The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by T. A. Gardner » 06 Nov 2020 20:58

And, Historically, with only a relatively small night fighter force, the Germans were inflicting roughly 3 %
bomber losses on the British PER MISSION ! If you give the nachtjaegers the assets they needed in terms of
numbers of aircraft and crews, you might have been able to increase this to 6% or more. If the British start
losing Lancasters and Halifaxes faster than they can be built, Bomber Harris' Whirlwind of Destruction gutters
out and dies. ( Just for some numbers, the British often sent three raids each week, of 300 bombers each.
This means they could count on losing nearly 27 bombers each week. This was tolerable. But, if you increase
it to 54 bombers per week, Bomber Command starts getting whittled down, until it cannot keep up the offensive.
It's just pure numbers. )
To do that you'd need:

1. To lengthen and specialize the training of pilots and crew for those planes. They have to be able to fly and navigate at night. The Wilde Sau use of single seat fighters at night was a disastrous tactic. Sure, highly skilled pilots could manage these missions, but the average pilots were suffering a 50% loss rate per sortie with very high death rates and most of that being self-inflicted through pilot and navigation errors. More pilot and crew training means longer lead times getting them into combat as well as more fuel being used for training.

2. You need to vastly expand the electronics industry to meet the demand for radar, radios, navigation aids, IFF, ESM, ECM, etc. Going along with that, you'd need to vastly expand R & D to catch up to the Allies in terms of the technology in use as well.

3. You'd need to expand twin engine aircraft production. Again, an expensive proposition that's harder to do. Or, I suppose you could to an extent just stop building bombers and lose any offensive capacity the Luftwaffe has...

Then, of course, the British have alternatives too. They could up the number of nightfighter escorts they send with their bombers, and probably do so significantly. Then the hunters become the hunted as much as hunters. Historically, the smallish number of nightfighters used by the RAF in this role had a disproportionate impact on Luftwaffe crews as they became spooked they were always being hunted and needed to continuously look over their shoulder, so-to-speak.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Nov 2020 10:05

Richard Anderson wrote:The German leadership made a choice in 1933 that essentially limited the Luftwaffe to 87 octane aviation fuel during the course of the war, which meant when it came to fighting aircraft flying with 100 octane and higher gasoline.
Doesn't appear correct. C-3 fuel (rate 96 octane) was the majority of fuel by the end of the war, per USN technical mission:
The relative volumes of production of the two grades cannot be accurately given, but in the last war years the major volume, perhaps two-thirds (2/3) of this total has the C-3 grade.
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_ ... %20sources.

Germany was also able to use methanol-water injection to replicate the anti-knock effects of 100-octane, as discussed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1PA70pN6zPM&t=392s
Richard Anderson wrote:The lack of investment in new refinery technologies keeps the German production limited to 87 octane fuel, which limits the performance of the Jagdwaffe.
See above.

As regards any limitation to performance, note again that my ATL is based on more Germans performing as did the Germans up to early 1944 or so.

So again, I'm not attempting to, nor interested in, bringing the LW on par with AAF in certain respects. The LW had a ~1:1 attrition ratio in Reich defense; that plus more planes is all I need to make the CBO untenable.
Richard Anderson wrote:Didn't you notice my remark regarding the limited places where high-octane aviation gasoline was produced?
See above. Again, I'm not interested in matching American fuel. And you appear to have an incorrect/incomplete idea of German fuel anyway.
Richard Anderson wrote:Sorry, but the limited production of TEL and the associated alkaloids required for the Pure/Phillips process meant the amount of higher octane fuels produced by Germany were tiny and still inferior to the 100+ octane fuels used by the Allies.
See above. More German fuel, not a switch to American fuel.
Richard Anderson wrote:the suitability of Caucasian and Rumanian crude remains a question-mark.
Agreed. Anybody have info?

I'd also note the oil from "Second Baku" - roughly between Samara and the Urals - would also figure.

