery, was in essence, to repeat the same mistake as the Germans have done.

Again, you're assuming any Med commitment is a mistake ATL because it was a mistake OTL. For the reasons stated above, not true.

Soviet defeat could have made the invasion of Europe much harder for the Wallies

Now that's an understatement. I've said elsewhere that I think it might have been possible for the Wallies to invade Europe if Germany beats the SU but the path there is deeply daunting.

Minimum size of U.S. Army would be 300 divisions. At OTL division slice, that means ~11mil more men drafted compared to OTL 91-division army. That removes ~25% of America's non-agricultural labor force.

The only remotely feasible route to equipping 300 divisions with 25% smaller labor force includes abandoning heavy bomber production (just for a start). Absent the bombing campaign, the German/European economy is roaring...

--------------------------------

EDIT and BTW - Perhaps it would be best to split this off into a new thread where I set forth the envisioned ATL push FROM a non-hostile or Axis Turkey. Depending on IRL factors and desired level of initial detail, could be done in a few days.

No, you don't appreciate the significance of diplomacy.

Spain and especially, Portugal would never join the Axis from late 1942 onwards, not even if the SU is defeated. Joining the Axis would have meant to join the countries under continental blockade. And to lose all ships in foreign harbours, and to lose colonies, and to risk death sentence and prison. Why would anyone join the losing side? The Germans had no means to attack the USA, and the neutrals started to be very careful even after the Battle of Britain was lost. (The same goes for Turkey.)

But put that aside. I didn't address the Wallied shipping options because I have serious problems with your method, and I don't know all the datas to make a real scenario for this one. For starters, I addressed the POL produced in the region, the OTL units stationed there, the stockpiles that have been built up and the Persian Corridor. Also the LL shipments now available for redirection. NA and ME was different for many reasons logistically. In the ME we are talking about local POL supplies, established airfields, years of stockpiling resorces, improved and established lines of communication and supply, local food and water supply. Plus, we are talking about defense and not offense. To compare the two is like to compare an apple with an apricot.

Maintenance or armored units in the Mediterran theatre meant improvisation and cannibalization, and the longer the German armor has to drive on roads instead of carried by trains, the lower their combat readiness will be. The drive on road to Suez alone would result a high rate of attrition. To give you a hint, 2nd Panzer lost about 30% in the Anschluss, and those were Austrian roads, European conditions, a smaller distance, no enemy resistance and lighter tanks.

Yes I am assuming that any MED commitment in late 1942 / 1943 is a mistake. Why do you want to maintain a foothold in Africa is you can't supply it and if you can't profit from it? To attack into established defense positions is stupid enough, but true to the German decision making for this time period (Kursk).

Your theory is that the Axis was somehow able to reach parity with the Wallies in production / losses, and you argue that offensives could result the desired ratio, but you simply don't appreciate the fact that attacking overseas under the circumstances the Germans had to face in the MTO in 1942/1943, it was simply not possible.

Such a ratio could only have been achieved by being on the strategic defense, and yes, that eliminates the possibility to win the war. This is why the attack on the SU is a bad idea to begin with.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Yes I am assuming that any MED commitment in late 1942 / 1943 is a mistake.

Your theory is that the Axis was somehow able to reach parity with the Wallies in production / losses

I didn't address the Wallied shipping options because I have serious problems with your method, and I don't know all the datas to make a real scenario for this one.

I think we've taken our back and forth about as far it can go. Unless some framework can be agreed for discussing Allied shipping logistics, there's not much hope of a revealing discussion. I have responses to your global points but I'd probably be repeating myself and eliciting the same from you.

Our discussion and has been mostly cordial and good-humored, I've learned about Balkan railways and Black Sea shipping. Thank you.

[Peter89]

Yes I am assuming that any MED commitment in late 1942 / 1943 is a mistake.

