Richard Anderson wrote:The German leadership made a choice in 1933 that essentially limited the Luftwaffe to 87 octane aviation fuel during the course of the war, which meant when it came to fighting aircraft flying with 100 octane and higher gasoline.
Doesn't appear correct. C-3 fuel (rate 96 octane) was the majority of fuel by the end of the war, per USN technical mission:
http://www.fischer-tropsch.org/primary_ ... %20sources
The relative volumes of production of the two grades cannot be accurately given, but in the last war years the major volume, perhaps two-thirds (2/3) of this total has the C-3 grade.
Germany was also able to use methanol-water injection to replicate the anti-knock effects of 100-octane, as discussed here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1PA70pN6zPM&t=392s
Richard Anderson wrote:The lack of investment in new refinery technologies keeps the German production limited to 87 octane fuel, which limits the performance of the Jagdwaffe.
As regards any limitation to performance, note again that my ATL is based on more Germans performing as did the Germans up to early 1944 or so.
So again, I'm not attempting to, nor interested in, bringing the LW on par with AAF in certain respects. The LW had a ~1:1 attrition ratio in Reich defense; that plus more planes is all I need to make the CBO untenable.
Richard Anderson wrote:Didn't you notice my remark regarding the limited places where high-octane aviation gasoline was produced?
See above. Again, I'm not interested in matching American fuel. And you appear to have an incorrect/incomplete idea of German fuel anyway.
Richard Anderson wrote:Sorry, but the limited production of TEL and the associated alkaloids required for the Pure/Phillips process meant the amount of higher octane fuels produced by Germany were tiny and still inferior to the 100+ octane fuels used by the Allies.
See above. More German fuel, not a switch to American fuel.
Richard Anderson wrote:the suitability of Caucasian and Rumanian crude remains a question-mark.
Agreed. Anybody have info?
I'd also note the oil from "Second Baku" - roughly between Samara and the Urals - would also figure.
Also the oil of Iraq. As I've discussed elsewhere, a high capacity rail line from northern Iraq to the Turkish port of Samsun was missing only a 100-mile link between Mardin and Diyarkabir that the Turks began in 1940 and which the Germans could have completed after taking the MidEast.
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=238638&p=2293504&h ... n#p2293463
For now I'm working on the assumption that a significant quantity of Russian/MidEast oil could produce avgas. If that's wrong, my ATL is significantly more difficult.
Richard Anderson wrote:Time, money, technology, and requirements are the deadly combination for the Germans in this situation. Given that a relatively small concentration of bombing assets wrecked the German synthetic fuel industry in relatively short order in 1944, the Germans are unlikely to ever catch up.
Wrecked by what though? The Wallies couldn't reliably penetrate in daylight until 1944 even against the OTL LW. Against a significantly stronger ATL LW, daylight bombing is out of the question.
"Merely" doubling LW production in '43, plus not Eastern Front, means point targets are largely secure throughout '43. By the time hordes of long-range fighters are available, Germany's well on her way to at least tripling LW production.
The switch of Bergius plants from ~50% to 100% avgas production as a bridge to the refineries coming online would double avgas supply in '43. Add to that whatever is already coming from the Caucasus and can be refined.
Richard Anderson wrote:Since I made no inference to the contrary, I'm unsure why you think that is a point I need to consider?
For the gallery, Richard. Not everyone already knows everything.
Richard Anderson wrote:your plan is to match American aircraft production, which implies being competitive in the air, which is going to require something approaching Allied aviation fuel production.
Well let's be careful about terms here. Match American OTL frame numbers, yes. Match weight of frames? No. Smaller planes burn less fuel.
And again it's not about matching America it's about multiplying German frames at ~1942 training standards. Those German standards burned less fuel than American but were still producing good pilots. America did things inefficiently in WW2 (in terms of manpower and material expended), Germany couldn't afford do at that level (yes bureaucratic inefficiency etc. but parsimonious with fuel).
A B-17 cost ~5x an American fighter yet killed around the same number of German fighters IIRC. So America can probably outmatch German frame numbers even in my ATL but:
- 1. Scrapping strategic bombing means either a permanent siege or invasion with a 15mil-man army, neither of which were politically feasible.
Richard Anderson wrote:To make use of that mass of aircraft implies a massive increase in pilot training, matching that of the US, which again implies that at least the American basic training fuel budget needs to be matched as does the unit training fuel budget.
See above. Again, this works only if you assume that the Germans spend material and manpower as lavishly as America. That's not a valid assumption in WW2, just see division slice.
Why are you avoiding using the OTL LW as a baseline for ATL larger LW? Yes, I see that more fuel is needed per pilot and that German AC will probably fly more sorties per frame. But that's why I say 5-10x more fuel for 3-4x the LW production.
Richard Anderson wrote:Yet again, it all depends on when/how this amorphous "1942 victory" occurs.
I consider this discussion as addressing the necessary conditions for the LW to defeat the CBO.
Consider it a young discussion, I haven't written up an ATL yet because I'm open regarding these questions and have some items on the research agenda yet. As often here, my position can be considered as questioning the inevitability of Allied victory rather than, so far, having a firm outline of how things could have gone differently.