Also the oil of Iraq. As I've discussed elsewhere, a high capacity rail line from northern Iraq to the Turkish port of Samsun was missing only a 100-mile link between Mardin and Diyarkabir that the Turks began in 1940 and which the Germans could have completed after taking the MidEast.

Image

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&p=2293504&h ... n#p2293463

For now I'm working on the assumption that a significant quantity of Russian/MidEast oil could produce avgas. If that's wrong, my ATL is significantly more difficult.
Richard Anderson wrote:Time, money, technology, and requirements are the deadly combination for the Germans in this situation. Given that a relatively small concentration of bombing assets wrecked the German synthetic fuel industry in relatively short order in 1944, the Germans are unlikely to ever catch up.
Wrecked by what though? The Wallies couldn't reliably penetrate in daylight until 1944 even against the OTL LW. Against a significantly stronger ATL LW, daylight bombing is out of the question.

"Merely" doubling LW production in '43, plus not Eastern Front, means point targets are largely secure throughout '43. By the time hordes of long-range fighters are available, Germany's well on her way to at least tripling LW production.

The switch of Bergius plants from ~50% to 100% avgas production as a bridge to the refineries coming online would double avgas supply in '43. Add to that whatever is already coming from the Caucasus and can be refined.
Richard Anderson wrote:Since I made no inference to the contrary, I'm unsure why you think that is a point I need to consider?
For the gallery, Richard. Not everyone already knows everything. ;)
Richard Anderson wrote:your plan is to match American aircraft production, which implies being competitive in the air, which is going to require something approaching Allied aviation fuel production.
Well let's be careful about terms here. Match American OTL frame numbers, yes. Match weight of frames? No. Smaller planes burn less fuel.

And again it's not about matching America it's about multiplying German frames at ~1942 training standards. Those German standards burned less fuel than American but were still producing good pilots. America did things inefficiently in WW2 (in terms of manpower and material expended), Germany couldn't afford do at that level (yes bureaucratic inefficiency etc. but parsimonious with fuel).

A B-17 cost ~5x an American fighter yet killed around the same number of German fighters IIRC. So America can probably outmatch German frame numbers even in my ATL but:
  • 1. Scrapping strategic bombing means either a permanent siege or invasion with a 15mil-man army, neither of which were politically feasible.
Richard Anderson wrote:To make use of that mass of aircraft implies a massive increase in pilot training, matching that of the US, which again implies that at least the American basic training fuel budget needs to be matched as does the unit training fuel budget.
See above. Again, this works only if you assume that the Germans spend material and manpower as lavishly as America. That's not a valid assumption in WW2, just see division slice.

Why are you avoiding using the OTL LW as a baseline for ATL larger LW? Yes, I see that more fuel is needed per pilot and that German AC will probably fly more sorties per frame. But that's why I say 5-10x more fuel for 3-4x the LW production.
Richard Anderson wrote:Yet again, it all depends on when/how this amorphous "1942 victory" occurs.
I consider this discussion as addressing the necessary conditions for the LW to defeat the CBO.

Consider it a young discussion, I haven't written up an ATL yet because I'm open regarding these questions and have some items on the research agenda yet. As often here, my position can be considered as questioning the inevitability of Allied victory rather than, so far, having a firm outline of how things could have gone differently.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Nov 2020 10:11

paulrward wrote:I had a series of blinding flashes of the obvious.

First- The Axis need not equal the Wallies production of aircraft to defeat them. If the Wallies are conducting
a 'round-the-clock' bombing campaign, using four engine bombers, this is a VERY expensive campaign in terms
of dollars, raw materials, manpower, and ( what I will come to later ) fuel.
The 4-E bombers point is so blindingly obvious, yet nobody responds when I've repeatedly made it. Yes, the Allies can afford 10-1 expenditure on frames IF they face only ~40% of German resources because Russia is kicking Germany's teeth in. If not, the situation is very different.

I suspect the obvious isn't compelling because it runs into something even more "obvious" and - for patriotic/habitual reasons - something not subject to being questioned: Allied victory was always inevitable.

