USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#181

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 11 Oct 2020, 19:13

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
11 Oct 2020, 19:00
... Actually, I'm not sure that the south coast ports were actually in use at this point.
My understanding is coastal traffic, the usual sort modified by war requirements. This kept extra traffic off the railways. I don't have numbers at hand for the west coast ports. Tho clearance is a factor. The capacity of the canal and railways to move bulk off the docks to destinations may not match closely the actual dock discharge capacity. Building new military storage depots adjacent to the ports alters the transport question.

Another side of this is the amount of damage to any of the ports from air attacks was occurring. A look at Hughes & Costellos 'Battle of the Atlantic' shows negligible sinking of Blue water cargo ships from submarines in the Channel after mid 1942. I don't have information for mined cargo ships, but blue water cargo ships sunk by German air attack on any of the Approaches don't look like much, if the information I have is correct.

Im also reminded that Liverpool was the second most bombed city in Britain after London, so that distance from the Channel was not a defense.

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#182

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 Oct 2020, 19:19

Aber wrote:
11 Oct 2020, 09:36
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
10 Oct 2020, 22:12
which would remove any practical shipping constraints on Bolero buildup.
But not UK port capacity constraints, or building infrastructure in the UK.
So many constraints, so little time. :lol:

For one thing, the U-Boat threat was not considered solved until mid 1943, which led to the extraordinary measures taken to protect troop convoys, which in turn took escort assets away from other convoys, which led to those taken losses, and so on. While hindsight tells us the threat was somewhat overstated and the measures in place were possibly sufficient that remains an intangible.

The next problem was the ports as you note. Virtually all BOLERO shipping came in through the western ports, Glasgow, Liverpool, and Bristol. However, the invasion ports were essentially all on the east (follow-up merchant shipping was dispatched from the western ports). That severely overtaxed the port and rail capacity at those ports. The port capacity limit was such that it was calculated the US military could unload a normal maximum of 150 ships a month in England and then only by exceeding the agreed limits for Army imports. The record figures for May 1944 were largely using capacity reserved for the invasion “exports”. Even so in March 1944 the estimate for May would be a backlog of 540,000 measurement tons of cargo for England in the New York Port of Embarkation and a shortage of 61 ships to move the cargo even assuming it could be unloaded in England. On top of that, as a mentioned in an earlier post whose implications I think were missed, military cargo tended to be less dense than other cargo, and it was difficult to co-ordinate movements to obtain the best use of shipping, to fill ships cargo holds at the same time as reaching their weight limits. In February 1943 for example some 93 transports sent to England had 5 million cubic feet (125,000 measurement tons) unused.

Next problem. Since everything came into western ports, it all then (in terms of AGF forces) had to be transported across England to depots established for the invasion in southeast England, by rail, which overtaxed a system never designed for such cross-country port to port runs. AAF of course was different, which added to the complication. Depots in southeast England did little to support AAF basing in the east and northeast. ASF of course was different too, since its resources had to be able to support both. By March 1944, as the British railways overloaded, 1/3 of US Army cargo was moved from the ports by road, which meant greater wear and tear on trucks and truck units already in short supply, as were the tires and fuel required to keep them on the road. In May came restrictions on civilian rail transport. The approach of the invasion put three extra loads on the railways: the export of the armies, the replacement for the coastal shipping used to support the landings, and the rerouting of cargo that would have normally used the ports the armies were using. Problematically, prewar the British railways put into service around 600 locomotives a year, but for 28 months to the end of December 1941 only 359 had been built, of which the government had requisitioned 378 of which 138 were lost in France. Thanks to holding onto older, normally retired locomotives the overall drop in numbers was only around 200, but the military also wanted locomotives for other theaters. Britain raised production of steam locomotives from 272 in 1940 to 1,050 in 1944, mainly using the Austerity design, 450 of which were in service on 14 March 1944. The US shipped around 400 locomotives to England starting in November 1943. By 28 September 1943 there were 341 in use, plus 33 in shops and 26 awaiting alterations. Apparently they were shipped needing alterations, like hand brakes, which meant they were not a complete bonus, competing with the local locomotives for repair facilities. By 15 February 1944 398 of the US locomotives were in use.