Your theory is that the Axis was somehow able to reach parity with the Wallies in production / losses

I didn't address the Wallied shipping options because I have serious problems with your method, and I don't know all the datas to make a real scenario for this one.

I think we've taken our back and forth about as far it can go. Unless some framework can be agreed for discussing Allied shipping logistics, there's not much hope of a revealing discussion. I have responses to your global points but I'd probably be repeating myself and eliciting the same from you.

Our discussion and has been mostly cordial and good-humored, I've learned about Balkan railways and Black Sea shipping. Thank you.

Okay.

[Richard Anderson]

I got your point Richard, I know it was impossible to reach 4000 extra aircraft in this ATL, but even if it was possible, it wasn't possible to operate them all at once in the MTO. (Not even 1500 extra.)

Okay good. I am sure the argument will become that without the strain of the Ostfront the infrastructure to operate the additional aircraft will just be created...which pretty much misses that at best 1,500 additional aircraft, along with the Italian contribution, will barely bring parity with the Allies in the theater as of January 1943 and the Allied, especially American, buildup cannot be matched in the air by Germany. It cannot solve the problems in North Africa, even the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica's temporary local superiority in December 1942-February 1943 didn't do that...and they don't have the means to significantly increase that force beyond what it was.

We agree on the rest btw. My argument just eliminated the possibility of such numbers and outcome.

Yes, a good dose of reality typically does that.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Yes I am assuming that any MED commitment in late 1942 / 1943 is a mistake.

Your theory is that the Axis was somehow able to reach parity with the Wallies in production / losses

I didn't address the Wallied shipping options because I have serious problems with your method, and I don't know all the datas to make a real scenario for this one.

I think we've taken our back and forth about as far it can go. Unless some framework can be agreed for discussing Allied shipping logistics, there's not much hope of a revealing discussion. I have responses to your global points but I'd probably be repeating myself and eliciting the same from you.

Our discussion and has been mostly cordial and good-humored, I've learned about Balkan railways and Black Sea shipping. Thank you.

Another poster tmp must to ignore because he was not agree on tmp imagination story.

[TheMarcksPlan]

My OP and my immediately-previous Ostheer OTL both posit Hitler having a different view of Germany's grand strategic position at the outset of the war. Specifically, it posits Hitler prioritizing the establishment of continental dominance prior to forcing terms on Britain or the U.S.

Some have criticized this view as requiring Hitler and the Nazi state to have instituted something like a contemporary American "Quadrennial Defense Review." The criticism implies that, absent such a formalized process, no high-level direction of grand strategy could have occurred. This always seemed a very weak argument - countries and leaders had grand strategies prior to modern formalization of them. Hitler did as well, it was just sub-optimal. The historical record proves it:

The Nuremberg Trials preserved and translated a lot of documents for us all to read; Harvard Law School has them online. Particularly interesting is the May 23, 1939 "Minutes of a conference outlining Hitler's view of the military situation in Europe and the scenario of a future war." http://nuremberg.law.harvard.edu/docume ... ces%22#p.1

The minutes memorialize a conference of Hitler with the service chiefs, CoS's, and OKW. In it Hitler sets forth his grand-strategic picture at the time (one that we all know he was forced by events to abandon within a few months). This is, for all intents and purposes, a strategic policy review.

Hitler begins with a review of what's been achieved in his six years so far. Much! Especially spiritually! of course...
He then states attack on Poland as the next strategic goal, with attendant efforts to isolate her (whoops).
He hopes for a short war, but planning should be for a war of 10-15 years (so much for Blitzkrieg theory).

When Hitler's discussion turns to England, the chaos of his mind and his occasional strategic/military stupidity really show:

• He states that Jutland and WW1 would have been won with 2 more BB's and cruisers (!).
• He sets forth with some prescience that German victory over France will put Germany in a strong situation vis-a-vis Britain, but the timeline isn't clear - is it '43-44 as mentioned later in the document or does this relate to possible English hostilities regarding the imminent attack on Poland?
• Incredibly, given OTL events, he states, "A country cannot be brought to its knees by Air Force."
• The tenor of his naval "analysis" and '43-44 timeline suggest he envisions a successful naval war against Britain but again, the document also mentions imminent attack on Poland and possibility of British intervention. Totally incoherent.