Richard's stats on fuel, however, obviate any chance of Germany catching up in that department. AAF burned >80mil tons of fuel in '44; all the oil in Eurasia wouldn't match that.

The analytical question, however, is whether Germany needs 80mil tons of fuel. 20mil (10x OTL Luftwaffe burn) seems more than enough to fuel/train a sufficient LW.
paulrward wrote:It required ROUGHLY three times the cost in dollars, aluminum, and workers to produce a single B-17 Fortress
or B-24 Liberator as it required to produce an Bf 109 or an FW 190.
For heavies vs. Me-109 it was on the order of 8x.

The cheap, decently-performing 109 was the true Wunderwaffe of the LW.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Nov 2020 17:09

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Nov 2020 10:05
Doesn't appear correct. C-3 fuel (rate 96 octane) was the majority of fuel by the end of the war, per USN technical mission:

Germany was also able to use methanol-water injection to replicate the anti-knock effects of 100-octane, as discussed here:
Since I mentioned German alkylization and addition of TEL to its 87-octane refinery production, in order to improve octane, I'm not sure why you think this is a gotcha? Two-thirds of a much smaller amount of fuels inferior to the Allied iso-octanes remains a problem for a Luftwaffe seeking to compete successfully against Allied air superiority.
See above.
See above.
As regards any limitation to performance, note again that my ATL is based on more Germans performing as did the Germans up to early 1944 or so.

So again, I'm not attempting to, nor interested in, bringing the LW on par with AAF in certain respects. The LW had a ~1:1 attrition ratio in Reich defense; that plus more planes is all I need to make the CBO untenable.
Okay, but you have to build this expanded Luftwaffe. How long does it take to reach that tipping point, given the Allies are about two years ahead in the growth curve?
See above. Again, I'm not interested in matching American fuel. And you appear to have an incorrect/incomplete idea of German fuel anyway.
See above.
See above. More German fuel, not a switch to American fuel.
See above. German C-3 remained inferior to Allied fuels and limited German aircraft performance.
Agreed. Anybody have info?

I'd also note the oil from "Second Baku" - roughly between Samara and the Urals - would also figure.

Also the oil of Iraq. As I've discussed elsewhere, a high capacity rail line from northern Iraq to the Turkish port of Samsun was missing only a 100-mile link between Mardin and Diyarkabir that the Turks began in 1940 and which the Germans could have completed after taking the MidEast.
You might as well include the oil from Maracaibo as well, after all it only requires the Germans to build a tanker fleet after taking South America.
Wrecked by what though? The Wallies couldn't reliably penetrate in daylight until 1944 even against the OTL LW. Against a significantly stronger ATL LW, daylight bombing is out of the question.
And here I thought you were just arguing how German production in 1943 was so badly affected by the British night bombing program? In any case, if the Allies are not doing the bombing preliminaries for NEPTUNE in winter-spring 1944, what do you think they would attack instead?
"Merely" doubling LW production in '43, plus not Eastern Front, means point targets are largely secure throughout '43. By the time hordes of long-range fighters are available, Germany's well on her way to at least tripling LW production.
Um, point targets were largely secure anyway throughout 1943. USAAF sorties quadrupled from 1943 to 1944. The first major attack by Eighth AF on the industry was 5 November 1943, followed by 7 January 1944, then further were delayed until the campaign began again on 12 and 28 May, until delaying again until after D-Day. If the Allies can't execute D-Day, then the air program likely shifts to concentrating on the oil industry, with the same result.
The switch of Bergius plants from ~50% to 100% avgas production as a bridge to the refineries coming online would double avgas supply in '43. Add to that whatever is already coming from the Caucasus and can be refined.
It is unlikely that much, if any, of the Caucasian oil would get to Germany in 1943. Rebuilding the field infrastructure and transporting it is a significant problem for Germany.
For the gallery, Richard. Not everyone already knows everything. ;)
Ah, you were appealing to the gallery. How Trumpian of you. :lol:
Well let's be careful about terms here. Match American OTL frame numbers, yes. Match weight of frames? No. Smaller planes burn less fuel.