Note however too the anticipated requirement for Continental rail operations. By the end of June 1944, some 1,720 out of the expected requirements of 3,404 locomotives for continental operations (2,270 for the US forces) had arrived in England, along with 20,351 disassembled rail cars, of which 7,106 had been assembled by the end of June. It was expected the allies would have to provide some 57,000 rail cars for continental operations.

Next problem. Where does it all get stored? You see, there simply wasn't convenient acres of covered storage in the English countryside. It had to be built from scratch. In order to handle the supplies the US Army in England built just under 20 million square feet of covered storage and shops, 43.5 million square feet of open space and hard stands, storage for 173,325 tons of POL, storage for 448,000 tons of ammunition, and storage for 48,350 vehicles. This building project took about a year, from May 1943 to May 1944, and cost $668 million on construction projects in England, the Air Force used $440 million of this, troop accommodation $59.2 million, hospitals $57.2 million, depots and shops $50.8 million.

Next problem. Who builds all that? Not the British for one, since they were already fully engaged in their own works projects and did not have the manpower, funding, or construction equipment to undertake such a massive undertaking. So guess who built it? The US Army, specifically the Engineer G/S and S/S regiments that were a large part of the initial troop strength shipped to England. Has no one noticed that for the period from roughly December 1942 to September 1943 US Army ground combatant forces in England consisted of the 29th Inf Div and not much else?

Next problem. Inexperience. Some of the problems caused by simple inexperience in the Army staff and its ill-considered actions border on the farcical. For example, it took until mid 1943 for the US Army to work out and put in place a standard set of mandatory labels for cargo, what was in it and whom it was for, standard manifests followed...in 1944. The failure to do this in 1942 caused a lot of angst. In mid 1942 an example given was one ship where 30% of the cargo had no markings and 25% had no addressee and just general description, e.g. Quartermaster. This was compounded by the lack of shipping, resulting in loading ships to capacity with what was on the docks rather than send a ship out partly loaded, and the shortage of army equipment, leading to piecemeal arrivals of equipment on the docks. In September 1942 the equipment of one infantry regiment was sent to England split up between 55 ships.

The result was although the equipment was in England for the US troops already in England allocated to Torch some of the equipment had to be sent a second or even third time because it became lost somewhere in England. Mainly thanks to inadequate markings with help from an inexperienced supply system in England. This was a major issue in 1942 as equipment that could have been training troops in the US was simply "lost" for the time. [As an aside, this problem extended into 1944. When my Dad's 537th AAA AW Bn POMed at Fort Dix in February 1943, they did not turn in the 32 trailer-mounted quad-.50 Machine Gun Mounts M51 (Multiple Cal. 50 Machine-Gun Mount, M45, on Trailer Mount M17) they were supposed to have, because they did not have them. Production of the M51 trailer had just begun in August 1943 and only 2,195 were manufactured through the end of 1943, which was insufficient to equip the large number of AW battalions in existence. Worse, most of those produced were shipped to the theaters of war, except for a few used for demonstration purposes at the Antiaircraft School. As a result, battalions made do with the venerable and heavy – the gun weighed 100 pounds, its tripod 380 pounds, its 200-round ammunition chest 80 pounds, and the cooling water 20 pounds – .50 Caliber Browning water-cooled heavy machine gun.] The lack of equipment and shipping space meant the troops had to give up their equipment 30 days before the voyage and it took 80 to 120 days longer than the troops to arrive in the UK. By mid 1942 the idea of "pre-shipment", excess stocks for later use was mooted and put into practice in 1943. This had the advantage of using “spare” port capacity in England in 1943 that troops could be issued equipment on arrival that troops posted overseas could wait until the last minute to give up equipment to another unit before moving instead of giving up vehicles 30 days before departure so they could be packed. Note pre-shipment was not for all equipment, and troops still moved with a significant amount of their own equipment. Some 2,427,628 measurement tons of pre-shipment cargo was sent to England in 1943, another 1,863,629 measurement tons in the first 5 months of 1944.