Russia is mentioned but mainly in connection to Poland's ability to resist her. Somehow Hitler's post-France analysis assumes redirection of army production to the LW and KM without accounting for what Stalin is doing.

EDIT and btw - if Raeder had been clear-eyed and a true patriot, rather than mostly concerned with the KM getting more of German resources, he'd have been perfectly placed to point out Hitler's nonsense about naval warfare with Britain on a timeline that presents a serious likelihood of imminent war.

---------------------------------------

As I said in my OP, if there's anything historically contingent it's what followed from the weaknesses and foibles of a dictator. Madmen can be instrumentally rational and intellectually brilliant (see, e.g., Lenin); that Hitler flubbed his opportunity to secure continental inviolability is a historical contingency based on one random lacunae (inability to see SU as a strong opponent).

The pieces of a winning German WW2 strategy were nearly there in this document: Beat your continental enemies then ramp up air/sea production from the massive European industrial base. The only missing piece is to remember that Russia is one of Germany's continental enemies.

At the grand-strategic level, my OP corrects Hitler's lacunae by reminding him that he can't focus on an air/sea battle while still sharing the continent with Russia.

With that correction plus pre-Barbarossa OTL events, durable German domination of Europe (at least) would have been the WW2 outcome favored by the military, economic, and geographic fundamentals.

[Peter89]

The pieces of a winning German WW2 strategy were nearly there in this document: Beat your continental enemies then ramp up air/sea production from the massive European industrial base. The only missing piece is to remember that Russia is one of Germany's continental enemies.

At the grand-strategic level, my OP corrects Hitler's lacunae by reminding him that he can't focus on an air/sea battle while still sharing the continent with Russia.

With that correction plus pre-Barbarossa OTL events, durable German domination of Europe (at least) would have been the WW2 outcome favored by the military, economic, and geographic fundamentals.

This is rather a new light to the enitrely known historography, because the SU and the Reich were getting closer and closer to each other. They were by no means the enemies they became later because of the Nazi aggression. A NAP, coordination of military expansions and trade agreements that profited them both. They almost became military allies in late 1940.

What you think the massive European industrial base was in 1940 is just another one of the grave mistakes you are so prone to make in your strategical visions: you seem not to understand how economy worked in 1940. Europe was the center of the world, and most of the planet was a colony of one of the European powers. The colonial systems worked in the same pattern: the trade and industry was located in the heartland of the empire, and the colonies provided markets, raw materials and cheap labour. So if you add up the "massive industrial base of Europe", the lack of resources and the continental blockade, you get a shrinking industrial base.

It became a centerpiece of the British strategy as soon as they realized that the Germans have no means to invade them. See the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

In 1940, the global trade worked this way: there wasn't a currency market. So it's not sane to say that 1 hungarian pengő worthed 1 american dollar. Because what could you buy for a hungarian pengő? Hungarian products. For 1 american dollar, on the other hand, you could buy: A.) american products, B.) products from other countries which are in trade relations with the USA, and they can't pay with their own currency. Long story short, the two currencies in the world that were more or less universally convertible, were the GBP and the USD. Other forms of payment on the international market included gold, credit and cross-company payments (like, a company that had subsidiaries in multiple countries, might be able to transfer between currencies). All other trade meant barter of goods, and in some cases, technologies.

The Anglo-Franco alliance had a reason to wage the phoney war: they didn't want to spill blood for no reason.