And again it's not about matching America it's about multiplying German frames at ~1942 training standards. Those German standards burned less fuel than American but were still producing good pilots. America did things inefficiently in WW2 (in terms of manpower and material expended), Germany couldn't afford do at that level (yes bureaucratic inefficiency etc. but parsimonious with fuel).
Except that Germany was already emphasizing frame number of frame weight and accelerated that through 1943 and 1944, but without any commensurate increase in operational aircraft.
See above. Again, this works only if you assume that the Germans spend material and manpower as lavishly as America. That's not a valid assumption in WW2, just see division slice.
Except the Germans didn't spend material and manpower as lavishly as America and the Luftwaffe didn't grow. Even concentrating more and more resources on a smaller fraction of the Luftwaffe and it still didn't grow. I simply don't see how anything other than lavish expenditure will grow the Luftwaffe.
Why are you avoiding using the OTL LW as a baseline for ATL larger LW? Yes, I see that more fuel is needed per pilot and that German AC will probably fly more sorties per frame. But that's why I say 5-10x more fuel for 3-4x the LW production.
I am not doing any such thing. On 4 May 1940 the Jagdwaffe had 1,369 aircraft on hand and 970 operational. On 3 May 1941 they had 1,277 and 867. On 10 May 1942 they had 1,442 and 978. On 10 May 1943 they had 1,654 and 1,077. On 10 May 1944 they had 1,748 and 1,050. Despite major additions to aircraft production they got fractional increases in operational aircraft. The root problem was not aircraft production, but lack of infrastructure.
I consider this discussion as addressing the necessary conditions for the LW to defeat the CBO.
Really? I thought this was a discussion about how the Germans increase Panzer production, which somehow enables them to someway get to a victory over the Soviet Union sometime in 1942?
Consider it a young discussion, I haven't written up an ATL yet because I'm open regarding these questions and have some items on the research agenda yet. As often here, my position can be considered as questioning the inevitability of Allied victory rather than, so far, having a firm outline of how things could have gone differently.
Okay, then you might consider aging this discussion and answering its primary question. How does Germany increase Panzer production in the summer of 1940? :D
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 07 Nov 2020 18:12

So here is your "OTL baseline" to work from.

Average Jagdwaffe Strength
Aug 38-Jul 39 - 530
Aug 39 - Jul 40 - 829.5
Aug 40 - Jul 41 - 759.2
Aug 41 - Jul 42 - 766.8
Aug 42 - Jul 43 - 1015.7
Aug 43 - Jul 44 - 1106.5
Aug 44 - Apr 45 - 1771.8 - peak operational strength was 10 November 1944 at 2,491
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by David Thompson » 07 Nov 2020 21:11

Richard Anderson -- Please give sources for your factual claims; our rules require it.

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Nov 2020 23:39

Richard Anderson wrote:Okay, then you might consider aging this discussion and answering its primary question. How does Germany increase Panzer production in the summer of 1940?
Upthread I say:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
26 Oct 2020 06:43
Re the OP topic, an easy route to higher German tank production would have been to avoid the cuts in the panzer program that occurred in mid-'39.

I don't, however, see any great impact from having even a few thousand more panzers in 1941. Tanks alone weren't sufficient, Germany needed a few more mobile divisions in Barbarossa.
So I don't think more tanks alone would yield Ostsieg. As I've said elsewhere, it's operational mobility that allowed the potential for Kesselschlachten. Mobile infantry divisions might have done just as well as panzer divisions though likely at higher casualty cost.

Re the 1939 cuts to the panzer program, you've oft opined that it made no difference. Why exactly?
Richard Anderson wrote:Okay, but you have to build this expanded Luftwaffe. How long does it take to reach that tipping point, given the Allies are about two years ahead in the growth curve?
It's a good question, one that I don't have a precise timeline for as of yet. Again, young discussion.