Next problem. When it came to bulk fuel stocks it was a steady juggle calculating between tanker allocations and consumption. This was especially critical during the U-Boat caused "tanker shortage" of 1942. Tankers could be “black oil” or “white oil” and changing between the cargo types required an extensive tank cleaning. So it was quite possible for an excess of white products like Avgas to build up while stocks of (black) naval oil fuel went down. Fuel consumption in the UK was generally below forecasts enabling stocks to be built up when the tankers were allocated on the basis of the expected consumption. Excess stocks then built up and the result was the reallocation of the tankers to other runs. So, for example, stocks went up even as the average weekly imports fell from around 364,000 tons/week in mid 1943 to 250,000 tons/week in the first two months of 1944. The trouble was tankers being in such short supply once they were allocated to another run it was very hard to get them back, and consumption by the forces in England rose significantly in early 1944. In the period March to May 1944 weekly imports climbed to 402,000 tons but bunker fuel levels were still below the October 1943 level and stocks of “white” products, like Avgas and MT80 continued to fall. For the first time in the war Avgas consumption exceeded the forecast. The “white” fuel stocks were still below planned levels on D-Day, the result was a major increase in shipments in the middle of the year, naturally putting stocks well above the agreed levels again, some tankers were then withdrawn and the feast/famine cycle began, again. As an aside the UK oil imports in 1938 had been an average of 223,000 tons per week.

Fundamentally, to enable a June 1943 assault on German-occupied France would require the US to begin all those construction activities that historically began in January-May 1943, a year earlier in January-May 1942...except there were essentially no trained Engineer G/S and S/S regiments in existence to begin the work that early. WATCHTOWER and TORCH were essentially improvised, shoestring operations, which garnered considerable experience on what would be required to mount a much larger operation like NEPTUNE. Without them and the additional experience gained in HUSKY and AVALANCHE and the result would likely have been problematic in the extreme.
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#183

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 11 Oct 2020, 19:36

Richard Anderson wrote:
11 Oct 2020, 19:19
...

Fundamentally, to enable a June 1943 assault on German-occupied France would require the US to begin all those construction activities that historically began in January-May 1943, a year earlier in January-May 1942...except there were essentially no trained Engineer G/S and S/S regiments in existence to begin the work that early. WATCHTOWER and TORCH were essentially improvised, shoestring operations, which garnered considerable experience on what would be required to mount a much larger operation like NEPTUNE. Without them and the additional experience gained in HUSKY and AVALANCHE and the result would likely have been problematic in the extreme.
All that is why arguing a 1943 or whatever Op OVERLORD, SLEDGEHAMMER, ect... either way from the 1944 NEPTUNE/OVERLORD model is pointless. Realistic strategic goals for earlier cross channel attacks have to be set.

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#184

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 11 Oct 2020, 20:39

And for anyone out there wondering why the Western Allies allowed themselves to be diverted from the agreed "Europe First" strategy in early 1942 (and for those who seem to keep forgetting that US strategic choices were not made in 'splendid isolation' and were affected by both the opinions and the successes/failures of their allies and their enemies) here are two papers produced by the British (Pound and Brooke) in late March 1942 (CAB80/61):
CAB80-61 - Pound - Future Strategy - 20.3.42 -p.1JPG.JPG
CAB80-61 - Pound - Future Strategy - 20.3.42 -p.2.JPG
CAB80-61 - Pound - Future Strategy - 20.3.42 -p.2.JPG (64.46 KiB) Viewed 828 times
CAB80-61 - Brooke - Future Strategy - 21.3.42.JPG
So this is the British First Sea Lord saying:
Though Germany still remains the prime enemy and though her defeat is the key to victory, it has now become vital to stem the Japanese advance in order to enable us to defeat Germany.
and the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff saying:
...unless a stop can now be put to Japan's further advances, both into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, we shall be in grave danger of losing control of the sea communications upon which we depend to defeat Germany...
Perhaps that's why so much American resource went west and British resource went east in 1942?