"Now let me turn to the position which confronts us in the economic war to-day. Our problem is different from the problem which confronted us in the last war, and is immeasurably more complicated. In the war of 1914 to 1918 nearly all the countries of Europe were, sooner or later, engaged in the fight. There were, consequently, comparatively few gaps in the enemy's frontier through which it was possible for supplies to reach him. But to-day there is only the French frontier that is closed. The rest of Germany's neighbours are neutral and Germany's possible channels of supply are, therefore, enormously increased. The problem is not only different but is also more extensive, and the difficulties which have to be overcome are multiplied."

http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/comm ... ic-warfare

What we are talking about here is that Germany was able to alleviate these deficiencies for a limited time by the quickly captured stocks and sources in 1938-1941, but and she was also able to keep open channels of trade with neutrals, most importantly, the SU. After the invasion of the SU, however, effctive starvation of raw materials and even food was on the table. I mean food wasn't on the table. We don't need to reinvent warm water, just search for German rationing on this very forum.

What you need to understand is that Germany had to either pay in goods or fight for resources, as continental Europe by no means was self-sufficient with many of the resources a modern war machine needed. Fight was a good choice when it came to small adversaries or small neutrals (also, against allies!), but trade was the good choice when it came to powerful states like the SU. Despite many warnings, the German decision makers chose poorly and attacked the SU.

There was no possibility for a German-led Europe in 1941 to compete with the Anglo-Saxon powers. The incapability to defeat the A-S heartlands, the sheer amount of resources and the quality of the technologies available to the A-S powers made it impossible to wage a 10-15 years war. The war was to end way sooner as Hitler anticipated, another grave misconception on his side.

All what we know (and all what the Germans had no way to influence) the buildup of the US / BE forces was so unparalelled that with or without the SU it was game over by 1945.

Just check out how Guderian assessed the potential AFV or aircraft productions before the war. Hitler was delusioning himself. We don't have to.

[TheMarcksPlan]

you seem not to understand how economy worked in 1940.

Just posted a new thread on the German economy; maybe you'd like to discuss there. viewtopic.php?f=66&t=252374

Not exactly responsive to your points below but discusses a lot of good scholarship I suspect you haven't read.

the SU and the Reich were getting closer and closer to each other. They were by no means the enemies they became later because of the Nazi aggression.

You may be saddened to hear this but neither party was sincere in their new friendship.

What you think the massive European industrial base was in 1940 is just another one of the grave mistakes you are so prone to make in your strategical visions: you seem not to understand how economy worked in 1940. Europe was the center of the world, and most of the planet was a colony of one of the European powers.

Well then surely global trade as a proportion of GDP would have been higher than ever in 1940 (more like 1938).
Hint: It was not.

So if you add up the "massive industrial base of Europe", the lack of resources and the continental blockade

Name one natural resource that Germany would lack if it had all of Europe. [okay rubber - they could make it. US actually had a lack of rubber too after Japan entered. Also made it.]

In 1940, the global trade worked this way: there wasn't a currency market.

No idea what you're on about. Currency markets didn't matter all that much in WW2. Germany forced a system of fixed exchange rates and clearing debts on occupied Europe; there wasn't much they could do about it. The value of a franc was basically what Germany said it was. Yet even with all that, Germany had ~50% of France working on its orders. See my linked economics thread for cites - Jonas Scherner's work is where to start.

After the invasion of the SU, however, effctive starvation of raw materials and even food was on the table. I mean food wasn't on the table.

Ha see what you did there.

Of the great powers in WW2, only the SU experienced significant starvation mortality until the war's end. Germany's food supply was secure; with the SU defeated she'd have resumed her role as Europe's primary source of fertilizer (turned into ammo OTL), meaning literally millions of tons more grain produced.

What you need to understand is that Germany had to either pay in goods or fight for resources

What you need to understand is that Germany successfully fought for resources until Barbarossa. The economic compulsion of modern societies is fairly easy; Germany effectively exploited a poorer Europe OTL and would have exploited a richer Europe ATL.

There was no possibility for a German-led Europe in 1941 to compete with the Anglo-Saxon powers.