I see a few points that would yield at least a doubling of LW strength over Germany in '43 though:
  • Demobilization of Ostheer frees sufficient Germans to put all LW factories on double shifts = ~50% delta to LW production mere months after Ostsieg.
  • LW lost ~4,000 planes against SU in '43 and ~900 in '42's last three months. In ATL, VVS is weaker in '42 - causing fewer LW casualties in first nine months of '42. Call it 6,000 fewer LW planes and airmen lost in the east by 1.1.44. Minus 500 or so Ju-88's not produced in '40.
  • 1943 bomb damage would be reduced via more nightfighters repurposed from Eastern Front bombing duty (i.e. producing more nightfighters and fewer bombers and day 2-E fighters). Also more Flak. CBO wouldn't be halted in early '43 but would be blunted in its impact.
These factors alone easily double LW Reich defense strength compared to OTL '43.

Meanwhile, LW investment program would exceed OTL's by early '42: unlike OTL, where Germany scrambled to undo '41's premature shift away from Heer over winter 41-42, army investment stops and all machine tool production and factory construction resources go to LW. Perhaps no Tiger I production, for example - until later if ever. Aside from the shift in capital investment resources, those resources are greater. As discussed upthread, OTL '42 began a decline in German investment; ATL '42 is the peak and sees massive investment in LW plant. How much additional plant is online in ATL '43? Not sure, need more info on historical German lag time between LW investment and production flow (of course those historical lag times were almost always amplified by construction labor shortages fixed in ATL).
Richard Anderson wrote:German C-3 remained inferior to Allied fuels and limited German aircraft performance.
Yes but with MW performance difference was negligible. Sure it cost some engine lifespan but German fighters won't have very long life spans anyway.
Richard Anderson wrote:You might as well include the oil from Maracaibo as well, after all it only requires the Germans to build a tanker fleet after taking South America.
Ah taking out the old Wehraboo hammer again.

Distance matters. Samsun to the Danube is ~400 miles, Maracaibo-England >12x longer. Convoying costs ~30% shipping capacity, is not necessary on the Black Sea. So Germany expends ~1/20th the shipping capacity per ton of oil moved, versus the Wallies.
Richard Anderson wrote:And here I thought you were just arguing how German production in 1943 was so badly affected by the British night bombing program? if the Allies are not doing the bombing preliminaries for NEPTUNE in winter-spring 1944, what do you think they would attack instead?
There's an obvious difference between hitting an industry embedded in the urban fabric of a large targeted area, versus hitting discrete and relatively isolated points such as Bergius plants. RAF didn't and probably couldn't target specific plants in 1943.
Richard Anderson wrote:It is unlikely that much, if any, of the Caucasian oil would get to Germany in 1943. Rebuilding the field infrastructure and transporting it is a significant problem for Germany.
I see Maikop falling in January '42 in a decent Ostsieg ATL, coming online in fall '42. That's ~4mil tons already. Baku falls in mid '42, starts pumping ~6 months later so early '43.

Black Sea is secure no later than September '42 when SU stops fighting. Maikop's oil can be moved via rail in the short term and via the limited extant Black Sea shipping fleet; Germany starts building a few tankers and more Danube barges in the meantime.
Richard Anderson wrote:Even concentrating more and more resources on a smaller fraction of the Luftwaffe and it still didn't grow. I simply don't see how anything other than lavish expenditure will grow the Luftwaffe.
That's a product of losing planes as fast as you make them, which is what happens when you're out-produced >3:1.

ATL LW growth would depend on who's winning the attrition battle.

Yes more infrastructure would be required - airfields, light Flak defenses, ground personnel. But those factors increase straightforwardly in an ATL where Germany has ~2x the productive labor and where it's not focusing ~60% of such labor on the SU.

-----------------------------------------\

Can anyone recommend a good reference for W.Allied aircraft losses by theater and month? I'm accumulating statistics from various sources but don't have a single great source.

One frustrating tendency is for sources to give attrition stats by % only, without telling either absolute losses or sortie numbers from which absolute losses could be inferred.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Nov 2020 23:41

Richard Anderson wrote:
07 Nov 2020 18:12
So here is your "OTL baseline" to work from.