Regards

Tom

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#185

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 Oct 2020, 23:25

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
11 Oct 2020, 20:39
and the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff saying:
...unless a stop can now be put to Japan's further advances, both into the Indian Ocean and the Pacific, we shall be in grave danger of losing control of the sea communications upon which we depend to defeat Germany...
Perhaps that's why so much American resource went west and British resource went east in 1942?

Regards

Tom
Yeah? Who cares? What did those fuddy duddies know anyway?
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#186

Post by EwenS » 11 Oct 2020, 23:53

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
11 Oct 2020, 19:13
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
11 Oct 2020, 19:00
... Actually, I'm not sure that the south coast ports were actually in use at this point.
My understanding is coastal traffic, the usual sort modified by war requirements. This kept extra traffic off the railways. I don't have numbers at hand for the west coast ports. Tho clearance is a factor. The capacity of the canal and railways to move bulk off the docks to destinations may not match closely the actual dock discharge capacity. Building new military storage depots adjacent to the ports alters the transport question.

Another side of this is the amount of damage to any of the ports from air attacks was occurring. A look at Hughes & Costellos 'Battle of the Atlantic' shows negligible sinking of Blue water cargo ships from submarines in the Channel after mid 1942. I don't have information for mined cargo ships, but blue water cargo ships sunk by German air attack on any of the Approaches don't look like much, if the information I have is correct.

Im also reminded that Liverpool was the second most bombed city in Britain after London, so that distance from the Channel was not a defense.
Any shipping arriving in west coast ports that required transferred to the east coast went north round Scotland rather than south and through the Channel. Eastbound EN convoys routed Clyde, Oban, Loch Ewe to Methil (Fife) which was the northern terminus of the east coast convoy routes to the Thames Estuary. Westbound WN convoys ran the route in reverse. These ran from 1940 until the end of the war even though the Channel reopened to convoys in late 1944. The inshore U-boat campaign in 1944/45 raised the threat level in the western part of the Channel again, hence the maintenance of the northern route until May 1945.

Two new ports were created during the war to increase capacity against the possibility of traditional ports being closed by enemy action. Military Port No. 1 was built at Faslane on the Gareloch near Glasgow (the site of today’s RN Clyde Submarine Base) and Military Port No. 2 at Cairnryan near Stranraer in SW Scotland (now a ferry terminal to Northern Ireland). Both were given significant rail sidings close to the quays with connections to the main rail network. Their existence was a well kept secret during the war.

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#187

Post by Michael Kenny » 12 Oct 2020, 00:39

EwenS wrote:
11 Oct 2020, 23:53
Military Port No. 2 at Cairnryan near Stranraer in SW Scotland ..................... Military Port No. 1 was built at Faslane on the Gareloch near Glasgow
https://www.shutterstock.com/editorial/ ... d-7421557a


Another of the secret war achievements is out, the Military Port. After the fall of France in 1940 the South and East Coast British ports were virtually closed to large ocean-going ships. Two ports were, therefore, built on the west coast of Scotland, one in the Greloach on the Clyde, and one at Cairnryan, Loch Ryan, Wigtonshire. The ports and their railways connecting with the main lines, were built entirely by Military labour, Royal Engineers and the Pioneer Corps. The complex engineering problems involved were mastered by Army engineers with advice from a panel of three civilian experts. The first ships were berthed in July 1942. Besides their obvious value to Military operations, the two ports were used as testing grounds in underwater clearance work. The men who built them, also built part of the famous Mulberry harbor, used by the Americans after D-day when civilian ports became too congested to accept traffic. Several battleships of the British Navy have also been berthed there. From the Clyde port, Prime Minister Churchill sailed on the Queen Mary to one of the historic conferences. No. 2 Military Port, Loch Ryan, Scotland, showing deep water wharf and approach to South deep water wharf in June 1945