I know that's your opinion. I simply haven't seen any analysis behind it or any substantive rebuttal of my analysis.

[Peter89]

Ha see what you did there.

Of the great powers in WW2, only the SU experienced significant starvation mortality until the war's end. Germany's food supply was secure; with the SU defeated she'd have resumed her role as Europe's primary source of fertilizer (turned into ammo OTL), meaning literally millions of tons more grain produced.

TMP...

please just check the food situation in German-occupied Europe throughout the war. The acceptable levels of food shortages in Germany and the effective famine in the occupied territories meant that Germany was not able to sustain the continent without food imports. What you are fantasizing here about is bordering Holocaust denial, but I think it's not on purpose, it's simply ignorance.

Other measures adopted are along the same lines. Thus the Reich Commissioner has vested in himself the right to act as a guardian or parent to a minor Dutch girl if she intends to marry a German.

The special care for legitimization of children in Luxemburg, as revealed in the order concerning changes in family law of March 22, 1941,

is dictated by the desire to encourage extramarital procreation with Germans.

PHYSICAL
The physical debilitation and even annihilation of national groups in occupied countries is carried out mainly in the following ways:

I. Racial Discrimination in Feeding.

Rationing of food is organized according to racial principles throughout the occupied countries. "The German people come before all other peoples for food," declared Reich MinisterGöring on October 4, 1942.

In accordance with this program, the German population is getting 93 per cent of its pre-war diet, while those in the occupied territories receive much less: in Warsaw, for example, the Poles receive 66 per cent of the pre-war rations and the Jews only 20 per cent.

The following shows the difference in the percentage of meat rations received by the Germans and the population of the occupied countries: Germans, 100 per cent; Czechs, 86 per cent; Dutch, 71 per cent; Poles (Incorporated Poland), 71 per cent; Lithuanians, 57 per cent; French, 51 per cent; Belgians, 66 per cent;Serbs, 36 per cent; Poles (General Government), 36 per cent; Slovenes, 29per cent; Jews, 0 per cent.

The percentage of pre-war food received under present rations (in calories unit) is the following:

Germans, 93 per cent; Czechs, 83 per cent; Poles (incorporated Poland), 78 per cent; Dutch, 70 per cent; Belgians, 66 per cent; Poles (General Government), 66 per cent; Norwegians, 54 per percent; Jews, 20 per cent.

The result of racial feeding is a decline in health of the nations involved and an increase in the deathrate. In Warsaw, anemia rose 113 per cent among Poles and 435 among Jews. The deathrate per thousand in 1941 amounted in the Netherlands to 10 per cent; in Belgium to 14.5 per cent; in Bohemia and Moravia to 13.4 The Polish mortality in Warsaw in 1941 amounted in July to 1,316 in August to 1,729; and in September to 2,160.

Raphael Lemkin - Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation

It was a systematic, deliberate starvation of the people of Europe, fueled by racial hatred. An unsustainable, economically unfeasible, disgusting procedure that the Germans implemented to fool their population just as they've fooled you.

If you call it an economic solution, we are not on the same page anymore.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The acceptable levels of food shortages in Germany and the effective famine in the occupied territories meant that Germany was not able to sustain the continent without food imports.

First, I said Germany's food supply was secure. I agree with you and Tooze that starvation was a policy tool of genocide in occupied Europe - primarily against Jewish people and in the East.

Germans, 93 per cent; Czechs, 83 per cent; Poles (incorporated Poland), 78 per cent; Dutch, 70 per cent; Belgians, 66 per cent; Poles (General Government), 66 per cent; Norwegians, 54 per percent; Jews, 20 per cent.

Starvation definitely happened in the East and was definitely intended/tolerated to some degree based on Nazi ideology. Is there any record of widespread starvation mortality in the West though?