Average Jagdwaffe Strength
Aug 38-Jul 39 - 530
Aug 39 - Jul 40 - 829.5
Aug 40 - Jul 41 - 759.2
Aug 41 - Jul 42 - 766.8
Aug 42 - Jul 43 - 1015.7
Aug 43 - Jul 44 - 1106.5
Aug 44 - Apr 45 - 1771.8 - peak operational strength was 10 November 1944 at 2,491
ATL LW strength would be residual of production minus attrition, integrated over time. So it requires more complete data on attrition, which I have for LW (e.g. Zamansky study up to '44) but not for W.Allies.

The baseline for fuel burn I'm working with is (1) combat sorties and (2) training regime - fuel per pilot trained - times a multiplier.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 07 Nov 2020 23:57

paulrward wrote:
06 Nov 2020 20:26
Hello All :

To Mr. Tom from Cornwall ;

Yes, but on the other hand we have fingers...... NO ! What I meant to say was, with the Russians off the
board, that might mean that some of the 88s and 105s on the Russian Front might be trucked home to deal
with those pesky Lancasters.....

Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward
There wasn't much heavy Flak deployed in the east - though a lot of light Flak.

More light Flak in the west would mean greater W.Allied losses for their bombing of German ports and other duties handled by medium bombers and fighters. Such attrition feeds back into the attrition big picture, with resources being siphoned from the CBO if the W.Allies want to maintain the OTL non-CBO actions.

Germany would probably build more heavy Flak as well, repurposing some of its OTL artillery tube/shell production. It's not as efficient as producing fighters but is still more efficient than W.Allies' heavy bomber production at historical attrition exchange rates, per Westerman's book on Flak.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 Nov 2020 00:33

David Thompson wrote:
07 Nov 2020 21:11
Richard Anderson -- Please give sources for your factual claims; our rules require it.
For the Luftwaffe operational strengths? Sure. AFHRA Reel K1027M, ff. 4-553. The original folder was K113.3014. The same series is available from TNA as AIR40/1207 "The German Air Force: first line strength at three monthly intervals during the European War 1939 - 1945", in the BAMA as RL 2 III/700 - 734, entitled "Übersicht über Soll, Istbestand, Einsatzbereitschaft, Verluste und Reserven der fliegenden Verbänden", and in the Australian Archives series AWM54 Control 423/4/103, part 100. Micheal Holm extracted and posted some minor parts of the series some years ago at http://www.ww2.dk/oob/statistics/gob.htm
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 Nov 2020 00:55

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Nov 2020 23:57
There wasn't much heavy Flak deployed in the east - though a lot of light Flak.
May I ask what factual basis you have to make that assumption?

It would be accurate to say that there was less heavy Flak deployed in the German theaters of war as compared to protecting the central area of the Reich, but otherwise no.

Hvy Btrys/Lt Btrys/S/L Btrys end of year 1943 (Westermann, Sword in the Heavens, pp. 351-351).

Reich - 1,234/693/350
Westfront (France, Belgium, Holland) 205/295/33
Nordfront (Norway and Finland) 92/69/1
Südostfront (Rumania, Greece, Hungary) 61/39/8
Ostfront - 148/162/0
Südfront 278/80/20
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 Nov 2020 01:17

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Nov 2020 23:41
ATL LW strength would be residual of production minus attrition, integrated over time. So it requires more complete data on attrition, which I have for LW (e.g. Zamansky study up to '44) but not for W.Allies.
Okay then, so let's take Zamansky's first period, 1 September 1939-21 June 1941, where he lists 1,683 1E-fighters lost. In the same period, well 2 Sep 39, but close enough, the average Jagdwaffe serviceable strength was 793.8. Production is more difficult, since we don't have monthly breakdowns for 1939 or 1940, but if we take the average produced in 1939, the total for 1940, and production for 1941 through June we get an approximately 3,847 produced.

