No, it isn't simple, it is a highly complex subject. Yes, I did say that, and it isn't wrong. I suggest you look at the inputs - the bombing campaign - and the outputs - the aircraft completed - and then think about the idea that the bombing campaign damaged aircraft production significantly in 1943. If we look at the attacks actually made, we find the following (excluding attacks on centralized repair sites).
Strikes at Aircraft Assembly Plants
Rostock, Heinkel (He 111), 20 April, BC, 149.1 tons
Nantes, Heinkel (He 111), 4 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 145 tons
Kassel, Fiesler (FW 190), 28 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 129 tons (note, most of the bombs appeared to hit the adjacent Sponfasser textile mill)
Oschersleben, AGO (FW 190), 28 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 62.9 tons
Warnemund, Heinkel (FW 190), 29 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 129 tons
Kassel-Bettenhausen, Fiesler (FW 190), 29 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 222 tons
Kassel-Waldau, Fiesler (FW 190), 29 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 87 tons
Wiener-Neustadt, (Bf 109), 13 August, IX Bmb Cmd, 162 tons
Regensburg, Ober Taubling (Bf 109), 17 August, VIII Bmb Cmd, 298.8 tons
Wiener-Neustadt, (Bf 109), 1 October, XII Bmb Cmd, 131.5 tons
Bremen-Weser (Ju 97), 8 October, VIII Bmb Cmd, 81 tons
Anklam, Arado (FW 190), 9 October, VIII Bmb Cmd, 185.5 tons
Marienburg, Focke-Wulf (FW 190), 9 October, VIII Bmb Cmd, 217.9 tons
Wiener-Neustadt, (Bf 109), 24 October, XII Bmb Cmd, 25.5 tons
Wiener-Neustadt, (Bf 109), XV Bmb Cmd, 329 tons
So I missed a few, but then so did the USSBS. Let's look at some of the outcomes, say FW 190? There were five attacks at the end of July, so what was the July/August/September output of each plant?
Kassel - 61/62/58
Oschersleben - 100/80/79
Warnemund - 58/52/77
Significant? What about all those strikes at Weiner-Neustadt? July/August/September/October/November/December output was 270/184/201/218/80/37. Significant? Maybe, except that by January it was back at 119, before dropping to 67, and then skyrocketing to 360 in March and 443 in April.
Strikes at Aircraft Component Manufacture
Bremen, Borgward, 17 April, VIII Bmb Cmd, 263 tons
Le Mans, Engines, 26 June, VIII Bmb Cmd, 181.5 tons
Le Mans, Engines, 4 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 259.5
Amsterdam, Fokker, 17 July, VIII Bmb Cmd, 51.5 tons
Villacoublay, Components, 24 August, VIII Bmb Cmd, 257.2 tons
Paris, Caudron-Billancourt (engines), 3 September, VIII Bmb Cmd, 111 tons
Paris, not stated, probably Caudron, 9 September, VIII Bmb Cmd, 58 tons
Paris, Caudron-Billancourt (engines), 15 September, VIII Bmb Cmd, 63
Paris, Hispano-Suiza (engines), 15 September, VIII Bmb Cmd, 229 tons
Frankfurt-am-Main, Heddernheim, VDM (propellers), 4 October, VIII Bmb Cmd, 219.3 tons
Augsburg, XII Bmb Cmd, 100 tons
I don't see many attacks on the Ruhr? Not unusual, since most aircraft component manufacture wasn't in the Ruhr.
You have to wonder how that could be, given the lack of aircraft infrastructure in the Ruhr and the lack of BC attacks on the known aircraft complexes.On the subsidiary point of who caused the damage, I'm with Tooze that it was primarily Bomber Command. Their resources were much greater in that period. I don't have the tons-dropped at hand but surely the British did the lion's share. If I'm wrong you'll surely correct me.
No, I don't think I'm confusing anything, since you keep expressing an opinion that something will happen instead of showing how the Germans could make it happen. So you think that by 1944-1945 they'll be able to triple aircraft output? How? And, more important, why, since their synthetic fuel program is ash by then. And, no, the bombing impact did not bite at least a year earlier.You're confusing our discussion of what happened in OTL 1943 (Bombing impact bit at least a year earlier than you claimed) with our discussion of what could happen in ATL 1944. The tripling of LW production is feasible only a couple years after SU's fall.
Okay, so then in 3Q43, the "final process of assembly" labor in the aviation industry (airframe, engines, and props) in Germany was 935,000 and the US was 910,851 (airframe), 296,949 (engines), and 157,593 (props), for a total of 1,365,393. Now do the productivity calculation.Well you have a choice of which economic analysts are wrong: 1945's or today's? Here's Tooze on Wagenfuhr's labor classification efforts:
From Statistics and German State, p.278.Nevertheless, WagenfuÈhr's Gesamtplan was far from complete. The
problem of attributing inputs to outputs remained unsolved. The rows
in WagenfuÈhr's table purported to show the labour, iron, energy and
transport consumed in the production of each type of weapon. In fact,
they recorded only the resources consumed in the final process of
Now you know how I feel. Okay, so build the plants, build and install the machine tools and jigs, bring in and train the labor force, bring in the raw materials, and have at it. Yes, it takes capitol as in money, but that capitol has to be translated into concrete things. Germany had a problem with that. While there was some plant expansion in the tank industry, it was more limited in the aviation industry, mostly I suspect because so much was already invested in it 1933-1939. The biggest "expansion" was the conversion of the bomber plants to fighter production in 1944.
Funny, I've also worked with economists, I don't know if they're renowned, but they were looking specifically at the economic costs of warfare.I've worked with a lot of economists - some renowned - and in a past life took steps on the path to becoming one. So it's not at all foreign to me, finding economists to have tripped up in their analysis. As a group, economists combine great insights with great blindness. Maybe that's the difference in our approaches here.
So all this time you've been arguing that economists - Budraß, et all, support your POV, but now you're saying you don't trust the analysis of economists? Um, huh? I don't quite follow the logic there.
"Rough" isn't the issue. Logical argument, critical thinking, and honest argument from the historical record rather than imagination that is the issue for me.That's fine with me and shared. I just don't want our threads locked. Mods - can Richard and I be allowed to play rough with each other?
Empathy, not sympathy is the key, in looking at adversary capabilities and intentions, as my old boss liked to say. I'm sorry if your use of suspect internet sources and some of your argumentation raised my hackles, but you must have noticed that it wasn't only me, given that you have been called out on it a number of times? On examination it does look like you bought into that "source" via a combination of eagerness and ignorance, rather than deliberately. And, no, saying it was "ignorance" is not disparaging you, it was just an unfortunate fact...basically you stepped in doo-doo because you thought it was chocolate pudding and might be tasty. As the saying goes, $H*T Happens!Yeah I'm not going to attempt rebutting an impression that analysis implies sympathy. It's beneath me and should be beneath you. This runs off me like I'm sure it runs off you whenever someone claims that TDI's evaluation of German combat effectiveness implies Nazi apologia.
However, as far as the silliness over CEV goes, no, I don't ignore such an implication and never will, because, well, it is silly.