This from Paying for Hitler's War is relevant:

Hein Klemann and Sergei Kudryashov, for example, provide an overview of the occupied economies that draws on the numerous studies of individual countries.5 Their comparative framework yields
new insights. One important contribution is their effort to estimate clandestine production by the occupied populations, which is not included
in the official wartime output statistics or in most estimates of GDP.
According to their findings, clandestine production was substantial. In the
Netherlands, for example, it amounted to about 20–25 percent of agricultural production. The implication is that the actual standard of living in
occupied countries might have been significantly higher than the levels
implied by official food rations or based on the official GDP/capita minus
German extractions

[TheMarcksPlan]

Germany was not able to sustain the continent without food imports.

This was true OTL but not necessarily true ATL. To understand why you'd have to consider why domestic European food production fell so much. This was a matter of fertilizer, fuel, and manpower (Romania and Finland's drafts, for example, massively decreased food production). All of those conditions are at least partially rectified by SU's defeat: fertilizer instead of explosives, Russian/MidEast oil, no need for Finnish/Romanian/Hungarian armies.

You also seem unaware of - ignorant of - the adaptability of agricultural production to wartime needs. I.e. you can't look at 1938 European imports and say "that's what Europe always needs." Just look up statistics on UK ag. production.

[Peter89]

Germany was not able to sustain the continent without food imports.

This was true OTL but not necessarily true ATL. To understand why you'd have to consider why domestic European food production fell so much. This was a matter of fertilizer, fuel, and manpower (Romania and Finland's drafts, for example, massively decreased food production). All of those conditions are at least partially rectified by SU's defeat: fertilizer instead of explosives, Russian/MidEast oil, no need for Finnish/Romanian/Hungarian armies.

You also seem unaware of - ignorant of - the adaptability of agricultural production to wartime needs. I.e. you can't look at 1938 European imports and say "that's what Europe always needs." Just look up statistics on UK ag. production.

Forgive me, but I am not keen to discuss systematic starvation as a legitimate tool for a prolonged war.

Find another way or another debate partner.

[Ружичасти Слон]

TMP...

please just check the food situation in German-occupied Europe throughout the war. The acceptable levels of food shortages in Germany and the effective famine in the occupied territories meant that Germany was not able to sustain the continent without food imports. What you are fantasizing here about is bordering Holocaust denial, but I think it's not on purpose, it's simply ignorance.

In real history Germany was have very big problem on food and was decide mostest best way for to reduce consumption was for to starve peoples on occupied territorys.

Where was can Germany for to get food and resources on long war when Britain was control seas ? Also must to remember on tmp imagination storys he was decide empire and colonys was not exist.

But it seems to me you was forget on tmp imagination storys nothing was can to stop nazi win war. So when real history was become problem everybody can to read normal tmp wave on hand to make real history disappear.

Germany can to make differet decision for to make more food.

Germany was not able to sustain the continent without food imports.

This was true OTL but not necessarily true ATL. To understand why you'd have to consider why domestic European food production fell so much. This was a matter of fertilizer, fuel, and manpower (Romania and Finland's drafts, for example, massively decreased food production). All of those conditions are at least partially rectified by SU's defeat: fertilizer instead of explosives, Russian/MidEast oil, no need for Finnish/Romanian/Hungarian armies.

You also seem unaware of - ignorant of - the adaptability of agricultural production to wartime needs. I.e. you can't look at 1938 European imports and say "that's what Europe always needs." Just look up statistics on UK ag. production.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Forgive me, but I am not keen to discuss systematic starvation as a legitimate tool for a prolonged war.

Execrably cheap tactic. Subpar in a Youtube comments section.

Find another way or another debate partner.

Haven't addressed any new ideas to you in a few days; given your last comment don't anticipate doing so.

[Terry Duncan]

As this thread is heading in much the same direction as the previously locked topic, this time with a twist towards war crimes, this topic is now also locked. When people learn to debate moderately and without recourse to personal comments then maybe threads will not be locked? It is not as though there have not been several previous warnings about personal conduct.

Terry Duncan