And
https://www.shutterstock.com/editorial/ ... d-7421543b

After the fall of France in 1940, the South and East Coast British ports were virtually closed to large ocean going ships. Two ports were therefore built for military purposes, on the West Coast of Scotland, one in the Gare Loch of the Clyde, and one in Cairnryan, Loch Ryan, Wigtonshire. The Ports and their railways connecting with the main lines, were built entirely by Military labour, Royal Engineers and the Pioneer Corps. The complex engineering problems involved were mastered by Army engineers with advice from a panel of three civilian experts. Work began at the end of 1940 and the first ship berthed in July 1942. Besides their obvious value to military operations the two ports were used as testing grounds in underwater clearance work, and the men who built them built part of the famous Mulberry Harbour. Gare Loch, showing deep water berth with lighter pool on left in June 1945

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#188

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Oct 2020, 02:28

Tom from Cornwall wrote: here are two papers produced by the British (Pound and Brooke) in late March 1942 (CAB80/61)
First, neither of these men favored the OTL American commitment to the Pacific. In fact, their opposition was so clear that King lied to his allies, telling them America was 80-20 ETO/PTO when we weren't even 50-50. Pound and Alanbrooke recommend defense of the Indian Ocean and offensive action by the U.S. Fleet, not the functional "Japan First" strategy we actually enacted for most of 1942. I find it odd that so many who would rightly laugh off a "What If" where Japan takes India and Australia in '42 take seriously Alanbrooke's invocation of these outcomes.

Second, these views should always be considered in light of the massive strategic errors the W.Allies made throughout the war. It was a farcical (and racist) under-estimation of Japanese capabilities, after all, that led to the strategic crisis addressed in the two papers. So it is not remotely true that Pound/Alanbrooke can be offered uncritically as the best strategic analysis.

Furthermore, comparison of Pound's recommendations versus actual events shows that not even his peers judged him correct: There was little diversion of bomber resources to the BoA and no massive refocus on the Middle East-Turkey-Southern Russia. W.Allies defended India but, given Japanese logistics to northern Burma, that should never have been judged sufficiently taxing to impeded a '43 landing in France.

Same goes for Alanbrooke largely.

[Note that I judge Pound/Alanbrooke correct and Harris et. al. wrong on the employment of RAF resources]
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
11 Oct 2020, 20:39
we shall be in grave danger of losing control of the sea communications upon which we depend to defeat Germany...
Perhaps that's why so much American resource went west and British resource went east in 1942?
There's an obvious contradiction between what you highlight and what you claim dictated W.Allied strategy: sending American resources west was a way to lose control of the Atlantic sea LoC, not preserve it. That's perfectly illustrated by America's disastrous and entirely-preventable losses to Operation Drumbeat. King's focus on the Pacific - which flourished in the absence of clear strategic guidance from FDR - underlies that strategic disaster.
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#189

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Oct 2020, 02:45

Fundamentally, a true Europe First strategy required Pacific patience that the gung-ho Yankees lacked.

The war against Japan was won via the Central Pacific drive (and sub campaign); everything else is ancillary. The South and Southwest Pacific atritted Japan but America could have sent British Lend-Lease to Japan and still overwhelmed her in 1944 via the Central Pacific. That drive, however, required strategic patience for the buildup of floating airfields to dominate the islands. It couldn't happen until nearly '44; in the meantime we should have finished off Germany.
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#190

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Oct 2020, 03:28

One thing to note regarding port capacity is that British imports declined during the war by close to 10mil tons while all Army cargo shipped to ETO in first half of '44 amounted to 9mil tons. Military cargo is less dense but you can see the shape of the port capacity issue and its solubility via those headline stats.

