That's perfect, thanks very much.
https://play.google.com/books/reader?id ... =GBS.PA172Mr. May presented evidence showing that the production capacity available or planned for some munitions, such as combat vehicles, small arms, small arms munitions, and artillery gun components, sub stantially exceeds the production rates required by objectives. Upon the most conservative estimate the excess capacity available before the end of 1943 amounts to almost 3 billion dollars of production. He urged that facilities for which there will be an over-capacity be diverted insofar as possible to pro duce items in which there are shortages.
WPB minutes of November 24, 1942.Because production in the nearby months will fall short of expectations, the acceleration will have to be even greater than that scheduled if the 8–K program of 107,000 planes in 1943 is to be achieved. Increased output is dependent on large facilities ex pansions, completion of which on time is by no means assured. The 8-K program will require before April 30, 1943, 72,000 new machine tools whose delivery will interfere seriously with programs other than aircraft. About 31,000 critical tools will have to be delivered by the end of January, but it is esti mated that not over 20,000 can be delivered by that date, so that airplane production will fall short of expectations. To correct this situation, Mr. May recommended that the machine tool requirements of the airplane program be scrutinized to assure that all tools requested are in fact needed; that as many tools as possible be obtained from non-war industries; and, that machine tool output be concen trated on critical tools.
From December 8, 1942:General Clay reviewed the changes in the Army Supply Program for 1942 and 1943. On February 1, 1942, after taking into account the fullest Inter national Aid requirements and the President's ob jectives for aircraft, tanks, and supplementary com ponents, the Army Supply Program totalled 62 billion dollars. On April 6, after consideration of the limits of shipping and consultation with other United Nations, the Program was reduced to 45 billion dollars. On May 29, after adjusting for the probable availability of raw materials and reducing International Aid, it was further curtailed to 38 billion dollars. After a slight increase on September 1 to 40 billion dollars, the Program was again reduced on November 12 to 31 billion dollars after giving effect to the augmented needs of the aircraft program.
December 22, 1942:Admiral Robinson stated that the recent issuance of Amendment No. 3 to General Preference Order E-1-b allocated 75 percent of the production of machine tools to the aircraft program and is diverting tools ordered by the Navy for escort vessels.
Also:In view of the recent cutback in the program, the Army Ground Force program does not face an over-all shortage of facilities.
So the 1942 cuts fell disproportionately on Army Ground Forces, reducing it further from the low-priority status already envisioned in such pre-war documents as the Victory Program of 1941.The major reductions in the 1943 objectives have been in the aircraft program and its related muni tions, which were cut back approximately 12 percent, and in the Army Ground Force program, which was reduced one-fourth. Adjustments in the Navy pro gram have not yet been completed, but on the basis of the best information available to date, the reduction is estimated at about 7 percent.
I just noticed this, Tom - thanks. Must have missed it a few months back...Tom from Cornwall wrote: ↑16 May 2020 12:04Apropos the origins of FDR's desire for the USA to produce huge numbers of aircraft, in David Reynolds book "From Munich to Pearl Harbour" (pp.44-45) he quotes FDR talking at a conference with 'the military and senior administration officials' on 14 November 1938:
the recrudescence of German power at Munich had completely reoriented our own international relations...the United States now faced the possibility of an attack on the Atlantic side in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. He said that this demanded our providing immediately a huge air force so that we do not need to have a huge army to follow that air force. He considered that sending a large army abroad was undesirable and politically out of the question.
EDIT to add: I think this article might contain a hint: Roosevelt and the Coming of the War: The Search for United States Policy 1937-42
Mark M. Lowenthal, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 16, No. 3, The Second World War: Part 2 (Jul., 1981), pp. 413-440.
Has anyone got access to that?
This immediately made me want to read the whole article. IMO too much of historical analysis tries to read a coherent mental map onto historical figures. This applies to Hitler, Churchill, Stalin, etc. Historians play the game "What was in X's heart all along" when anyone with insight into their own mind knows that what lies within can't be mapped neatly in a strategic diagram.President Roosevelt's policy, for
all of the linearity later imposed on it, was actually a series of fits
and starts whose interconnection the President himself denied at
In each period Roosevelt knew, at least vaguely and
usually within broad general outlines, what he wanted and what he
hoped to avoid. Unfortunately, he regularly failed to define this for
those subordinates responsible for executing this policy, leaving
them to arrive at their own conclusions upon which to base and
carry out their plans.
As I said upthread, FDR consistently had the better appraisal of the grand strategic situation than his military. Virtually alone he foresaw the possibility of the SU enduring and the urgency of helping it, same with Britain. (he was wrong about France and its colonies but that's minor)the priority of Rainbow 4 also
indicated the pessimistic although not unrealistic views of the
military planners, namely that the US would have to stand alone in
the near future. Roosevelt evidently did not agree, presenting the
military with a strategic hypothesis of his own on 13 June 1940,
which presumed for the end of 1940 the survival of Britain and its
empire, France still fighting from its empire, and US naval and air
units co-operating with the Allies on the periphery of occupied countries
Trying my best, Georg. All I said was thank you - thought that might help things go smoother. Trying to be nice. I no longer tell people if they are on my ignore list.Georg_S wrote:you two behave!!
Just a tip, posting things that come across as sarcastic or attempts at having the last word to the site owner might not be in your best interests?
Yes. Dunn makes some substantial errors or distortions. Looks like he exaggerates the resources available for 1943. Whatever the merits of a 1943 invasion Dunn is not the final word for making a case. If one dials down the strategic objective for such a operation it may look more practical.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑10 Oct 2020 08:23...
BTW - Has anyone read Second Front Now: 1943 by Walter Dunn? Several reviews by military historians say that Dunn proves his case on the military feasibility of a '43 landing, though disagreeing with his political analysis. It also has a forward by General Wedemayer - the author of the 1941 Victory Program. Given VP41's diagnosis, Wedemayer demonstrates a lot of intellectual nimbleness if he came around to Dunn's view.
Dunn's analysis appears to take for granted OTL events up to mid-1943; my analysis does not. If the US was capable of Roundup in OTL '43, it certainly would have been capable in my ATL with its greater focus on AGF and landing craft, plus avoiding the Operation Drumbeat fiasco and its shipping implications.
That's always been clear even from the Army's own publications:Aber wrote: shows how lip-service was paid to Europe First
As the article from Tom from Cornwall relates, a basic problem was FDR's inability to provide clear strategic guidance to the armed forces. I've discussed this far upthread regarding American defense against Operation Drumbeat as well.Aber wrote:The main problems with arguing for a landing in NW France in 1943 are:
a) when you make the decision
b) what you sacrifice to make it possible
Deployments to the Pacific took ~twice as much shipping per man deployed as did Bolero. So for each division not deployed westwards you can send two eastwards. And again, if you don't let the navy ignore half the Battle of Atlantic in early '42 you should have an extra 2mil tons of ships, which would remove any practical shipping constraints on Bolero buildup.Aber wrote:there is very little on shipping logistics and IIRC it is light on actual readiness of US divisions still in training in 1943.
Interesting. Anyone have sources on this? Throughput capacity in '43 vs. '44 for example?
And of interest is Mountbatten's point made in March 1942 that the south coast ports of England had suffered considerable damage since the start of the war and work would be required to fit them for a role in a cross-channel attack in 1942 (CAB80/61):