So for the Luftwaffe to get to an on hand,serviceable strength on 21 June 1941 of 1,440/1,092 from a starting point of 770/676 on 2 September 1939, some 1,683 aircraft were lost and about 3,847 were produced. So replacing 2.29 aircraft for each lost increased operational strength by 1.64. We can look at the other periods in the same way.
The baseline for fuel burn I'm working with is (1) combat sorties and (2) training regime - fuel per pilot trained - times a multiplier.
And your sources/data for those for the Luftwaffe are...?
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Nov 2020 01:56

Richard Anderson wrote:
07 Nov 2020 17:09
...
I am not doing any such thing. On 4 May 1940 the Jagdwaffe had 1,369 aircraft on hand and 970 operational. On 3 May 1941 they had 1,277 and 867. On 10 May 1942 they had 1,442 and 978. On 10 May 1943 they had 1,654 and 1,077. On 10 May 1944 they had 1,748 and 1,050. Despite major additions to aircraft production they got fractional increases in operational aircraft. The root problem was not aircraft production, but lack of infrastructure. ...
I probably missed something there but to quote Longstreet: "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it." That is to say was the lack of infrastructure more important than the combat losses?

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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 08 Nov 2020 02:08

Richard Anderson wrote:So replacing 2.29 aircraft for each lost increased operational strength by 1.64. We can look at the other periods in the same way.
Applying that ratio to ATL:OTL analysis would assume declining on-hand : serviceable ratio for ATL:OTL.

Had serviceability not declined after the war started, 6.21.1941 figure would have been 1440/1264. [of course serviceability declined once the shooting started]

For an ATL/OTL comparison there's little reason to think serviceability rates would be worse than OTL.

Probably certain aircraft were retired as "war-weary" or obsolete.

So let's revise:

ATL on-hand strength = [OTL on-hand strength] + [delta to production] - [delta to losses] - [delta to retirements]

The variable [delta to losses] has a massive range. Do the Wallies trade frames until one or the other side runs out? If so, ATL LW strength may be no greater than OTL but very few bombs would land in Germany. If the Wallies hunker down to defend England then ATL on-hand strength is much higher.

This is why I'm not focused on ATL LW strength, rather on the attrition picture. The easiest ATL outcome would be furious attrition in which LW never grows, only the W.Allied air forces shrink. That would imply little need for additional LW infrastructure - you're just feeding the meat grinder faster.

A reasonable projection would be in somewhere in between: increased attrition and increased LW on-hand strength. Per Askey's Barbarossa volume IIB, Germany had 33 LW personnel per plane. So if we want to build capacity for 5,000 more on-hand fighters, that'd require 165,000 additional LW personnel. Easily manageable absent an Eastern Front. Does that mean I'm predicting 5,000 on-hand strength? No, it means it's doable. It would also probably suffice to close the skies over Germany to a sustained CBO, so seems a reasonable target. Maybe it's higher though; higher is also doable.
Carl Schwamberger wrote:I probably missed something there but to quote Longstreet: "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it." That is to say was the lack of infrastructure more important than the combat losses?
Exactly my point.
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Re: The Germans increase Panzer production in the Summer of 1940

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 08 Nov 2020 02:19

Richard Anderson wrote:
08 Nov 2020 01:17
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
07 Nov 2020 23:41
The baseline for fuel burn I'm working with is (1) combat sorties and (2) training regime - fuel per pilot trained - times a multiplier.
And your sources/data for those for the Luftwaffe are...?
I'm describing the model not the data. If we knew the historical combat/training proportion, we could project ATL fuel burn based on projecting a multiple of sorties/training. For that projection we don't necessarily need the sorties data but having it would be nice. I remember seeing it somewhere (gotta remember to bookmark).
Richard Anderson wrote:Hvy Btrys/Lt Btrys/S/L Btrys end of year 1943 (Westermann, Sword in the Heavens, pp. 351-351).
Welp. That's a lot less than I expected. Zamansky shows the predominance of mobile Flak in the East, must have confused those. That mobile Flak would stay with the smaller Heer in its Mideast campaigns, where it would cause significantly higher losses to W.Allies than OTL.
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