Furthermore, we need not assume that the W.Allies were incapable of infrastructure adjustment to strategic needs. The W.Allies could have invested more in port capacity, if necessary - the USN spent $9bn for on-shore construction in the war.

In fact the W.Allies did so invest:
EwenS wrote:Two new ports were created during the war to increase capacity against the possibility of traditional ports being closed by enemy action.
Thanks. Didn't know that. As these ports - at least partially operational in 1942 - seem to have been an insurance policy and under-utilized OTL, the W.Allies probably had greater port throughput capacity than they demonstrated.

So port capacity seems unlikely to have constrained an ATL '43 landing but I'm glad we're discussing it.
Carl Schwamberg wrote:My understanding is coastal traffic, the usual sort modified by war requirements. This kept extra traffic off the railways. I don't have numbers at hand for the west coast ports. Tho clearance is a factor. The capacity of the canal and railways to move bulk off the docks to destinations may not match closely the actual dock discharge capacity. Building new military storage depots adjacent to the ports alters the transport question.
Coastal shipping was extensive and essential as the canals/railways were indeed a chokepoint from the docks. Coastal Convoys, 1939-1945: The Indestructible Highway by Hewitt has good discussion.

The military storage depot issue is a red herring that assumes W.Allied inability to adjust to strategic needs. The W.Allies were pretty good at logistics, we shouldn't assume they'd fail the test. If the W.Allies need to spend $600mil on depots a year earlier, that's small change in the grand strategic picture and certainly less than was spent in '42-'43 on the massive British aerodromes compelled by OTL aerial-focused strategy. Same goes for the builders of those depots. Americans turned distant, desert islands into airport-cities; they could have thrown up storage depots in their sleep in relatively-close Britain given different strategic priorities.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Upthread there was discussion of Torch and its importance to gaining American experience. After reading more about the US Army's abysmal performance in North Africa, I give the point more weight.

But IMJ both Torch and an enhanced Roundup would have been possible given (1) an AGF-focused US and (2) a truly Europe-focused US. Worst case you can draw down North Africa and move ~half its divisions into France around April '43. If Hitler wants to throw good resources after bad in Tunisia let him. Knowing Germany rules in Tunis can be added to rule in Courland in Eva's last lullaby. Knocking out Italy should have been judged a trifling strategic factor; half of Italy arguably contributed more as an occupied economy than as a co-belligerent. Shortening the LoC for Imperial rule over India was probably the real motivation OTL.

------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fundamentally we have two enormously wealthy world powers fighting less than half a European power and its junior ally. It would have been over much sooner had the wealthy powers been less averse to ground combat.
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#191

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 12 Oct 2020, 09:00

Regarding the information extrapolated from this graph re shipping losses caused by the lack of a convoy system along the US east coast in the first half of 1942:
Allied Merchant Shipping losses to German SMs - Jul 41 - Jun 43.png
Allied Merchant Shipping losses to German SMs - Jul 41 - Jun 43.png (55.14 KiB) Viewed 743 times
I've been re-reading Overy's Why the Allies Won and came across this statement this morning:
In four months 1.2 million tons of shipping was sunk off the American coast alone. The Allis lost 2.6 million tons of shipping between January and April, more than had been lost in the Atlantic in the whole of 1941.
He references Ruge Der Seekrieg, Beesly Very Special Intelligence, Hadley U-Boats against Canada and M. Milner 'Anglo-American Naval Co-operation in the Second World War.

So my question is do we have reliable figures for the total of shipping lost in different geographic areas to go alongside the classifications of 'unescorted', 'in convoy' and 'stragglers'?

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Tom

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#192

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Oct 2020, 19:20

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
12 Oct 2020, 09:00
...

So my question is do we have reliable figures for the total of shipping lost in different geographic areas to go alongside the classifications of 'unescorted', 'in convoy' and 'stragglers'?

Regards

Tom
Hughes and Costello 'Battle of the Atlantic' have maps showing locations of ships and submarines sunk for biannual periods. Your chart tracks H & Gs map for January - May 1942 if you go outside Op Drumbeat itself & look at all sinking in that period. Losses in the Gilf of Mexico and Caribbean appear to rival or outnumber those off the US east coast. However there are also significant losses shown along the North Atlantic convoy routes and the West African route. I'll try to scan the map & post it here.
Last edited by Carl Schwamberger on 12 Oct 2020, 19:48, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#193

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Oct 2020, 19:24

Heres the map. Hope it helps a bit. You may need to make a expanded view to catch the details.
Scan 1.jpeg

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#194

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 12 Oct 2020, 20:32

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Oct 2020, 19:20
Hughes and Costello 'Battle of the Atlantic' have maps showing locations of ships and submarines sunk for biannual periods. Your chart tracks H & Gs map for January - May 1942 if you go outside Op Drumbeat itself & look at all sinking in that period. Losses in the Gilf of Mexico and Caribbean appear to rival or outnumber those off the US east coast. However there are also significant losses shown along the North Atlantic convoy routes and the West African route. I'll try to scan the map & post it here.
Carl,

Thanks for that and the map - interesting stuff. I've also found some figures for Indian Ocean losses here:

https://www.naval-history.net/WW2Campai ... nOcean.htm

Jan 42 - 13 merchant ships of 46,000 tons
Feb 42 - 18 merchant ships of 38,000 tons
Mar 42 - 65 merchant ships of 68,000 tons
Apr 42 - 31 merchant ships of 154,000 tons
May 42 - 4 merchant ships of 22,000 tons

For a grand total of 131 merchant ships of 328,000. Not insignificant clearly.

We could add the merchant shipping losses from the Mediterranean as well, although they seem much more marginal:

https://www.naval-history.net/WW2CampaignsRNMed2.htm

Jan 42 - 1 British or Allied merchant ship of 7,000 tons
Feb 42 - 4 British or Allied merchant ships of 19,000 tons
Mar 42 - 4 British or Allied merchant ships of 20,000 tons
Apr 42 - 6 British or Allied merchant ships of 13,000 tons
May 42 - 6 British or Allied merchant ships of 21,000 tons

For another 21 merchant ships of 80,000 tons.

A useful reminder, if we all needed one, that merchant shipping losses were not caused by German submarines alone.

Regards

Tom

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#195

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 12 Oct 2020, 20:58

Richard Anderson wrote:
11 Oct 2020, 23:25
Yeah? Who cares? What did those fuddy duddies know anyway?
:lol: :lol: :lol:

As I demonstrated, both the British First Sea Lord and CIGS, responding to the situation as they saw it in late Mar 42, recommended a change in emphasis in Allied grand strategy that would allow resources to be deployed to the Far East to stabilise the situation there and ensure the retention of those 'vital interests' and 'raw materials' needed to continue to prosecute the war in Europe. My interpretation is that they were describing a 'temporary' change of emphasis and would support a return to a more heavily 'Europe-centric' strategy once what they identified as the Allies' (and of course the British empire's) key interests were secured.

A temporary change in emphasis such as the one that can be seen in the charts for US Army personnel and cargo shipping that TMP kindly posted up in another locked thread and in which we can see the war in Europe regain its primacy for the US Army in Jun-Jul 42:
Flow of US Army tps and Cargo - Dec 41 - Apr 43.png
Flow of US Army tps and Cargo - Dec 41 - Apr 43.png (180.13 KiB) Viewed 698 times
In the same way that the US needed to take into account British strategic opinions, the British had to take into account those of her Dominions (especially those such as Australia and New Zealand whose formations would be key to the eventual British victory in the Western Desert). An example of this in action can be seen in the appreciation on the defence of Australia approved by the COS committee in early Apr 42 (CAB80/62):
CAB-80-62 - Defence of Australia - 2 Apr 42.JPG
If only they had a bucket of hindsight! :D

Regards

Tom

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